Few issues trigger more passionate sentiments than how to deal with debtors who are not paying their creditors. From almost the dawn of recorded history to the present day, the same conundrum has faced every society: on the one hand, there is a widely shared moral imperative that debtors should pay their just debts; but on the other hand, there is the unfortunate practical reality that many debtors simply cannot do so, with a recognition that keeping them enslaved to their debts is bad not only for the debtors but also, perhaps surprisingly, for their creditors, and, indeed, for the society as a whole.
Canada shares in this common experience. In Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 1867–1919, bankruptcy scholar and historian Thomas G.W. Telfer has produced the foundational study of the nascent and still-enduring resolution of this common conundrum in Canada. Telfer's masterful exegesis takes us from Confederation in 1867, to the enactment of the Insolvent Acts of 1869 and 1875, to repeal of the 1875 Act in 1880, and finally to the passage of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act of 1919, which ushered in the permanent era of federal bankruptcy relief in Canada. As Telfer shows, however, the path to the 1919 Act was anything but easy; for much of that half-century, debtors and creditors alike were left to the vagaries and inefficacy of provincial relief, as interest groups, politicians, and institutions struggled to sort out the most prudential course. In reality, few benefited from federal inaction, and yet, it took scores of years for pragmatic realism to finally trump pious moralism.
The parallels of the Canadian experience to that of the United States in the same era are striking. In the United States also, the much-maligned federal bankruptcy law was repealed (in 1878, just 2 years before repeal in Canada), and for many of the same reasons as in Canada; followed by unsuccessful resort for many years to ineffective state regulation of insolvency; and culminating finally (in 1898) in a practical concession to the commercial needs to have a means for ruined debtors to obtain redemption and for all creditors collectively to share in a fair and equitable distribution of assets, both of which needs could be efficaciously realized only if offered at the federal level. United States economic and political historians could profit from a close reading of Telfer's masterwork.
Telfer divides his work into three chronological and conceptual parts, encompassing the period from 1867 to 1919. Part One, which comprises the longest and in many ways most fascinating part of the book, covers the period 1867–1880, with a rollercoaster-like rise and fall of federal bankruptcy legislation. A federal act was enacted in 1869, just 2 years after Confederation, then replaced in 1875, and then repealed soon thereafter, in 1880. How does one explain such a mercurial history? Part One contains four chapters. The first examines the constitutional and legislative history from 1867 to 1880. The second and third focus, respectively, on the importance of and impact of the rise, fall, and repeal of the federal law on the two core objects of any bankruptcy legislation; namely, equitable distribution of assets among creditors and the discharge of debts for the debtor. The fourth examines the role of institutions and ideas during this erratic period, culminating in repeal. Notable is Telfer's adroit exposition of how disfavored interest groups (such as the farm lobby) pretextually invoked the moral high ground—that debtors should pay their debts—to advance their own self interests. Telfer also shows how the law in action left a bad taste in the mouth of many, and contributed to repeal, exemplified by the unsavory actions of the official assignees in bankruptcy, who often did little more than plunder bankrupt estates for their own gain.
In the second part of the book Telfer focuses on what might be called the “wilderness period”: the time from 1880 to 1903, when any notion of federal bankruptcy relief was at its nadir following the repeal of the 1875 Act in 1880. Telfer divides his study in Part Two into three chapters. In the first, he examines the legislative history of reform efforts from 1880 to 1903, at both the federal and provincial levels, and shows that little political enthusiasm could be garnered for a federal law. The end result of resort to provincial relief in this period, Telfer convincingly shows, is that debtors and creditors alike were profoundly harmed. Even today, whether in the United States or Canada, anyone who advocates for “harsher” laws against bankrupt debtors should have to read Telfer's persuasive exposition of how such a moralistic attitude counterproductively wreaks havoc on the commercial society as a whole. Debtors could not discharge their debts and were left open to the ceaseless collection efforts of creditors; creditors discovered to their dismay that equality in treatment inter se was lost, leaving them to scramble for shards of assets. Many debtors fled Canada entirely, crossing the southern border to the United States. The remaining two chapters in Part Two examine, first, the constitutional question and the impact of federalism, and second, the ongoing debates over the wisdom of a federal bankruptcy law. Interestingly, Telfer shows that both Canadian Boards of Trade as well as foreign (especially English) creditors began lobbying in earnest for a bankruptcy law.
The denouement comes in Part Three, as Telfer explains how reform finally was achieved with passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1919. Multiple forces contributed to the eventual—and apparently enduring—concession that federal bankruptcy relief is a necessity. As the twentieth century dawned, industrialization and urbanization boomed; federal governmental regulation surged; economies grew and became more national and international; and, finally and importantly, attitudes changed. No longer was discharge of an insolvent debtor's debts seen as an unmitigated evil, but rather as an unfortunate but inescapable necessity. Ironically, creditor groups themselves spearheaded the reform movement, as they recognized the economic value of granting mercy to hopelessly insolvent debtors, as well as the equity and fairness in distribution to creditors viewed collectively. Once established in the aftermath of the First World War, federal bankruptcy legislation in Canada has almost certainly become a permanent part of the economic landscape. Telfer's monumental study is the definitive explanation for how that important sea change came to pass.
