Many books have located the source of the distinctive traits of American foreign policy in distinctive traits of America's political culture. This volume, despite its flaws, is the best I have read. Its argument can be divided into three parts.
The first part, consisting of the first four chapters, sets forth a theoretical framework. For John Kane, the root of America's diplomatic problems is to be found in its central national mythology. The country's Founders, sharers in the Enlightenment's faith in liberty and progress, believed that the United States has a distinctive mission to advance the march of progress. The myth, in turn, was essential to American nationhood: It provided the commonality necessary to glue its diverse parts into a whole. But it also spawned political disputes over exactly how to fulfill the providential mission. Should it, on the one hand, passively promote liberty by being an example of the virtuous republic or, on the other hand, should it use its power to spread liberty. It also fed two variants of nationalism. Conservative or parochial nationalists emphasized the promotion of national pride, whereas liberal nationalists emphasized cosmopolitan norms and American conformity with them. No matter which pole one occupied on any of these binaries, one was faced with the dilemma named in the book's title. Effective foreign policy required accommodation with the realities of power. The challenge, therefore, was and is to design a policy that is simultaneously realistic and also virtuous. That “irresolvable tension” (p. 2) has been harmful for American diplomacy, as it has caused an eroded public support for policies that appeared unjust, and for American political development.
The second part provides an interpretive narrative of the history of American foreign policy. Isolationism conceivably could have reconciled power and virtue, but political nonentanglement was rendered moot by economic ties; thus, the dilemma was engaged and continued until World War II was ending. The struggle with the Axis powers provided the basis for reconciliation: American power, applied through multinational institutions, would be used to stop manifest evil and create and preserve a liberal order. The Cold War corrupted that vision, however. Power increasingly came to be used in violation of virtue, culminating in the quagmire of Indochina, with consequent erosion and destruction of the postwar foreign policy consensus. Since Vietnam, efforts to reconstruct the foreign policy consensus have been efforts to reconcile the exercise of power with virtue, and they have failed largely because of their militaristic and unilateral nature.
The third part of the book consists of the last chapter, titled “Epilogue.” In it, the author prescribes the path to reconciliation of power and virtue. He believes that the United States can muster its power in a morally coherent fashion. Further, he holds that the world needs the United States to provide such leadership. The key is that America must be self-constrained by real partnerships with other democratic states, through established international institutions, by conforming to international law and norms, and by emphasizing diplomacy rather than military force, though force is not to be eschewed completely.
The foregoing summary hardly does justice to Between Virtue and Power, which rests on massive research in secondary sources. Its synthesis of well-established ideas, such as American “exceptionalism” and the challenge of post-Vietnam foreign policy dissensus, is innovative and largely persuasive. The scope of its integration of diplomatic history is magisterial, and the historical analysis is rich and subtle. It provides a parsimonious explanation of how normative ideas have affected U.S. foreign policy. Further, it shows how the normative ideas are interpreted and adapted in history in response to external and internal conditions. In Kane's hands, political culture is not a fixed set of unchanging ideas having quite general effects independent of other factors, but is an important element in a dynamic relationship of causal processes. The writing is lucid throughout and, in places, elegant. It also is passionate; Kane cares deeply about his topic and his anger at the conservative political forces that, in his rendering, have hijacked America's virtuous tendencies is palpable, even visceral.
Any work as ambitious as this one will have flaws. Occasionally, the analysis seemed to strain to fit events into the interpretive framework. In a handful of places, claims seem to rest more on bald assertion than on logical demonstration or reference to prior scholarly work. Significant parts of the argument are unpersuasive. For instance, the explanation of the genesis of the Cold War exaggerates the extent to which it resulted from conservative Republicans' use of anticommunism as a tool for rolling back the New Deal. Likewise, the emphasis on moral revulsion as a source of opposition to the war in Vietnam, and the lack of discussion of other reasons for opposition, creates an exaggerated impression of the importance of the loss of virtue. In the treatment of the George W. Bush administration, passion takes over, and the point of the book—the tension between power and virtue—gets lost in a devastating comprehensive critique of the neo-conservative strategy and the war in Iraq.
Despite those disagreements, I consider this to be quite a fine book, and I have no qualms about recommending it to anyone interested in understanding American foreign policy, American political development, or the role of morality in international affairs.
