Case C-60/15P, Saint-Gobain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2017:540
Documents related to environmental policy which form part of an administrative procedure cannot be construed as seriously undermining an ongoing decision-making process in the sense of Regulation 1049/2001, Article 4(3), first subparagraph, when read in conjunction with the second sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006. Consequently, this exception to immediate public disclosure as foreseen by Regulation 1049/2001 does not apply.Footnote
1
I Facts
On 13 July 2017, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) delivered its judgment in an access to documents case brought by a private party (the German glass producer Saint-Gobain) against an EU institution (the Commission) concerning a document of a national government (the Federal Republic of Germany). The judgment’s most important contribution is the clear and unambiguous way in which it draws limits to the application of the exception protecting the institution’s ongoing decision-making process; beyond that, it predominantly throws up new questions that remain unanswered.
The requested document was submitted to the Commission as part of an administrative procedure. It concerned provisional estimates of free emission allowances of German industries coming under the EU emissions trading system, which were later to be used in a decision-making process in which emission allowances would be finalised. In line with the special status of Member States under the access to documents act (Regulation 1049/2001, Article 4(5)), the Commission consulted the German government concerning the possibility of disclosure. The German government held that access to the document should be refused, as disclosure would seriously undermine the decision-making process of the Commission because the administrative procedure was still ongoing (Article 4(3), first subparagraph). Article 4(3), known as the “space to think clause”, protects “the institution’s decision-making process” from disclosure that would seriously undermine it, unless an overriding public interest exists. The Commission assessed that Germany’s grounds for application of the exception were prima facie relevant. It thus provided partial access to information that was considered non-essential or that had already been made public by the German authorities and refused access to the rest based on the first subparagraph of Article 4(3).
It is important to note that it was a clear and uncontested fact that the document, pertaining to emission data, made up “environmental information” in the sense of Regulation 1367/2006 on access to environmental information (better known as the Aarhus Regulation). The second sentence of Article 6(1) of this Regulation holds that:
“… the grounds for refusal [in Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001] shall be interpreted in a restrictive way, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure and whether the information requested relates to emissions into the environment”.
Saint-Gobain relied on this provision to argue against the Commission’s reliance on the “space to think clause”. The General Court (GC) nevertheless ruled in favour of the Commission. It based its decision on the argument that the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) must not be interpreted to apply merely to decision-making documents stricto sensu, but may also apply to information that forms the basis of decision-making processes. As a result of this interpretation, documents drawn up in the course of an administrative procedure may also come under the Article 4(3) exception. The GC furthermore held that the Commission had tacitly taken the public interest in disclosure sufficiently into account by foreseeing the document’s disclosure after the completion of the administrative procedure.Footnote
2
Saint-Gobain subsequently appealed the judgment.
II The Opinion of the Advocate General and the judgment of the Court of Justice
The appeal of Saint-Gobain focuses on two separate pleas in law. First, it argues that the GC provided an incorrect interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) Regulation 1049/2001 (protecting the “space to think”), when read in conjunction with the second sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006 (reinforcing the right of access to environmental information). The ground of appeal is further divided in two parts. The applicant first argues that the GC interpreted the aforementioned provisions too extensively, and second, that it failed to confirm the existence of an overriding public interest justifying disclosure of the environmental information requested. In the second ground of appeal, the applicant argued misapplication of Article 4(5) of Regulation 1049/2001, which concerns the right of a Member State to request the institution not to disclose a document originating from the Member State without its prior agreement. Neither the Advocate General nor the CJEU considered it necessary to examine the second plea.
The opinion of Advocate General Szpunar focuses on the concept of decision-making process in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) in Regulation 1049/2001 together with the obligations for strict interpretation stemming from Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006. The Advocate General finds that the GC interpreted “the space to think” exception too broadly infringing the principle of restrictive interpretation in Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006.Footnote
3
The CJEU essentially examines three different considerations of the GC: (1) the scope of the concept of decision-making process, in particular whether it may be made to encompass the concept of administrative procedure; (2) the relevance of the fact that the documents contained environmental information; and (3) the foreseen repercussions on the decision-making process resulting from disclosure of the information.
With regard to the concept of decision-making process, the CJEU notes that the GC confused the concepts of “decision-making process” and “administrative procedure”, thereby expanding the scope of the exception protecting ongoing decision-making processes up to a point that would allow the institutions to refuse access to any document, including documents containing environmental information, “in so far as that document directly relates to matters dealt with as part of an administrative procedure pending before that institution”. The Court specifically states that the concept of decision-making process “must be construed as relating to decision-making, without covering the entire administrative procedure which led to the decision”.Footnote
4
With reference to the purpose of Regulation 1367/2006 and the Aarhus Convention underlying it, it finds the requirement of a strict interpretation of the exception protecting ongoing decision-making processes to be all the more compelling where documents contain environmental information.Footnote
5
Indeed, when Regulation 1367/2006, Article 6(1) is read in conjunction with Article 4(4)(a) of the Aarhus Convention, the “space to think clause” remains clearly limited to the decision-making process without including the administrative procedure leading up to it.Footnote
6
This makes it necessary to consider, in a restrictive manner, the possible repercussions resulting from disclosure to the decision-making process to which it is connected, which makes up the final point addressed by the CJEU. In this regard, the Court notes that at the stage of the administrative process, a mere suggestion or possibility of negative repercussions does not in itself constitute proof of serious harm to the decision-making procedure.Footnote
7
To emphasise this point, the Court notes that under the sectoral rules governing the administrative procedure in question the Commission is under no obligation to examine or respond to public reactions that could result from the disclosure of such documents. Thus, the CJEU holds that disclosure of the documents cannot jeopardise compliance with time limits in the administrative procedure.
Based on these considerations, the CJEU sets the judgment of the GC aside and delivers a final decision annulling the Commission decision. The Commission is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the applicant in both stages of the proceedings.
III Comment
The CJEU’s judgment in Saint-Gobain contains interesting aspects related to various subthemes of the EU access to documents case law. Three of them are here considered more closely: the fact that the request concerned (1) a Member State document; and (2) environmental information; and (3) the Court’s determination of a document’s role in the EU’s policy cycle.
First, Saint-Gobain falls into a longer line of cases related to requests for Member State documents held by the Commission.Footnote
8
The CJEU in its judgment does not discuss this circumstance.Footnote
9
The fact that the CJEU finds it unnecessary to examine the plea is interesting. The CJEU merely considers the Commission’s objection to disclosure, implying the arguments provided by Germany are by themselves immaterial to the case at hand. The German government is thus viewed, as it were, as an extension of the EU administrative sphere in which a single set of administrative principles apply.Footnote
10
Article 4(5) creates a privileged status for Member States by giving them the right to request the institution not to disclose documents originating from them “without [their] prior agreement”. This provision dates back to the adoption of Regulation 1049/2001 and abolishes the so-called “authorship rule”, which precluded a right of access to documents that were not drawn up by the institution in question, but only held by it.Footnote
11
However the Article’s wording, containing both a suggestion of discretion (“request”) and of obligation (“without its agreement”) on the side of the handling institution, was so ambiguous that it “seemed destined to pose interpretative challenges for the Court”.Footnote
12
The matter was thereafter clarified in a number of cases. In the IFAW saga, the CJEU ruled that a Member State does not enjoy “‘boundless’ discretion” to prevent disclosure of its documents submitted to EU institutions.Footnote
13
Subsequent case law confirmed the Commission’s final word in determining whether any refusal grounds provided by a Member State were prima facie legally well-founded.Footnote
14
Connecting to this strand of case law, the current judgment goes a step further by reaffirming tacitly that a Member State’s objection to the disclosure of a document is not decisive. The Advocate General’s opinion in this sense prepares the ground for such an approach. He finds that, as the objection by Germany is made on grounds of the protection of the Commission’s decision-making process, it does not constitute a genuinely autonomous ground for refusal, which could justify upholding the contested decision.Footnote
15
By deciding not to examine the plea, the CJEU implicitly follows the Advocate General’s logic.
A second aspect of the judgment is the relationship between the general rules on access to documents in Regulation 1049/2001 and the specific rules on access to environmental information in Regulation 1367/2006 implementing the Aarhus Convention. So far a reliance on Regulation 1367/2006 has not proven to be particularly useful for applicants in the EU Courts,Footnote
16
and its Article 6(1) has not materialised in a clear obligation on the institutions’ side to grant wider access to environmental information.Footnote
17
Some recent indications, however, suggest a growing significance of Regulation 1367/2006.Footnote
18
The Court continues this trend in the judgment under consideration, albeit guardedly. By underlining the particular value of transparency of environmental information, it includes the Aarhus Convention and Regulation 1367/2006 in the reasoning that leads it to set aside the Commission’s access refusal.
Yet the role that the Court accords Regulation 1367/2006 remains rather cursory. It alludes to the legislation in general terms, without examining thoroughly the wording of Article 6(1) and the influence of its obligation of strict interpretation of the exceptions. Significantly, the Court’s reference to the Aarhus rules comes in the context of the “space to think” clause contained in Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001, and not in the context of a potential wider duty emerging out of Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006. Thus, the judgment does not clarify the relationship between the dual obligations of strict interpretation stemming from both regulations. Again, the Court largely follows the argumentation of the Advocate General in this respect.Footnote
19
However, whereas the Court’s judgment hinges more on the concept of decision-making process contained in Regulation 1049/2001 in a self-standing manner, the Advocate General in his Opinion explicitly derives his recommendation to set aside the judgment from an infringement of the obligation of strict interpretation stemming from Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006.Footnote
20
Another indication of the emerging relevance of the Aarhus rules, in particular Article 4(4)(a) of the Aarhus Convention, is visible in the argumentation of both the Advocate General and the CJEU. In the analysis regarding the concept of decision-making, both refer to Article 4(4)(a) of the Aarhus Convention as an argument reinforcing the restrictive interpretation of the concept of decision-making process. The CJEU finds that
“Article 4(4)(a) of the Aarhus Convention provides that a request for environmental information may be refused where disclosure of that information would adversely affect the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, […] and not the entire administrative procedure at the end of which those authorities hold their proceedings”.Footnote
21
This brings us to the third aspect of the case. The Court makes it clear that all information relating to decision-making process cannot be construed as coming under the exception protecting a decision-making process. The Court establishes that administration, which in essence arranges the preparatory work of decision making, produces a discrete category of documents in a separate stage of the policy cycle, rather than “decision-making documents” that form an integral component of the decision-making process.Footnote
22
Next, in line with established case law, the Court finds that, separate from the question to which policy stage the document belongs, the risk of harm to the uncompleted decision-making process must be plausibly argued, rather than merely alluded to.Footnote
23
In this sense, it seems somewhat curious that the Court should engage with the Commission’s argument of potential delay deriving from its duty to respond to potential public inputs.Footnote
24
After all, apart from the factual flaw in this argument (seeing that such a duty does not exist), it essentially seeks to prove harm to the administrative procedure, rather than the decision-making process. The link to Article 4(3) remains at best tenuous: can delay or disruption caused in other parts of the policy cycle be construed to constitute harm to the decision-making process itself?
This throws up the related question whether a systematic perspective can be derived from the Court’s definition of documents’ role in the EU policy cycle that other types of documents, whether administrative or decisional in nature, might align with. As the CJEU clarified, documents produced as part of an administrative procedure cannot be considered decision-making documents stricto sensu. In reality, administrative documents break down in various categories, for which it seems plausible that transparency “can and should take different forms”.Footnote
25
It furthermore appears logical that harm becomes harder to establish as the document is further removed from the decision-making process in the policy cycle. At the same time, the Court makes it clear that administrative documents are certainly not exempt from the access to documents rules.Footnote
26
The case law of the GC and CJEU reveals a delicate and complex balancing act in this regard. The gulf in the extent of Court review in different administrative procedures is clearly apparent when the (generous) interpretation of access to documents in the current case is compared to categories of administrative documents in which the courts found a “general presumption” to exist against disclosure while procedures are ongoing.Footnote
27
It may also lead to apparently contradictory tendencies in the case law. An interesting related case in this regard is ClientEarth v Commission, in which the GC crossed straight through traditional dividing lines of (increased) transparency by finding that a general presumption existed against disclosure of impact assessments carried out by the Commission, even where these come under the Aarhus rules and possibly even the legislative procedure. Responding to the argument of a public right to information in order to be able to participate in the democratic process, the GC put the cart before the horse by arguing that the imperative of confidentiality meant that citizens should use other moments and avenues to participate.Footnote
28
The courts’ degree of leniency clearly matters, as the finding of a general presumption reverses the burden of proof to the applicant’s side.
In conclusion, it remains very difficult to establish a consistent pattern or doctrine related to (non-) disclosure of administrative documents. Whereas administrative procedures are inherently strongly differentiated and therefore difficult to compare, the Courts also seem to struggle to develop a consistent line in the matter. The current case, while widening environmental information disclosure, does little to clarify this situation. However, the judgment, at least in the context of environmental information, sets a clear limitation to the use of the exception concerning an ongoing decision-making. The result might not be path-breaking, but forms an important reminder of the principle of restrictive interpretation of the exceptions.
Case C-60/15P, Saint-Gobain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2017:540
Documents related to environmental policy which form part of an administrative procedure cannot be construed as seriously undermining an ongoing decision-making process in the sense of Regulation 1049/2001, Article 4(3), first subparagraph, when read in conjunction with the second sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006. Consequently, this exception to immediate public disclosure as foreseen by Regulation 1049/2001 does not apply.Footnote 1
I Facts
On 13 July 2017, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) delivered its judgment in an access to documents case brought by a private party (the German glass producer Saint-Gobain) against an EU institution (the Commission) concerning a document of a national government (the Federal Republic of Germany). The judgment’s most important contribution is the clear and unambiguous way in which it draws limits to the application of the exception protecting the institution’s ongoing decision-making process; beyond that, it predominantly throws up new questions that remain unanswered.
The requested document was submitted to the Commission as part of an administrative procedure. It concerned provisional estimates of free emission allowances of German industries coming under the EU emissions trading system, which were later to be used in a decision-making process in which emission allowances would be finalised. In line with the special status of Member States under the access to documents act (Regulation 1049/2001, Article 4(5)), the Commission consulted the German government concerning the possibility of disclosure. The German government held that access to the document should be refused, as disclosure would seriously undermine the decision-making process of the Commission because the administrative procedure was still ongoing (Article 4(3), first subparagraph). Article 4(3), known as the “space to think clause”, protects “the institution’s decision-making process” from disclosure that would seriously undermine it, unless an overriding public interest exists. The Commission assessed that Germany’s grounds for application of the exception were prima facie relevant. It thus provided partial access to information that was considered non-essential or that had already been made public by the German authorities and refused access to the rest based on the first subparagraph of Article 4(3).
It is important to note that it was a clear and uncontested fact that the document, pertaining to emission data, made up “environmental information” in the sense of Regulation 1367/2006 on access to environmental information (better known as the Aarhus Regulation). The second sentence of Article 6(1) of this Regulation holds that:
“… the grounds for refusal [in Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001] shall be interpreted in a restrictive way, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure and whether the information requested relates to emissions into the environment”.
Saint-Gobain relied on this provision to argue against the Commission’s reliance on the “space to think clause”. The General Court (GC) nevertheless ruled in favour of the Commission. It based its decision on the argument that the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) must not be interpreted to apply merely to decision-making documents stricto sensu, but may also apply to information that forms the basis of decision-making processes. As a result of this interpretation, documents drawn up in the course of an administrative procedure may also come under the Article 4(3) exception. The GC furthermore held that the Commission had tacitly taken the public interest in disclosure sufficiently into account by foreseeing the document’s disclosure after the completion of the administrative procedure.Footnote 2 Saint-Gobain subsequently appealed the judgment.
II The Opinion of the Advocate General and the judgment of the Court of Justice
The appeal of Saint-Gobain focuses on two separate pleas in law. First, it argues that the GC provided an incorrect interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) Regulation 1049/2001 (protecting the “space to think”), when read in conjunction with the second sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006 (reinforcing the right of access to environmental information). The ground of appeal is further divided in two parts. The applicant first argues that the GC interpreted the aforementioned provisions too extensively, and second, that it failed to confirm the existence of an overriding public interest justifying disclosure of the environmental information requested. In the second ground of appeal, the applicant argued misapplication of Article 4(5) of Regulation 1049/2001, which concerns the right of a Member State to request the institution not to disclose a document originating from the Member State without its prior agreement. Neither the Advocate General nor the CJEU considered it necessary to examine the second plea.
The opinion of Advocate General Szpunar focuses on the concept of decision-making process in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) in Regulation 1049/2001 together with the obligations for strict interpretation stemming from Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006. The Advocate General finds that the GC interpreted “the space to think” exception too broadly infringing the principle of restrictive interpretation in Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006.Footnote 3
The CJEU essentially examines three different considerations of the GC: (1) the scope of the concept of decision-making process, in particular whether it may be made to encompass the concept of administrative procedure; (2) the relevance of the fact that the documents contained environmental information; and (3) the foreseen repercussions on the decision-making process resulting from disclosure of the information.
With regard to the concept of decision-making process, the CJEU notes that the GC confused the concepts of “decision-making process” and “administrative procedure”, thereby expanding the scope of the exception protecting ongoing decision-making processes up to a point that would allow the institutions to refuse access to any document, including documents containing environmental information, “in so far as that document directly relates to matters dealt with as part of an administrative procedure pending before that institution”. The Court specifically states that the concept of decision-making process “must be construed as relating to decision-making, without covering the entire administrative procedure which led to the decision”.Footnote 4 With reference to the purpose of Regulation 1367/2006 and the Aarhus Convention underlying it, it finds the requirement of a strict interpretation of the exception protecting ongoing decision-making processes to be all the more compelling where documents contain environmental information.Footnote 5 Indeed, when Regulation 1367/2006, Article 6(1) is read in conjunction with Article 4(4)(a) of the Aarhus Convention, the “space to think clause” remains clearly limited to the decision-making process without including the administrative procedure leading up to it.Footnote 6
This makes it necessary to consider, in a restrictive manner, the possible repercussions resulting from disclosure to the decision-making process to which it is connected, which makes up the final point addressed by the CJEU. In this regard, the Court notes that at the stage of the administrative process, a mere suggestion or possibility of negative repercussions does not in itself constitute proof of serious harm to the decision-making procedure.Footnote 7 To emphasise this point, the Court notes that under the sectoral rules governing the administrative procedure in question the Commission is under no obligation to examine or respond to public reactions that could result from the disclosure of such documents. Thus, the CJEU holds that disclosure of the documents cannot jeopardise compliance with time limits in the administrative procedure.
Based on these considerations, the CJEU sets the judgment of the GC aside and delivers a final decision annulling the Commission decision. The Commission is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the applicant in both stages of the proceedings.
III Comment
The CJEU’s judgment in Saint-Gobain contains interesting aspects related to various subthemes of the EU access to documents case law. Three of them are here considered more closely: the fact that the request concerned (1) a Member State document; and (2) environmental information; and (3) the Court’s determination of a document’s role in the EU’s policy cycle.
First, Saint-Gobain falls into a longer line of cases related to requests for Member State documents held by the Commission.Footnote 8 The CJEU in its judgment does not discuss this circumstance.Footnote 9 The fact that the CJEU finds it unnecessary to examine the plea is interesting. The CJEU merely considers the Commission’s objection to disclosure, implying the arguments provided by Germany are by themselves immaterial to the case at hand. The German government is thus viewed, as it were, as an extension of the EU administrative sphere in which a single set of administrative principles apply.Footnote 10
Article 4(5) creates a privileged status for Member States by giving them the right to request the institution not to disclose documents originating from them “without [their] prior agreement”. This provision dates back to the adoption of Regulation 1049/2001 and abolishes the so-called “authorship rule”, which precluded a right of access to documents that were not drawn up by the institution in question, but only held by it.Footnote 11 However the Article’s wording, containing both a suggestion of discretion (“request”) and of obligation (“without its agreement”) on the side of the handling institution, was so ambiguous that it “seemed destined to pose interpretative challenges for the Court”.Footnote 12 The matter was thereafter clarified in a number of cases. In the IFAW saga, the CJEU ruled that a Member State does not enjoy “‘boundless’ discretion” to prevent disclosure of its documents submitted to EU institutions.Footnote 13 Subsequent case law confirmed the Commission’s final word in determining whether any refusal grounds provided by a Member State were prima facie legally well-founded.Footnote 14 Connecting to this strand of case law, the current judgment goes a step further by reaffirming tacitly that a Member State’s objection to the disclosure of a document is not decisive. The Advocate General’s opinion in this sense prepares the ground for such an approach. He finds that, as the objection by Germany is made on grounds of the protection of the Commission’s decision-making process, it does not constitute a genuinely autonomous ground for refusal, which could justify upholding the contested decision.Footnote 15 By deciding not to examine the plea, the CJEU implicitly follows the Advocate General’s logic.
A second aspect of the judgment is the relationship between the general rules on access to documents in Regulation 1049/2001 and the specific rules on access to environmental information in Regulation 1367/2006 implementing the Aarhus Convention. So far a reliance on Regulation 1367/2006 has not proven to be particularly useful for applicants in the EU Courts,Footnote 16 and its Article 6(1) has not materialised in a clear obligation on the institutions’ side to grant wider access to environmental information.Footnote 17 Some recent indications, however, suggest a growing significance of Regulation 1367/2006.Footnote 18 The Court continues this trend in the judgment under consideration, albeit guardedly. By underlining the particular value of transparency of environmental information, it includes the Aarhus Convention and Regulation 1367/2006 in the reasoning that leads it to set aside the Commission’s access refusal.
Yet the role that the Court accords Regulation 1367/2006 remains rather cursory. It alludes to the legislation in general terms, without examining thoroughly the wording of Article 6(1) and the influence of its obligation of strict interpretation of the exceptions. Significantly, the Court’s reference to the Aarhus rules comes in the context of the “space to think” clause contained in Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001, and not in the context of a potential wider duty emerging out of Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006. Thus, the judgment does not clarify the relationship between the dual obligations of strict interpretation stemming from both regulations. Again, the Court largely follows the argumentation of the Advocate General in this respect.Footnote 19 However, whereas the Court’s judgment hinges more on the concept of decision-making process contained in Regulation 1049/2001 in a self-standing manner, the Advocate General in his Opinion explicitly derives his recommendation to set aside the judgment from an infringement of the obligation of strict interpretation stemming from Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006.Footnote 20
Another indication of the emerging relevance of the Aarhus rules, in particular Article 4(4)(a) of the Aarhus Convention, is visible in the argumentation of both the Advocate General and the CJEU. In the analysis regarding the concept of decision-making, both refer to Article 4(4)(a) of the Aarhus Convention as an argument reinforcing the restrictive interpretation of the concept of decision-making process. The CJEU finds that
“Article 4(4)(a) of the Aarhus Convention provides that a request for environmental information may be refused where disclosure of that information would adversely affect the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, […] and not the entire administrative procedure at the end of which those authorities hold their proceedings”.Footnote 21
This brings us to the third aspect of the case. The Court makes it clear that all information relating to decision-making process cannot be construed as coming under the exception protecting a decision-making process. The Court establishes that administration, which in essence arranges the preparatory work of decision making, produces a discrete category of documents in a separate stage of the policy cycle, rather than “decision-making documents” that form an integral component of the decision-making process.Footnote 22
Next, in line with established case law, the Court finds that, separate from the question to which policy stage the document belongs, the risk of harm to the uncompleted decision-making process must be plausibly argued, rather than merely alluded to.Footnote 23 In this sense, it seems somewhat curious that the Court should engage with the Commission’s argument of potential delay deriving from its duty to respond to potential public inputs.Footnote 24 After all, apart from the factual flaw in this argument (seeing that such a duty does not exist), it essentially seeks to prove harm to the administrative procedure, rather than the decision-making process. The link to Article 4(3) remains at best tenuous: can delay or disruption caused in other parts of the policy cycle be construed to constitute harm to the decision-making process itself?
This throws up the related question whether a systematic perspective can be derived from the Court’s definition of documents’ role in the EU policy cycle that other types of documents, whether administrative or decisional in nature, might align with. As the CJEU clarified, documents produced as part of an administrative procedure cannot be considered decision-making documents stricto sensu. In reality, administrative documents break down in various categories, for which it seems plausible that transparency “can and should take different forms”.Footnote 25 It furthermore appears logical that harm becomes harder to establish as the document is further removed from the decision-making process in the policy cycle. At the same time, the Court makes it clear that administrative documents are certainly not exempt from the access to documents rules.Footnote 26 The case law of the GC and CJEU reveals a delicate and complex balancing act in this regard. The gulf in the extent of Court review in different administrative procedures is clearly apparent when the (generous) interpretation of access to documents in the current case is compared to categories of administrative documents in which the courts found a “general presumption” to exist against disclosure while procedures are ongoing.Footnote 27 It may also lead to apparently contradictory tendencies in the case law. An interesting related case in this regard is ClientEarth v Commission, in which the GC crossed straight through traditional dividing lines of (increased) transparency by finding that a general presumption existed against disclosure of impact assessments carried out by the Commission, even where these come under the Aarhus rules and possibly even the legislative procedure. Responding to the argument of a public right to information in order to be able to participate in the democratic process, the GC put the cart before the horse by arguing that the imperative of confidentiality meant that citizens should use other moments and avenues to participate.Footnote 28 The courts’ degree of leniency clearly matters, as the finding of a general presumption reverses the burden of proof to the applicant’s side.
In conclusion, it remains very difficult to establish a consistent pattern or doctrine related to (non-) disclosure of administrative documents. Whereas administrative procedures are inherently strongly differentiated and therefore difficult to compare, the Courts also seem to struggle to develop a consistent line in the matter. The current case, while widening environmental information disclosure, does little to clarify this situation. However, the judgment, at least in the context of environmental information, sets a clear limitation to the use of the exception concerning an ongoing decision-making. The result might not be path-breaking, but forms an important reminder of the principle of restrictive interpretation of the exceptions.