In the United States, a change of president involves an elaborate and prolonged process that is controlled by partisans and results in thousands of offices changing hands. In Britain, a change of government is swift and unceremonious: In 1997, moving vans arrived to remove the personal effects of the defeated prime minister from Number 10 Downing Street less than twenty-four hours after the election. The changeover of personnel, however, is limited to ministerial offices and ministers' political staff, and the mechanics of the transition are handled by career civil servants. In Ontario, as in the Canadian federal government in Ottawa, transitions are somewhat slower and more politicized than in Britain, although there is no turnover of unelected officials comparable to that which occurs in Washington following a change of president or in most states following a change of governor.

The broad theme of this study is that transitions can be done well or badly, and how they are done has a major effect on an incoming government's performance—specifically, its ability to carry out its agenda. It would have been helpful if, at the outset, the authors had more clearly identified and ranked their criteria for evaluating transitions. Instead, it gradually becomes clear from their analyses of three transitions (1985, 1990, and 1995)—the first characterized as a modest success, the second as an abject failure, and the third as a brilliant triumph—that they attach primary importance to the quality of the working relationship established during a transition between politicians and senior public servants, since a transition “centrally involves taking control of the public service” (p. 151). In order to achieve a productive working relationship, they conclude, it is essential for opposition political parties with a chance of winning power to engage in thorough, systematic, preelection transition planning, and incumbent governments must authorize preelection planning exercises by the bureaucracy so that it, too, will be properly prepared if the election results in a change of government.

In assessing transitions, the authors rely heavily on material gathered through unstructured interviews (presumably, since the questions asked are not revealed). These were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Among the principal subjects were nineteen civil servants (ten deputy ministers and nine others of an unspecified lesser seniority) and thirteen members of the two opposition parties' transition teams (eight PC and five Liberals). Only three politicians gave on-the-record interviews: two minor PC ministers and the former leader of the Liberal party, Lyn McLeod, who resigned following her party's electoral defeat. It is not reported how many potential respondents were approached but declined to be interviewed. The lack of any explicit attention to methods is a serious weakness in a study of this kind. Nevertheless, the authors' key findings are amply supported by insightful (if also anonymous) quotations that only could have come from well-informed insiders.

In sum, they find that Ontario's NDP government of 1990–95 was handicapped from the outset by a disastrous transition, whereas the PC government that took power in 1995 benefited from an outstandingly well-executed transition. One of the most appealing features of the book is the detailed, incisive, and eminently readable account of these events.

The failed transition of 1990 is clearly explained and appears in retrospect to have been virtually inevitable. The NDP never expected to win the election and did no serious transition planning; it was confused over its goals and priorities; and some of the newly appointed NDP ministers and political staff were left-wing ideologues who were deeply mistrustful of what they saw as the inherent conservatism of the public service. When the premier appointed his notoriously partisan chief political advisor to the post of Cabinet Secretary (the head of the Ontario public service) and parachuted a number of other partisans into the higher echelons of administration, career bureaucrats understandably interpreted these moves as signals that the NDP was intent upon politicizing the public service. In one of the most interesting sections of the book, “Politicizing the Bureaucracy” (pp. 44–9), the authors come to the surprising verdict that the bureaucrats' case against the NDP is not proven. Nevertheless, as their study demonstrates, the antagonistic atmosphere during the transition had a lasting and ultimately debilitating effect.

The 1995 transition, which is the main focus of the study, is dealt with in an equally illuminating and readable fashion. It is also an original contribution to scholarship in the field. The authors show how the PC, from the very beginning, approached the election with “a governing mindset.” Transition planning was given a high priority by the party leader, Mike Harris, who as early as January 1994 put in place the core members of a capable and experienced team of transition advisors. Consequently, when the PC won an upset victory it came to power ready to govern. It helped that the party also had an unambiguous right-wing agenda that it was determined to push through, and that Harris took immediate steps to placate the bureaucracy. As the authors state, the PC transition team “viewed the incoming government's relationship with the public service as the most important element in taking power effectively, and it sought and received a good deal of advice from former public servants who knew the system and the senior players well” (p. 85).

The authors also give due credit to the Cabinet Secretary, whose appointment by the NDP had provoked outraged cries of “patronage” and “politicization.” It is an ironic ending to the story (and to his career as a bureaucrat, since he was fired by the Conservatives immediately after the election) that he contributed greatly to the success of the PC takeover by doing a thoroughly professional, nonpartisan job of preparing the bureaucracy for a transition.

A concluding section, “Practical Lessons and Recommendations” (pp. 153–9), neatly sums up the authors' advice on transition planning. It is so wise and plainly stated that their book will almost certainly become essential reading for future transition teams in Canada, and it merits attention in other parliamentary democracies as well.

The book's obscure title is not explained until page 102. It derives from an arch joke by an unnamed PC transition planner. Upon entering the deserted Cabinet office the day after the election, he recalls, he had the eerie sense that bureaucrats were watching him from behind the potted plams. “I felt,” he said, “like the first Viet Cong soldier cycling into Saigon after the Americans had left.”