Musk-ox conservation and sovereignty concerns

The diplomatic correspondence between Canada and Denmark was initiated in July 1919. Stefansson, having returned from his five-year Canadian Arctic expedition in 1918, was vigorously promoting a musk-ox and reindeer industry in the north. At this time, Stefansson enjoyed the strong support of the prime minister, Sir Robert Borden, and he had every reason to be optimistic about the success of his plans for northern development. In May 1919 Stefansson received a letter from American whaling captain George Comer, who informed him that in 1916–1917 the Inughuit of Thule had brought back about 150 musk-ox skins from Ellesmere Island. ‘This they never used to do but now . . . they no doubt will continue . . . until the Musk ox will become scarce’ Comer wrote (Comer Reference Comer1919). Ellesmere Island was considered the best source of musk-oxen for domestication. Stefansson therefore passed the letter to J. B. Harkin.

Harkin, who was to be one of the key actors in the Arctic drama of the next few years, was a man of great self-confidence, but he had limited knowledge of the north. He was quick to adopt ideas and immensely tenacious in holding them. His qualifications for dealing with foreign policy matters were virtually non-existent. Born in 1875 in rural eastern Ontario, Harkin became a journalist at the age of seventeen. After nine years as a newspaperman, in 1901 he became private secretary to the minister of the interior, Clifford Sifton. He continued in this post under Sifton's successor, Frank Oliver, and in 1911 he was named Commissioner of Dominion Parks. By Harkin's own account, when Oliver offered him the parks job, his first impulse was to refuse, since he ‘knew nothing about the parks or what would be expected of me.’ Oliver countered this argument by pointing out that Harkin would not ‘be hampered by preconceived ideas and you can find out’ (Harkin Reference Harkin1957: 5). After eight years as parks commissioner, Harkin had evidently come to believe that Oliver was right, and that he was more than equal to any challenge.

In one of his areas of official responsibility, however, Harkin had not as yet been as successful as he would have liked. In 1917 the government passed the Northwest Game Act, which forbade the killing of musk-oxen, buffalo, elk, white pelicans, swans, and eider ducks (with the proviso that aboriginal hunters could kill musk-oxen for food when in extreme need). It was not considered worthwhile to establish government administration in the Northwest Territories until late 1920, following the discovery of oil at Norman Wells. The responsibility for enforcing the new Act in the NWT was therefore initially given to Harkin and the Dominion Parks branch (Zaslow Reference Zaslow1971: 243). Harkin had no possible way of doing this except to work through the Royal North West Mounted Police (RNWMP), which operated only in certain parts of Canada's north, and in any case was usually preoccupied with other tasks. The failure to carry out the job assigned to him must have weighed heavily on Harkin's mind. Now here was proof that enforcement of the Game Act was required in even the remotest areas of the Arctic, and that failure to take action might result in the depletion of an economically important national resource.

Harkin responded to Comer's information with a memorandum to the deputy minister of the interior, W.W. Cory, recommending that a copy of the Northwest Game Act should be sent to the Danish government. In a second memorandum, he added the suggestion that in order to ensure the Canadian regulations were observed, the Danes should permit Canadian game officers to be stationed in Greenland (Harkin Reference Harkin1919). Both recommendations were approved without comment by Cory. Harkin also suggested that a Mounted Police post should be established on Ellesmere, but he was promptly informed that this would involve too much expense. The comptroller of the RNWMP, A. A. McLean, did offer the assurance that the police at Herschel Island and Fullerton Harbour would strictly enforce the Northwest Game Act (McLean Reference McLean1919), but since the two posts were far removed from Ellesmere, this was of little help.

Neither Harkin nor Cory seems to have realised that there was no Danish administration in northern Greenland. In 1905, the northernmost limit of Danish colonisation had been extended from 73° N to 74.5° N. A large portion of the island lay beyond this boundary (Rasmussen's trading station was located between 76 and 77° N). The Danes were, however, working diligently to obtain international recognition of their sovereignty over the entire island. They were apparently anxious to ensure that their claim would not be contested by any of the great powers before they ventured on official action north of the 1905 boundary. The history of British exploration and whaling in the area made a British territorial claim possible, though none had ever been put forward. In 1916, the United States had formally renounced any claim it might have to the northern areas explored by the Americans Elisha Kent Kane, Charles Hall, Adolphus Greely, and Robert Peary in favour of Denmark (United States, Department of State 1940, 1971), but Britain did not recognise Danish sovereignty over all of Greenland until September 1920. In the meantime, the suggestion that Canadian officials should enforce Canadian game laws in northern Greenland was virtually certain to arouse serious concerns in Copenhagen, but of this Harkin and Cory were entirely oblivious.

Nor did Sir Joseph Pope, the under-secretary of state for external affairs, to whom Harkin's recommendations were duly forwarded by Cory, realise the untoward nature of the request. Harkin's recommendation was passed on to the governor general, the Duke of Devonshire, and on 31 July a letter was written from Devonshire to Lord Milner, the colonial secretary, in London. Milner's policy was not to interfere in the concerns of the self-governing dominions (Wigley Reference Wigley1977: Ch. 4). On 23 August the Colonial Office informed the Foreign Office of the matter without making any comment on it. The Foreign Office in turn addressed a diplomatic note to the Danish minister, Henrik Grevenkop-Castenskiold. The note, signed by the foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, asked that ‘the Authorities in Greenland should advise the Eskimos regarding the provisions of the Canadian North-West Game Act,’ and added, ‘in order to facilitate this the Government of Canada offers to station such officers in Greenland as may be necessary’ (Curzon Reference Curzon1919). Grevenkop-Castenskiold replied the next day that he had ‘not failed at once to submit’ the note to his government (Grevenkop-Castenskiold Reference Grevenkop-Castenskiold1919).

The Danes did not answer the British note until 12 April 1920, and an additional month passed before the reply was received in Ottawa. In the interval, testimony by Comer and the American explorer Donald MacMillan before the Royal Commission on Musk-oxen and Reindeer (of which Harkin and Stefansson were both members) reinforced the impression that Inughuit hunting might result in the extermination of the musk-ox on Ellesmere Island. Discouraged by the slow pace of the Royal Commission, Stefansson resigned in early March 1920, and shortly afterwards he left for London, where he discussed his plans for reindeer grazing on Baffin Island with officials of the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC). In London, he heard rumours that Rasmussen's trading station at Thule was doing a lively business in musk-ox hides from Ellesmere. Stefansson wrote to Rasmussen in order to inform him about the Canadian regulations. He also wrote to Harkin to let him know of Rasmussen's activities, but he emphasised that, although Rasmussen had traded in Canadian musk-ox hides, he had probably done this in simple ignorance of the law. Harkin responded with indignation, and fired off another memo to Cory. He had mistakenly received the impression that Rasmussen was a Norwegian, and asked that the ‘poaching’ be brought to the attention of the Norwegian government (Harkin Reference Harkin1920a, Reference Harkin1920b).

The influence of Stefansson

Harkin's mistake about Rasmussen's nationality demonstrates his ignorance of the Arctic and its recent history. Though not nearly so renowned a figure as Stefansson in the English-speaking world, the Danish explorer already had a solid record of important geographical and ethnographic work in the far north. Rasmussen was born in Greenland of mixed Danish and Inuit ancestry. By his own account, from childhood he was fascinated by tales of the Inughuit who lived so far removed from the other aboriginal inhabitants of Greenland (Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen1908: xix). He first visited them in 1902–1904, as a member of Ludvig Mylius-Erichsen's Danish Literary Expedition (the first Danish expedition to northern Greenland). Both Mylius-Erichsen and Rasmussen were anxious to secure northern Greenland for Denmark. In the early years of the twentieth century, however, the activities of the American explorer Robert Peary presented a serious obstacle. Peary had long been determined to win world renown as an explorer. During four expeditions between 1891 and 1902, he explored Greenland to its northernmost point, Cape Morris Jesup (named after one of Peary's wealthy supporters), and then turned to the North Pole as his ultimate aim. Peary perfected a system of travelling based on the techniques of the Inughuit, and he recruited the Inughuit themselves (‘my Eskimos’, as he called them) to serve his cause. Arrogant and ruthless, Peary appeared to one Danish observer as the ‘uncrowned monarch, who considers himself the legitimate owner of all countries and inhabitants from Cape York and northwards’ (Steensby Reference Steensby1909: 892).

In 1909, having allegedly reached the pole at last, Peary left the north for good. Rasmussen promptly urged the Danish government to establish a trading station among the Inughuit (Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen1925; Sand Reference Sand1934; Nyeboe Reference Nyeboe1935; Gilberg Reference Gilberg1988: 47). This suggestion was ultimately rejected from fear of an unfavourable American or British response. As Rasmussen himself recorded, he ‘received an answer to the effect that the land being considered No Man's Land the Danish Government . . . did not see its way to establish a station there.’ Any Danish actions ‘would therefore have to be left to a private initiative’ (Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen1925). Rasmussen accordingly went forward on his own. (It would appear that when referring to northern Greenland as a no man's land, which he frequently did [Brøsted Reference Brøsted1988: 264], Rasmussen's intention was to emphasise that neither the British nor the American government had ever made a formal claim to the area.) In the summer of 1910 Rasmussen founded a station, which he named Thule, at North Star Bay near Cape York. From this base, he explored the northern coastline and interior in 1912 and 1916–1918; the results of these expeditions were reported in international publications like the British Geographical Journal and the American Geographical Review (Geographical Journal 1913; Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen1919a, Reference Rasmussen1919b).

Of the basic facts about Rasmussen and Thule Stefansson seems to have been well aware, while Harkin and other civil servants in Ottawa knew nothing about them. Unfortunately, Danish officials apparently made the unwarranted assumption that their Canadian counterparts would be adequately informed about conditions in Greenland. When the Danes received the British note, they were unable to deal directly with the matter through the Grønlands Styrelse or Greenland Administration (a branch of the Danish Ministry of the Interior), as the Inughuit lived outside the area subject to Danish rule. The Greenland Administration sent the note to Rasmussen for comment. His reply being considered satisfactory, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarded a copy to the Foreign Office without considering whether the remarks it contained would be readily understood in London and Ottawa. The covering letter neatly avoided a direct statement about the lack of any official Danish presence in the Thule district, with the result that the Danish position was entirely misconstrued by Harkin and others.

In his letter, Rasmussen pointed out that the Inughuit had begun to hunt on Ellesmere Island only after the ‘ruthless’ slaughter of game instigated by Peary exterminated the caribou in their traditional hunting grounds in Greenland. According to Rasmussen, the need of the Inughuit for musk-ox skins was far greater than their need for the meat, since caribou skins, traditionally used for most of their clothing and bedding, were no longer available. Rasmussen confirmed that the hunting was on a scale that might eventually result in the extermination of the musk-ox, but he believed that many years would be required to accomplish this. In the meantime, he was taking steps to import reindeer skins. He argued that the Inughuit should not be forbidden to hunt musk-oxen on Ellesmere until his ‘effective counter-balancing measures’ had been fully implemented. He alone would have to take responsibility for this programme, since, as it was ‘well known’, there was no official authority in the (Thule) district, ‘except that which I exercise through my station – an authority which I have hitherto had no difficulty in maintaining.’ Rasmussen was evidently alarmed at the possible sovereignty ramifications of any involvement by Canadian officials, and he concluded with the emphatic assurance that he would ‘need no assistance whatever from the Canadian Government’ (Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen1920a).

It is important to keep in mind that this letter was written to the Greenland Administration, not the Canadian government. It was certainly well known in Denmark that Thule lay in a no man's land, but this fact was anything but common knowledge in Ottawa. Unaware of the precarious, unofficial nature of the Danish presence in northern Greenland, Canadians reacted with panicky reflections on their own limited activities in the archipelago. Nothing of an administrative nature had been done for many years after the transfer of sovereignty from Great Britain to Canada in 1880. In 1895 came the first administrative act, an order in council dividing the Canadian Arctic into the districts of Mackenzie, Franklin, Ungava and the Yukon. In 1897 fisheries officer William Wakeham raised the flag on Baffin Island. In 1903–1904 A. P. Low of the Geological Survey made a cruise in Neptune, proclaiming Canadian sovereignty on Ellesmere, North Somerset, and North Devon Islands. Further proclamations were made by Joseph Bernier during his voyages of 1906–1907, 1908–1909, and 1910–1911. However, these important initial steps were not followed up by a fuller occupation. The long history of British discovery in the Arctic, plus the clear and well publicised indications of the Canadian government's intention to exercise sovereignty,Footnote ⁵ unquestionably placed Canada's claim to the archipelago on a much firmer basis than Denmark's claim to northern Greenland. Nevertheless, to Harkin, with his superficial knowledge of international law gained from a quick reading of one textbook,Footnote ⁶ the Canadian position seemed lamentably weak, while Denmark was apparently poised to establish the effective occupation that Canada had neglected.

Disinterested expert advice might possibly have changed Harkin's mind, but instead, his initial responses were reinforced by Stefansson, who was anything but disinterested. A few days after Rasmussen's letter was received, Harkin showed it to Stefansson, and asked for the explorer's comments. Stefansson produced a five-page memorandum that painted a dramatic picture of the Danish threat. He began by suggesting that the Inughuit (who had migrated from Ellesmere to Greenland several hundred years before) were about to make a ‘reverse migration’ back to Canadian territory.Footnote ⁷ It was implied that they would carry the Danish flag with them; however, Stefanssson evidently knew quite well that the Inughuit were not yet Danish subjects. ‘I should think our Government might well take the position that though we have nothing to say about the political status of North Greenland . . . we do have very definite authority over all the lands to the west of Baffin Bay, Smith Sound and Robeson [C]hannel,’ he wrote with reference to Rasmussen's ‘no man's land’ passage. However, he also stated that Canada should take steps to halt the Inughuit hunting expeditions ‘if the Danes are not willing through International courtesy to see that they are not undertaken by residents of their colonies.’ Stefansson thus muddied the waters instead of clarifying them, as he evidently might have done. He also wrote that Rasmussen was ‘deceptive’ when he claimed that musk-ox skins were essential for the survival of the Inughuit. They were too heavy to be used for clothing; therefore, their main use was as bedding, which Stefansson did not consider essential for life. Stefansson put forward the alternate explanation that Rasmussen was in the habit of sending the Inughuit into Canadian territory in quest of valuable white fox and polar bear furs; while on these expeditions, the hunters and their dog teams lived mainly on musk-ox meat. The musk-ox skins, though relatively unimportant, were carried back to Thule and sold (Stefansson Reference Stefansson1920a).

Harkin responded with the suggestion that perhaps Canadian Inuit could be settled on Ellesmere Island. This idea, fortunately, was soon dropped. Harkin's main focus at this time was on an answer to the Danish note. In a long memorandum to Cory, he demonstrated his profound ignorance of the relevant facts. He described the Inughuit as Danish subjects, and observed testily, ‘It is not any part of the duty of the Canadian Government to provide for the natives of Greenland. That is a duty properly appertaining to the Danish Government.’ Apparently at Pope's request, the memorandum was sent back to Harkin for revision and shortening. The next version was slightly more concise, and certainly clearer in its recommendations. The first memorandum had urged that Canada take ‘a very strong stand’ regarding its sovereignty without specifying how this might be done, but the second put forward a concrete plan: ‘Denmark should undertake to prevent its natives from going to Ellesmere land for musk-oxen and . . . failure on its part to do so will result in the establishment of mounted police posts in Ellesmere land to deal with the situation on behalf of Canada’ (Harkin Reference Harkin1920b, Reference Harkin1920c; Cory Reference Cory1920a, Reference Cory1920b). There is no indication that Harkin consulted the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or RCMP (as the RNWMP was known after February 1920).

Harkin's second memorandum was forwarded to the Colonial Office by the governor general on 13 July, with a covering letter to Milner which stated, ‘My Government consider if Denmark fails to take steps to remedy the situation complained of, it will be necessary for Canada to establish a mounted police post in Ellesmere Island for the purpose of stopping this slaughter, and of asserting Canadian authority’ (Devonshire 1920). The letter was not passed to the Foreign Office until 30 August. There Harkin's long and, by British standards, amateurish memorandum was insufficient to make the matter clear. It also seems that the Foreign Office did not believe any challenge to Canadian sovereignty was intended by the Danes. Those in London were undoubtedly better informed about Greenland sovereignty issues than the Canadians. And, as a mere matter of practical politics, it must have seemed highly unlikely that a small power like Denmark would openly challenge the British Empire. The Danes could hardly expect such an action to go uncontested, and a contested occupation would not create a valid title. A puzzled and perhaps slightly exasperated official wrote on the minute sheet, ‘I do not think we can very well send a copy of this despatch to the Danish Minister so I have prepared a draft letter embodying the salient points’ (Maxse Reference Maxse1920). The British note (sent on 7 September) focused on the question of hunting rather than sovereignty, stating that ‘unless the Eskimos can be restrained from crossing into Canadian territory to kill musk oxen, the Canadian Government will be compelled to establish mounted police posts in Ellesmere Land to protect their own interests’ (Gregory Reference Gregory1920). Few copies of this note found their way into Canadian files, and so it has not previously been realised that the supposed ‘protest’ to Denmark was a very mildly worded document indeed.

The Advisory Technical Board and plans for a Canadian expedition

Harkin and others in Ottawa believed that a clear line had been drawn in the snow, when in fact the Danes remained unaware of the strong Canadian concerns over sovereignty. On 19 July Rasmussen was invited to visit Ottawa and give evidence before the Royal Commission. As the results of the protest and this invitation were awaited, the initiative in sovereignty matters shifted from Harkin to Stefansson. Borden had recently resigned, and Stefansson was determined to bring the issue to the attention of the new prime minister, Arthur Meighen. He had by this time received a reply to the personal letter he had sent to Rasmussen from London the previous April. Rasmussen's answer, written on 11 May, gave Stefansson a pretext for his approach to Meighen.

Rasmussen's letter was a completely frank and straightforward document. He provided a history of his activities at Thule in order to show how it had come about that he traded in Canadian musk-ox skins. If Stefansson had previously been unaware that by ‘Polar Esquimaux’ Rasmussen meant only the Thule tribe, this letter should have enlightened him: in it, Rasmussen referred to ‘the Polar-Eskimos, generally known under the name of the Smithsound-Eskimos’. Rasmussen described how he had attempted to persuade the Danish government to make an official claim in 1910, but ‘because of the American and [British] interest in this country – the matter was given up.’ Again, if Stefansson had not previously realised the unofficial nature of Rasmussen's activities, this would have made the true situation clear to him. Rasmussen then went on to the musk-ox issue. He insisted that ‘the trading station at Thule has not wished to consider the musk-oxen as an article of merchandise, but on the contrary it has appealed to the Eskimos to chase them as little as possible.’ Finally, Rasmussen told Stefansson about his plans for a new expedition lasting four years, ‘during which I shall visit as many as possible of the American Eskimos’ (Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen1920b). This expedition, intended to re-trace in reverse the migration route of the Inuit from the western Arctic to Greenland, was a long-standing dream of Rasmussen's. Later known as the Fifth Thule Expedition, Rasmussen's venture would ultimately prove to be one of the most important ethnographic expeditions ever to work in the Canadian Arctic.

Stefansson was scheduled to start on a lecture tour in November, and he was apparently anxious to inspire action on Arctic matters in Ottawa before the tour began. On 16 September he wrote to Meighen from New York. He told the prime minister that the Danes were ‘thinking of colonising and exploring the islands . . . north of Lancaster Sound.’ He asked for an interview in order to discuss the matter. Meighen's secretary replied that Stefansson should first meet with Loring Christie of External Affairs. Stefansson then wrote a long letter to Christie. He did not refer to Rasmussen by name, saying only that ‘a private person in Denmark’ had written to him, and that this person was largely responsible for the message sent to Canada. ‘I do not know how the communication of the [Danish] Department of State [sic] was actually worded,’ Stefansson (who had of course been shown the Danish note by Harkin) went on, ‘but . . . the implication was clear that no Canadian claims were recognised. This appears in a phrase to the effect that the Danes would not interfere with game “south of Lancaster Sound where the Government of Canada has jurisdiction.”’ Stefansson followed up this entirely mendacious assertion with a warning that ‘if we do nothing, I should think that if this case came before an international court it would probably be decided in [Denmark's] favour’ (Stefansson Reference Stefansson1920b).

Stefansson then hurried to Ottawa, where he met Christie and Borden on 30 September. Christie, a lawyer with a brilliant academic record at Harvard, joined External Affairs in 1913, and over the years became one of Borden's most trusted advisers. His background in international law was, however, weak.Footnote ⁸ By Christie's own account, when he first met Stefansson he was greatly impressed by the explorer's personal charisma, and accepted his statements about the Danish threat without question. The Department of External Affairs did not have the resources to make a study of the matter, and it was therefore passed on to the Department of the Interior. The next day Stefansson attended a meeting of the Advisory Technical Board, a group formed not long before to consider the more complex or technical matters that came before the department.Footnote ⁹ Harkin was a member of this body. Stefansson dramatically informed the board that the purpose of Rasmussen's new expedition was to ‘colonize the country with Danish Eskimos from Greenland’. He again claimed that Rasmussen's letter to him included the statement, ‘There is no question of our breaking Canadian Game Laws because we are not coming into Canada but a part farther north. It is not under Canadian jurisdiction’ (Advisory Technical Board 1920a).

On the same day as this meeting, a letter from Rasmussen was received in the Department of the Interior. Written in early August, it expressed Rasmussen's regret that he would not be able to come to Ottawa, as he was obliged to make a trip to northern Greenland.Footnote ¹⁰ The letter had not been mailed until September because Rasmussen's secretary was not sure of the correct address (Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen1920c). Harkin immediately decided that a dark conspiracy was being played out. Unaware of the delays in London, he conjectured that the protest had been received in Copenhagen in August; immediately, the Danes had decided to send Rasmussen north, in order to lead an invasion of the archipelago before the Canadian police posts could be established. Rasmussen's letter had been kept unmailed so that he could get away before Canadian suspicions were aroused (Harkin Reference Harkin1920d, Reference Harkin1920e). For a time the panic-stricken Harkin was convinced that, whatever the practical difficulties, a Canadian presence must be established at once. He met with Cortlandt Starnes, the assistant commissioner of the RCMP, who in turn telegraphed the commissioner, A.B. Perry, in Edmonton: ‘Reported Danish Government endeavouring get possession Ellesmere Island. [Harkin] [s]tates Government anxious Police Patrol over land take possession first. [A]fraid expedition by water next season too late. . . . I consider such undertaking started at this late season hazardous. . . . Please wire views.’ (Starnes Reference Starnes1920). Perry confirmed that the plan was ‘impracticable’ (Perry Reference Perry1920).

Harkin then put forward the even more impracticable idea that a British dirigible could transport the police to Ellesmere Island (Advisory Technical Board 1920b). Another member of the Advisory Technical Board, Otto Klotz, who had already complained that the board was ‘being stampeded’ by Harkin and Stefansson, ridiculed Harkin's various schemes for ‘establishing posts, law and order among the musk ox and above all establishing sovereignty against the wily Danes until the exploring ship arrives next year.’ He added: ‘We all believe in obtaining the sovereignty for Canada, but use reason & common sense to attain the end.’ Klotz and the other board members authorised the surveyor-general, Édouard Deville, ‘to discuss with the Deputy Minister the matter rationally’ (Klotz Reference Klotz1920: 15 and 20 October). Deville bluntly told Cory, ‘I am satisfied that the alleged intention of Knud Rasmussen or of the Danish Government to occupy Ellesmere island . . . has never existed, otherwise than in Mr. Stefansson's imagination. The wild schemes suggested for the immediate occupation of the island can only result, if they become known, in bringing ridicule over the Department’ (Deville Reference Deville1920).

Harkin's sense of urgency was somewhat eased when a relative of Frits Johansen (a Danish-born member of Stefansson's 1913–1918 expedition) conveyed the news that Rasmussen had left Copenhagen in mid-July and had returned in early October. Nevertheless, Harkin's fear that in those few months Rasmussen had taken steps detrimental to Canada's interests remained strong, and he returned to the possibility in memorandum after memorandum over the next six months, usually repeating the claim that Rasmussen had left after the arrival of the Canadian protest (Harkin Reference Harkin1921h, Reference Harkin1921i). Meanwhile, the prime minister requested Stefansson's recommendations on the action that should be taken. In response, Stefansson outlined a number of steps, including police posts, a revenue cutter service, the encouragement of private enterprise in the north, and a five-year exploring expedition (Stefansson Reference Stefansson1920c).

Stefansson versus Shackleton

By January 1921 plans for a ship expedition to establish police posts were well under way. In 1919 the Mounted Police had firmly rejected the idea of establishing a post on Ellesmere Island because of the expense, but now the creation of as many as five new posts in the eastern archipelago was being considered (three on Ellesmere, one on North Devon, and one on Bylot Island). The police and their supplies were to be carried north in the CGS Arctic, made famous by Bernier's voyages, and now undergoing extensive repairs and refitting in Quebec. A Nova Scotian, Captain H.C. Pickels, was appointed to command the ship, while J.D. Craig, a surveyor employed by the Department of the Interior, would be in overall command of the voyage.

With the appointments of Craig and Pickels in December 1920, the involvement of the Advisory Technical Board came to an end. Harkin, however, continued to play an important role. The task of dealing with Stefansson fell largely on his shoulders. It was obvious that if a threat to Canadian sovereignty did indeed exist, an exploring expedition could do much to enhance Canada's presence and claims in the high Arctic. On the other hand, the cost might be enormous. Christie initially favoured an expedition led by Stefansson (Christie Reference Christie and Clark1920), and Stefansson was eager to take on such a role. Early in January, Stefansson wrote to Meighen, Borden, and the minister of the interior, Sir James Lougheed, stating that he would consider it ‘both an honor and a public duty’ (Stefansson Reference Stefansson1921a, Reference Stefansson1921b, Reference Stefansson1921c). However, Harkin's fears about Rasmussen were matched by an equally wary view of Stefansson. He believed that Stefansson had no true loyalty to Canada, which, though the place of his birth, was not really his country. But if the exploration project were rejected outright, Stefansson might go to the Danes or the Americans with what he knew about Canada's plans, hoping that they would sponsor his venture. As Harkin later summed it up, ‘it not being possible to really look upon him as a real Canadian this expedition idea was developed with a view to providing a positive assurance by this sop to Stefansson's pride and selfishness that there would be no chance of his tipping off the actual situation concerning the north to either Denmark or the United States’ (Harkin Reference Harkin1921b). If Stefansson were sent north in the summer of 1921, he would be unable to make any mischief until after the posts were established. Lougheed endorsed the plan, and Stefansson was accordingly summoned to Ottawa in February. He was clearly told that he would have nothing to do with the police posts or other steps designed to establish effective occupation, but encouraged to think that he would be placed in charge of extensive exploration work. His party would be transported north in Arctic along with the police and then set off independently.

At this point, Stefansson unwittingly made a serious mistake. He was committed to several more months of his lecture tour, which made it all but impossible for him to plan an expedition on such short notice. He asked that an advance party be sent north in Arctic in 1921 to establish a base on Axel Heiberg Island; he himself would not begin his work until 1922. This plan was approved by Cory on 17 February; however, care was taken to ensure that Stefansson had nothing in writing. Although Stefansson was clearly uneasy about the absence of a written agreement, he enthusiastically went forward with his plans for the advance party, carrying on an extensive correspondence with Harkin from the various American cities on his tour. Harkin, for his part, believed that the government must honour the verbal assurances given to Stefansson. However, a number of circumstances now began to work against such an outcome. Christie, whose influence with Meighen was strong, had turned against Stefansson, mainly because when comparing notes with other officials, he discovered that Stefansson often misrepresented what Christie had said to him, twisting Christie's words to suit his own purposes (Christie Reference Christie1922a). On the same day that Cory approved the exploration plan, Christie wrote a memo to Meighen in which he argued that the Danish threat, if it existed at all, was probably not a serious one. In Christie's opinion, a firm stand by Canada would quickly put an end to any Danish plan for occupation of the islands (Christie Reference Christie1921a). Others in the government were quick to observe that if Stefansson was not going north until 1922, the expedition would not serve the purpose of keeping him out of the way until the police posts were established. Why, then, spend so much?

Another factor was the dramatic appearance on the scene of the famous Antarctic explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton. In popular renown, personal charm, and force of character, Shackleton was more than a match for Stefansson, and he also possessed the advantage of being a British subject. Moreover, Shackleton put forward a proposition that might save the government a significant amount of money. He initially asked that Canada pay half the cost of his planned expedition to the Beaufort Sea; on being told that this was impossible due to the expenditure on Stefansson's expedition and Arctic's voyage, Shackleton offered to establish two of the police posts, thus reducing the cost of the other enterprises (Harkin Reference Harkin1921a). Harkin, fearful of what Stefansson might do if the government dropped him in favour of Shackleton, was entirely against this plan, but for others it had considerable appeal.

On 12 March Stefansson paid a quick visit to Ottawa. Harkin made the government's first definite (though still unwritten) commitment to implement Stefansson's plans when he agreed that Stefansson should appoint Lorne Knight, a young American member of the 1913–1918 expedition, to oversee arrangements for the advance party. A few days later, Stefansson sent a fulsome letter to Lougheed, emphasising that he had turned down a $60,000 lecture contract for 1922–1923 in order to take charge of the Arctic work ‘which Mr. Cory tells me is definitely decided on’, and that he preferred to go without a salary from the government ‘because I feel I am helping to build the foundation of Canada's greatness’ (Stefansson Reference Stefansson1921d). The plan, however, had not yet been approved by the cabinet, and Lougheed was now reluctant even to recommend it to his colleagues. ‘If this is to be the policy it constitutes a complete change of policy,’ Harkin wrote in an agitated memo to Cory (Harkin Reference Harkin1921c). He warned that if Stefansson did not get his way, the explorer's subsequent actions would ‘be decided entirely on personal and selfish grounds’ (Harkin Reference Harkin1921d). In the weeks that followed, Harkin received a steady stream of telegrams from Stefansson, which he forwarded to Cory with agonised pleas for a decision. However, none was forthcoming, as cabinet fruitlessly debated the relative merits of the two plans. (There are, unfortunately, no records of these discussions.)

Meighen's decision

While this part of the drama was unfolding in Ottawa, there were further developments in London. On 9 March, a preliminary response was at last received to the Canadian ‘protest’. Grevenkop-Castenskiold informed Curzon that the British note of 7 September had been ‘the subject of serious consideration and of various discussions with Mr. Knud Rasmussen.’ In response, Rasmussen had taken steps ‘which will in future make it quite unnecessary for the Eskimos to hunt musk oxen on Ellesmere Land.’ Rasmussen would be making a trip to London shortly, and he wanted to discuss matters with the British authorities (Grevenkop-Castenskiold Reference Grevenkop-Castenskiold1921a).

As it turned out, these discussions related far more to obtaining help for the Fifth Thule Expedition than to the musk-ox issue. On 15 March Rasmussen and his colleague, Ib Nyeboe, met with W.L. Griffith of the Canadian High Commission and outlined the plans of the expedition. Griffith reported these to Lougheed, and noted that he had asked Rasmussen and Nyeboe to submit their plans in writing (Griffith Reference Griffith1921a). The next morning the two Danes spoke to Sir Henry Lambert at the Colonial Office. In a letter to Griffith, Lambert conveyed the reassuring information that Rasmussen ‘certainly used no language contesting Canada's unrestricted Dominion of Ellesmere land. I myself spoke deliberately on the basis that it was entirely Canadian, and neither he nor Mr. Nyborg [sic] . . . directly or indirectly demurred’ (Lambert Reference Lambert1921). Finally, Rasmussen and Nyeboe met Charles Sale, the deputy governor of the HBC, to inquire whether the company would be able to provide supplies and other assistance to the Fifth Thule Expedition. Sale was very favourably impressed by the two Danes, and, in a memorandum of the conversation, he recorded that Rasmussen had ‘promised to address a letter to us within a few days giving references and guarantees which he feels sure will prove his good faith’ (Sale Reference Sale1921a). Rasmussen perhaps relied too much on the excellent impression he had undoubtedly made in London (by all accounts he was an immensely likeable man), and he did not in fact submit the documentation he had promised.

Griffith's account was promptly conveyed to Ottawa by cable and letter; Sale's memo was also forwarded in good time. But Lambert's report, the most important in relation to the sovereignty issue, was not sent until late April. Harkin, in any case, was a man whose fears were not easily allayed. Despite Christie's opinion and the satisfactory news from London, he continued to harp on the possibility of Danish territorial ambitions, advising that ‘when Rasmussen first touches Canadian territory he should be compelled to pay duty on his supplies and otherwise submit to acts of administration on the part of Canadian authorities’ (Harkin Reference Harkin1921e). Harkin eagerly seized on a newspaper report that the Danish government would contribute 100,000 kroner to Rasmussen's expedition. Would this not make it an official expedition, one that could make territorial claims for Denmark? (Harkin Reference Harkin1921f)

Despite all that Harkin could say, Christie was by now strongly inclined towards the Shackleton plan. On 9 April both men attended a meeting with Shackleton in Commissioner Perry's office, at which it was suggested that one police post might be sufficient; this could be established by Shackleton, and there would be no need to equip Arctic at all. Shackleton had received promises of substantial support from various wealthy Canadians, including $100,000 from Sir John Eaton, and he was willing for his venture to be known as the ‘Eaton-Shackleton Canadian Arctic Expedition’ (Christie Reference Christie1921b). On the subject of Rasmussen, Christie did not appear to be much alarmed, but he assured Harkin that the British authorities would be requested to make inquiries in Copenhagen as to the objects and sponsorship of the Fifth Thule Expedition (Christie Reference Christie1921c).

On 20 April Shackleton reported from England that, having inspected his ship for the first time, he now realised it could not carry the men and stores for even one police post. He telegraphed one of his Canadian supporters, John Bassett of the Montreal Gazette, asking Bassett to ‘Try obtain at least fifty thousand dollars as government contribution without stipulation to carry their party’. Or, if the government would give him $100,000, he would charter a second ship for the police party. A third possibility was that the government should give Shackleton a grant, the supplies already purchased for Arctic, and authority as a magistrate. Shackleton would winter on Ellesmere Island, with his presence replacing the police post (Shackleton Reference Shackleton1921). Bassett apparently replied on his own initiative. He proposed that Shackleton should establish a police post in 1921, deferring the exploration work until 1922. Shackleton promptly agreed, and he seemed to regard Bassett's suggestion as a definite Canadian commitment. Bassett unwisely forwarded Shackleton's cables to Christie and Meighen. The documents gave the impression that Shackleton was unreliable and self-serving, and, as a result, Meighen turned strongly against him. On 9 May, Meighen wrote coldly that his government had ‘made no definite commitment whatever . . . Our arrangements now do not admit of assistance [to] your expedition’ (Meighen Reference Meighen1921b).

Meighen's decisive rejection of Shackleton did not, however, mean that the government was now prepared to embrace Stefansson. On 3 May the prime minister had become aware of a new possibility: that the Canadian flag could be carried north at no expense to the government by the HBC, which was in the process of expanding its activities into the archipelago. The previous autumn, Stefansson had spoken to Edward Fitzgerald, the deputy chairman of the HBC's Canadian advisory committee, about the government's sovereignty concerns. On 16 April an employee in the HBC's Winnipeg office noticed a news story about Rasmussen's proposed expedition. Company officials therefore decided that Ottawa might be interested in their plans. On 25 April Harkin received a letter from Angus Brabant, the fur trade commissioner, informing him that ‘a reconnaissance visit to Ellesmere Land’ might be made that summer, when posts were to be established on Baffin Island (Harkin Reference Harkin1921g). Harkin duly passed this information to Cory and Christie, but the prime minister had no inkling of it until George Allan, the member of parliament for Winnipeg South, forwarded a similar letter from Fitzgerald. Meighen's response was immediate. ‘I am glad indeed to have the information of the intentions of the Hudson's Bay Company and I assure you it is most opportune,’ he wrote to Allan on 4 May (Meighen Reference Meighen1921a). Brabant was promptly summoned to Ottawa. On 12 May he had a meeting with Harkin and Cory in the morning, then another with Harkin in the afternoon. Harkin's report was discouraging. The HBC, reasonably enough, was not eager to establish a post on Ellesmere Island, where there was no one with whom to trade. Harkin recommended that Arctic be sent north in June, with orders to establish police posts on Bylot Island and Ellesmere Island. In September, an HBC officer could take over the Bylot post, and the police could return south in the HBC ship, thus reducing the overall cost of the operation. As for Stefansson, ‘To eliminate him now would probably appear to him to be an act of bad faith of the part of the Government. . . . it is important that an immediate decision be reached because matters of personnel and supplies will necessarily take some time to arrange’ (Harkin Reference Harkin1921h). At the next cabinet meeting on 18 May, Lougheed pressed strongly for a decision.

Cabinet decided that the HBC presence would be sufficient. The traders were appointed to act as customs inspectors in order to give them official status. Both Stefansson's exploring party and the voyage of Arctic were cancelled. Stefansson was later told that the ministers were evenly divided between his supporters and Shackleton's, and therefore preferred to send no expedition at all (Stefansson Reference Stefansson1943: 691). However, not only is this explanation improbable in itself, but Shackleton's proposals had been dismissed nine days before the cabinet's decision. Despite the elimination of Shackleton, the rejection of Stefansson's plan was nearly inevitable, given Christie's attitude and his influence on Meighen. Even Harkin must have known that he was fighting a losing battle. The decision not to send Arctic, however, came as a complete surprise to many of those involved. There is no record of the process by which the decision was reached, but it appears that cabinet members were reassured by Lambert's report from London that Rasmussen did not contest Canadian sovereignty. A copy of his 16 March letter to Griffith had at last arrived in Ottawa on 14 May, and in all probability this was the factor that tipped the balance. Christie later wrote to Borden that the final cabinet decision was taken ‘as the result of secret information that made the whole affair seem less urgent than it had originally appeared, and that being so, it was felt that in a time of financial stringency the proposed expenditures might well be avoided’ (Christie Reference Christie1922b).

Harkin was not to be converted to this view. On 26 May he wrote a rambling, nine-page memorandum to Cory, strongly urging that the decision be reversed and the police posts established. Arctic was nearly ready; $55,000 had already been spent on it and could not be recovered. For only $26,000 more, the expedition could proceed. Harkin admitted that Rasmussen himself might not contest Canada's jurisdiction, but this was not ‘in any way binding on Denmark’. There was ‘no positive evidence yet that Denmark is engaged in operations in that connection’, but ‘the attitude of Denmark right up to the present continues to suggest suspicions. There has been no repudiation by Denmark of the “No Man's Land” contention though no re-assertion of it. Denmark seems to have adopted a policy of evasion and delay.’ Rasmussen too might be carrying out evasive manoeuvres; most significantly, he had not yet submitted the promised outline of his plans. Harkin did not want Rasmussen to arrive in the Arctic and find ‘that Canada is not administering the north islands. Should Denmark wish to raise the question later on his evidence will be available’ (Harkin Reference Harkin1921i). He also forwarded a clipping from the American magazine The World's Work about a proposed American expedition involving navy personnel, with marginal annotations by Stefansson, who declared: ‘I can beat them to it if Canada wants me to. It is optional with us if it is our territory or theirs.’

None of these arguments carried any weight with Harkin's superiors, and the matter was now dropped by Meighen and Christie, who were both deep in preparations for the forthcoming Imperial Conference in London. Harkin conceded defeat on Stefansson, and sent the explorer a blunt cable – ‘entire expedition abandoned’ – on 30 May (Harkin Reference Harkin1921j). However, when it came to the police posts, Harkin was determined to fight on. His determination was shared by others in the Department of the Interior, and it was largely due to their unyielding attitude that Arctic went north a year later. And, once Meighen and Christie had withdrawn from active involvement in Arctic matters, Harkin's stubborn suspicion of Danish motives nearly resulted in the cancellation of the Fifth Thule Expedition.

Rasmussen in London

The Danes had, in fact, made a further reply to the Canadian ‘protest’ on 13 May, but as the matter was not considered especially urgent in London, their note was not forwarded to Ottawa until 25 May; it was received on 14 June. Having made a formal declaration of their sovereignty over all of Greenland on 10 May, the Danes now offered a guarantee that the Inughuit would not kill musk-oxen in Canadian territory except in cases of dire need; such cases would be reported to the British government. ‘I venture to express the hope on behalf of my Government,’ Grevenkop-Castenskiold wrote, ‘that these measures will satisfy the wishes of His Britannic Majesty's Government’ (Grevenkop-Castenskiold Reference Grevenkop-Castenskiold1921b). So far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the question had indeed been resolved. But to Harkin in Ottawa it had not; and despite the stand taken by Christie, Meighen, and the cabinet, Harkin's indirect influence almost put a stop to Rasmussen's plans.

Brabant had returned to Winnipeg after his conversations with Harkin firmly under the impression that Rasmussen's proposed journey was ‘solely [for the] purpose [of] advancing Danish claims’ to Ellesmere Island (Hudson's Bay Company 1921). The Winnipeg office accordingly cabled their London headquarters that all support for Rasmussen should be withdrawn, and Brabant informed Harkin that this had been done. Fortunately for Rasmussen, the matter was dealt with in London by Sale, who suggested that the explorer come to London immediately. Sale also informed the Winnipeg office that in his opinion, the Canadian authorities were ‘unduly alarmed’ (Sale Reference Sale1921b). Rasmussen arrived in London on 4 June. He was scheduled to leave Copenhagen twelve days later. Without the HBC's support, his expedition would not be able to proceed. Time was therefore of the essence. Rasmussen immediately called on Griffith at the High Commission, and the two men went together to meet with Lambert at the Colonial Office. There Rasmussen presented the long-delayed outline of his plans, with a covering letter in which he stated that his expedition was ‘of a purely scientific character, without taking any interest whatever in political or mercantile matters.’ He promised that the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs would confirm his statement (Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen1921). Sale accordingly telegraphed Fitzgerald in Winnipeg, who in turn sent a cable to Lougheed, requesting permission to assist Rasmussen. The cable was received in Ottawa on Sunday, 5 June, when Lougheed was out of town. Contacted by telephone, Lougheed reacted with confusion. Unsure whether the directive to withhold assistance was in fact an official one, he could only reply that Meighen and Christie should be consulted. On Monday, Craig first spoke to Christie and the prime minister's secretary, then searched through the files and found Brabant's letter to Harkin, ‘which probably explains the matter’ (Craig Reference Craig1921). Lougheed returned on Wednesday; Meighen and Christie having left for London, the matter was now entirely in his hands. He wired to Winnipeg that there was no objection to the Rasmussen expedition, and recommended that Rasmussen should obtain a letter from the high commissioner ‘setting out the purposes for which he is going into the North’ (Lougheed Reference Lougheed1921). However, Lougheed omitted to send instructions to the High Commission.

Alarmed by the silence from Ottawa, the Danes took action on 9 June. Grevenkop-Castenskiold requested a meeting with Curzon, at which he presented a note guaranteeing on behalf of the Danish government ‘that no acquisition of territory whatsoever is contemplated’. Canadian permission for the expedition to proceed was requested (Grevenkop-Castenskiold Reference Grevenkop-Castenskiold1921c). Acting on the belief that the Canadian government had ordered the HBC to refuse assistance, Curzon asked that Ottawa should ‘be immediately informed by telegraph of the facts of the case, and requested to furnish an assurance by telegraph that the expedition will be allowed to land and pursue its investigations without interference’ (Gregory Reference Gregory1921). The result was a ‘Clear the Line – Urgent’ telegram from the Colonial Office to Devonshire. This was promptly passed to Lougheed, who, however, did not reply to the Colonial Office as requested; instead, he again cabled Fitzgerald in Winnipeg, repeating his assurance that the HBC could assist Rasmussen so long as the explorer did not dispute Canadian sovereignty.

On Friday, 10 June, Rasmussen called at Griffith's office ‘in great distress’, since it was imperative that he leave for Copenhagen the next day. Again, Griffith and Rasmussen went together to the Colonial Office, where Lambert was not at first entirely sympathetic: as Griffith recorded, ‘[o]pportunity was taken to point out in polite terms to Mr. Rasmussen’ that if he had submitted his plans in March, ‘the matter would no doubt have been adjusted in time’. It was suggested that Griffith should provide Rasmussen with a letter for the HBC, but in the absence of instructions from Ottawa, he did not feel able to do so (Griffith Reference Griffith1921b). Griffith did, however, send a cable asking for authorisation, and he wisely chose Pope rather than Lougheed as the recipient. Pope now took charge of the matter. He tactfully arranged with Cory for cables to be sent to both the High Commission and the Colonial Office. By 11 June the tangle of misdirected communications had at last been straightened, and Rasmussen was able to depart for Copenhagen as planned. ‘Have interviewed High Commissioner and Colonial Office everything satisfactorily settled Rasmussen expresses many thanks,’ Sale cabled to Winnipeg the next day (Sale 1921c).

Harkin and the 1922 patrol

When the Danish notes of 13 May and 8 June were at last received in Ottawa, Harkin grudgingly conceded that ‘apparently Denmark is definitely admitting British sovereignty in Ellesmere Land’. However, he disliked the idea of relying on the Danes to report breaches of the law. ‘It does not seem to me to be good policy for Canada to be dependent upon the actions of a foreign country for the observance of Canadian law upon Canadian territory,’ he argued to Cory (Harkin Reference Harkin1921k). Harkin also continued to suggest at regular intervals that Stefansson might be planning an expedition with official American sponsorship. So long as Meighen remained in power, these hints fell on deaf ears.

However, with the defeat of Meighen's government by Mackenzie King's Liberals in the December 1921 federal election, Harkin and his allies felt renewed hope for an expedition in Arctic. Christie found little favour with the new prime minister, who regarded him as a Conservative supporter (Bothwell Reference Bothwell1988: 322–324). In January 1922 Harkin, Craig, and the director of the new Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch, O.S. Finnie, began a quiet but ultimately successful campaign. On 16 February Craig wrote a long memo summarising their arguments. The guarantees offered by Rasmussen and Grevenkop-Castenskiold were ‘somewhat reassuring’ and ‘apparently removed a cause of immediate anxiety’; however, they ‘did not dispose of’ all doubts on the subject of Canada's title. Since Arctic had already been refitted, only a small additional expenditure would be required (Craig Reference Craig1922a). This reasoning was eventually accepted by the new government, and the expedition was authorised in May 1922. Arctic sailed in July. Captain Pickels having died in the interval, command of the ship went to the ageing but still energetic Arctic veteran Joseph Bernier. In the autumn of 1922 Harkin had the pleasure of receiving a letter from Craig, written at Craig Harbour, the newly founded post on the southern coast of Ellesmere Island, and mailed at ‘the Post Office which is the direct result of your strenuous efforts for Canada's good in 1920–21’ (Craig Reference Craig1922b). Harkin must indeed have felt that he had battled against adverse circumstances for the sake of his country, and near the end of his life he recorded it as one of his greatest achievements that when he learned of the Danish plan, he ‘vigorously pressed upon the attention of the Government the necessity of action’ in the north, with the result that ‘Canada's title is now indisputable’ (Harkin undated).

When one of the major participants remained so firmly convinced of the Danish threat, it is hardly surprising that historians have also believed in its existence. However, the documentary evidence clearly indicates, not only that there was no threat from Denmark, but that others who were involved in both London and Ottawa realised the truth which Harkin refused to accept. Harkin's dogged determination that Arctic should go north was, in a sense, seriously misguided. But in another way it was indeed ultimately for Canada's benefit. Canada's northern sovereignty did not, as Harkin so fervently believed, hang on the immediate establishment of effective occupation in 1921–1922, but once that occupation had become a fact, the likelihood of actual challenges was dramatically reduced. The patrols were perceived by others besides Harkin as irrefutable proof of Canadian jurisdiction over the archipelago. The Norwegian legal scholar Gustav Smedal wrote in 1931 that they might stand as a model of ‘how to take effective possession of polar areas’ (Smedal Reference Smedal1931: 35). Pope's successor, O.D. Skelton, was able to deal successfully with potential challenges from the United States and Norway (countries which, unlike Denmark, could make claims in the archipelago based on discovery), thanks in part to the strong position created for Canada by the northern police posts and Arctic's voyages (see Dinwoodie Reference Dinwoodie1972; Inglis Reference Inglis1971: 947–979). However, to over-emphasise the positive outcome of Harkin's actions would be to create an unduly triumphalist version of events. The full story of the misunderstandings and deceptions that led to the 1922 patrol is important not only to set the record straight, but in order to emphasise the many internal as well as external difficulties encountered by the Canadian government as it sought to establish its northern sovereignty during the post-World War I transition to fully autonomous nationhood.