Our economy still struggles to recover from the 2008 financial meltdown. Dozens of books, both journalistic and scholarly, have been published to explain its causes. In Engineering the Financial Crisis, Jeffrey Friedman and Wladimir Kraus distinguish themselves by presenting the most systematic and rigorously empirical analysis of the crash to date. They counter the conventional wisdom of a crisis metastasizing in unregulated financial markets and make a compelling case for regulatory failure as the key causal variable.
The authors first dissect competing explanations of the crash. Conservative narratives blame the government: overly loose monetary policy and slack lending standards by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs) induced a housing bubble. The housing bubble was, however, a necessary but insufficient condition for the crisis. Liberals interpret this more as market failure. Deregulation allowed the development of exotic mortgage-backed securities (MBSs); banks shifted their activities to unregulated “shadow banks;” and Wall Street executives enriched themselves through compensation schemes that rewarded excessive risk taking, knowing that they were “too big to fail.” The market failure thesis is the most widely accepted, and it is meticulously, dispassionately, and devastatingly debunked by Friedman and Kraus. A thumbnail sketch of their critique follows, yet it does not do justice to the depth of their argument, including two detailed appendices.
Deregulation created an environment in which financial innovations like credit default swaps (CDSs) could be created. Yet the crisis occurred not because banks created and sold these securities to others; it happened because they bought loads of MBSs themselves. That is, the dependent variable is the demand for MBSs, not their supply. Deregulation in general, or specific regulatory changes (i.e., the repeal of Glass-Steagall) do not link specifically to the factors producing the crash. Similarly, huge bonuses paid to bankers may have been unseemly, but the evidence that they altered corporate strategies is weak (p. 36). Had this been the case, they would have invested in the riskiest and most lucrative securities. In practice, the major banks overwhelmingly invested in triple-A-rated MBSs (p. 42), which paid 1% less than triple-B rated asset-backed securities (p. 24). Nor did the market seem to think that these institutions were too big to fail, demanding larger spreads for bank bonds compared to the (clearly backed) GSEs (p. 45). Friedman and Kraus argue that the big banks thought that they were investing in safe securities.
How could they be so wrong? The answer lies in capital-adequacy requirements. According to the so-called Basel rules, banks must maintain capital cushions, generally 8% of assets. Basel I established cross-national capital minima based on “risk weights” for different classes of assets. Ultra-safe assets (gold, government bonds), for example, were weighted at zero, business loans at 100%. Securities issued by government-sponsored entities, such as Fannie Mae, were weighted at 20%. Thus, for every $100 invested, a business loan required $8 in capital, while a GSE-issued MBS required $1.60. The “regulatory arbitrage” of MBS investments allowed banks to increase profits, yet in a manner regulators deemed “safe.” That safety was illusory. Revised rules (Basel II, implemented in the United States as the Recourse Rule in 2001) adjusted the risk weights by ratings as well as the type of security. Three companies—Moody's, Fitch, and Standard and Poor's—maintained a government-sanctioned ratings oligopoly. The Recourse Rule encouraged U.S. banks to shift toward triple-A-rated MBSs, the senior tranches of which were consistently rated highly since widespread default was considered improbable. That these assessments were wrong is now obvious, but it transpired because the ratings agencies faced no competition. Still, the asset underlying MBSs—subprime mortgage loans—never defaulted at high rates, peaking at only 7% in 2009.
How did this translate into a massive financial meltdown? The final link was “mark to market” (MTM) accounting rules, which required assets to be credited at current market prices. As housing declined, the value of MBSs fell. With lots of banks holding lots of them, a sell-off ensued. With the collapse of Lehman Brothers, it became unclear which bonds would pay off and which would default. The market panicked. At that point, excessive pessimism as to the “real value” of MBSs prevailed. MTM turned that assessment from a temporary negative market opinion into a legal, binding, accounting requirement. Unable to sell MBSs, MTM forced banks to stop lending to the “real economy” in order to maintain capital adequacy ratios, leading to recession—all of which was inadvertently engineered by financial and accounting regulators.
Ideology played a role, not in the guise of regulators' blind faith in markets but in their “economism”—the belief that a) perfect markets are the ideal against which to judge real-world capitalism, and b) deviations result from misaligned incentives. Friedman and Kraus argue that this economism is a poor guide for action as it does not take human ignorance into account. It was the ignorance of the failings of the rating system that led Wall Street to invest heavily in “safe” triple-A-rated MBSs. It was ignorance of the consequences of capital-adequacy regulations and a fetish for the “correctness” of market prices embedded in MTM that turned a housing decline into a financial crash. Such ignorance, however, does not fit into economic models because it is not malleable to incentives.
All told, Engineering the Financial Crisis is an important book, tackling a complex event with sound argumentation and detailed empirical analysis. It should be read by all those wishing to understand the 2008 crash. That being said, the book does have two shortcomings. First, the authors assert at multiple points (e.g., pp. 106 and 142) that regulators were ignorant of the dangers inherent in the system, especially the oligopoly of the ratings agencies. No evidence, however, is presented to support the claim that regulators were truly unaware of these dangers. An equally plausible explanation is that they (along with market actors) recognized the dangers but, with the good times rolling, suppressed doubt. Given the weight of unintentional ignorance in their argument, the authors seem regrettably unwilling to contemplate that this might be a case of willful ignorance. Even if the latter is true, it does not undermine their causal case. It would, however, change the political story. Those absolved by ignorance would again be culpable.
A bigger disappointment is the book's lack of policy prescriptions. Accounting for human ignorance means recognizing the increasing difficulty of “getting the incentives right.” Friedman and Kraus ultimately support a more free-market regulatory structure, with all its potential for market failure and herd behavior, because it is more likely to weed out bad ideas. Yet they are hardly libertarians. Capital-adequacy regulations are blamed for the crisis, but the authors are not suggesting that they be eliminated. The logical question that follows is: What sorts of regulations are now needed to create a properly functioning financial system? Support for light-touch financial regulation is fine as far as it goes, but it does little to answer the hard questions of exactly where to draw the regulatory boundaries. The authors are disappointingly silent on this point. And this silence weakens their otherwise powerful account of the fiscal crisis.
