Is it possible to interpret Strauss without dissolving the tensions or quarrels that appear on the surface, and perhaps therefore also at the heart, of his work: city and man, reason and revelation, ancient and modern? A sympathetic reader of Laurence Lampert's intrepid and frank new book on Strauss is left with that question. For Lampert's Strauss the quarrel between the ancients and moderns is nonexistent (187), revelation poses no serious challenge to reason (17), and any tension between city and man is dissolved by the philosopher (man) creating a place for himself to rule over the city, once in secret, now openly. On this final point only does Strauss waffle, and for this Lampert rebukes and corrects him. Lampert argues that Strauss fails to grasp Nietzsche's insight that the advances of modern physics, biology, and anthropology have bequeathed to modern politics a new situation that requires a rhetoric that is unconcealed and plain-spoken in its announcement of the sovereignty of reason. By failing to announce his true thoughts on this matter, Lampert claims, Strauss's enduring importance is obscured, even threatened, by the secretive school he founded. This is a brilliant study, full of detailed and exciting exegeses of several of Strauss's most important (and in some cases strangely neglected) works. The discussion of Strauss's correspondence with Klein tracing his discovery of exotericism, the elegant treatment of Strauss's late Xenophon study, the attention to Seth Benardete as one of Strauss's most important epigoni: these and many other discussions are all very fine. One may dispute numerous interpretive points, but as a Nietzschean appropriation of Strauss, Lampert's work is excellent.
The title of the book communicates a great deal about Lampert's intention. The emphasis on “enduring” should make us think of Nietzsche's “monumental” history: Strauss's enduring importance is that he points us to past greatness. His discovery of exoteric writing allows us to appreciate the greatness of thinkers from the past who were never prisoners of their time, and therefore whose stature might still inspire us. Perhaps the enduring contribution of Lampert's study will come from walking his reader carefully through a number of Strauss's finely wrought studies, pointing out numerous employments of the devices of exotericism, and allowing the reader to appreciate these as the marvelous adornments that they are. Strauss presented his own work, though, as introductions to permanent problems, whose dignity it would seem surpassed that of the people who thought about them.
Lampert really has two strands to his argument. The first is his announced intention to point out the work of Strauss's recovery of the art of exoteric writing. The second strand is more ambiguous, or perhaps more tangled. He means to show that once this art of writing is understood correctly, then the superficial tensions in Strauss's work relax: the ancients and moderns, far from representing different assessments of the character of the challenge to philosophy posed by revelation are, in fact, deeply alike in being untroubled by the challenge of revelation, and need only to adjust their political strategies to handle it adequately. Thus, Descartes, Bacon, and Nietzsche are fundamentally like Xenophon, Plato, and Judah Halevi in holding to an ontology of “process monism” and devising rhetorical means both of communicating this insight and securing the rule of like-minded philosophers.
How could the thinkers of the Socratic Enlightenment be fundamentally identical to the thinkers of the Modern Enlightenment? Lampert interprets Strauss's late work on Xenophon to show Socrates's discovery of how to rule over gentlemen. The secret is in the discovery that the gentleman is in fact ruled by his wife. Thus, Socrates, the student of rule, learns from the gentleman how to imitate his wife and so “master” the gentleman. Socrates does this by correcting the gentleman's understanding of nobility and its relationship to the divine. Socrates provides the gentleman with a “teleotheological” teaching whereby the gods provide rational support for the gentleman's notion of justice, a teaching given again to Glaukon and Adeimantus as the “ideas” in Plato's Republic. By such means do philosophers alter their fellows' notions of divinity and thereby rule the world.
Whereas Lampert presents himself as following Strauss in the latter's interpretation of classic thinkers, he is more critical of Strauss's understanding of moderns. Lampert objects to the suggestion—be it Strauss's or scholars' who have misunderstood Strauss (220)—that the orientation of modern political philosophy is determined by “ire” (“antitheological ire” as in Strauss's reading of Machiavelli, 235–36) or the courageous passion that Strauss refers to as “probity” in Philosophy and Law and his autobiographical “Preface” to the translation of his Spinoza book. He argues that Strauss would have done better to follow Nietzsche more consistently. If I understand Lampert correctly (220ff.), he denies that Strauss's attention to probity uses a Nietzschean insight against Nietzsche. Indeed, one does not get the sense from Lampert that Strauss saw Nietzsche as a divided or internally inconsistent thinker, who pointed at once to the possibility of the recovery of nature as a standard as well as to history. This view of Strauss's is present in Philosophy and Law (1935) and in Strauss's correspondence with Karl Löwith of this period, and is clearly restated in his later correspondence with Löwith on the merits of Heidegger's published interpretations of Nietzsche. In this exchange, Strauss defends certain eccentricities of Heidegger's interpretation as being warranted by tensions in Nietzsche's own position. The presentation Lampert gives is that Strauss sometimes saw but sometimes did not see the character of Nietzsche's recurrence to nature, the “fundamental fact” of the will to power. Lampert is therefore in the position of needing to decry as ill-judged rhetoric on Strauss's part his frequent though always qualified pairing of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Strauss seems to have seen the return to nature in the classical sense as one path from Nietzsche's own inconsistency, whereas Heidegger's radical historicism was another. In his championing of Nietzsche and dismissal of Heidegger, Lampert misses the connection Strauss tried to indicate between the two of them.
One of Lampert's most serious charges against Strauss is that he failed to reckon with the truths discovered by modern natural science. Unlike virtually all of the great modern philosophers, Strauss refuses to consider the findings of modern biology and anthropology to understand new truths about human nature (233). But Lampert himself overlooks Strauss's most direct consideration of such matters, his critique of positivistic social science. This critique, which earned Strauss his first blush of notoriety, included the denial that moral and political phenomena could be accounted for with the conceptual apparatus, such as the fact/value distinction, of social sciences modeled on modern natural science, and insisted on a treatment of the phenomena of political life as inherently moral in character. One could characterize Strauss's critique as “phenomenological,” where the “lifeworld” to which the philosopher refers is characterized by “noetic heterogeneity” and rife with conflicting opinions concerning the noble and base, just and unjust, such as those confronted by the Socratics and, though in a different temper, Machiavelli and his successors. Though he misses Strauss's clearest response to modern science, Lampert does inadvertently refer to Strauss's most serious reason for expressing little interest in it: “this does not mean that physics refutes the God of revelation” (233). Lampert rejects the idea that Jerusalem represents more than simply a “basis of moral utility” in Strauss's thought (see 17).
Lampert presents himself as disagreeing with Strauss about the merits and therefore the character of modern political philosophy. It is fundamentally like the Socratic philosophy praised by Strauss, so he should follow them, Lampert claims. But Lampert in fact disagrees with Strauss about the character of Socratic philosophy, though this disagreement does not come through in Lampert's book, as he understands himself to be following, and presents himself as following, Strauss. His misconstrual of Strauss on the classics may be indicated by referring to his conclusion about Xenophon's Socrates. Socrates's considered, mature advice to those who would follow him is to submit to nature in order to understand it. According to Lampert, this means “master nature” and “conquer nature” (126). By submitting to nature we master it?
It would be comforting to think that all of the wise in succession, from Xenophon and Plato—no, from Homer!—to Nietzsche and Strauss were “process monists.” Is the world about which such thinkers as Hobbes and Plato, Bacon and Xenophon dispute really so homogeneous as Lampert implies in his suggestion that these minds all simply agree with one another—if not on minutiae, then on fundamental matters; retail quarrels, wholesale concord—on the fundamental character of reality? Is not Strauss's enduring service rather more like an introduction to these most persistent, difficult problems? Anyone interested in what endures in Strauss's thought should assess for themselves Lampert's claims—and by way of them Strauss's—in this learned study, sine ira et studio.
