Early in the twentieth century, R. W. and A. J. Carlyle published the magisterial and encyclopedic six-volume A History of Mediaeval Political Thought in the West, a study that ranges from late antiquity up to the end of the sixteenth century. While there have been many very good textbooks and scholarly compilations on the same topic produced during the intervening century, no one has attempted a survey comparable to that of the Carlyle brothers (at least in the English language) until Francis Oakley. Oakley, one of the most eminent historians of medieval political thought of the last generation, has taken on the challenge of writing a synthetic overview of the same historical period (and a bit beyond). This book—the final volume of a trilogy entitled The Emergence of Western Political Thought in the Latin Middle Ages—completes Oakley's effort to revisit, widen, and remap the terrain traversed by the Carlyles, as he expressly acknowledges (1–2). Oakley's achievement is daunting, not least because The Watershed of Modern Politics poses once again the thorny problem of when, where, and/or whether European political theory crossed the Rubicon from the Middle Ages to modernity. Given his lengthy and substantial scholarly career—rendered all the more remarkable by the fact of his nearly two decade-long service as dean of faculty, and then president, of Williams College and thereafter as president of the American Council of Learned Societies—no one could be better qualified to take on this Herculean task. It is hardly surprising that the Medieval Academy of America recently awarded Oakley's three volumes the 2016 Charles Homer Haskins medal for a distinguished work in medieval studies.
It is impossible to convey fully the scope and breadth of Oakley's accomplishment, so an all-too-brief synopsis must suffice. He wisely eschews organizing in strict chronology the 350 years worth of thought covered in the Watershed of Modern Politics. Rather, he adopts a conceptual framework that groups authors and texts from the late medieval and early modern periods thematically. Thus, successive chapters address the relations between pope and emperor (“the politics of nostalgia”), Italian Renaissance republicanism (“the politics of virtue”), the persistent demand for the spiritual purity of the clergy and ecclesiastical institutions (“the politics of sin”), and the sanctification of royal authority (“the politics of deference”). The book's crescendo arrives in his lengthy discussion of “the politics of consent” in the temporal and ecclesiastical realms respectively. His overarching narrative identifies the relatively cohesive manner in which the “politics of consent” articulated during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and associated specifically with constitutionalism, subverted various earlier forms of politics, achieving fulfillment in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This is a provocative thesis, but Oakley presents a well-documented story that carefully resists the seductive Siren call of Whig history.
As a scholar of the generation succeeding Oakley's—and his sometime academic sparring partner—the present reviewer might be tempted to bury, not to praise, him. Nothing could be further from the truth. But my high regard for The Watershed of Modern Politics does not absolve me from offering a few critical observations. My main concern is a lingering uncertainty about the precise character of what Oakley hopes to achieve. On the one hand, as the title of the trilogy suggests, he seems to be engaged in an effort to survey broadly the contours of European political thought as it evolved from and synthesized its classical and early Christian roots until it emerged into the intellectual contours commonly associated with the Latin Middle Ages. As Oakley comments in his general introduction to the series, one of his aims is “to address, and in adequate depth, the political thinking of the centuries labeled by the stubborn historiographical convention as ‘medieval’” (ix). On the other hand, Oakley also proposes “to effect something of a shift in the perspective from which we characteristically view that [‘medieval’] body of thought” (ix), presumably by demonstrating how it carried forward into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, thus demolishing the supposition of a “great divide” between the political ideas of the Middle Ages and those typical of the so-called “early modern” period.
I am unconvinced that these two goals fit together as seamlessly as Oakley evidently believes. My concern stems from the choices he is inclined to make among the texts and authors on which he concentrates. With relatively few exceptions, he discusses a narrow range of figures of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (most of them “canonical”) whose impact, directly or indirectly, he can trace into the political thought of later times. Thus, Marsilius of Padua, William of Ockham, Nicholas of Cusa, and similar prominent thinkers share the main stage. This is entirely defensibly if Oakley's main thrust is the second of the projects mentioned above. However, the consequence is to write out of the narrative a significant number of authors, texts, and genres that do not fit the mold.
One of the dominant expressions of political ideas during the later Middle Ages was found in the so-called mirror of princes (speculum principum) writings. The treatises in this genre were the most widely circulated and read works of political thought during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, finding an audience at royal courts no less than in universities. They were translated into numerous vernaculars. Although sometimes disdained for their supposed highly conventionalized and monotonous moralizing tone—lecturing rulers about governance according to the virtues—mirrors are now commonly regarded to be of great significance as works of political thought in their own right. Although Oakley, in the second volume of The Emergence of Western Political Thought in the Latin Middle Ages, discusses one very influential mirror, Giles of Rome's De regimine principum, he doesn't address other instances of medieval specula, which were ubiquitous. (He does, however, mention in passing Renaissance humanist mirrors [74–75].) We hear nothing about the royal advice books inspired by (or directly cribbed from) the pseudo-Aristotelian text Secreta secretorum that adopted a highly pragmatic approach to governance. The latter were almost never cited by schoolmen, yet enjoyed wild popularity among rulers and their advisors; hundreds of manuscripts, in Latin and in every major (and many minor) vernacular languages, are extant. Nor was the mirror literature thoroughly standardized. Texts falling within the genre could be highly critical, whether of corrupt legal systems and the practices arising from them (the anonymous Speculum justiciarioum), the royal mistreatment of the peasantry (William of Pagula's Speculum de Edwardi III), or the condescending disrespect for and abuse of women (Christine de Pizan). (The latter, by the way, is never discussed in any of Oakley's three volumes, despite the fact that she was arguably the most prolific political thinker of the later Middle Ages.) Any survey of medieval political thought that almost entirely overlooks such a significant body of writing is hard-pressed to claim “depth.”
Examples of other texts, authors, and genres of medieval political writing neglected by Oakley could be multiplied. In my view, the reason why he is so selective in his focus stems from his self-acknowledged “ambition to engineer… [a] reshaping in the constitutive narrative that has long served to frame the way in which we understand the full course of Western political thought” (ix). But this ambition comes at a price, namely, the exclusion of many thinkers and ideas that formed central elements in the story of the “emergence of western political thought in the Latin Middle Ages.” Nevertheless, Oakley's achievement in The Watershed of Modern Politics and its two predecessors is considerable. I hope that these volumes will challenge the complaisance of scholars and students who treat the Middle Ages as “an aberration, as a deviation from the norm,” in the history of Western political thought generally (ix).
