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The impact of private participation and countervailing information on disability costs: evidence from Chile

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

ESTELLE JAMES*
Affiliation:
Professor Emeritus, State University of New York, Stony Brook and Consultant, World Bank
ALEJANDRA COX EDWARDS*
Affiliation:
Professor of Economics, California State University, Long Beach
AUGUSTO IGLESIAS
Affiliation:
Director, PrimAmerica Consultores, Santiago, Chile
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Abstract

Many social security systems face high and escalating disability costs. In Chile's new system, the disability assessment procedure includes participation by private pension funds (AFPs) and insurance companies, who finance the benefit, have a direct pecuniary interest in controlling costs and are able to pursue this objective by helping to set criteria and providing countervailing information. We hypothesize that these procedures and incentives will keep costs low, by cutting the incidence of successful claims. Using the Cox proportional hazard model and a retrospective sample of new and old-system affiliates (EPS, 2002), we find that disability hazard rates are only 20–35% as high in the new system as in the old traditional system. Analysis of mortality rates suggests that the new system has accurately targeted individuals with more severe medical problems.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Table 1.Inflow to disability benefit status, Chile vs. US and OECD, 1999(new inflow, per thousand in insured population).

Figure 1

Table 2.Main sample composition by old vs. new systems, 1932–62 cohorts >age 40

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Table 3.Sample composition by birth cohorts, 1922–62a

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Table 4.Sample of disability pensioners by birth year, pension year and pension agea

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Table 5.Main sample composition by choice vs. no choice, 1932–62 cohorts >age 40

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Table 6.New- and old-system disability pensioners by choice vs. no-choice, 1932–2002 cohorts >age 40

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Figure 1.Kaplan–Meier survival as non-disability-pensioner, by system

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Figure 2.Baseline disability hazards by gender and marital status(getting disability pension at a given age as % of group at risk).

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Figure 3.New vs. old-system disability hazards for married men(getting disability pension at a given age as % of group at risk).

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Table 7.Determinants of hazard of disability pension for 1932–62 cohorts(Cox proportional hazard stratified by sex and marital status; numbers given are hazard ratios relative to baseline).

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Figure 4.Survival as non-disability pensioner, married men – Cox model(married men – by system).

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Table 8.Disability hazards: selection bias tests based on choice and no-choice groups

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Table 9.Probit analysis of mortality rates in new vs. old systems(change in probability of dying by 2002 in percentage points). Probit regression, reporting marginal effects.

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Figure 5.Kaplan–Meier: Survival rates (not dying) by disability status and system(survival from death at a given ages as % of group at risk).

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Figure 6.Cox model: death hazard among disability pensioners, by system(men – by system).

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Table 10.Estimates of determinants of hazard of death after disability pension(Cox proportional hazard model; hazard ratios relative to old-system baseline).