Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 February 2004
In discussions among nonphilosophers, the ethical argument from naturalness frequently comes up. “Of course, cloning should be banned—it is unnatural.” “Surely you cannot deny that homosexuality is unnatural (and hence it should be condemned).” “The immorality of gene technology is apparent because things like that do not happen in nature. Genes do not jump between species and crossbreeding produces infertile offspring.” Even those who come from a philosophical background can catch themselves thinking, “That is unnatural!” and finding grounds for suspicion from the thought. But what do we mean when we talk about (im)morality and (un)naturalness? What interpretations can be given to the ideas of natural and unnatural in ethical discussions? What are the implications of these interpretations? Are there good grounds for assuming that naturalness is morally better than its opposite?This paper was first presented at the Fourth International Bioethics Retreat in Paris, May 2001. I wish to thank the participants for their comments on my paper. This paper was produced as a part of the project Genes, Information, and Business, financed in 2000–2003 by the Academy of Finland.
In discussions among nonphilosophers, the ethical argument from naturalness frequently comes up. “Of course, cloning should be banned—it is unnatural.” “Surely you cannot deny that homosexuality is unnatural (and hence it should be condemned).” “The immorality of gene technology is apparent because things like that do not happen in nature. Genes do not jump between species and crossbreeding produces infertile offspring.” Even those who come from a philosophical background can catch themselves thinking, “That is unnatural!” and finding grounds for suspicion from the thought. But what do we mean when we talk about (im)morality and (un)naturalness? What interpretations can be given to the ideas of natural and unnatural in ethical discussions? What are the implications of these interpretations? Are there good grounds for assuming that naturalness is morally better than its opposite?
The connection between (im)morality and (un)naturalness can be traced back at least to Aristotle. But many philosophers have viewed the alleged link with caution. Two powerful conceptual criticisms can be found from the eighteenth-century works of David Hume and Jeremy Bentham.1
Hume D. A treatise of human nature [orig. 1739–40]. In: Raphael DD, ed. British Moralists 1650–1800. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett; 1991:510–1.
Bentham J. The principles of morals and legislation [orig. 1780, 1789, 1823]. In: Raphael DD, ed. British Moralists 1650–1800. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett; 1991:959–63.
Following Hume, I will start with three different interpretations of the word “natural.” The basis of the distinction is that what is natural can be opposed to the “artificial,” the “miraculous,” or the “rare.”3
See note 1, Hume 1991.
The concept of natural as everything that is not artificial seems like a promising idea. In the context of modern biotechnologies, especially when it comes to patenting genetic material, this distinction has been frequently used. It is usually held that people should not be allowed to patent natural living organisms. Further analyses have shown, however, that in gene technology the limits between the natural and the modified are difficult to set and that even if this could, by strict definitions, be done, the ethical questions would still remain open. Something made out of a human gene sequence can be classified as artificial, and hence patentable, but ethicists disagree on whether any living thing of human origin should be patentable in the first place.4
Macklin R. The ethics of gene patenting. In: Thompson AK, Chadwick RF, eds. Genetic Information: Acquisition, Access, and Control. New York: Plenum; 1999:127–37.
“Not man-made” is also, more generally, a possible definition for the natural. There are, however, three major problems in this interpretation. First, is there such a thing as nature apart from humans? Is not everything on this planet somehow influenced by humans? Our “natural” environment is in its current state because we have invaded every corner of the world and forced other living beings to adjust to this. Some places can, of course, be physically untouched by human hand, but the changes our actions have caused, for instance, in the global climate have still left their mark.
Second, a justification is needed to the claim that human beings are somehow different from the rest of the nature. What quality, event, or process could have enabled us to perform nonnatural or unnatural acts? Are we not a part of the natural evolution as well?
The third, and probably the most crucial, problem is that if the distinction between the natural and the unnatural is made by an appeal to human interference, the connection between morality and naturalness is lost. It is not a very good starting point for ethical inquiries to assume that everything done by the only (thus far) acknowledged moral agents is unnatural and hence immoral.
I am not convinced that naturalness, as opposed to miraculousness or to rarity, would do any better in this respect. Miracles are usually thought to be good, not evil, and the fact that something is unfamiliar, or does not occur that often, does not make it immoral. Unfamiliarity is, however, often the basis of our initial reaction to “immoralities.” Not so long ago it was quite natural to say that it is unnatural for women to take part in political life. The suffering of many minorities can be attributed to this prejudicial connotation of the term “unnatural.”
If we rely on the distinctions made thus far, the connection between morality and naturalness seems to escape us. But what if “This is unnatural, and therefore wrong” means instead, “This is against nature, and is therefore wrong”? What would follow from this conceptual turn?
In Finland, politicians have recently discussed the possibility and permissibility of same-sex marriages. In this debate, the line “homosexuality is unnatural, and therefore wrong” has often been heard. The argument has been used even by some members of the parliament, who have asserted that, because homosexuality does not exist in nature, we can be certain that it is wrong. Even assuming that these politicians have their facts right (which is a bold assumption), their deduction from nature to morality involves the logical fallacy generally known as “Hume's guillotine” (a term invented by Bertrand Russell). Hume questioned the way in which many philosophers move from how things are to how they should be without justifying this move in any way.5
See note 1, Hume 1991:504.
This is/ought problem is prominent in the ethical discussions concerning naturalness. Why would it be that if something exists in nature, it is good, and if it does not, it is bad? In fact, the matter is not understood this straightforwardly, given that not everything that exists in nature is taken to be good and, vice versa, not everything that is alien to nature is considered undesirable or immoral. There are, after all, seen from many ethical perspectives, bad things in nature. Not all patterns of sexual behavior among other species are universally praised (everybody having sex with everybody else, or one male having sex with all the females). The survival of the fittest can be a natural principle, but very few would like to adopt it as an ethical guideline. Then there are natural disasters and diseases, fighting against which is seen as quite acceptable. Why would it be that the nonoccurrence (or alleged nonoccurrence) of some things in nature proves their wrongness, whereas this does not apply to other activities—like modern medicine as a whole?
Maybe what is at stake here is “going against the natural order of things,” rather than acting in ways that are foreign to nature (if humankind is not a part of it). This can be interpreted in at least two ways. Actions and policies can be regarded as immoral because they “go against the laws of nature” or because they “go against the natural law.”
By the laws of nature I mean those invariances that science seeks and tries to describe. Laws of nature explain how everything works, and knowledge of them enables us to predict future events. Going against the laws of nature in this sense is a ridiculous idea—a contradiction in terms. We cannot, for instance, suddenly decide to move around against the laws of gravity. Our movements are subordinate to that law. We can fight it—we can create artificial surroundings in which it feels as if there were no gravity—but beyond that, nothing can be done.
The basis of this argument is empirical. We can understand the laws of nature, and we can know them quite well, but we have no control over them. The introduction of new elements—say, genetically modified organisms—to a system that we cannot control understandably creates fears and anxieties that are not totally groundless. What we should make out of these, though, is largely an empirical question.
The second interpretation of “going against the natural order of things,” the idea that it is immoral to go against the natural law, ultimately takes us back to Aristotle's ethics and metaphysics. According to his teleological view, every being has its “natural goal,” which is apparent in its “natural growth.” Here we find the first systematic formulation of the view that what is good and orderly (the nomos) and what is natural (the physis) are one and the same. The Aristotelian ideas were revitalized in the thirteenth century by Thomas Aquinas, the paramount natural law theorist. Immorality understood as going against the natural law is in the heart of philosophical discussions on (un)naturalness.
According to many natural law theorists, God is the origin and fount of natural law. But, as Frederick Copleston wrote in A History of Philosophy:
The natural law is expressed passively in man's natural inclinations, while it is promulgated by the light of reason reflecting on those inclinations, so that inasmuch as every man naturally possesses the inclinations to the end of man and possesses also the light of reason, the eternal law is sufficiently promulgated for every man. The natural law is the totality of the universal dictates of right reason concerning that good of nature which is to be pursued and that evil of man's nature which is to be shunned, and man's reason could, at least in theory, arrive by its own light at a knowledge of these dictates or precepts. (p. 409)6
Copleston FC. A History of Philosophy, Vol. 2. Tunbridge Wells, UK: Burns and Oates; 1999 [1950]. This is the Aquinian version. There are others who do not put so much emphasis on reason, but, following Aristotle, Aquinas did. Given that not all have the ability or time, a divine revelation, such as the Decalogue, is also needed.
It is an interesting reflection of the difficulties of the theory that the good of the nature is to be pursued, whereas the evil of man's nature is to be shunned. What conceptual work can “nature” do, if it can be either good or evil?
The point of the passage is, however, that the natural law can be grasped by reason as well as by revelation. According to Thomas Aquinas, the three most important rational precepts of the natural law for humans are to seek the preservation of one's own being, to procreate, and to seek the truth, especially about God.7
Aquinas T. On Law, Morality, and Politics. Baumgarth WP, Regan RJ, eds. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett; 1988:47–8.
The tensions within the model, however, make its application to real life difficult. An oft-quoted example is chastity for religious reasons—which goes against the precepts of the natural law, but can be still tolerated, even celebrated. There are explanations to this irregularity, of course, but exceptions even to the most fundamental rules are likely to cause trouble in further applications. Within the natural law school, reason, with the help of revelation, is expected to overcome these difficulties.
For those who do not subscribe to the natural law theory, the enigma is indecipherable. What if there are no divine laws behind the natural ones, and what if there is no divine being to begin with? Why should we seek guidance from a purely purposeless nature in which the name of the game seems to be the dominance of the mightiest, until they, too, must die? There is indeed an unsurpassable gap between Aristotelian-Aquinian theorists and everyone else. If there is a telos, plan, or reason for and behind nature, then nature can, and probably should, be taken as a guide. But if there is no such plan, nature seems like an odd place to start looking for ethical norms.
Philosophically speaking, if theorists want to uphold the connection between the natural and the moral, the argument of “going against the natural law” is their best bet. Without the presupposition of a natural telos for man and his planet, Hume's guillotine cuts the argument short. Natural law theory is one among many ethical theories, which are all, at least up to a point, applicable and acceptable only within their own framework. So the philosophical debate goes on.
In everyday discussions, we seem to be stuck with various arguments from (un)naturalness. The huge market for “naturally” produced necessities from clothing to medicine is just one manifestation of this fact. This is not to say that there is, as such, anything wrong with “naturally” produced things. It is just that, in the light of what I have argued, the fact that something is made “naturally” or is “natural”—if the distinction can, in the first place, be made—does not necessarily make it ethically good.
What, then, should we make of the word “natural” in ethical discussions? There are almost always prejudices hidden behind appeals to (un)naturalness. Prejudices should not guide ethical decisionmaking, but true expressions of anxiety should not be dismissed, either. And charges of unnaturalness are clear indicators that we have in our hands an ethical problem—something into which ethicists and others should look more deeply. It could be that with the development of biotechnology and the like, the whole paradigm of how we perceive the world is about to change.8
See: Midgley M. Biotechnology and monstrosity: why should we pay attention to the “yuk factor”? Hastings Center Report 2000;30(5):7–15.
To conclude, I do not think that it is acceptable to tie morality and naturalness together in the way prevalent in semiphilosophical discussions on the ethics of modern biotechnologies and other controversial issues. Further qualifications are needed as to what counts as “natural” or “moral” and why. I would like to suggest that this is the case even within the natural law theory. It is, after all, possible to disagree on what the correct interpretation of the scriptures is and whose reason can best grasp the true dictates of the natural law.