Hostname: page-component-74656f9884-8rzl6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-06T07:06:51.276Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Rise of Transnational Environmental Law and the Expertise of Environmental Lawyers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2011

Elizabeth Fisher
Elizabeth Fisher*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law and Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom. Email: liz.fisher@law.ox.ac.uk.
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The concept of transnational environmental law is used descriptively and prescriptively to refer to a multitude of legal processes which are distinct from transnational law in other legal areas. Hence, the rise of transnational environmental law requires environmental lawyers to reflect on their skills and knowledge and to foster both their contributory and interactional expertise in this area. That process of fostering expertise needs to be seen in light of a number of intellectual challenges, including the necessity to engage with comparative environmental law methodology, the need to not privilege one legal system over others, the need to engage with extended legal pluralism, the importance of thinking about the role of language in legal processes, and the significance of understanding the process of co-production.

Keywords

Transnational Environmental LawLegal MethodologyContributory ExpertiseInteractional Expertise

Information

Type
Invited Article
Information
Transnational Environmental Law , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , April 2012 , pp. 43 - 52
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

1. INTRODUCTION

A necessary aspect of being an environmental law scholar is the need to keep up with current legal and policy developments. While much can be said about that need,Footnote 1 one thing is very clear – it requires environmental law scholars to reflect on their own skills, knowledge and expertise. In some cases that process of reflection does little to re-orient environmental law scholarship as a whole. In other cases, it requires a dramatic re-evaluation. The rise of transnational environmental law falls firmly into this latter category.

2. A DIVERSION INTO PERSONAL HISTORY

Before pondering the nature of that re-orientation, let me digress into personal history – self indulgent I know, but bear with me. My first experiences in environmental law were studying undergraduate law at the University of New South Wales (Australia) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As Australia is a federal system in which historically most environmental law has been developed by the states, a heavy focus of the course was on New South Wales legislation and case law. My time was spent glued to the Environmental Planning Assessment Act 1979 (nsw) and my focus was on the decisions of the New South Wales Land and Environmental Court’. Federal competence in the area was an issue of significant constitutional debate.Footnote 2

At the same time I had the opportunity to work on a project concerning the precautionary principle, which included a national conference on the subject.Footnote 3 The principle had been included in the Rio Declaration in 1992Footnote 4 and had, in the same year, found its way into many pieces of federal and state legislation and policy.Footnote 5 This process of implementation was not simply one of relocating international law. Rather, the drawing on international law reflected local debates about the problems of scientific uncertainty in environmental decision-making, particularly in the natural resource sector.Footnote 6

At Oxford, I wrote a doctorate on United States (us) environmental and administrative law.Footnote 7 The whole ‘Australian in the United Kingdom (uk) studying us law’ struck many as plain weird, but my decision reflected the fact that in discourses about Australian environmental law and the precautionary principle constant reference was being made to the us experience, but in ad hoc and incomplete ways. After finishing my doctorate, I found myself immersed in many different discussions that crossed jurisdictions particularly because of work on the precautionary principle.Footnote 8 I also found myself teaching European Union (eu) environmental law and engaging more with international regimes. None of this was a one-way journey to higher and more significant realms. Rather, I found myself needing constantly to engage simultaneously with a range of different jurisdictions, so as to understand the nature of a legal problem and/or the nature of a regime. To understand the heated controversy surrounding the eu’s chemical law, reach,Footnote 9 an understanding of us chemical laws was needed.Footnote 10 The profound complexity of the role of models in environmental decision-making could only be truly captured in comparative perspective.Footnote 11 Likewise, the co-production of risk, public administration and law became starkly obvious when studied across legal cultures.Footnote 12 In these inquiries, New South Wales was not left behind and international regimes were not all encompassing. I found myself scrambling through nsw Land and Environment Court merits review decisions,Footnote 13 as well as understanding the scope and nature of the World Trade Organization (wto) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (sps).Footnote 14 The point is that to get the bigger picture I needed to understand all at once and I spent, and still spend, my days shuffling back and forth across legal cultures.

This history is unique to me but the engagement with a range of different legal cultures is typical of contemporary environmental law scholars. Our starting points may be different and our intellectual obsessions and neuroses diverse, but in nearly all cases we cannot remain with our heads down in one jurisdiction, even if we stay put in it. We find ourselves moving across legal borders whether we like it or not. Moreover, it means that for most scholars our publications cut across legal borders. The self-citation in the last couple of paragraphs may look obnoxious but it highlights that, as a scholar, I cannot remain focused on one jurisdiction only. Analyze the publications of nearly any other environmental law scholar and you will see a similar pattern.

What is striking about the fact that environmental law scholars have been constantly engaged with different legal cultures is how little of an intellectual framework or discourse there is concerning that engagement. We are all moving across borders, but are often doing so on the basis of hunches, guess work and a blind faith that what we are doing has scholarly legitimacy. This is not ideal, and what is needed is a firmer foundation for these scholarly endeavours. That foundation can be established through fostering our scholarly expertise and that fostering has two interrelated aspects. First, there is a need to understand what is actually involved in this process of moving across borders. Secondly, there is a need to understand the intellectual challenges involved in studying that movement. I consider each in turn below with the concept of expertise fleshed out in regard to the second of these aspects.

3. THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

My discussion so far has remained rather hazy on the concept of what is ‘transnational environmental law’. This is not accidental – it reflects the fact that, because there has been no sustained scholarship on the issue, there is little in the way of a coherent understanding of what it is. True, there have been outstanding scholarly pieces on the topic,Footnote 15 but that is very different from a full-blown research paradigm.Footnote 16 There is thus a need for a more rigorous understanding of the concept to be fleshed out.

In discussing the concept of ‘transnational environmental law’ I am not going to pretend that I have any in-depth understanding of transnational environmental law, but from my experience it has three important features which need further inquiry. The first is that the complete multitude of processes involved in crossing jurisdictional borders needs to be identified. There are processes of ‘uploading and downloading’,Footnote 17 regulatory diffusion,Footnote 18 and ‘trans-echelon borrowing’.Footnote 19 Similarly there is the creation of private and public governance systems;Footnote 20 the clash between levels of governance;Footnote 21 the overlap between different dispute resolution forums;Footnote 22 inter-governmental debate;Footnote 23 worldwide discourses;Footnote 24 and the concurrent development of particular legal doctrines and phenomena.Footnote 25 Moreover, as Lee and Stokes have noted, there is little that is universal about globalization which encompasses a range of different interactions and different forms of ‘mobility, visibility, and audibility’.Footnote 26

To understand transnational environmental law, all this needs to be charted and mapped in multiple different ways.Footnote 27 Thus, for example, there is a need to think about the role of lawyers,Footnote 28 the role of fragmentation,Footnote 29 the role of international educational networks such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (iucn), and the contribution made by dispute resolution processes.Footnote 30

Secondly, there needs to be a distinction drawn between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ in discussions of transnational environmental law. Much of transnational environmental law is inevitable and there is a need to understand why that is the case. The rise of cross-border interaction is not simply a product of common environmental problems but also of the type of nuanced processes that Lee and StokesFootnote 31 and othersFootnote 32 have identified. At the same time, it also needs to be recognized that the identification of ‘transnational’, or more often ‘global’, environmental law is an act of scholarly prescription.Footnote 33 This is not to say that these acts of prescription are not legitimate, or that a distinction between description and prescription is easy to draw. My point is that the distinction is important to identify in providing a firm foundation for scholarly discourse. A similar challenge can be seen in discourses about governanceFootnote 34 and customary international law.Footnote 35 To put it crudely, we need to distinguish between wishful thinking and empirical analysis.

The third challenge in thinking about transnational environmental law is recognizing the limits of current discussions about transnational law in other areas. This is because while the concept of transnational law has quite a long pedigree,Footnote 36 much of that has been in the commercial sector where the assumption is that the legal phenomenon being described is ‘non-statist’.Footnote 37 While there are, of course, examples of private actor regulation of environmental problems, the reality is that the state, in all its institutional and legal complexity, looms large in environmental law.Footnote 38 ‘Transnational’ cannot simply mean non-statist; nor is it the creation of some neat hierarchy of legal norms.

4. THE INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGES OF TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE NEED FOR EXPERTISE

All this is very sobering and environmental law scholars face some very profound challenges in researching and writing about transnational environmental law. Intellectual challenges are, of course, not limited to the transnational aspect of environmental law. I have written elsewhere with others that there is a need for environmental law scholars to take a very hard look at what they do and why they do it.Footnote 39 In particular, there is a need to reflect upon methodological choices, to map the subject, to engage with legal methodology debates, to engage with debates about interdisciplinarity, and to develop a discourse about the quality of environmental law scholarship.

There is a need to do all of these things in transnational environmental law as well. One way of thinking about this is that there is a need to foster expertise in transnational environmental law. Much has been written about expertise,Footnote 40 but for my purposes let me use a very simple definition: namely, that the term connotes a set of skills and knowledge that other scholars are not expected to have.Footnote 41 The focus then becomes the knowledge, skills and experience that are required for someone to be identified as a transnational environmental lawyer as opposed to another type of lawyer, including other types of environmental lawyer. Those skills and that knowledge and experience fall largely into two categories: contributory and interactional expertise. These terms are taken from the work in science and technology studies of Collins and Evans.Footnote 42 While the questions asked within the context of their work do not relate directly to law, it provides a useful frame.Footnote 43 This is particularly because their analysis heavily emphasizes the importance of language.Footnote 44

Contributory expertise refers to the sets of skills, knowledge and experience that are needed to contribute to the development of transnational environmental law as a discipline. This expertise is legal expertise and it is interesting to note four of its key features. First, transnational environmental law scholars need to contribute to a discourse about comparative environmental law methodology.Footnote 45 Indeed, the lack of much in the way of a sustained discussion of comparative law method in environmental law scholarship is striking when compared to other areas. In particular, there is a need to be wary of ignoring the finer details of legal culture.Footnote 46 The rise of transnational environmental law does not mean the uniformity of national laws. Thus, the legal cultures of the us, Australia, Singapore, and Canada have given rise to fundamentally different environmental regimes, even if the same regulatory concepts are being deployed.Footnote 47

The second key aspect of contributory expertise in this area is that any development of this methodological basis for comparison must realize that there is often no ‘home’ legal culture from which to study transnational environmental law and to frame an understanding of it. As is implicit in the above analysis, transnational environmental law requires constant engagement with a range of different legal cultures at many different levels of governance. Transnational environmental law is thus not simply international environmental law with a sexier title. Rather, transnationalism ‘breaks the frame’.Footnote 48 This process of breaking is both practical and theoretical. Practically, it does so by forcing scholars to not privilege one legal culture over another. This often requires a careful analysis of legal concepts and starting assumptions.Footnote 49 Theoretically, as Zumbasen notes, transnational law ‘presents a radical challenge to all theorizing about law as it reminds us of the very fragility and unattainedness of law’.Footnote 50 It also requires scholars to take legal culture seriously while paradoxically transcending the boundaries of legal cultures.

The third requirement in developing contributory expertise in transnational environmental law is a head-on engagement with extended legal pluralism.Footnote 51 By extended legal pluralism I mean the range of different legal and quasi-legal norms that can operate in transnational environmental law, whether international agreements, dispute settlement, policy-making, or negotiation. Legal pluralism is not just another word for the political science term ‘governance’, or for ‘soft law’. Rather, it is a term that signifies that there is much that is legal in transnational environmental law but that its legal nature requires careful and nuanced analysis. To put it another way, transnational environmental law is not just politics and it does have legal content.

The fourth feature relates to language. So much about the study of law is about the study of language, but once we move across legal borders the connotation and denotation of legal terms can change. Take, for example, the definition of ‘court’. While the concept obviously refers to a triadic adjudicative relationship,Footnote 52 it means different things in different legal cultures. Thus, care must be taken when discussing ideas such as environmental courts. The idea of ‘environmental principles’ offers a further example. While environmental principles have a high profile, they serve different legal functions in different legal systems.Footnote 53 The same is true of the idea of ‘markets’ and ‘trading schemes’.Footnote 54

Contributory expertise is not the only form of expertise that needs to be fostered in relation to transnational environmental law, however. There is also a need to develop interactional expertise. By this I refer to the need to interact with the other disciplines that relate to how environmental problems are conceptualized. In particular, there is a need to develop linguistic expertise in these other areas.Footnote 55 The development of this type of expertise is not just about reading the right textbook or knowing what a particular scientific term means – it requires understanding the complexities, ambiguities and nuances of environmental problems and discourses.Footnote 56 This often involves engagement with a range of different disciplines. Thus, understanding risk requires a multi-disciplinary approach,Footnote 57 as does making sense of the activity of modelling.Footnote 58 Fostering this type of expertise also requires the fostering of critical capacity – we should not just blindly accept concepts from other disciplines but subject them to the scrutiny we give to legal concepts.Footnote 59 Of course, it cannot be the same scrutiny, but the point about interactional expertise is that it highlights the need to develop a distinct expertise for addressing this process of interaction.

A key aspect of developing that expertise with regard to transnational environmental law is to understand the ways in which environmental problems can be framed in incommensurable ways by different legal cultures. The best analysis of this point is Jasanoff’s very powerful work on transatlantic debates about biotechnology,Footnote 60 but there are other examples which include Heyvaert’s recent and significant work on paradigms of risk regulation.Footnote 61 The significant feature of these works is that they highlight the process of co-production which is:

shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it. Knowledge and its material embodiments are at once products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; ... [Scientific knowledge] both embeds, and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions.Footnote 62

Co-production can also be understood as a process of ‘framing’, which acts as an ‘interpretative context’ that allows things to be made sense of and acted upon. This activity of framing is incredibly powerful:

Problems that have been framed with particular causal explanations can also, in principle, be controlled by addressing the perceived causes. At the same time, framing is by its nature also an instrument of exclusion. As some parts of an issue come within a problem frame, other parts are left out as irrelevant, incomprehensible, or uncontrollable.Footnote 63

Thus, if the problem of climate change is framed so as to be understood as a serious problem in one legal culture but not in another, then those different frames will be important in the way in which those cultures interact. Another example is the way in which social regulation is framed by trade law and public law – the former understanding it as a potential form of trade protectionism (whether implicit or explicit) and the latter understanding it as an exercise of legitimate state power.Footnote 64

What all this highlights is that environmental lawyers need to develop a subset of different types of expertise in thinking about transnational environmental law. I should make very clear that my saying this does not require the rest of the world to fall at the feet of transnational environmental lawyers and defer to their every utterance. Rather, it is my attempt to identify the importance of having certain skills, knowledge and experience in dealing with transnational environmental law.

I do acknowledge that the concept of expertise is not palatable to all and has been widely critiqued. Similarly, the work of Collins & Evans has been subject to criticism, particularly from those who argue that it does not properly accommodate the idea of co-production.Footnote 65 However, the negative intellectual baggage that the concept of expertise carries is a virtue, as it ensures that the term is debated and scrutinized. Thus, for example, expertise can be understood in terms of language, politics, epistemic communities, and academic culture.Footnote 66 All these insights ensure that the term ‘transnational environmental law’ is interrogated and not used in an unquestioned fashion. Seeing ‘transnational environmental law’ as an expertise is a way of seeing that the subject needs to be fostered, reflected upon, and held to account.

I should also make clear that nothing I say should be construed as claiming that transnational environmental law eclipses (or should eclipse) more traditional environmental law scholarship. While we all need to think about transnational environmental law processes, it is not the case that they are the only show in the environmental law town. Rather, my argument is that what we are seeing is the rise of a subdiscipline in environmental law. Indeed, for those scholars who are primarily based in one jurisdiction, the expertise they need to foster so as to interact with another legal culture may be more interactional than contributory.Footnote 67 This is because their scholarly focus is ultimately on one legal culture but, to make sense of what is going on in that legal culture, they need to refer to other jurisdictions. It is fair to say that environmental law is too sprawling and expansive a disciplinary area to be encapsulated into one disciplinary paradigm.Footnote 68

5. CONCLUSION

There is a temptation to think that transnational environmental law is a rather glamorous and jet-setting way to save the world (and, yes, I note the carbon paradox in that statement), but not a topic with substantive content. This is because environmental law scholars see policy and legal trends come and go. Transnational environmental law is not just the latest fashion – thinking about it is about facing the complex legal reality created by the multitude of legal cultures that shape, and are shaped by environmental problems. The intellectual challenges created by it require the fostering of contributory and interactional expertise, and what is needed is not a series of ad hoc intellectual contributions but a sustained discourse about the nature of transnational environmental law. In saying all this I do not pretend to have my head completely around transnational environmental law. Indeed, all of the above is only beginning to grasp what is a profoundly complex topic. By focusing in on this area, this journal has the potential to make an important contribution to the discourse and thus the expertise of environmental law scholars.

References

1 Fisher, E., Lange, B., Scotford, E. & Carlarne, C., ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21(2) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 213–50 at 228–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Commonwealth v. Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1.

3 This ultimately resulted in the edited collection Harding, R. & Fisher, E. (eds.), Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (Federation Press, 1999)Google Scholar.

4 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (unced), Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, available at: http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163&l=en.

5 For a discussion of this, see Fisher, E. & Harding, R., ‘The Precautionary Principle in Australia: From Aspiration to Practice?’, in O’Riordan, T., Cameron, J. & Jordan, A. (eds.), Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May, 2001), pp. 215–33.Google Scholar

6 J. Segal, ‘An Industry Perspective on the Precautionary Principle’, in Harding & Fisher, n. 3 above, pp. 73–82.

7 Fisher, E., Risk, Expertise and Judicial Review: Scope of Review and Decision-Making under Scientific Uncertainty (Thesis in Law submitted for a D.Phil Degree, Oxford University, 1998).Google Scholar

8 Renn, O., Dreyer, M., Klinke, A., Losert, C., Stirling, A., van Zwanenberg, P., Muller-Herold, U., Morosini, M. & Fisher, E., The Application of the Precautionary Principle in the European Union: Regulatory Strategies and Research Needs to Compose and Specify a European Policy on the Application of the Precautionary Principle (PrecauPri) (Centre for Technology Assessment, 2003).Google Scholar

9 Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 of 18 Dec. 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (reach) and establishing a European Chemicals Agency [2006] OJ L396/1.

10 Fisher, E., “The Perfect Storm” of reach: Charting Regulatory Controversy in the Age of Information, Sustainable Development, and Globalization’ (2008) 11(4) Journal of Risk Research, pp. 541–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 Fisher, E., Pascual, P. & Wagner, W., ‘Understanding Environmental Models in Their Legal and Regulatory Context’ (2010) 22(2) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 251–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 Fisher, E., Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2007).Google ScholarPubMed

13 Fisher, E., ‘Administrative Law, Pluralism and the Legal Construction of Merits Review in Australian Environmental Courts and Tribunals’, in Pearson, L. & Harlow, C. (eds.), Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in Honour of Mark Aronson (Hart Publishing, 2008), pp. 325–48.Google Scholar

14 Fisher, E., ‘Beyond the Science/Democracy Dichotomy: The World Trade Organisation Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism’, in Joerges, C. & Petersmann, E.-U. (eds.), Transnational Trade Governance and Social Regulation: Tensions and Interdependencies (Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 327–49.Google Scholar

15 See Lee, R. & Stokes, E., ‘Environmental Governance: Reconnecting the Global and Local’ (2009) 36(1) Journal of Law and Society, pp. 1–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which introduced a special issue on the global and local in environmental law.

16 Kuhn, T., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1970)Google Scholar; Lakatos, I., ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Science (Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 91–196.Google Scholar

17 Yang, T. & Percival, R., ‘The Emergence of Global Environmental Law’ (2009) 36 Ecology Law Quarterly, pp. 615–64.Google Scholar

18 Busch, P.-O., Jörgens, H. & Tews, K., ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Instruments: The Making of a New International Environmental Regime’ (2005) 598(1) Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, pp. 146–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 Wiener, J., ‘Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law’ (2001) 27 Ecology Law Quarterly, pp. 1295–371.Google Scholar

20 Heyvaert, V., ‘Levelling Down, Levelling Up, and Governing Across: Three Responses to Hybridization in International Law’ (2009) 20(3) European Journal of International Law, pp. 647–74Google Scholar; and Schepel, H., The Constitution of Private Governance (Hart Publishing, 2005).Google Scholar

21 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).

22 Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635.

23 E. Hey, ‘Global Environmental Law’ (2009) unpublished essay, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511188.

24 See Bogojevic’s discussion of the ‘global gaze’ in Bogojevic, S., ‘Ending the Honeymoon: Deconstructing Emissions Trading Discourses’ (2009) 21(3) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 443–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 de Sadeleer, N., Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University Press, 2002).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 Lee & Stokes, n. 15 above, at pp. 2 and 7.

27 Fisher, Lange, Scotford & Carlarne, n. 1 above, at pp. 245–6.

28 Kelemen, D., Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European Union (Harvard University Press, 2011).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29 Carlarne, C., ‘Good Climate Governance: Only a Fragmented System of International Law Away?’ (2008) 30(4) Law & Policy, pp. 450–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30 Stephens, T., International Courts and Environmental Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2009)Google Scholar; and Scott, J. & Sturm, S., ‘Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’ (2007) 13(3) Columbia Journal of European Law, pp. 565–92.Google Scholar

31 Lee & Stokes, n. 15 above.

32 Scott, J., ‘From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction’ (2009) 57(4) American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 897–942Google Scholar; and Heyvaert, V., ‘Governing Climate Change: Towards a New Paradigm for Risk Regulation’ (2011) 74 The Modern Law Review, pp. 817–44.Google Scholar

33 Yang & Percival, n. 17 above.

34 Fisher, E., ‘Unpacking the Toolbox: Or Why the Public/Private Divide Is Important in EC Environmental Law’, in Freedland, M. & Auby, J.-B. (eds.), The Public Law/Private Law Divide: Une entente assez cordiale? (Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 215–42.Google Scholar

35 Bodansky, D., ‘Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law’ (1995) 3(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, pp. 105–19.Google Scholar

36 Jessup, P., Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956).Google Scholar

37 Koh, H., ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review, pp. 181–208, at 184.Google Scholar

38 Kingsbury, B., ‘Global Environmental Governance as Administration: Implications for International Law’, in Bodansky, D., Brunnée, J. & Hey, E. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 63–84.Google Scholar

39 Fisher, Lange, Scotford & Carlarne, n. 1 above.

40 Evetts, J., Mieg, H. & Felt, U., ‘Professionalisation, Scientific Expertise, and Elitism: A Sociological Perspective’, in Ericsson, K., et al. . (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 105–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

41 M. Chi, ‘Two Approaches to the Study of Experts’ Characteristics’, in Ericsson, et al., ibid., pp. 21–30.

42 Collins, H. & Evans, R., Rethinking Expertise (University of Chicago Press, 2007).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43 Ibid.

44 Collins, H., ‘Language and Practice’ (2011) 41 Social Studies of Science, pp. 271–300.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

45 Fisher, Lange, Scotford & Carlarne, n. 1 above, at pp. 239–43.

46 Fisher, n. 12 above.

47 Cf. Purdy, J., ‘The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy’ (2010) 119 Yale Law Journal, pp. 1122–209Google Scholar; Godden, L. & Peel, J., Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2010)Google Scholar; Heng, L.L., ‘A Fine City in a Garden: Environmental Law and Governance in Singapore’ (2008) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 68–117Google Scholar; and Wood, S., Tanner, G. & Richardson, B., ‘What Ever Happened to Canadian Environmental Law?’ (2010) 37 Ecology Law Quarterly, pp. 981–1040.Google Scholar

48 Teubner, G., ‘Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems’ (1997) 45(1) American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 149–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

49 Fisher, E., ‘Risk Regulatory Concepts and the Law’, in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (ed.), Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the Governance of Risk (OECD, 2010)Google Scholar; and Bogojevic, n. 24 above.

50 Zumbasen, P., ‘Transnational Law’, in Smits, J.M. (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, 2006), pp. 738–54, at 739.Google Scholar

51 Galligan, D., Law in Modern Society (Clarendon Press, 2007), at Chapter 10.Google Scholar

52 Shapiro, M., Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (University of Chicago Press, 1981).Google Scholar

53 Scotford, E., ‘Mapping the Article 174(2) EC Case Law: A First Step to Analysing Community Environmental Law Principles’, in Etty, T.F.M. & Somsen, J. (2008) The Yearbook of European Environmental Law, Vol. 8, pp. 1–47.Google Scholar

54 Bogojevic, n. 24 above.

55 Collins, n. 44 above.

56 Dryzek, J., The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2005).Google Scholar

57 Bammer, G. & Smithson, M. (eds.), Uncertainty and Risk: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Earthscan, 2008).Google Scholar

58 Fisher, Pascual & Wagner, n. 11 above.

59 Heinzerling, L., ‘The Environment’, in Cane, P. & Tushnet, M. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 701–24.Google Scholar

60 Jasanoff, S., Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (Princeton University Press, 2005).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

61 Heyvaert, n. 32 above.

62 Jasanoff, S., ‘The Idiom of Co-Production’, in Jasanoff, S. (ed.), States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order (Routledge, 2006), pp. 1–12, at 2–3.Google Scholar

63 Winickoff, D., Jasanoff, S., Busch, L., Grove White, R. & Wynne, B., ‘Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk and Democracy in World Trade Law’ (2005) 30 Yale Journal of International Law, pp. 81–123, at 94.Google Scholar

64 Fisher, n. 14 above.

65 Wynne, B., ‘Seasick on the Third Wave? Subverting the Hegemony of Propositionalism: Response to Collins & Evans (2002)’ (2003) 33(3) Social Studies of Science, pp. 401–17Google Scholar; and Jasanoff, S., ‘Breaking the Waves in Science Studies: Comment on H.M. Collins and Robert Evans, “The Third Wave of Science Studies”’ (2003) 33(3) Social Studies of Science, pp. 389–400.Google Scholar

66 Abbott, A., The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (University of Chicago Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Sennett, R., The Craftsman (Allen Lane, 2008)Google Scholar; Haas, P. (ed.), Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Co-ordination (MIT Press, 1992)Google Scholar; and Evans, R., ‘The Sociology of Expertise: The Distribution of Social Fluency’ (2008) 2 Sociology Compass, pp. 281–98.Google Scholar

67 Collins, n. 44 above.

68 Plater, Z., ‘Environmental Law and the Three Economies: Navigating a Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in which Everything is Connected to Everything Else’ (1999) 23 Harvard Environmental Law Review, pp. 359–92.Google Scholar