Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 February 2004
As the issue of assisted dying continues toward more expanded legal standing, we shift our primary focus from questions of patients' rights to the largely overlooked challenges that face physicians who elect to assist patients in ending their lives. Dr. Howard Grossman, a Manhattan internist and plaintiff in the unsuccessful New York lawsuit to the Supreme Court (Vacco v. Quill), came forward to say, “Anybody who has done it knows that it is a tremendous decision that you carry with you forever.”1 We focus our attention on the psychological experience and philosophical conflicts faced by physicians engaged in physician-assisted dying (PAD). Based on those potential conflicts, we argue for a new model of the physician and patient relationship in assisted dying: a medical friendship.We wish to express our most sincere appreciation to all the physicians who spoke so openly and generously about what can only be described as profound and life-altering experiences with dying patients. We also wish to thank the Section of Philosophy and Medical Ethics of the Vrije Universiteit Medical Center (Professor Evert van Leeuwen, Ph.D., Chair) for consenting to serve as the host institution for this study. This project was also made possible by a generous grant from the Research Foundation of the Professional Staff Congress of the City University of New York.
As the issue of assisted dying continues toward more expanded legal standing, we shift our primary focus from questions of patients' rights to the largely overlooked challenges that face physicians who elect to assist patients in ending their lives. Dr. Howard Grossman, a Manhattan internist and plaintiff in the unsuccessful New York lawsuit to the Supreme Court (Vacco v. Quill), came forward to say, “Anybody who has done it knows that it is a tremendous decision that you carry with you forever.”1
Steinhauer J. Was it mercy or murder? The New York Times 1998 Oct 17:B1.
Philosophical and psychological repercussions confronting PAD practice revolve around personal conflicts common to accepting our own mortality as well as conceptual conflicts that arise in assisting to end life. In the first instance, there is a Freudian contention that, even though the conscious mind can clearly recognize the mortality of the self, the unconscious mind remains utterly convinced of the self's immortality.2
Freud S. Thoughts for the times on war and death. [(II) Our attitudes towards death.] Strachey J, Freud A (trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth Press; 1957;14:289–300.
Kübler-Ross E. On Death and Dying. New York: Simon and Schuster; 1969.
Becker E. Denial of Death. New York: Free Press; 1973.
There is also an intriguing hypothesis by Johan Huizinga that the acuteness of our concern with our own death is a function of increased individual choice when social control diminishes. See: Huizinga J, Hopman F (trans.), The Waning of the Middle Ages. Middlesex: Penguin Books; 1972.
On the philosophical and conceptual side, Allen Buchanan6
Buchanan A. Intending death: the structure of the problem and proposed solutions. In: Beauchamp T, ed. Intending Death: The Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall; 1996:23–41.
Intending death may be a special problem in medicine, but controversies over the moral status of intentionally killing reach far beyond medicine. The prohibition against intentional taking human life is so deeply ingrained—so morally primal—that the killing of heinous criminals and aggressors in war is rejected by some persons of undoubted moral integrity. Indeed, even those who find capital punishment and the killing of aggressors acceptable usually do so with a sense of profound moral loss and feel obliged to articulate and refine moral justifications for such exceptions to the general prohibition. To take intentionally an innocent person's life may seem like the very paradigm of an immoral act. One is tempted to say: if anything is wrong, that is wrong.7
See note 6, Buchanan 1996:23.
As a paradigm, the point is that we are not dealing with an absolute standard but, rather, with a critical mass of inherited moral thought. Paradigms operate as centralized pivots or guiding models in a system of belief. They serve that system rather like hinges uphold and support a door. As Wittgenstein once put it, “If we want the door to function, the hinges must stay put.”8
See: Wittgenstein L. On Certainty. Anscombe GEM, von Wright GH, eds. New York: Harper and Row; 1969:para. 343.
The difficulty is that PAD appears to fit neatly into the paradigm of an intentional taking, or assisting in the taking, of innocent personal life. That is, prima facie, PAD neatly fits the very paradigm of a wrongful act. The problem for Buchanan, then, is to provide an ethical defense of the growing public acceptance of a right to die that is logically consistent and commensurate to the moral weight of the paradigm against the intentional taking of innocent personal life. We are faced with a dilemma. Either we reject the paradigm and all that implies it, or we accept the paradigm and face the logical outcome of PAD being something we ought to have as a moral and constitutional right and at the same time allow a practice that conforms to the very paradigm of moral wrong: an ethical conflict of staggering proportions.
To articulate the problem, Buchanan considers what he believes are the two basic wrong-making features in intentionally taking innocent personal life: depriving persons of the good of well-being, and violating a person's right to life. Buchanan then points out that, in standard PAD cases, illness has already irreversibly deprived the well-being of the patient. Second, given that it appears incumbent in the very notion of having a right that an individual has the right to waive it, both wrong-making features of the paradigm can be seen not to apply in standard cases of PAD. Against the paradigm, Buchanan thus argues that the second wrong-making feature—against the intentional taking of life—actually reveals that patient autonomy arises as the appropriate norm to justify PAD practice in at least some cases.
Although PAD may have an ethical basis in autonomy, the articulation of the defense does not come easily and comes only at the expense of recognizing at least two deep conflicts; one psychological and the other philosophical.9
We make no claim to an exhaustive analysis of conflicts by exploring these two possibilities. Indeed, we expect many others to be uncovered as research evolves.
To address the impact of PAD on physicians, we argue that there is a need for a special model in the physician-patient relationship in PAD practice. The concern can be intensified by consideration of the following dilemma. Given the intimacy and emotional depths of entering PAD practice, should the practice be undertaken impersonally and with professional objectivity? Ethically, such an attitude appears callous and out of character with the momentousness of assisting a patient end her life. Alternatively, if this is the kind of activity where physicians should be more personally involved, would this diminish the professional competence of the physician? Our discussions with Dutch physicians turned in a unanimous report that, if the doctor is going to participate in PAD, a personal relationship was an absolute necessity.10
See also: Thomasma DC, Kimbrough-Kushner T, Kimsma GK, Ciesielski-Carlucci C. Asking to Die: Inside the Dutch Debate about Euthanasia. Dordrecht: Kluwer; 1998:271–364.
In “Models for Ethical Medicine in a Revolutionary Age,”11
Veatch R. Models for ethical medicine in a revolutionary age. Hastings Center Report 1972;2(3):5–7.
See note 11, Veatch 1972:7.
See note 11, Veatch 1972:7.
What finally distinguishes the contractual model from the collegial, for Veatch, is that there is to be no false sense of common goals implied by the collegial model, and the “lay community is given and should be given the status of contractor … but the day-to-day medical decisions can, with trust and confidence rest with the medical community.”14
See note 11, Veatch 1972:7.
See note 11, Veatch 1972:7.
In PAD, however, the moral paradigm against the intentional taking of innocent life emphatically indicates that the doctor who intentionally assists in ending a person's life is involved in one of the most ethically at-risk situations of the physician's career. As such, something needs to be said about measures that protect not only the patient's control over their destiny—in the face of significant choices—but also the physician's choice and destiny in these cases.
In beginning to view the issue from the physician's standpoint, let us consider some remarks made by Kenneth Vaux.16
Vaux K. Commentary: Debbie's dying: mercy killing and the good death. JAMA 1988;259(14): 2140–1.
See note 16, Vaux 1988:2141.
See note 16, Vaux 1988:2141.
Vaux's position leads us to believe that something of the “loving act” perspective should be included in the model of physician and patient in the context of an assisted dying. Both individuals would be well served by a process that promotes mutuality, but this mutuality is what Veatch ruled out as an unrealistic pipe dream in the collegial model of physician and patient. Our suggestion, however, is that the demands of PAD practice require that we reconstruct crucial aspects of Veatch's collegial model. The ethical and psychological implications of PAD practice require that the physician and patient construct a collegial bond for the benefit of both parties.
Adopting professional distance in PAD is inappropriate just because the physician and patient are entering into one of the most intimate of all human experiences. Here the role of contractor that Veatch assigns to the lay community seems very much beside the point. The issue of PAD is about two individuals sharing a situation of “life and destiny where profoundly significant choices are to be made.”19
See note 11, Veatch 1972:7.
The “loving act” perspective might gain clarity by reference to Aristotle's view that a complete friendship is founded on reciprocal love of virtue. For Aristotle, “if friendship consists more in loving than in being loved … it seems that loving is the distinctive virtue of friends.”20
Aristotle. Ethics. Book Eight, viii:1159a9–60a9.
The conception of friendship in a medical relationship has been encouraged by Ezekiel and Linda Emanuel. They advocate a Deliberative Model, where “the physician acts as a teacher or friend, engaging the patient in dialogue on what course of action would be best.”21
Emanuel E, Emanuel L. Four models of the physician-patient relationship. In: Arras J, Steinbock B, eds. Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine. 5th ed. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield; 1999:67–76.
See note 21, Emanuel, Emanuel 1999:69.
In PAD practice, the interests of the physician and the interests of the patient are quite nearly on a par. What seems to be characteristic of the idea of this model is something approaching a “medical friendship.” The emphasis of this medical friendship is an interpersonal process relationship between physician and patient. Dr. E, a Dutch physician who has not experienced serious backlash from PAD practice, put the matter as follows:
In my practice the average number of PAD [cases] is two per year, as it is in 50% of Dutch practices. An intensive interaction between physician and patient is very important. The process of coming to an interpersonal agreement is at the heart of a well-realized physician-patient relationship…. Euthanasia is the final stage of the intersubjective process. The patient informs the doctor about his or her complaints and the doctor informs the patient about the possibilities of medical treatment. It is a process with an equal position for both parties.
Along with Dr. E's views, we believe it is necessary to create an opportunity for the physician and patient to spend enough time in discourse to arrive at a medically well realized and ethically well adjusted similarity of understanding about when the process of the illness has gone far enough. The physician must respect the biological and biographical interests of the patient, and the patient must respect the (philosophical and psychological) vulnerabilities a physician faces by agreeing to assist in ending a life. Failure on either side shifts the relationship to one of utility. Consequently, a patient who wants a physician to assist in ending her life but refuses to enter the process of a medical friendship treats the physician unjustly. Not only in Aristotelian terms, but in a straightforward Kantian way, the patient is not respecting the physician as a person. In such a case, it is the physician who is being treated as a means to the end of others.23
We owe this point to a question raised by Jan Narveson.
Quill T. Quoted by permission. Personal correspondence 1998 Jul 22.
Earlier, we quoted Dr. A regarding the need for a personal relationship with his patients. What was not mentioned there were the qualifications Dr. A places on that personal relationship. Dr. A was clear that the personal relationship needs to be balanced with some emotional distance. He commented, “What I need in a close relationship with patients who ask me to help them end their life is a maximum of involvement with a certain emotional distance so that I can still exercise the necessary objectivity with full professional responsibility.” Dr. A also spoke of mutual respect required in the process. He said, “It is important for you to make your own limits clear to the patient.” Dr. A then gave a personal example of one kind of behavioral problem that he would resist. “I do not like it when the patient makes a party out of it,” he said. “Some patients want to organize a party around their bed. I do not want to do euthanasia in an atmosphere like that.” For Dr. A, the situation was also made difficult both if he did not like the patient or if the patient was a good friend. Dr. A said, “I find the decisionmaking process very difficult when I do not like the person at all. When I feel antipathy toward the patient … I will ask my colleague to take over for me … on the other hand, when somebody is a personal friend … I will ask my colleague as well.”
On the psychological side, PAD physicians have to be prepared to encounter conflicts regarding their unconscious picture of their own mortality. On the philosophical side, there is the conceptual conflict regarding the paradigm of a wrongful act and its apparent coincidence with PAD practice. We have shown that important arguments indicate that they do not in fact coincide, but one has to wonder how clear the difference is in the moral consciousness of PAD physicians. Given these conflicts and their implications for PAD practice, it seems evident that specialty practice in the manner of Dr. Kevorkian's proposal that advocates for a subspecialty in medicine called “obitiatry,” where obitiatrists would practice “medicide,” is morally unsound.25
Kevorkian J. Prescription: Medicide: The Goodness of Planned Death. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books; 1991.