THE MODERATION NARRATIVE

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Islamist movements were analysed in the context of the potential democratisation of the region, leading scholars to discuss their commitment to democratic politics or absence thereof. Thus, there exist numerous studies looking at Islamist movements as potential facilitators or potential spoilers of democratisation (Mortimer Reference Mortimer1996; Ghadbian Reference Ghadbian1997; Robinson Reference Robinson1997). Many of these studies questioned the democratic credibility of Islamists for a number of reasons: a widespread belief that Islam and democracy were not compatible; the perception that democracy was simply an instrument through which they would get to power to then install an authoritarian theocracy; and the conviction that they were too illiberal on matters related to fundamental rights such as gender quality or respect for minorities (Lewis Reference Lewis2002; Mozaffari Reference Mozaffari2007). Other scholars focused on the views of important Islamist intellectual figures to demonstrate their anti-democratic views (Belen-Soage Reference Belen-Soage2008, Reference Belen-Soage2009). Those who argued against such a negative view of Islamists did so by emphasising that from a theological point of view there was no incompatibility between Islam and political pluralism and that therefore the politicisation of religion did not necessarily constitute an obstacle to democracy. Paradoxically it could in fact be of help to its instauration by undermining incumbent authoritarian ruling elites (Esposito Reference Esposito2002).

Throughout the 2000s, the debate on Islamism and Islamist parties changed because the wider intellectual context within which Arab politics was framed had abandoned the assumptions of democratisation (Carothers Reference Carothers2002; Anderson Reference Anderson2006; Hinnebusch Reference Hinnebusch2006) to focus instead on the notion of upgraded authoritarian rule (Heydemann Reference Heydemann2007). The various strands of Islamism feature prominently within this literature and the focus is usually on how most movements progressively changed their most radical positions to embrace, at least rhetorically, the concepts of democracy and human rights, in addition to modifying their actual behaviour by entering into cross-ideological cooperative agreements with non-Islamist opposition forces (Browers Reference Browers2007; Clark Reference Clark2010). This vast literature builds largely on Olivier Roy's work (Reference Roy1992). Roy had pointed to the failure of political Islam as an ideological project alternative to the dominant values of liberal-democracy and had suggested that Islamists would inevitably bend to its requirements.

In any case, the main narrative through which mainstream Islamist parties are examined is one of progressive moderation (Schwedler Reference Schwedler2006) and the different ways in which such moderation occurs (Clark Reference Clark2006; Schwedler Reference Schwedler2011). The principal explanation for moderation is that increased political participation into consensual ‘institutions’ leads to the moderation of the demands of Islamists. As the political systems of which they are part democratise, Islamist parties moderate to such an extent that they will finally reject the label ‘Islamist’ and employ terms such as ‘Muslim democrats’ (Ghannouchi Reference Ghannouchi2016). Thus, through continued interaction and cooperation with other political actors, they learn to moderate their stances on a number of issues, most notably the acceptance of democratic politics and fundamental liberal rights. Islamist thinkers who had written about the compatibility between Islam and democracy or Islam and human rights are therefore ‘brought back’ to the political fore to impress upon Islamist activists that democracy is now the objective to be achieved. This is the case of scholars/political leaders such as Rachid Ghannouchi or Abdessalam Yassine (Ali Abdelkader Reference Ali Abdelkader2011). In short, moderation is about toning down highly ideological anti-democracy rhetoric and clearly illiberal policy prescriptions in favour of pragmatic choices leading to or reinforcing pluralist institutions and political rights.

Two types of studies have emerged within this broader frame. On the one hand, we have single-case analyses dealing with the ‘progressive moderation’ of specific Islamist parties such as the Turkish AKP, the Moroccan PJD, the Egyptian Brotherhood or the Tunisian al-Nahda (El-Ghobashy Reference El-Ghobashy2005; Allani Reference Allani2009; Wegner Reference Wegner2011; Gurses Reference Gurses2014). On the other, there are studies comparing the path towards moderation of Islamist parties with the one that other radical parties travelled in the past, such as the communist parties of Western Europe (Karakaya & Yildirim Reference Karakaya and Yildirim2013). In this context radicalism refers to the emphasis on practices and policies that derive from strict ideological tenets that need to be enforced even against the will of the majority to the detriment of both democratic procedures and liberal rights. The broad theoretical assumption is that this type of radicalism can be moderated through electoral inclusion where democracy exists and through cross-ideological and cross-party cooperation in opposition where authoritarianism exists. It should be mentioned here that there exists an alternative explanation for moderation in the literature on Islamist parties: state repression. By preventing the political participation of Islamists through repression, the state signals that their attitude towards democracy and pluralism has to change. Repression then leads Islamists to moderate their stances if they genuinely want to take part in institutional politics (Dalacoura Reference Dalacoura2006). In some cases, such as the one for the Tunisian Islamists of al-Nahda, this seems to make superficial sense, although Cavatorta & Merone (Reference Cavatorta and Merone2013) demonstrated that repression in reality simply delayed a process of moderation that had already begun within al-Nahda autonomously from state repression.

There are two important points worth taking into consideration when accepting the path towards moderation of Islamist parties as the principal narrative of political Islam. First, it should be highlighted that the supposed path towards moderation implies its original absence. While this might be true for some movements and parties, it might not be the case for many others, as their supposed conversion to the politics of moderation never occurred because it was already built in when they were first set up, particularly if one considers that the meaning of both democracy and human rights – key features of moderation – has been constantly evolving over time. Thus, the accountable and democratic political system they might have had in mind in the past is in conflict with its contemporary understanding, but this is also true for many other political formations of different ideological persuasions across the globe, in so far as essentially contested concepts such as democracy have to be examined in time-specific historical contexts. In short, the concept and practice of moderation has to be historically located. A deeper examination of Islamist movements might reveal that ‘moderation’ was always one of their founding traits when such a historical perspective is taken into account. Where their original ‘moderation’ comes from may vary from movement to movement and has to do with factors such as leadership, social basis or institutional context. What is crucial to highlight though is that accountability of rulers and respect for pluralism – key aspects of moderation – need not be ‘imported’ values or practices learnt through inclusion, but might be inherent to the rhetoric and practice of the movement. Second, the current understanding of moderation implies acceptance of ‘foreign’ norms by indigenous Islamist actors that without their ‘contamination’ with the global, modern and democratic world would not be able to adhere to democratic principles and basic human rights. This is a Western-centric view, which excludes the possibility that genuine democratic aspirations can be developed indigenously. This is clearly not the case, as heated debates on how to rule in Muslim societies have taken place for a very long time among intellectuals and political leaders (Browers Reference Browers2006, Reference Browers2009). Thus, it cannot be excluded that from the start, some Islamist movements might have wished to marry Islamism with democracy as conceptualised at the time. This is very much the case, for instance, of scholars and activists such as Malek Bennabi (Walsh Reference Walsh2007) or Rachid Ghannouchi (Tamimi Reference Tamimi2001).

THE MULTIPLE FACETS OF ISLAMISM IN MAURITANIA

Like other countries in both the Arab world and Africa, Mauritania has had a tumultuous political history, fluctuating between periods of authoritarianism – often – and periods of partial liberalisation – rarely (Clausen Reference Clausen2001; Mint Ainina Reference Mint Ainina2001). In 2012, the country was classified as having a ‘restrictive hegemonic authoritarianism’ (Szmolka Reference Szmolka2011: 21). Specifically, the military is the main decision-maker (Marty Reference Marty2002; N'Diaye Reference N′Diaye2006). However, Mauritania also experienced its own Spring starting in early 2011 in the form of widespread protests against the regime. Formally, Mauritania has a French-style semi-presidential system, but, given the power of the military, the reality of Mauritania, following the theory of the African ‘big man’ (Van de Walle Reference Van de Walle2003), is that its system is much closer to a pure presidential one where presidents enjoy vast executive powers because they are generally members of the military or enjoy their army's support.

The country has only known two years of difficult and contested liberalisation: from 2006 until 2008 (Jourde Reference Jourde, Friedman and Wong2008). In March 2007 free and fair presidential elections, at least according to the European Union (EU), took place and Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi was elected (MOE UE 2007). This period of political liberalisation, although rife with difficulties, allowed the country to enjoy a degree of economic support from the EU, while the Mauritanian military promised to also support these liberalising efforts, which ultimately permitted the country to hold pluralistic elections and find itself in a process of an admittedly volatile transition to democracy (Zisenwine Reference Zisenwine2007). Despite its promise to stay out of politics, in August 2008 the army once again intervened in the political process to depose Abdallahi. The new putschiste President Ould Abdel Aziz blamed the inability of the elected government for the coup, suggesting that under President Abdallahi there were both institutional chaos due to party fragmentation and widespread ineffectiveness in tackling the country's social and economic problems due to corruption and governmental infighting. In some ways the army's reading was correct. For example, the coalition of independents (the National Pact for Development and Democracy) that was supposed to support Abdellahi in Parliament broke up quite rapidly and the president ended up losing its parliamentary majority (Bensaad Reference Bensaad2008). Once in power, Ould Abdel Aziz organised new presidential elections for July 2009, but the electoral process was a sham. In the wake of the Arab Spring the regime faced reasonably strong popular opposition.

It is within this context that Islamism has developed in the country. As in the rest of the Arab world and increasingly in Africa, in Mauritania Islamists feature prominently on the public scene where they have been a constant presence over the last four decades with the Brotherhood tendency representing the majority and the Wahabi/Salafist tendency being minoritarian (see Table I). The complexity of the Islamist landscape in the country is an important aspect of the discussion on moderation in so far as over the last two decades the violence and ideological extremism of groups such as the GSPC-AQIM helped non-violent Islamists project an image of adherence to democratic procedures, respect for pluralism and individual rights. In short, moderation is not only historically contingent, but also relative to the discourse and practices of other actors operating in the same environment.

Table I.

Islamist movements and parties

Source: Authors

Y_ Yes; N = No

MB: Muslim Brotherhood; W/S: Wahabiste/Salafiste; MOV = Movement; ASO = Association; TER = Group Terrorist; PAR = Party

The empirical evidence for the arguments made here regarding the narrative of moderation is already largely available in the literature on Mauritanian Islamism, but it is here updated and treated in a novel manner in order to reflect more broadly on the conceptual and political limits of subscribing to the dominant understanding of the moderation of Islamism.

The resurgence of Islamist politics outside the control of the state dates back to the 1970s and the development of Islamist activism follows similar lines to the ones found in the rest of the region: it is connected to rising personal religiosity, increasing social welfare provision through Islamist charities, re-affirmation of Arab identity and dissatisfaction with state-sponsored modernising policies (Hames Reference Hames1994; International Crisis Group 2005; Jourde Reference Jourde2011a, Reference Jourdeb). The first organised Islamist movement in the country, the Jamaat Islamiyya, was established in 1974 as a social movement influenced by the thinking of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and therefore dedicated mostly to providing religious education and exercising its influence on religious affairs (Ould Ahmed Salem Reference Ould Ahmed Salem, Soares and Otayek2007). With respect to its political attitudes, the movement opposed the Mauritanian military and was favourable to the implementation of sharia law, its key demand. Despite its opposition to the ruling regime, the movement never espoused violence to overthrow it and preferred to focus on its social and educational activism. The choice of non-violence might have to do with the desire to avoid repression, but might also indicate an adherence to an agenda for political change based on integration into the political and institutional system of the country. In any case the movement was never legalised. It is interesting, however, to note that this group supported President Haidallah, who came to power in 1980. He implemented sharia law in the country and partially Islamised the state (Ould Ahmed Salem Reference Ould Ahmed Salem, Soares and Otayek2007). The decision to support President Haidallah simply because of his decision to make sharia the sole source of legislation was not acceptable to some within the movement because it overlooked the fact that Haidallah was a member of the military establishment and therefore not only an authoritarian leader, but one who was also responsible for the poor state of the country. This criticism towards Haidallah and towards the leadership of the movement led to the creation of a break-away group called Hasim (Harakat al Siyasiyya al Islamiyya fi Muritaniyya, the Mauritanian Islamist Movement) and indicates that accountable if not democratic governance was already important for many Islamist activists in the early 1980s (Jourde Reference Jourde and Miles2007a: 103; Ould Ahmed Salem Reference Ould Ahmed Salem2013: 184). Hasim remained an illegal organisation, which continued its educational work outside political institutions without espousing political violence (Thurston Reference Thurston2012: 6). The establishment of Hasim is a crucial step in the development of Islamist politics in Mauritania because one of its leaders was Mohamed Jemil Ould Mansour, who would later be the founder of Tawassoul, the most important Islamist political party in today's Mauritania.

If we were to attempt to trace the idea of progressive political moderation in the case of many early Mauritanian Islamists, it would be difficult to say how they might have changed over time. The two examples above contradict the assumption of political transformation and progressive moderation, pointing instead to the demands and stances of both the Jamaat and Hasim as being similar since the mid-1970s. Hasim in particular seemed to be quite aware of the necessity to achieve political goals such as the implementation of sharia through pluralistic decision-making mechanisms rather than through compromise with an authoritarian regime (International Crisis Group 2005). This discussion over means and ends within the Jamaat is what led to an internal split and the creation of Hasim.

It is important to underline that such discussions regarded only a very small number of activists and intellectuals, making it very difficult to associate diverging views about democratic procedures, compromises with the authoritarian regime or the institutional and legal transformations Mauritania might have needed with large movements. In many ways there were no large Islamist movements at the time and the Islamist camp was divided due to competing ideological influences (Ould Ahmed Salem Reference Ould Ahmed Salem2013: 7). Nevertheless debates among Islamists at the time influenced subsequent developments. The trend towards demanding political participation and representation resurfaced in 1991 when the Mauritanian regime partially opened up the political system. The introduction of multi-party politics was one instrument through which many authoritarian regimes attempted to renew their legitimacy both locally and internationally; Mauritania was no different. The president created a regime's political party that became the dominant actor and also legalised a few other parties to give the impression of an impending transition to democracy, which never materialised (Bonte & Guillaume Reference Bonte and Guillaume1994; Dupraz & Gaouad Reference Dupraz and Gaouad1996; Pazzanita Reference Pazzanita1996). Many believed that the opening up of the system was genuine. Hasim, for instance, at the time created a political party to participate in elections, but the party was refused legalisation. Another prominent Islamist and preacher involved in education, Mohamed Ould Sidi Yahya, wanted to unify the different Islamist groups and associations in a political party that could also compete in the multi-party elections that were going to be held. Sidi Yahya therefore worked to federate Islamists of different political and social persuasions and created the Umma party. The intention was to seek legalisation, but the regime refused. It follows that this federative experiment ended quickly because the illegal status of the party encouraged many of its members and leaders to retreat into social activism (Ould Cheikh Reference Ould Cheikh1994; Pazzanita Reference Pazzanita1999). As Jourde (Reference Jourde and Miles2007a: 109) states, ‘they [Islamist leaders] always played by the rules of the game and they were not radicals, as the regime portrayed them’. A similar point is made by Ould Ahmed Salem (Reference Ould Ahmed Salem, Soares and Otayek2007: 50) who argues that ‘Mauritanian religious leaders have been often law-abiding’. Seeking legalisation for the setting up of an Islamist party was a way for what could effectively be called ‘proto-movements’Footnote ¹ to challenge the rigidity of tribal structures and overcome considerable social divisions in the name of a wider and shared identity.

Having witnessed the capacity of Sidi Yahya and the Islamists to come to an agreement and establish party structures, the regime decided against legalisation for fear of an Algerian scenario and initiated a strong repressive campaign. What is important to underline here is once again the demands for participation and representation coming from the majority of the Islamist camp, however small, indicating that Islamists had come to terms with the idea of political pluralism and democratic procedures. In Mauritania, large swathes of political Islam have repeatedly demanded inclusion in the political system and therefore might qualify for the adjective ‘moderate’ since the beginning of their activism. Of course, demands for inclusion do not equate with moderation because the fear of many is that inclusion of Islamists could lead to their domination of the political system, which would eventually end with the instauration of a religion-based authoritarian regime. In short, the problem was, and still is, about what Islamists would do once in power (Netterstrøm Reference Netterstrøm2015). This fear is certainly legitimate, but, as Brumberg (Reference Brumberg2002) convincingly argued, it is quite pointless to second-guess Islamists a priori. While permission to create a political party might not be an indicator of subscription to democratic ideals, it is indicative of the willingness to participate in institutional politics. This in turn has a constraining effect on how the party might then behave because it signals acceptance, however passive, of the rules of the game, which then become difficult to overthrow without losing credibility. In any case, the repression following the establishment of Umma was carried out in the name of anti-extremism. This came, paradoxically and unsurprisingly, from a regime that did not want to cede power and therefore had an interest in representing Islamists as extremist and radical when in fact Umma simply took up the demands that movements like Hasim had made in previous decades. In many ways, the repression of radicalism and extremism was nothing but the attempt to eliminate political opposition, whether extremist or not (Jourde Reference Jourde2007b).

Following the failure of Umma due to state repression, some members joined a different political party while others went on to create civil associations such as Jamaat al-Dawa wa Tabligh. The Jamaat al-Dawa wa Tabligh was legalised in 1991 and therefore offered the opportunity to militants to remain somewhat faithful to their Islamist engagement without raising suspicions from the authorities because the association was keen to distance itself from political life. As Ould Ahmed Salem (Reference Ould Ahmed Salem, Soares and Otayek2007: 52) argues, ‘Mauritania's Islamism redeployed in favour of dawa’. In some ways, charitable and educational activities became the only way through which Islamism could operate, indicating that the authorities were willing to tolerate social Islam, but not the political one (Peter & Ortega Reference Peter and Ortega2012).

The retreat into society lasted until 2003 when Cheikh Ould Horma and Ould Mansour set up the Party of Democratic Convergence (PDC), whose objective was again to provide political representation for Mauritanian Islamists. The opportunity to set up this new party came about because of the institutional weakness of President Ould Taya (Bensaad Reference Bensaad2008). The PDC was established along the traditional lines of Muslim Brotherhood's reformism, which implied that it accepted and encouraged the procedures of democracy, a valence issue for the party. The PDC also made it clear that it rejected violence to change the political system. Despite these assurances, the PDC was not legalised and therefore could not run a candidate in the presidential elections and decided instead to support former president Haidallah. However the sitting president undermined Haidallah's bid because it had him arrested and only released him from jail the day before the contest (Bonte Reference Bonte2003). After the elections, the PDC had a change of heart about supporting Haidallah because he did not perform well, scoring a modest 18·7% (Ojeda Garcia Reference Ojeda Garcia2009), although it should be highlighted that the opposition argued that widespread electoral fraud had taken place. The PDC leadership did not focus much on vote rigging, preferring to re-evaluate the amount of support they had in society. Their support for Haidallah did not help the candidate achieve a respectable score. While this was largely down to the authoritarian nature of the electoral process, the party also began to question why their calls to vote for Haidallah seemed to fall on deaf ears. Thus, following the elections, the party surprisingly switched its support to the parties representing the usually discriminated against black Mauritanian community. Having won the presidential race with 67% of the votes and therefore strengthened his position, President Ould Taya initiated a new wave of repression against the political opposition (Ould Mohamedou Reference Ould Ahmed Salem, Soares and Otayek2007). While all opponents of the regime were targeted, the Islamists were singled out for the harshest repression in an already repressive context that had begun in the aftermath of 9/11. The policy of denial of official recognition for Islamist parties continued, their newspapers and magazines were shut down and many militants were imprisoned. The leadership of the PDC decided to lay low and ‘weather the repression’ (Thurston Reference Thurston2012). After 2005, the repression diminished and PDC leader Ould Mansour began to work on another political project: the creation of Tawassoul, an Islamist party capable of challenging the regime. In order to tap into the less-politicised religious constituencies, he built an alliance with Ould Dedew, who is considered the ‘spiritual patron of Tawassoul’. Ould Dedew is a scholar and a Muslim Brotherhood activist who enjoys a significant degree of popularity among religious Mauritanians. Ould Dedew has for quite some time defended the idea that democracy and Islam are absolutely compatible.Footnote ² The timing of this new political project coincided with a second attempt at political democratisation in the country. In August 2005 President Ould Taya was overthrown in a military coup and the junta replacing him promised to hand power to a civilian, democratically elected government. The promise was kept and a new constitutional text was introduced by referendum in June 2006. In November of the same year both local and legislative elections were held. The legislative elections were quite important because they saw the participation of Islamist candidates, although they ran as independents because no Islamist party had been legalised at this time (MOE UE 2007). Islamists decided to take part in the electoral process because they believed that the transition was genuine. The all-important presidential elections were held in March 2007 and Abdallahi, who was sponsored by the military, won the contest. He received 24·79% of votes in the first round with his nearest opponent Ould Daddah, leader of the socialist Coalition of Democratic Forces, taking 20·68%. In the run-off Abdallahi obtained 52·85% of the votes, defeating Ould Daddah. It is interesting to note that the Islamists did not field a candidate in the presidential elections, preferring instead to support the socialist candidate Ould Daddah or the black candidate of the descendants of former slaves (haratines), Ould Boulkheir.

Two conflicting reasons can be given for the reluctance of the Islamists to field a candidate. First, mindful of the Algerian scenario of the early 1990s, they were afraid that a good score on the part of an Islamist candidate would trigger a repressive reaction on the part of the military, thus ending this second attempt at democratisation (Brown Reference Brown2012). Second, the Islamist-sponsored candidate in the 2003 elections had not performed very well (Ould Ahmed Salem Reference Ould Ahmed Salem, Ellis and van Kessel2009: 57) and at the legislative elections of 2006 only a handful of Islamist independents gained seats (Aghrout Reference Aghrout2008). Thus, in order to avoid a potentially embarrassing low vote, the Islamist leadership decided to support Ould Daddah in an attempt to become part of the winning coalition. These two explanations are in opposition to each other in so far as the first one is built on the over-estimation of the Islamist vote while the second one underestimates it, but both can be deemed the product of strategic and pragmatic thinking. What is important is that the decision not to field a candidate in the presidential elections was not due to an ideological opposition to the procedures of democracy, but to strategic considerations that all parties and movements made at specific points in time through a very rational calculation of costs and benefits. Again, this attitude problematises the concept of moderation that the literature uses to analyse the political development and the policy changes that Islamists go through, because it indicates that there has been no real moderation in so far as this behaviour was consistent with their long-standing attitude towards participatory politics. The participation in cross-ideological coalitions and the support for a socialist candidate also suggest a commitment to democratic procedures that is not simply self-serving. As Ould Mansour has more recently repeated, the ‘choice to support democracy is strategic and not tactical’,Footnote ³ indicating strongly that it comes from a tradition of commitment to pluralistic politics.

Following on from his election Abdellahi decided to continue on the path of democratisation and legalised Tawassoul (Ould Hamed Reference Ould Hamed2008) with the ‘blessing’ of Ould Dedew who, as mentioned earlier, had always insisted on the necessity to combine democracy and Islam. The possibility to operate legally for the first time allowed the party to better sharpen its political positions with respect to the state of the country. Generally speaking, the party and its leader Ould Mansour stayed away from heavily influenced religious rhetoric and demands, preferring instead to concentrate on presenting the party as a defender of democracy and human rights, proposing for instance a bill against slavery.Footnote ⁴ The stance against slavery in Mauritania on the part of an Islamist party is very important, as it contributes to dispel the myth – both domestically and internationally – that slavery in the country is inextricably bound up with Islam. The priorities of Tawassoul in the period 2007/2008 were the consolidation of national unity in order to fully allow Mauritania to exit its authoritarian period while maintaining national solidarity between different social groups as well as strengthening democratic mechanisms.Footnote ⁵ As Ould Mansour stated very clearly, ‘Islam should be seen as a factor that brings people together and the party is therefore against the slavery state.’Footnote ⁶ In order to achieve these objectives the party was willing to join the government, although this did not ultimately occur apart from a very brief period at the end of the Abdellahi presidency in May 2008. Despite his liberalising reforms, the Abdallahi presidency was tainted with corruption and marred by its inability to deal with Mauritania's economic problems. The entry of both Islamists and socialists in his government in May 2008 further alienated an already disgruntled military, which Abdellahi had tried to marginalise. Following a tried and tested tradition, the military intervened once again in the political life of the country and carried out a military coup in August 2008 and some Islamist leaders entered into the national unity government that was formed in the aftermath – Mokhtar Ould Mohamed Moussa became Minister of Islamic Affairs and Education, for instance.

The new leader, General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, promised new presidential elections under pressure from the international community. The contest took place in July 2009. During the 11 months that elapsed between the military coup and the new elections, Tawassoul complained at first forcefully about the military coup and then attempted to come to terms with the new strong man once it became clear that Abdel Aziz was indeed going to call for new presidential elections for which the party could field a candidate (AVOMM 2009). The initial strong opposition to the military coup occurred for two main reasons. First, the party and its leader had for a long time campaigned for political participation and were therefore extremely wary of a military coup that seemed to turn back the clock to the days of repression and unaccountability. Second, and quite pragmatically, the party had just been invited in government by Abdellahi and was hoping to build on that in order to raise its profile and obtain what it thought were the overdue political benefits of office. The same reasons can explain why the party changed its position somewhat once Abdel Aziz called for new elections: they wanted to participate and they wanted to govern. Thus, in July 2009 the presidential race took place and for the first time Tawassoul fielded a candidate and the long-time Islamist leader Ould Mansour stood for president.

The elections did not go very well for the party, as Ould Mansour obtained only 4·76% of the votes (Ojeda Garcia Reference Ojeda Garcia2012). Abdel Aziz won the race outright with 52·58% of the votes. After some hesitation, in the aftermath of the presidential elections of 2009 Tawassoul decided to formally join the opposition coalition with Daddahs’ party and Boulkheir's APP. This indicates both the degree of pragmatism of the party and its traditional moderate stances, in so far as the party had no real problem in joining a coalition with political parties of different ideological persuasions (Jourde Reference Jourde2011b: 12), again confirming choices that had been made before. It could even be said that Tawassoul displayed a cynical degree of political opportunism in once again joining the opposition only after its opening to Abdel Aziz had been rejected, but this in fact further confirms that the party and its leaders tend not to behave very differently from other parties, because they attempt to obtain as many benefits as they can from the political system by changing strategy when necessary. One of the accusations often made against Islamist parties in general is that their high level of ideological commitment prevents them from making rational and pragmatic political decisions (Ben Mansour Reference Ben Mansour2002) and that therefore ideological moderation is necessary to attain political rationality. The evidence from Tawassoul and its predecessors indicates that ideological commitment to Islamism does not necessarily clash with pragmatism and rationality.

There are two reasons that should be highlighted when explaining this pragmatic approach of Tawassoul. First, ideology might not matter as much to political actors as it matters to political analysts (Cavatorta Reference Cavatorta2007). In the case of Tawassoul, striking alliances or negotiating with the regime is not really about ideological commitments, but about the political objectives that can be attained. Thus, at specific moments in time the cleavage that emerges as the most important one is not ideology, but whether one is against the policies of the president or in favour. Second, in Mauritania, the informal role of tribal linkages (Marchesin Reference Marchesin1992 Reference Marchesinb62; Marty Reference Marty2002) at times becomes more significant than ideological commitment and this is true also for Islamist parties although, theoretically, they dismiss the relevance of tribal links in favour of a broader Muslim identity (Jourde Reference Jourde2011a: 3). However, in the everyday practices of ‘politicking’ these tribal linkages do matter even for Tawassoul, as indicated by the attempts Abdel Aziz made to woo sectors of the party by playing on his tribal connections with some of its leaders (Boukhars Reference Boukhars2016). Eventually this attempt failed, but for a time Tawassoul was torn on this issue of joining Abdel Aziz despite its commitment to remain in opposition. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Tawassoul paradoxically radicalised its moderate demands. Following events elsewhere in the region, Tawassoul and a number of other opposition political parties joined in the Democratic Coordination of the Opposition (COD). The alliance, through the boycott of the November 2013 elections, sit-ins and street demonstrations, aimed at obtaining the same results other pro-democracy movements attained in Tunisia and Egypt, namely the departure of the president and a real process of political change (Lum Reference Lum2011; Mohamed Reference Mohamed2012; Mamadi Reference Mamadi2012). In this respect it is no surprise that the party condemned the military coup against Mursi in Egypt.Footnote ⁷ Despite this more militant stance against the president, Tawassoul ran candidates in the 2013 legislative elections. Some opposition parties boycotted the elections in protest and Tawassoul was able to gain 16 seats (out of 146) coming in second place after the UPR (75 seats of a total of 146).Footnote ⁸ The party is thus the largest opposition force in Mauritania, a position from which it can build on for the future. The choice to participate in the elections despite the boycott of other opposition forces with which Tawassoul had collaborated is another demonstration of the rational strategising and commitment to the mechanisms of democracy of the party, irrespective of the authoritarian constraints in place.

The party has made it clear where it stands regarding its position on the necessity to set up an accountable political system. First of all, there is heavy emphasis on the consolidation of national unity in order to avoid social and political chaos if the regime folds. Second, this national unity can only be achieved if there is a shared acknowledgment of the right to ethnic and cultural diversity. Tawassoul is aware of the ethnic and social complexity of the country and therefore it aims at appeasing all groups by stating that it is in favour of the recognition of important group rights. For instance, in March 2012, the party strongly condemned the repression against the slavery abolitionist movement IRA.Footnote ⁹ Third, the party re-emphasised the necessity to protect individual freedoms and human rights, including the right to private property. Finally, but no less significantly, the party re-stated its commitment to the proper implementation of the Constitution and to democratic mechanisms and procedures to allow peaceful changes in power. In order to further provide evidence of its commitment to democratic change, Tawassoul has often reiterated its support for demonstrators and movements in opposition to ruling elites across the region from Tunisia to Syria.Footnote ¹⁰ Irrespective of the outcome of the Arab Spring in Mauritania, Tawassoul has continued to stick to its peaceful methods of political activity and its consistent moderation over time challenges the notion that it moderated through inclusion.