Paternalism: Theory and Practice is an important contribution to an ever-growing literature on the meaning of and possible justifications for ‘paternalism’. Eleven of its 13 chapters were presented at a 2011 workshop at Bowling Green State University: “Freedom, Paternalism and Morality”. While one can quibble with some editorial choices, the decision to publish the proceedings as a book cannot be faulted. Nearly every essay in Paternalism makes an important contribution to value theory. Political philosophers, ethicists, and philosophers of law should read this text to remain current in paternalism studies.
As Gerald Dworkin points out in Paternalism’s first chapter, the meaning of the term ‘paternalism’ is contested. It is used in so many different ways that one may question its value and worry that any collection of essays devoted to paternalism that does not stipulate a meaning will be too varied to cohere. This worry could be particularly acute here; conference proceedings are often varied. Luckily, while the meaning of the term ‘paternalism’ does vary throughout Paternalism, this is not a major deficit. As Coons and Weber note in their introduction—which provides an overview of the field rather than an overview of the collection—several recent works challenge traditional views on paternalism. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s influential works on ‘libertarian paternalism’ and Seana Shiffrin’s excellent 2000 Philosophy & Public Affairs piece, “Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine & Accommodation”, serve as examples. This reimagining of paternalism does not entail that the meaning of ‘paternalism’ should be fluid. After all, Dworkin makes a convincing case that one can assess competing definitions of the term. Instead, further work needs to be done to better understand the concept. An ecumenical approach at the outset proves advisable.
Nearly every chapter in Paternalism is commendable. The strongest essays serve three purposes: they contribute to general philosophical studies of paternalism, continue particularly salient debates, and establish the importance of and ground rules for future research programs. The first two chapters are important examples. Dworkin contributes a collection of popular definitions of paternalism and highlights their differences. He then argues that definitions matters and particular definitions are preferable to others. His schema for assessing their relative merits is another important contribution, which provides guidance for future research. Dworkin concludes by applying this schema to Shiffrin’s work, offering a detailed examination of her view that links up with a particular current debate on paternalism.
Douglas Husak’s second chapter then defends a type of paternalism. His limited defense of “penal paternalism” is “complex”, “sensitive to empirical facts” and closely related to his influential theory of criminalization (39-40). Husak not only argues for this partial justification, but also deals with common challenges to each feature of his account by continuing his debate with one of his strongest critics: Heidi Hurd. Finally, Husak provides guidance for future research programs in the form of “six constraints that must be satisfied before a penal law [including paternalist laws] … may be enacted and enforced” (42ff). Though one could arguably avoid some constraints by adopting a different theory of criminalization, Husak’s research program is important given his influence on criminal law theory.
Yet even articles that do not include all three elements prove enlightening. For instance, Danny Scoccia’s chapter does not explicitly include a research program but it makes important points about the relationship between autonomy and paternalism as well as the work of Joel Feinberg. Scoccia also contributes new cases to the literature, which is another common feature of the book’s theoretical chapters. While Paternalism includes good work on traditional paternalism cases about suicide and drugs, it should be commended for the number of different cases that appear within it, particularly in Richard Arneson’s and Lawrence Alexander’s respective contributions.
Several essays fit together into research clusters, providing further support for the decision to publish the collection. For instance, Peter de Marneffe, Scoccia, Daniel M. Haybron and Anna Alexandrova, J.S Blumenthal-Barby, and Jeremy A. Blumenthal all focus on the relationship between autonomy-focused political philosophies (such as libertarianism); the latter three can further be read as responses to Thaler and Sunstein. Paternalism may have been more accessible if it had been divided into sections that explicitly highlighted these broader research clusters. Yet even prima facie unnatural pairings can be used to great effect; e.g., Dworkin’s schema can be used to assess the other chapters’ responses to their own versions of ‘paternalism’.
Many contributors, including Husak, Michael Cholbi, and Haybron and Alexandrova, build on their earlier work on similar topics. One does not, however, need to be familiar with the contributors’ earlier work to appreciate their work in Paternalism. The aforesaid serve as introductions or updates to the authors’ larger projects. Whether the updates are improvements is subject to debate. Husak is likely too easy on Hurd when continuing their debate; he is no longer certain that his private/public wrongs distinction can serve as the basis for an adequate constraint (49), but I hope he does not concede the point. Scholars interested in these thinkers should read these new works to assess the argumentative developments.
Some background knowledge is nonetheless important. While Coons and Weber set out the general philosophical terrain well and most authors do an able job of providing necessary context for their arguments, inclusion of previously published texts could have made Paternalism more accessible to neophytes. For instance, Shriffin’s paper is widely available, but its inclusion in this collection would have made for an easier entrance into this complex field. Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge obviously could not be included in full and may not be easily excerpted, but including one of their articles would also have been valuable.
Ultimately, Paternalism is an important collection of philosophical works. The inclusion of the phrase ‘Practice’ in the subtitle may be misleading. Several articles explain the implications of their views for public policy. Only one provides a detailed description of a particular social policy and it fits uneasily with the larger collection. Public policy experts must work to link Paternalism’s important philosophical work with larger practical concerns, but philosophically-inclined decision-makers could do worse than read Paternalism.
