This edited volume begins with the premise that increasingly high levels of polarization in American politics—particularly in Congress—are problematic. In part, this is because the definition of polarization, which provides a starting point for the book, captures some of negative consequences or side-effects of a more narrow form of ideological polarization (e.g., increasing distance between the two parties and decreasing heterogeneity within each party)—including hyperpartisanship, gridlock and obstruction, and incivility (p. 4). Added to this premise is a review of the available evidence for different explanations for polarization (Chapter 2), and an argument that polarization is asymmetric (and thus solutions must address differences between Democrats and Republicans) (Chapter 3). The solutions that follow fall into four categories—reforming the electoral system, strengthening parties, empowering and informing moderate voters, and lowering barriers to policymaking.
Across these categories, the discussion of polarization and potential solutions fall into those that seek to reduce the level of polarization in a more narrow sense (i.e., partisan and ideological divergence in Congress) and those that want to address the negative consequences of polarization (i.e., gridlock and incivility). It is important to remember that these are not necessarily the same thing. As many of the authors note, polarization—defined by ideological divergence between the two parties—is not a problem in and of itself. Many of the more pressing concerns are side-effects of this more narrow definition of polarization and can be addressed even if parties offer voters distinct choices.
The proposed solutions offer many imaginative and thought-provoking options. Among the most interesting proposals are supermajority rules for selecting congressional leadership to make the leadership accountable to a bipartisan majority (Chapters 6 and 17), compulsory voting to increase the voice of moderates and to make the general electorate more important than the primary electorate (Chapter 7), softening the effects of the filibuster through a storable vote system that would account for Senators’ intensity of preferences over issues (Chapter 11), leveraging data science to provide information about candidate positions to voters (Chapter 12), and designing media coverage to discouraging reflexive partisanship (Chapter 13).
Perhaps most surprising, however, are the chapters advocating the strengthening of parties. While many of the complaints about polarization in the media demonize parties, a number of authors in this book offer compelling arguments for why stronger parties could lessen polarization itself and/or reduce the negative side effects of polarization. For instance, Nolan McCarty provides a compelling rationale for why either very weak or very strong parties would limit polarization (as candidates converge to political center), but why intermediately strong parties produce high levels of polarization (Chapter 9). Similarly, Nathaniel Persily notes that polarization is exacerbated by the “relative weakness of party organizations and leaders vis-à-vis outside groups” (p. 123). Campaign finance and primary reforms that strengthen the relative influence of party organizations could help parties support mainstream rather than fringe candidates (Chapter 8). Arguments along these lines fit with a growing body of scholarship that examines the goals of ideologues (and interest groups) versus the goals of parties (e.g., see Hans Noel, Political Parties and Political Ideologies in America, 2013). Stronger parties may also be able to minimize some of the negative consequences of polarization. Richard H. Pildes advocates that stronger parties would counteract the effects of political fragmentation and increase the capacity to govern (Chapter 10). He notes that recent government shutdowns resulted, not from strong parties, but from “the inability of party leaders to bring recalcitrant minority factions of their parties and individual members along to make the deals that the party leaders believed necessary” (p. 147).
The proposed solutions to polarization also serve to highlight some of the broader debates in the field, such as why a polarized Congress can persist even if the majority of the public is more moderate (an argument made by Morris Fiorina in Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America [2005], among others) or when policies result in gridlock rather than compromise. In Chapter 7, Jonathan Rodden notes that “districts where the presidential vote is near 50% do not necessarily contain a large density of moderates” (p. 109) and as such, do not elect moderate members of Congress who will work across the aisle. Rather, “much of the supposedly red ‘rural’ America is a patchwork of very Democratic towns, … and a large Republican periphery” (p. 109–12). Thus, elected officials must represent either their staunch Republican majority or their Democratic minority. Taking a moderate approach potentially leaves nearly everyone unsatisfied. Regarding the difficulties reaching compromises in Congress, Sarah Binder and Frances Lee emphasize that policies and politics are inextricably linked (Chapter 18), while Jane Mansbridge discusses how human errors (i.e., self-serving bias and fixed-pie bias) and transparency laws hamper successful negotiations (Chapter 19). George C. Edwards III adds that efforts to “go public” also hurt negotiation and compromise (Chapter 20). Instances of successful negotiations such as those in the 105th Congress (1997–1998) can be attributed to neither side moving the issues into the public arena. In essence, “governing by campaigning is anti-deliberative” (p. 276).
While not all of the proposed reforms are backed by empirical evidence, the speculative nature of the reforms is ultimately a strength of this book. Rather than asking scholars to state only what they can say with a high degree of confidence, the structure and stated purpose of this edited volume opens the door for scholars to draw on what they know as experts in their fields and offer even tentative solutions to polarization. As a result, this book provides the chance for experts to connect what they know about elections, parties, and polarization to the problems facing contemporary politics. This makes the insights of scholars more accessible to a wide audience. Not only may ordinary citizens not read theoretical and empirical scholarly books and articles, but even when they do, ordinary citizens may be ill-prepared to infer the types of solutions that would follow from scholarly research on the causes or consequences of polarization. This book offers a way for scholars to “connect the dots” for non-experts.
Although the upside of an edited volume is the inclusion of a wide range of ideas, the downside is a loss of cohesion across chapters. For instances, while the introductory chapters emphasize some of the weaknesses of conventional explanations for polarization (e.g., gerrymandering, primaries, etc.), solutions to polarization that rely on changes to primaries or district boundaries show up in subsequent chapters without sufficient acknowledgement to why these reforms would help if the institutions are not closely related to polarization in the first place. Moreover, several chapters propose the same or similar reforms (e.g., redistricting reform, primary election reform, campaign finance reform, etc.). While perhaps pointing to these potential solutions as particularly important, the repetition may lead some readers to skip over chapters or sections that have similar points. Finally, several chapters draw heavily on material published in the American Political Science Association Task Force report (Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin, eds., Negotiating Agreement in Politics, 2013). While this makes the findings in that report accessible to a broader audience, it reduces the new contribution of this book for scholars who may have read this material elsewhere.
