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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2005
In this book, Paul Foos seeks to rescue the Mexican-American War from its status as a forgotten war, a status it has long shared with the Korean War. His approach is in keeping with recent work on the history of war from the perspective of the ordinary soldier, the regulars and militiamen who did the fighting at the front, not from the perspective of the generals. He thus mines a rich and fruitful seam of first person accounts written by soldiers themselves in the form of letters and memoirs long overlooked by historians. He seeks to correct two standard interpretations of the war. One of these, in the triumphalist tradition, interprets the conflict as a limited war that reflected and unleashed American “nationalism;” the other sees it as a victory for moralistic political elites who rescued the nation from the reckless expansionism of Southern extremists by limiting the acquisition of Mexican land in the final settlement. Both interpretations—and the second in particular—spotlight the leading men, insisting it was a war that the “masses” did not “understand, nor did they care” (9). Readers of this lively and eye-opening book are unlikely to put much credence in the received wisdom.
In this book, Paul Foos seeks to rescue the Mexican-American War from its status as a forgotten war, a status it has long shared with the Korean War. His approach is in keeping with recent work on the history of war from the perspective of the ordinary soldier, the regulars and militiamen who did the fighting at the front, not from the perspective of the generals. He thus mines a rich and fruitful seam of first person accounts written by soldiers themselves in the form of letters and memoirs long overlooked by historians. He seeks to correct two standard interpretations of the war. One of these, in the triumphalist tradition, interprets the conflict as a limited war that reflected and unleashed American “nationalism;” the other sees it as a victory for moralistic political elites who rescued the nation from the reckless expansionism of Southern extremists by limiting the acquisition of Mexican land in the final settlement. Both interpretations—and the second in particular—spotlight the leading men, insisting it was a war that the “masses” did not “understand, nor did they care” (9). Readers of this lively and eye-opening book are unlikely to put much credence in the received wisdom.
Foos pursues two objectives within his revisionist framework. He tries to show that individual soldiers differed in their perspectives on the war. He also tries to link the war to the larger context in which it played out, notably the effusive doctrine of Manifest Destiny that animated journalists and political elites, the shifting institutional arrangements of the military, and the systems of class domination in the United States and in Mexico. He is more consistently successful in achieving his first goal. The second goal is compromised somewhat by neglect of the ideological setting.
Though Manifest Destiny is no mystery, it is certainly worth a fresh look, all the more so because it is identified throughout as the decisive motivational force in politics and on the field of battle. Instead, it is assumed and referred to, not simply as a rationale for the war in the first place but more important, for the mayhem and atrocities on the ground, which became a major feature of the conflict and which Foos recounts in vivid and compelling detail. It is plausible, as he writes, that the official ideology of the war's promoters “was nakedly opportunistic and expressly promised plunder as the right of the volunteer,” but this bold claim needs more support than a few scattered references (113). As for the question of class, there was an undeniable class dimension at work in the recruitment of soldiers and in the treatment of them, but Foos pushes this line of reasoning too hard, with tendentious assertions of class interest, both within the army and across national lines. Thus, we are told that had the New York authorities followed the democratic blueprint for militia organization outlined by the radical populist Mike Walsh, “American workers and Mexican peasants might have found they had much in common” (81). The text is also marred by dubious psychologizing, characteristic of a recent strand of thinking on the historiography of race. Is it possible to show that American soldiers “saw in Mexican institutions and society a corrupted version of themselves and their own institutions” (132)?
Foos is considerably more compelling when he sticks closer to the narratives embedded in his sources. He begins with revealing chapters on the workings of the military, explaining distinctions between the regular army and the volunteer units. He offers a vivid social portrait of the regular army's officer corps and an unparalleled one of its soldiers, about forty per cent of whom were foreign born and over a third illiterate—and with good reason. Though enlistment was voluntary in theory, in fact officers and the recruiting stations set up by the national government resorted to “compulsory recruitment,” (61) impressing men from work crews and even jails to fill out regiments as they marched along. Conditions were simply horrible and the pay not much better. Discipline ranged from strict to harsh, and in either case far more overbearing than the regime of the volunteer units. Foos gives the most rounded picture of the volunteers we have through a series of case studies, which disclose how the volunteer militias quickly displaced the decrepit system of state militias sustained by universal military training and conducted on democratic principles marked by election of officers, negotiation of conditions, and so on. Governors and local officials honored traditional practices in the breech, giving local and state elites a free hand to do pretty much as they pleased, which effectively erased the distinction between the private volunteer units and the regular army. They used everything from bribery to coercion and were not above drawing on the most unruly elements, sometimes welcoming street gangs into their ranks. The heavy-handedness of an unimpressive officer core, rotten with nepotism and patronage, coupled with terrible conditions and broken promises, roiled the young recruits with at least some awareness of republican conventions. The predictable result was great desertion, which, interestingly enough, was higher on the way to the front than at the front itself. And though desertion was higher still in peacetime (thirty percent), Foos calculates that the “Mexican War had the highest rate of desertion of any American War” (25).
Such rag-tag soldiers were thrust into a land at war with itself. Central authority in Mexico, weak and battle-shy to begin with, collapsed during the war, leaving the hinterlands to an elite divided against itself and against laborers and small holders angered by heavy taxes and eager for land. The officers of the regular army, notably Winfield Scott, tried to impose discipline early on to avert atrocities, but soon gave up in frustration; their counterparts in the militias encouraged reprisal and retribution or looked the other way, as their men, motivated by a mix of nationalism, racism, and the instinct for survival, looted homes and churches and killed soldiers and civilians alike. Some felt no remorse, but others, as Foos astutely points out, were shamed and disgusted even if they felt no particular sympathy for their hapless victims in one of the darker and more shameful chapters in the history of the American military. One cannot read Foos's account of the atrocities without a deep sense of dread, deepened by the possibility of still another US intervention abroad, as this is being written.
Nor can one consider the impact such men had on war and its aftermath without thinking about the impact of the ordinary solider and domestic critics on the Vietnam War. One of the more arresting accounts of Vietnam attributes the American withdrawal and defeat not to opposition at home but to the collapse of the army in the field, an almost complete breakdown of discipline and control that made prosecution of the war next to impossible. Foos finds something similar at work in the Mexican War. He argues that the ordinary soldier's rejection of authority on the field of battle blunted the more ambitious expansionist project of the Polk administration. Other historians, of course, see it differently, crediting Conscience Whigs, Libertyites, and would-be Free Soilers with defeating Polkism. One can question Foos's emphasis here, for we do not have to choose between these interpretations. Each is valid and together they provide a more complete picture of the forging of the peace. The same point holds for Foo's take on the impact of the veterans on postwar politics in Massachusetts. He shrewdly argues that returning soldiers got back at their oppressors by supporting Free Soil politicians who had opposed the war. While that is true, it was also the case that Caleb Cushing, a former officer and one-time Whig turned Democrat, also shaped postwar politics but in a different way. Cushing helped rebuild the Democratic Party through policies premised on racism and white supremacy. As a state representative, he engineered the defeat of a personal liberty bill in the legislature, then as President Pierce's Attorney General, he orchestrated the rendition from Boston of the fugitive slave Anthony Burns.
Thus, it is doubtful that the forces unleashed by bitter experience on the Mexican battlefields cut in a single direction at home. Just as Foos's soldiers did not see the war one way, they did not push political events one way, either. What is not in doubt is the debt we owe Paul Foos for raising important questions and opening up an entirely new line of thought on one of the more obscure but politically important wars this nation has ever fought.