Focusing on the medieval Islamic context, the author presents a vivid discussion of an important question: do the Qurʾan and hadith explicitly establish or merely point to the meaning of good and evil? The goal of this study is to challenge the view that moral values and prescriptions in Islam derived their legitimacy by recourse to divine origin. The first position under discussion, the so-called divine command theory, was mainly advocated by the Ashʿarites; the Muʿtazilites, in contrast, were proponents of an objective morality, distinguishing between good and evil on the basis of rationality. Dedicating major parts of the book to ʿAbd al-Jabbar's theory of ethics—the culmination of Muʿtazilite views on this topic—al-Attar successfully demonstrates that ethical voluntarism never prevailed in Islamic theological–philosophical thought.
In the introduction, the author briefly describes previous works dealing with Islamic ethical thought; unfortunately, however, she does not provide a serious discussion of their various approaches. She then briefly sketches the framework and methodology of her study and establishes the goal of providing fresh insights into the study of Islamic ethics, which, she asserts, should help to challenge interpretations that restrict “the utilization of reason in the realm of ethics and Islamic law” (p. xxi); her own approach, combining historical and descriptive methods “to reveal the political and intellectual history of the formative period in Islam,” is followed by a comparative study of different ethical discourses and finally an analytical investigation of ethical concepts and philosophical arguments.
Chapter 1, the shortest in the book, is dedicated to aspects of pre-Islamic ethical thought, which establish, according to the author, the theoretical and historical background of ethical theories in Islam. Plato's Euthyphro occupies a central position here, as, according to al-Attar, it displays the main problem related to ascribing a divine source to ethical values. In Chapter 2, ethical presuppositions in the Qurʾan and the hadith are analyzed. Based on several verses, the author states that the Qurʾan does not support ethical voluntarism but rather imputes an ontologically objective status to ethical values. This is also supported by the historical fact that the Qurʾan utilized preexisting Arabic ethical terms connected to values and duties that were already known in the wider context in which it was revealed. God's justice, as it is presented in the Qurʾan, is furthermore congruent with human justice. Accordingly, the author argues that although the Qur'an promotes itself “as the prime source of ethical knowledge and guidance” for man, it establishes the foundations “for the independent use of man's reason in ethics” (p. 16): good and evil are not bound to divine revelation but exist intrinsically in the essence of things and actions. Connected with the teaching of human free will, this idea leads to an objective concept of divine justice proclaimed in the Qurʾan and in prophetic statements.
In the following chapter, which presents pre-Muʿtazilite ethical teachings, the author rightly points to the political rationale behind some of the ethical doctrines held in early Islam; political and social interests were, after all, articulated in early kalām within an ethical framework, as the debates between the Kharijites and the Murjiʾites—as well as between the Qadariyya and the Jabriyya theological movements—clearly demonstrate. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the discussion of Muʿtazilite ethics through an interpretation of the five principles the Muʿtazilites adhered to in regard to their moral implications. Hence, emphasizing God's unity and uniqueness (tawḥīd), for instance, proposed—in opposition to the teachings of the Imamiyya and the deification of the Caliphs—“to liberate human beings from subordination to any oppressive, political or allegedly religious power that dared to claim divine legacy in support of its authority” (p. 49); the author asserts here that the principle of absolute divine justice also upholds human freedom and responsibility.
The last two chapters of the study present the ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbar (d. 1025) as a mature paradigm of Muʿtazilite thought. The author first discusses five presuppositions of ethical judgments in his ethical theory: moral knowledge is necessarily available to human beings because they are able to distinguish rationally between what is morally right and what is morally wrong; human beings undertake moral judgments autonomously and, thus, assume responsibility for them; ethical judgments are purposeful; they are universal and applicable to all people regardless of cultural or religious differences; and they are objective and obligatory by reason—just because they are good. For the most part, ʿAbd al-Jabbar is in agreement with former Muʿtazilites such as Abu Hashim al-Jubbaʾi (d. 933) and his father, Abu ʿAli (d. 915), in regard to these presuppositions. Finally, ʿAbd al-Jabbar's distinction between normative and value judgments is presented within an extensive analysis of his ethical judgments. This section includes the most elaborate arguments in the study. While normative judgments—functioning as guidance to human conduct—imply the freedom of the human agent, value judgments relate to the value of an action apart from the agent's state. The author makes clear that according to ʿAbd al-Jabbar, what is objectively good is ultimately beneficial and should be adopted and what is evil is ultimately harmful and should be avoided. Committed to the independence of moral values from the agent's state, ʿAbd al-Jabbar separates himself from former Muʿtazilite thinkers. Partially utilizing semantic arguments, this part of the book includes a solid presentation of ʿAbd al-Jabbar's ethics and their impact on later generations.
The main thesis of the author is generally convincing; there is no monolithic system of Islamic ethics based exclusively on sacred writings. According to ʿAbd al-Jabbar's theory of ethics, an ethical judgment is eligible for religious prescription based on intrinsic and rationally objective values. The author succeeds in presenting ʿAbd al-Jabbar's ideas clearly, and they do represent developed Muʿtazilite thought. The book is, furthermore, well written and well organized and represents a useful contribution to the study of ʿAbd al-Jabbar's vast oeuvre. Of most significance, in regard to contemporary debates about religious peculiarities vis-à-vis ethical norms, this book advocates a system of universally valid ethics without religious borders. This system would derive ethical values and judgments not from particular sacred writings adopted by specific religious communities but rather from human reason.
All of this aside, the scope of this study's theoretical framework could have been widened. Given the fact that the main subject of Plato's Euthyphro is human piety, the reader wonders why other dialogues of Plato, which tackle the main subject of the book, were ignored: The Laws, for instance, features pilgrims on a journey to the cave of Zeus discussing questions related directly to divine revelation, human law giving, and the relationship between philosophy, religion, and politics in regard to social order. This dialogue, or perhaps Galen's summary of it, was translated into Arabic and summarized by al-Farabi (d. 950). It is mentioned furthermore by Ibn Sina (d. 1037) as an ancient philosophical reference on prophecy and religious law. Naturally, this would have been a proper addition to the intellectual background of the topic treated in the book. Important secondary literature is also missing in the bibliography, such as God's Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam by P. Crone and M. Hinds (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), which could have been included in the discussion on pages 53 to 57.
A minor irritation is that the book includes several mistakes and inconsistencies in translating and transliterating Arabic words: al-Naẓẓām, not al-Naẓam (p. xiv); al-Akhlāqiyya, not al-Akhlāqiya (p. xix); Yuḍillu, not Yaḍillu (p. 20); al-ghulāt, not al-ghulā (p. 43); Al-Khayyāṭ, not Al-Khayyaṭ (p. 45); Yaḥyā, not Yiḥya (p. 47); and Mutaʾkhkhirīn, not Mutaʾakhirīn (p. 180). In the shahādatayn Muhammad is declared God's messenger (rasūl Allāh), not “his [sic!] prophet” (p. 43). The Arabic term Allāh should appropriately be rendered as “God” (p. 49). Allāh is not a proper name; the word designates the Supreme Being in Arabic and, in this sense, it is used not only by Muslims but also by Arabic-speaking Christians and Jews. Finally, the title of M. Heemskerk's book Suffering in the Muʿtazilite Theology: ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000) is missing in the bibliographical entry including O. Leaman's book review (p. 183).
More annoying in my view, however, is that important scholarly works in languages other than English, such as the studies of the renowned German scholar Josef van Ess on Islamic theology, are neglected in this book. As broad as the scholarly literature in English may be, it remains an island in the wide sea of scholarship in many other languages. The happiness felt by the inhabitants of this island is deceptive, as it implies ignorance of what is beyond.
Nevertheless, in spite of these deficiencies, the book is recommended to students of medieval Islamic thought.
