The analysis of the commons has recently received a lot of attention. It is an important topic and it deserves all the attention it has received. The idea of the book series, History for a Sustainable Future, also deserves praise. It is important to know the way humans have formed organizations in the past in order to be better prepared for the future. However, The Commons in History does not live up to expectations.
Section 1, Commons Ecology, is intended to give the reader a historical overview of the commons. For most of Section 1, the author compares Garrett Hardin's pessimistic view (“The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 1968, vol. 162, no. 13) to Elinor Ostrom's optimistic analysis on the commons (Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, 1990). The difference between Hardin and Ostrom is that in Hardin there is only anarchy but in Ostrom there are rules, i.e., punishments associated with a particular behavior.
Section 1 leaves the reader with the impression that the author has only read a few works on the topic. Hardin and Ostrom are referenced constantly through the book, as if no scholarly work has been done since. The other book that the author cites extensively is Das Kapital by Karl Marx. Although referencing Marx, or Marxism, when talking about the commons is justified, the constant references to Marx, suggest that this book is more about political propaganda than an academic exercise. Marx is cited in 15 places.
The statement made by the author that commons were omnipresent through history is true. However, this is not by itself a valid reason to advocate for commons today. By the same logic, we could advocate slavery in labor relations. The long-defunct idea of the “noble savage” and the idealized living style of pre-Columbian American tribes is a recurrent theme in the book. The author takes this to the absurd on p. 107, “Mongolian herders who believe that dragons own the soil provide a beautiful example of communing beyond cost-benefit analysis.”
By the end of Section 1 the author talks about “successful commons.” As it happens, I am familiar with one of the communities studied by Ostrom: the irrigation communities in Mediterranean Spain. Contrary to what Wall claims, land ownership was private, and so were water rights. Only the irrigation system (dam, channels, and gates) was communal. Moreover, in some towns’ water use was sold in an auction. This and the following paragraph illustrate how little knowledge the author has on commons outside of England.
In the nineteenth century, the Spanish government auctioned off forests that were used as communal lands in many towns in Spain. After the sale, the trees in many of those forests were cut down for commercial purposes. After the massive deforestation, southeastern Spain suffered one of the worst droughts of recent history. This fact lead to contemporaneous scientists to propose the first ever hypothesis of climate change induced by human behavior (see Gil Olcina, “Sequía de 1846-50 e hipótesis de cambio climático por deforestación en el sureste ibérico,” Estudios Geográficos, LXVIII, 262, pp. 91–117, 2007, for a description of the event). For a book that is trying to combine history, the commons and environmental sustainability, missing this episode is a striking omission.
Section 2, Culture in Common?, is a further attempt to discredit the economic analysis of the commons. I say “attempt” because the criticisms are misplaced and sometimes absurd. Following another pointless reference to Marx, the author claims “Words like benefit, cost and prosperity are to some extent cultural and cannot be determined with precision as scientific or neutral terms” (p. 46). Arguably prosperity has an ambiguous meaning, but benefit and cost are rather clear concepts. Contrary to the author's beliefs (p. 59), economists have been dealing with heterogeneous individuals for decades. On page 48 we read “It is assumed [in economics] that human beings need to make choices.” I understand that some assumptions made in economic models might be controversial or oversimplified, but is the need to make choices one of them?
The author mentions informal rules, arguing that economists are not well equipped to deal with them. He seems unaware of concepts routinely deployed by economists like reputation, signaling, cheap-talk, and relational contracts that were developed to deal with informal rules or rules that cannot be enforced by a third party. The author also seems to be unaware of the concept of “Order without Law” introduced by Robert Ellickson (Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Harvard University Press, 1994) and Eric A. Posner (Law and Social Norms. Harvard University Press, 2000) among others.
Section 3, Commons in Conflict, is even more disorganized than the previous sections. The author relates a list of conflicts involving the elimination of commons in places like England, Germany, and the United States. Most of the examples involved some expropriation of land by the central government or the colonists. As it happens, the land was held as commons before its expropriation. Since expropriation was bad, the author suggests, the commons must have been the best form of resource-management. These anecdotes might be useful to stir in the reader sympathy for poor farmers or Indians that were expelled from their lands, but it does not add support to an argument about the sustainability of commons versus private property.
Section 4, Questions for Good Ancestors, serves as a conclusion of the lessons learned in previous chapters. The author cites cases as SETI@home and Wikipedia as successful modern commons to encourage the reader to be involved in commons as much as possible. Wall does not like capitalism: “capitalism pushes for unrestrained exploitation of the environment and increasingly can be criticized as centralized and insensitive to local needs” (p. 131), but he does not provide any detail or evidence. Hardin's argument was that capitalism will prevent unrestrained exploitation, an argument that rests on the assumption that there are no externalities (a word which is not mention in the entire book) or perfect contracting according to Ronald Coase (“The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1–44, 1960), who is one of the many relevant scholars absent in the book.
In sum, this book reads more like a pamphlet for a political party, rather than aimed at an international scholarly audience. The book betrays very little knowledge of economics, history, or the commons, and the author seems completely unaware of theories and events that are relevant for the story he is trying to tell. If you are an uninformed English leftist activist looking for something easy to read that will confirm your beliefs, this book is for you. Otherwise, stay away.
