L.W. Sumner’s Assisted Death is offered as a contribution to public and political debate on its titular topic. The year 2011 saw ample evidence that this debate is increasingly contentious. Polls continued to show strong public support for the legalization of some form of assisted death (assisted suicide or euthanasia) in Canada. The Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel report on End-of-Life Decision Making recommended the legalization of both assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. Legal challenges in British Columbia threatened to change the state of the law. For instance, the ALS patient Gloria Taylor and her co-plaintiffs challenged the criminal prohibition on physician-assisted dying before the Supreme Court of British Columbia under sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, thus revisiting Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), one of the most significant Charter cases. In their submissions, the plaintiffs explicitly deny the binding nature of Rodriguez and hint that they expect their case to go to the Supreme Court. In June 2012, Taylor’s petition was successful; calls for appeal quickly followed. Assisted Death is clearly a timely text.
Assisted Death is “an extended argument to two conclusions.... The ethical conclusion is that, when all other factors are equal, assisted death is no more difficult to justify than other end-of-life measures that may also hasten death and that are already established legal and medical practice.... The legal conclusion is that ... assisted death (under appropriate conditions) should itself be established legal and medical practice” (ix). Both are secular conclusions grounded in “common rationality.” Following a prologue in which Sumner outlines the definitions and distinctions used in the book, the text is divided into two parts devoted to each conclusion.
Part I, “Ethics,” rejects the Conventional View of assisted death, distinguishing conventionally accepted end-of-life measures that hasten death: withholding/withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, movement to the higher stages of the analgesic ladder and terminal sedation. Sumner’s argument largely rests on the Conventional View’s failure to distinguish between end-of-life measures. In short, “the best justification of the conventionally accepted practices will equally justify the rejected ones.... [Thus,] the various end-of-life measures that can hasten death stand or fall together” (23). Sumner’s negative argument apparently entails the positive conclusion that “there is no good reason for thinking that assisted death is ethically unjustifiable” (208 (italics in original)).
In order to combat the right not to be killed and sanctity of life arguments against assisted death, Sumner must also establish the ethical permissibility of any means of hastening death. He argues that both the conventionally accepted means of hastening death and assisted death can be grounded in the autonomy and well-being of the patient. This dual-pronged account is offered to establish that i) one can request hastening death and ii) the means of hastening death do not differ in an ethically significant way. So constructed the account not only permits assisted death for the presently competent, but also advanced directives requesting assisted death. Common arguments against permitting assisted death, the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, apparently fail to distinguish between means of hastening death in the manner required under the Conventional View.
The ethical argument alone cannot ground the legalization of assisted death. In Part II, “Law,” Sumner defends legalization of assisted death and a draft regulatory regime for its implementation. He suggests Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States should move from a prohibitionist regime to a regulatory regime similar to those adopted in Benelux nations. The state of the law in both clusters is well-documented (with a particularly strong emphasis on the Netherlands) before Sumner’s civic virtue argument is laid out in full.
Sumner’s legal philosophical arguments stem from the “civic virtues of compassion and respect.” The former demands that those most in need have access to the best (in the subjective view of the patient) remedy for their suffering. The latter requires acknowledging patients’ “[r]ight to make their own decisions about their lives in accordance with their own value system” (168). Sumner wisely leaves legislative drafting to the lawyers but offers features of a legislative regime that cannot be eschewed without significant “ethical cost.” These include suffering that surpasses the limits of toleration, understanding assisted death as a request rather than a refusal (with the consequent informed consent requirements) and several procedural requirements. Both forms must be legalized in order to avoid discrimination against those who cannot self-administer lethal medication.
Unlike the Royal Society of Canada, Sumner’s definition of assisted death only includes physician-assisted death, so there is also a limit on who can provide it. While the ethical argument permitting the physician to assist deaths is less developed than the ethical argument allowing one to request it, Sumner suggests doctors not only are not committing wrongful killings and therefore are not bound by general duties against homicide, but also may be permitted to kill due to their role responsibilities. Respecting patient autonomy and their well-being are the highest duties of doctors. Their duty to provide this treatment is weaker than their duty not to provide treatment, but is not trivial.
The relationship between ethics and law in Assisted Death can be difficult to discern. Sumner notes that the ethical is not dispositive of the legal, but the ethical and legal sections both begin with what originated as (and remains) a legal doctrine: informed consent. Where informed consent criteria form four of the five criteria for a valid assisted death on Sumner’s account, establishing the ethical, rather than legal, justifications for these criteria is essential. Sumner does an able job of examining the ethical justifications for this doctrine, but the sharp divide between ethics and the law can be difficult to draw. While informed consent is widely accepted in bioethics, it is possible that this is a function of its status as positive law. To the extent that its acceptance is based in ethical concerns, bioethics’ heavy autonomy-interest appears more pertinent than the well-being prong of Sumner’s argument. It is thus unsurprising that the Royal Society of Canada focuses on autonomy rather than well-being when arguing for legalization. The well-being argument appears to be the weaker claim.
The use of law in the section devoted to ethics can nonetheless be very enlightening. Sumner has a talent for exploring the philosophical assumptions underlying judicial decisions. For instance, his argument against the Doctrine of Double Effect is introduced via Rodriguez and can be understood as an argument both against the philosophical doctrine and against a legal decision resting on that doctrine. In Part II, Sumner supplements his account of the Doctrine of Double Effect and the law by noting that no charges have been laid in double effect cases concerning the administration of pain medication.
It is my duty as a reviewer to offer some critique of Sumner’s illuminating text. Sumner’s argument against the Conventional View is a strong one. I am less convinced by his opposition to the sanctity-of-life arguments. Sumner is right to demand that one should always be fair to one’s opponents. It may be fair to present a stronger version of the “Kantian” view. In “Kant and the Irrationality of Suicide,” David Cholbi identifies (and critiques) three Kantian views on suicide. The third view “holds that because suicide obliterates the rational will from the world, and as the rational will is the source of moral worth, suicide cannot be consistently willedby beings subject to moral requirements” (Cholbi, 160). While Sumner is perplexed by David Velleman’s dignity-based Kantian position, an alternative construction emphasizes autonomy as the dominant ethical norm. Dignity inheres in the autonomous. Moral action requires autonomy. The prerequisite for autonomy is life. To use autonomy to deny autonomy is to undermine the very moral principle on which the individual acts. As Kant writes, “It cannot be moral to root out the existence of morality in the world.” While I will not fully oppose Sumner’s view here, his negative arguments may be well-served by a fair treatment of this alternative Kantian view.
From a legal (or, better, political) philosophy perspective, I am unclear on why the civic virtues of compassion and respect are the leading political norms on Sumner’s view. The Royal Society of Canada instead focuses on core values central to Canada’s constitutional order. The Constitution is the legal encapsulation of our national values. Our self-understanding of civic virtue is reflected in the document. From a Canadian perspective, neither compassion nor respect is enumerated as a value underlying our constitutional order. The constitutional right to human dignity that grounded the Colombian right to euthanasia is, unfortunately, unavailable in Canada. Sumner rightly leaves adaption to local context to the advocates and lawyers. He could, however, spend more time establishing compassion and respect as civic virtues in order to establish the necessity of that adaption. While most liberal democrats will recognize them without prodding, greater analysis of their importance could help combat claims based on competing virtues.
The importance of Sumner’s contribution to public and political debate is already clear. While the Royal Society argued strictly on autonomy grounds for the legalization of assisted death, they acknowledged Sumner’s importance by citing him in their treatment of well-being-based arguments. Taylor et al. argue on grounds of both autonomy and well-being and likewise cite Sumner in their submissions. He is also referenced in the Supreme Court of British Columbia’s decision in that case. Sumner is an important figure in this debate and readers would be well-advised to read Assisted Death to understand an influential position therein. His text also stands as a useful primer on the state of the law and its philosophical foundations.
