Saudi Arabia makes its home in a tough neighborhood. Regional and global wars embroiled the Persian Gulf states throughout the 20th century, and a particularly destabilizing war in Iraq ushered in the 21st. Postcolonial political transitions, Cold War geopolitics, nationalism, ethnicity, religion, and oil all figured prominently in the pretexts for violence, rendering the Gulf one of the least stable regions on the planet. Saudi Arabian leaders have perceived themselves as being particularly vulnerable. Home to the world's largest oil reserves, the kingdom's riches have long been a coveted prize. The United States, the kingdom's military backer for most of the past century, guaranteed Saudi security in exchange for oil, but that partnership spawned as much conflict as it prevented. Although they have ebbed and flowed over time, regional rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and even smaller Gulf emirates have also been cause for serious concern. At home the rule of the Al Saʿud has also been precarious. The ruling family enjoys only as much support as oil revenues can buy. With little social support, internal threats have periodically appeared as dangerous as external ones.
The perception that multiple threats lurk around every corner has dominated Saudi Arabian domestic and foreign policymaking. Indeed, the kingdom's leaders have overseen the spending of billions of dollars in pursuit of an elusive national security. In their book, National Security in Saudi Arabia, Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid examine the threats that appear most daunting to the kingdom and suggest ways to deal with them. The authors suggest that Saudi Arabia continues to be troubled by a variety of serious security concerns, although none appear formidable enough to topple the rule of the Al Saʿud.
In the last two decades of the 20th century, Saudi Arabia's foremost anxieties stemmed from the perception that its neighbors, most notably Iraq and Iran, harbored designs to either steal Saudi territory or undermine it ideologically. Saudi leaders considered the extent of both threats to be very serious. In some years during the 1980s and 1990s, Saudi Arabia spent as much as 40 percent of its annual GDP on military hardware. In the 1980s, the kingdom's support for the jihad in Afghanistan served simultaneously to fight the Soviets and to prevent the expansion of Khomeini's Islamic revolutionary zeal into Central Asia. In 1991, Saudi concern over the territorial ambition of Saddam Hussein led to an invitation for hundreds of thousands of American troops to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
Much has changed in the decade since the end of Desert Storm. Cordesman and Obaid contend that neither Iran nor Iraq poses a conventional military threat. To show this, they document in exacting detail the military and security capabilities of Saudi Arabia, its two bellicose neighbors, and Yemen. In what amounts to an encyclopedic analysis of each country's air, land, and naval abilities, including dense discussions of weapons systems, hardware inventories, and force projection capabilities, the authors demonstrate that although Saudi Arabia suffers from its own shortcomings—especially the absence of transparency and cooperation between the kingdom's security and military services—the military power of its regional rivals has been significantly eroded in the last decade.
Although there appears to be no imminent conventional danger to Saudi Arabia, Cordesman and Obaid demonstrate that other threats exist. Iran's alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons is a source of considerable anxiety and potentially devastating for Saudi security. Despite its antiquated military, Iran could still use its admittedly degraded systems to disrupt stability in the Gulf through unconventional methods, although the authors offer little analysis for why Iran might wish to do so. Because it appears that Iraq will remain unstable for the foreseeable future, it, too, threatens Saudi Arabia. Violence there could easily spill over into the kingdom. The porosity of the Yemeni–Saudi border is also a serious problem, allowing for the transport of massive quantities of weapons as well as people who wish to use them to do the kingdom harm.
The authors of National Security in Saudi Arabia contend that the most pressing challenge facing Saudi rulers is the possibility of continued Islamist extremism. Cordesman and Obaid argue compellingly that as a result of Saudi Arabia's stern response, the threat of domestic extremism has diminished since 2003, when al-Qaʿida-affiliated militants carried out simultaneous bombings against Western housing compounds. However, the authors also reason that heightened security is insufficient to deal with the problem in the long term and that the best antidote to domestic instability is to engage more Saudi Arabians in the political arena. They encourage Saudi leaders to pursue a broad program of reform that deals with political, social, economic, and religious challenges.
The discussion of Islamic extremism and the need for reform will likely be most interesting for those curious about the connection between security and domestic politics in Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, this discussion is also the book's most serious analytical weakness. Although Cordesman and Obaid quietly exhort Saudi leaders to do more in dealing with both militancy and reform, the sections that deal with these issues too often come across as an apologia for steps already taken rather than a critical or substantive discussion of what should be done next. Since the first outbreak of domestic militancy in Saudi Arabia, analysts in the kingdom itself, as well as in Europe and the United States, have discussed the need for reform in considerable detail. National Security in Saudi Arabia fails to engage any of those earlier works and, regrettably, contributes little that is new to the discussion. The book's strength lies in its detailed discussion of military and security apparatuses and capabilities, which will be of significant interest to defense and policy analysts.
