In The Logic of Cooperation in Autocracies: Political Opposition in the Third Yemeni Republic, Jens Heibach seeks to understand strategic cooperation among opponents through the case study of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) under former president Ali Abdullah Salih. More specifically, Heibach sets out to answer three questions: Why are strategic alliances formed? What makes them last? And what makes them prevail? This undertaking entails analysis not only of the emergence of alliances and inner dynamics between opposing political parties, but also interactions with relevant international actors outside of the alliance. In the case of Yemen, a country caught in broader geopolitical webs, this international aspect provides key insights into how political elites strategize in an authoritarian context. At the same time, the case of the JMP is an intriguing one given the unlikeliness of the cooperation. The major constituents of the alliance—Islah and the Yemeni Socialist Party—are on opposing ends of the political spectrum and have a long history of violence, resulting in a fascinating array of compromises and tensions.

This book is divided into four chapters with the first outlining the formation of the JMP, the second its internal processes, and the third and fourth its external performance. Through these chapters, the author demonstrates the four requirements necessary for cooperation: goal convergence, a surplus of benefits, balanced attitudes, and central committed elites. Crucially, in Chapter 2, Heibach argues that the organizational structures of alliances ensure these basic conditions and facilitate their internal mobilization capabilities. In Chapter 3, for instance, he contends that maintaining cooperation requires convincing party elites that goal attainment is feasible. While there is already much research on strategic alliances, Heibach adds to the literature by systematically analyzing how alliances are formed and maintained under autocracies. Through process tracing, he discovers the causal mechanisms that formed the JMP and its behavior with the Salih regime. The author’s argument that strategic alliances occur under three conditions—agreeing upon common goals, expecting the benefits of cooperation to outweigh costs, and balancing attitudes toward each other—is convincing, and draws on a plethora of sources, including interviews, bylaws, memoirs, social media data, and Yemeni newspapers. Due to this detailed research, Heibach is able to outline the mechanisms of confidence-building in depth, including qat chew sessions held in private homes and joint prayers held before, during, and after meetings. While culture is often overlooked in rational choice literature, he demonstrates that certain cultural practices are used to further political means and build relationships with opposing forces. Rather than hindering cooperation, culture can provide a space for increased communication that benefits negotiations. Instead of approaching culture in a static matter that refers to language or customs, Heibach demonstrates how culture can be considered as a terrain for engagement that influences political outcomes.

Heibach provides an overview of relevant theoretical literature on cooperation and builds upon it in this book. The literature states that two fundamental conditions must be met for cooperation: goal convergence and a surplus of benefits. Adding to these conditions, Heibach argues that since party elites uphold and justify cooperation, they must settle on common goals, be convinced that cooperation benefits them, soothe any attitudinal constraints, and commit their party to cooperation with opposing groups. Meeting these conditions requires organizational structures to shape internal performance. Organizational structures are essential in establishing transparency with cooperation partners, which facilitates reciprocity. These structures are important as one of the biggest obstacles to alliances is hostility between opposing groups. To maintain cooperation, noncompliant behavior by partners must be sanctionable. As such, effective organizational structures serve as a platform for functional decision-making processes and sanctioning power.

In addition to arguing that strategic alliances are essential to internal performance, Heibach shows that they influence the external environment. This point is crucial in the case of Yemen, where Western support for Salih maintained the regime despite economic decline and grievances. As part of attempts to counter Yemeni branches of al-Qaʿida, multiple states and organizations, including the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the United Nations Development Programme, and the United States, founded the Friends of Yemen group. This development entailed a drastic increase in aid to the Salih regime, from $5 million to $150 million in 2010. Despite increased economic support and political backing, the Salih political regime was still in crisis, yet the JMP remained a key player in mass protests that successfully deposed Salih. Shockingly, the alliance outlived the Salih regime and was a crucial part of the transitional government despite its diverse array of groups from various political ideologies, internal crises, and regime attempts to divide it. Not only that, the alliance partnered with incumbents in other major cities that were also impacted by Salih’s policies, such as the Southern Movement and the Independent Youth.

Ultimately, the biggest strength of Heibach’s book is its detailed account of recent Yemeni history. While his political analysis provides new insights into cooperation under authoritarian regimes, his historical overview of key players, challenges in the Salih regime, and the cultural elements of politics leave few stones unturned. That said, his utilization of Fred Halliday’s quote claiming that Yemeni society is “more socially fragmented than that of any other country in the region with the exception of Afghanistan” warrants some pushback given the strong social networks and unity in the country, even during times of conflict (p. 37). Historically, Yemen has experienced minimal foreign intervention, which has preserved cultural traditions that foster community and a sense of national unity. While the Soviets and British attempted to alter tribal structures, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the attempts to destroy these social structures confirm their power. Despite conflict, Yemeni identity is largely intact, with even opposing factions still congregating in social settings, including mosques and qat chews.

Most importantly, the Logic of Cooperation in Autocracies lays the foundations necessary to understand the current political and ensuing humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Given international involvement and the political division of the country with three separate governments in power, Heibach sets the scene of the crisis that birthed an even larger one and the driver of its continuation. As he astutely notes, “The single biggest impediment to a rapprochement between Yemeni actors, however, is the ongoing heavy external involvement in the war” (p. 288). Yet, not all hope is lost. The book ends with a quote by Jamal Benomar, former UN special envoy to Yemen: “When Yemenis start talking anything is possible” (p. 290). Taking this statement one step further, it is time for external actors to start listening to Yemenis.