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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2004
Many explanations have been proffered for why the Oslo peace process has unraveled into the latest violent phase of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In this book, Marc Gopin suggests an explanation not often found in standard political analyses: the failure to cultivate peace among the Israeli and Palestinian masses. Gopin himself has long been involved in such grass-roots efforts, and accordingly Holy War, Holy Peace is part personal reflections of a peace activist and part manual on conflict resolution. Both parts illuminate and inform each other, making this work a more readable and more poignant study than most books on this subject.
Many explanations have been proffered for why the Oslo peace process has unraveled into the latest violent phase of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In this book, Marc Gopin suggests an explanation not often found in standard political analyses: the failure to cultivate peace among the Israeli and Palestinian masses. Gopin himself has long been involved in such grass-roots efforts, and accordingly Holy War, Holy Peace is part personal reflections of a peace activist and part manual on conflict resolution. Both parts illuminate and inform each other, making this work a more readable and more poignant study than most books on this subject.
Religion has always been an important part of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Its significance may not have been paramount in the origins of the conflict. Zionism and Arab/Palestinian nationalism were largely secular movements when they began, and one can scarcely identify strictly religious motives for all of the Arab–Israeli wars fought since 1948. But religion has undeniably assumed greater prominence since the 1967 war, as Israel occupied and annexed East Jerusalem, as the settlement of the West Bank and Gaza mainly by religious Jews gained momentum, and as Palestinian Islamic organizations such as Hamas emerged as rivals to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The dispute between Israelis and Palestinians over the same piece of land has in the past thirty years increasingly become a dispute over the same piece of holy land.
But it is not just land that is being contested in this particular conflict, according to Gopin. What makes this dispute so intractable is that the same land is being claimed by members of the same “family,” all of whom view themselves as the rightful heirs of Abraham. This is Gopin's point of departure—the claim that competing “myths” of entitlement, “chosenness,” and religious authenticity or superiority make this conflict particularly intense and intractable. But this same family metaphor can also—if cultivated properly—bring the parties to reconciliation: “[i]f these theologies can change over time for the worse…then it stands to reason that standard conflict theory is wrong about the intractability of conflict over religious beliefs and practices, or religious identity issues tied up with land. Whatever is not static, whatever changes for the worse, can also change for the better” (p. 80).
Gopin devotes roughly half of this book to charting specific ways that competing theologies can be reworked hermeneutically to emphasize peace, human dignity, and shared community over land, revenge, and communalism. His suggestions will be familiar to those conversant with conflict-resolution theory, but Gopin's contribution is to emphasize how religion can both help and hinder in peace-building efforts. He outlines scriptural resources available in Judaism, Islam, and Christianity for forgiveness and reconciliation. He discusses the importance of gestures and spoken and unspoken means of communication. He criticizes the almost exclusive focus of diplomacy on bringing the leaders of warring parties together rather than on devoting some effort to broadening the base for peace among the people.
This discussion leads finally to some concrete proposals on how religion can be reworked to serve peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. First, Gopin suggests that “education and training must begin to occur in a coordinated, bilateral way, between significant portions of both populations, and not just children” (p. 200). The goal of such programs will be to inculcate among a broad base of people on both sides the values they share rather than the positions they dispute. The importance of this goal can hardly be over-emphasized. The Palestinian Authority, not to mention other Arab governments, has been repeatedly and rightly criticized for not doing more to curb the dissemination of virulent anti-Semitism, from primary-school textbooks all the way to adult media. But more subtle forms of the converse prejudices and misunderstandings are readily found in the way Israelis and many American Jews think of Palestinians and Arabs generally. Examples of the ignorance of some basic facts that foster such prejudice and misunderstanding are provided in Gopin's candid self-examination, as when he admits to being astonished that Arabic-speaking Jews had for centuries used the phrase Allāhu akbar (God is most great) in their own devotions. “This shocked me, because I was familiar with that phrase, until I studied and taught world religions professionally, as the words suicide terrorists would shout before they killed Jews. This is the only resonance that the phrase has for European Jews and most Westerners” (p. 156).
Second, Gopin suggests the sharing of myth, ritual, and ceremony. These include mourning and commemoration of the victims of violence on both sides. Interfaith dialogue might expand to include joint prayers. Other “pro-social” acts would include acts of repentance and forgiveness, including, “when the time is ripe,” a truth and reconciliation commission that, through its public airing of grievances, might provide some restitution for those Palestinian refugees from Israel who will probably never enjoy a “right of return” (p. 214).
A third recommendation is that Israelis and Palestinians engage in a series of multiple, low-level, and incremental confidence-building measures. These could take the form of what Gopin calls “treaties,” “covenants,” and “contracts” (p. 222). But unlike the official diplomacy of the past, which yielded numerous disengagement agreements and promises of further negotiations among elites, these treaties would be negotiated and concluded by the people themselves. Thus, Jewish and non-Jewish workers could arrive at a shared agreement on the values that link them to one another. Likewise, for mothers on both sides, teenagers, doctors, rabbis and shaykhs, and so on. Gopin does not propose to replace official, “track one” diplomacy with this type of unofficial, “track two” diplomacy. “No one wants to suggest the hijacking of official diplomacy by demagogic religious or cultural leaders who happen to be on top” (p. 226). But grass-roots efforts can and must supplement the work of official negotiators or jump start peace talks when the officials themselves are part of the reason they are stalled.
None of Gopin's suggestions are unreasonable, and we may reasonably conclude that many of his recommendations will have to be part of any lasting solution to this conflict. Indeed, as of this writing, his argument that track-two diplomacy is a vital adjunct to official negotiations is being dramatically echoed by the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators of the Geneva Accord and their supporters around the world. The declaration of the Geneva Accord has also been roundly condemned by many who see it as a nefarious attempt to bypass democratically elected leaders. Gopin's call for popular peace-building efforts will also undoubtedly be met with the same criticisms and charges of dangerous naivete.
The main problem with Gopin's recommendations, however, is that there are extremists on both sides of the Israeli–Palestinian divide who find nothing reasonable in accommodating the other side. As anyone who has ever participated in interfaith dialogue knows, the interlocutors are usually those predisposed to the aims of dialogue; those who most need to be at the table are rarely there. Gopin is aware of this problem and insists on the need to include so-called fundamentalists in the conversation. But he offers only vague suggestions on how to draw them in, placing most of the burden on the “intervenor,” who must “develop multiple, finely tuned methods of intervention for the various constituencies of a religious community, including the most extreme elements of that community” (p. 133).
Ultimately, it seems, his approach assumes that the only way to deal effectively with the most violent religious elements is to marginalize them through a groundswell of religious-based peace work. When grass-roots conflict resolution proceeds along all the constructive tracks he recommends, the conflict-prone religious groups will be progressively squeezed into such a narrow space that they will have little room in which to operate. Tragically, however, the recent round of suicide bombings and Israeli reprisals demonstrates that religious extremists do have the power to create groundswells of popular support in directions other than forgiveness and reconciliation. Breaking this cycle of tit-for-tat violence will require more vision, sagacity, and moral courage from the leaders and the masses on both sides than has been demonstrated so far—or, perhaps, might be reasonably expected from any people.