Philo of Alexandria's treatise Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat (‘That the worse tends to attack the better’) is based on the biblical account of Cain's murder of his brother Abel, and his interrogation and cursing by God (Gen 4:8–15). Though from the title of the treatise we might expect to find the two brothers allegorically representing warring psychological aspects within humans (i.e. irrational vs rational), instead Cain's fratricide is transformed into an ethical suicide, as he represents the ‘self-loving’ soul-type whose irrational pursuit of pleasure kills his ‘virtue-loving and God-loving’ inner ‘Abel’ (Det. 48, 50, 69–70, 78).
This commentary begins with an introduction that includes a summary of the treatise and its rather elusive purpose as well as helpful discussions of Philo's psychological allegoresis and the influence of tragedy, philosophy and rhetoric on the treatise. Especially important is a recurring rhetoric of comparison (synkrisis), in which Cain is unfavourably compared to a succession of biblical personae, including Noah, Abraham, Sarah and the Levitical priests. Also given consideration are Philo's interpretative techniques, which often involve citation or allusion to biblical ‘prooftexts’ and parallels, a practice that imparts an associative, ‘stream of consciousness’ feel to his interpretative efforts (cf. Det. 91–5).
The Greek text with facing-page English translation is followed by the commentary. K. divides the treatise into seventeen sections, each of which starts with an examination of the base biblical text, an outline of the section and a summary of Philo's ‘exegetical reasoning’. Unlike Brill's English-orientated Philo of Alexandria commentary series, K.'s commentary sequentially treats untranslated Greek phrases, which he believes affords easier identification of the ‘most relevant parallels’ (p. ix). The breadth and the depth of his scholarship are apparent on every page, particularly in the identification of those relevant parallels, which are drawn from across Philo's corpus as well as classical literature and ancient philosophy. K.'s mastery of the critical literature is also evident, though older German scholarship (c. nineteenth and early twentieth century) often is most conspicuous.
A variety of philosophical themes populate the treatise, including Platonic asceticism (Det. 33–4), noetic epistemology (22, 27) and metaphysics (75–8, 89). Similarly well-represented are Stoic beliefs, such as the extirpation of the passions (28, 105, 110), healthy ‘soul tension’ (46, 103, 119, 168) and their distinctive programme of moral progress (12, 28–31). In accord with his body-soul dualism, Philo repeatedly lauds the Stoic belief that ‘only the moral good is a good’ (μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν), to the detriment of the Peripatetic external goods: health, wealth, honour etc. (9, 33–4, 137, 157). While all these many topics are ably handled by K., an especially noteworthy example of his scholarship occurs in the discussion of Philo's fusion of Stoic and Platonic metaphysics in Det. 118. In that text, the Stoic τί (‘something’), the highest genus in their ‘scale of being’, is allegorically identified with the biblical ‘manna’ (cf. Exod 16:15: Ⲧί ἐστιν τοῦτο;) as well as God's ‘eldest’ mediator, the Logos (cf. pp. 460–4).
K., however, occasionally overlooks significant issues. For example, in one of the most-studied passages in the Philonic corpus, Det. 86–90, the issue of the origin of concepts (ἔννοιαι) and ‘concept-formation’ is central. In contrast to the Stoics, who believed ἔννοιαι derived from sense experience and offered a reliable criterion of truth, the Middle Platonists asserted the primacy of a noetic epistemology based on the prenatal contemplation of the Forms and activated by recollection. Philo, however, distances himself from both construals, insisting instead that humans receive an accurate ‘conception of the invisible God’ only from the deity himself. Moreover, these ‘conceptions of God’ are transmitted via two distinct revelatory acts, the first invoking Jewish traditions of divine breath/spirit, while the second enlists Stoic ‘seal in hot wax’ imagery. Thus, accurate ‘conceptions’ of God occur when he ‘breathes his own deity into’ humans and ‘stamps on the invisible soul the impress of himself’ (86). The significance of this aspect of Middle Platonic epistemology is evident in the extensive coverage it receives in G. Boys-Stones, Platonist Philosophy 80 bc to ad 250: An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation (2018), pp. 368–9, 371–3, 378, an important work that does not make an appearance in K.'s commentary. He also fails to consider the possibility that Philo's assertion, that ‘no part of that which is divine cuts itself off and becomes separate’ (Det. 90), might be seen as deliberately countering an early Stoic belief that the human soul was a detached or separated fragment of the cosmos (cf. F. Ademollo, ‘Cosmic and Individual Soul in Early Stoicism’, in: B. Inwood and J. Warren [edd.], Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy [2020], pp. 113–44, esp. 137–8).
Such oversights are few and far between in K.'s commentary; instead, one consistently finds thorough coverage of the many common Philonic motifs appearing throughout the treatise, including the deceptions and dangers of the senses (Det. 4, 15, 25, 34, 53, 99–101, 109–10, 173–6), the acquisition and exercise of virtue (17–28, 51, 59–60, 109–14, 120–2, 157), the contemplative ascent to the visio Dei (27, 30, 114, 158–9), the crucial role of the conscience (23–4, 146), and the agonistic deprecation of sophists (1, 35–41, 71–4). The inconsistencies and contradictions that are a hallmark of the Philonic corpus are identified and often attributed to Philo's use of prior interpretative traditions (cf. pp. 316–17, 352–3, 360, 552). Furthermore, the theology of Det. is rich and includes depictions of God as good (46, 93), merciful (93, 95, 146), omniscient (57) and omnipresent (153), ‘continually benefitting all things’ (55), the ‘nourisher, nurse, and rearer’ of virtuous humans (115), the source of laughter and joy (124), the guide of the soul (29, 114) and as instrumental within the human conscience (146). K.'s insights into this rich theology often are profound. A notable example occurs in his comments on Det. 55–6, where Philo contends that the deity's self-sufficiency and perfection means that he is in need of nothing. Therefore, humans who worship him are benefiting themselves only, as evidenced in their ‘eager endeavour to enter into intimacy with God’ (γνωρισθῆσναι θεῷ προθυμούμενοι). K. nevertheless detects a relational reciprocity in the phrase, with both passive and active connotations. As he observes, this is similar to the warm-hearted depiction of the visio Dei in Somn. 2.227, which involves ‘seeing and being seen’ (p. 282).
K. assumes a high level of expertise on the part of his audience, and few concessions are made for novice scholars. For example, a common theme in Det. is the doctrine of the logos endiathetos and the logos prophorikos (38–40, 66–8, 126–32); K. accordingly devotes a great deal of space discussing this theme (cf. pp. 234–41, 488–500). Yet he never provides an introductory discussion; for that one must refer to his essay, ‘The Logos Endiathetos and the Logos Prophorikos in Allegorical Interpretation: Philo and the D-Scholia to the Iliad’, GRBS 44 (2004), 163–81, esp. 163–4. K. also may be faulted for occasionally failing to provide an introductory summary of a section's main point, making his subsequent treatment somewhat difficult to follow. For example, while discussing Det. 141–9, such a summary occurs only after ten pages, in §§150–63, after fifteen pages, and in §§167–76, on the second to last page.
Despite these occasional shortcomings, this commentary will richly reward the diligent, and those who are determined to make sense of one of Philo's most difficult to understand treatises.
