Economic interdependence compromises the fundamental principles of discrete and meaningful borders, geographic sovereignty, and mutually exclusive jurisdiction underlying the Westphalian international state system. It is increasingly difficult, for example, for regulation to be both effective and contained within a state's borders: Extraterritorial regulatory spillover is becoming the norm rather than the exception. The problem is exacerbated by the growing importance of digital transactions.

Efforts to protect the privacy of electronic data provide an excellent example. While there is considerable disagreement about the efficacy of territorial jurisdiction in cyberspace, there is no question that individuals using the Internet often “cross borders” effortlessly and often unknowingly. It follows that attempts to protect a citizen's data privacy cannot stop at the water's edge if they are to be effective: Regulatory spillover is inherent in the process.

In Protectors of Privacy, Abraham Newman uses the history of data protection efforts in Europe leading to the passage of the European Union's 1995 Data Directive to demonstrate the importance of regulatory capacity “in expanding privacy protection within Europe and around the world” (p. 9). Using a comparative historical institutional framework, he argues that the sequencing of events is critical, and that the creation of independent national data authorities in a number of European countries prior to the development of the Single Market Initiative allowed for the development of “policy expertise, regulatory authority and network ties” (p. 75), which enabled them to overcome resistance (or indifference) on the part of business, national governments, and the European Commission to an EU-wide Data Directive.

Newman relies on Anne-Marie Slaughter's idea of transgovernmentalism (A New World Order, 2004) to argue that the networks of European data authorities were instrumental both in enabling passage of the Data Directive and, perhaps more interestingly, in securing global adoption of the European comprehensive data privacy approach, with its reliance on explicit rules and regulatory authority. At this point, only a few countries, most notably the United States, maintain more limited data privacy regimes relying on ad hoc legislation, individual responsibility, and market mechanisms. Newman argues that it is regulatory capacity, rather than market power, than enabled the EU to exert its influence globally in this issue area.

The strength of the book lies in its very detailed and comprehensive historical analysis, which is embedded in an explicit theoretical framework. The “stepwise, sequenced construction of regulatory capacity” (p. 143), which is central to the author's argument, is developed as a thorough historical narrative. This work should be of interest to anyone concerned with the development of the EU, transgovernmentalism, or the role of “regulatory capacity” and the power of regulators in political economy.

One of the critical problems of our age is the disconnect between an economy that is largely global and the fact that politics, law, regulation, and society remain national. As Jürgen Habermas has observed (The Postnational Coalition: Political Essays, 2001), global politics needs to catch up with economics, and transgovernmental coalitions of authoritative and knowledgeable regulators certainly offer one interesting possibility for doing so. Newman's detailed analysis is useful in fleshing out this line of argument.

While this book is interesting theoretically and historically, it is weaker when it comes to the specifics of data privacy and privacy protection. The discussion of privacy regimes in Chapter 2 covers rather quickly the difference between the comprehensive European approach and the more limited American mode of dealing with the issue. Newman does not get into much detail when discussing the specifics of either the European Data Directive itself or the Safe Harbor agreement, which allowed data transfers from Europe to the United States. To be fair, his interest is in the theory rather than data privacy per se, and there is enough discussion of this issue area for the reader to understand the argument.

Yet, I am concerned that alternative explanations are dismissed much too quickly. This is particularly true when it comes to explaining the difference between the American and European approaches to data privacy. Newman claims that “conventional wisdom” ascribes differences to experience with fascist or authoritarian regimes and then argues that this explanation is at variance with the historical record, particularly among European countries. But that is a marked oversimplification of the argument.

There are fundamental differences in political-economic philosophy and in democratic governance between the United States and Europe that directly affect approaches to privacy protection. Differences in beliefs about the efficacy of markets versus regulation, individual rights versus economic efficiency, individual versus collective social responsibility, and common versus civil law all have had major impacts on the development of data privacy norms. Privacy is seen as a fundamental human right of citizens in Europe, whereas it is often taken as an alienable commodity subject to the market in America (the Data Directive itself describes privacy in terms of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals).

That certainly does not invalidate or even compromise Newman's argument. However, regulatory capacity did not develop in a vacuum; context matters. The fact that privacy is a constitutional right in a number of European countries and not in the United States is important. Furthermore, while an authoritarian past in itself is not a sufficient explanation of European preferences, neither is it irrelevant. The East German Stasi, for example, was a very real presence during the period when European privacy regulators were developing their expertise and authority.

I have a few more minor concerns about the book. The argument that the fragmentation (concentration) of sectors affects preferences for regulation of data protection is not well developed, nor is the author's argument about veto points (indeed, the equation Newman presents that regresses veto points and the fascist legacy on national privacy regulations is relatively meaningless, and probably should not have been included).

That said, Protectors of Privacy is a thoughtful, informative, and useful book. Both the historical narrative and the theoretical argument should be of interest to scholars concerned with European affairs and global governance.