The First Decade—Weak Government

Tribal life and modes of politics continued even after the establishment of the modern state in 1921, following the agreement between Britain and Abdullah and the League of Nations' decision to turn the country into a Mandate state. This was a result of the character of the society as well as the inability or unwillingness of the emerging central government to change it. Therefore, during at least the first decade of the emirate, tribal chieftaincies continued to operate alongside the central government. Moreover, they played an active role in the state-building process.

As Mary Wilson shows, until 1924 Britain attached little strategic importance to maintaining a separate political entity in Transjordan.

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It sought only limited involvement in its running of the country and allowed Abdullah free rein over internal tribal affairs. Abdullah ruled Transjordan in a chieftaincy-like manner. He was not interested in the affairs of Transjordan per se but saw Transjordan as a launching pad for expanding his reign into Syria. Therefore, he took little interest in the daily administration of the country and the strengthening of the central government, leaving these matters to the discretion of his ministers. Instead, he immersed himself in tribal politics, making an enormous effort to cultivate shaykhs, especially from nomadic tribes. The result was the emergence of two, almost separate systems of government. The settled population was controlled by the Arab government, which by 1922 had managed to assert its authority along the narrow strip of the settled zone west of the Hijazi railway (ma

mūra). This was a result of a reactivation of the old Ottoman infrastructure as well as of increased military presence backed by occasional assistance from the Royal Air Force. British reports from that period indicate regular collection of taxes and a satisfactory degree of public order. The latter was also a reflection of Abdullah's practice of employing customary means of conflict resolutions to bring blood feuds to an end.

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As far as nomadic or seminomadic tribes were concerned, they enjoyed complete autonomy. For this purpose, Abdullah removed tribal affairs from the authority of the central government. Instead, he looked after them personally or through his cousin and confidante Shakir ibn Zayd. Abdullah's policy did not necessarily indicate a natural bias toward the nomads, as the British claimed. It was simply a reflection of the reality on the ground. Even if he had wished to, Abdullah could not have forced the strong tribes to accept government orders.

By securing the tribes' extensive autonomy from the government, offering presents, transferring plots of state land to private owners, and exempting certain tribes from the obligation to pay taxes, Abdullah managed to achieve support for his rule and a degree of co-operation from the powerful tribes. It also allowed him to mobilize the military support of the nomadic tribes to fend off the raids of the Wahhabi Ikhwan, who on two occasions penetrated as far as the eastern outskirts of Amman itself. The main beneficiaries of this policy were the strong nomadic confederacies of the Bani Sakhr and the Huwaytat and the tribes who resided far away from the center of power in Amman, such as the Majalis in Karak and the seminomadic Bani Hamida in the same vicinity.

The British juxtaposed these two segments of the Transjordanian population. Their sympathies lay with those settled communities who paid taxes and seemed productive and whom they sought to protect. Such were the farmers in the villages of

Ajlun and the Balqa

tribes. By contrast, the British singled out those tribes who did not pay taxes, ignored government orders, and continue to dominate and harm small farming communities in their neighborhood. British officials complained during these first years about what they perceived as Abdullah's preferential “bedouin” treatment of these tribes and their shaykhs.

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Indeed, the preferential treatment extended to certain tribes also tended to alienate some of the settled tribes. The latter bore a heavy tax burden to offset uncollected revenues from the nomads and saw their position vis-à-vis their nomadic rivals undermined with the support of Abdullah. Abdullah's regime faced its first tribal challenge as early as April 1921, only a few weeks after the establishment of the new government, when the tribesmen of the Kura district led by the Shurayda shaykhs resisted the forces sent by the local governor to collect taxes. It took a whole year before the government, assisted by British air power, suppressed the rebellion and brought the area under its control. In 1923, Abdullah faced another major revolt staged by the Balqa

alliance in central Transjordan under the leadership of Sultan al-

Adwan.

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The reason for the revolt was that the alliance felt threatened by the tightening grip of the government in their area as well as by the encroachment of their nomadic neighbors from the Bani Sakhr who seemed to enjoy Abdullah's favor and protection.

The defeat of that revolt by British armored cars brought about the weakening of this particular chieftaincy but not its disappearance. Certainly it lost its might and ceased to function as a military alliance as its security functions were assumed by state agencies. In the immediate aftermath of the revolt, the British could report with satisfaction that the Balqa

tribes were paying taxes in full and that the military demonstration had enhanced the authority of the government.

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However, it was Abdullah's and the government's policy to uphold the status of the chiefs and to maintain their patronage over the tribal constituencies to achieve better control over the population. Less than a year after the revolt, Abdullah granted amnesty to the

Adwani shaykhs. They returned to the Balqa

and made peace with Abdullah (in much the same fashion as the Shurayda family had after the Kura affair) and with the Bani Sakhr.

²¹

This reconciliation marked the beginning of enhanced cooperation between Abdullah and Sultan's family. In later years, Majid, who inherited the position of paramount shaykh after his father's death in 1935, became one of Abdullah's closest allies.²²

Thus, in the settled area the government created a new role for the chiefs and maintained their privileged status while gradually limiting their autonomy.

The British takeover of the administration of the country in the summer of 1924 constrained Abdullah's ability to protect his allied tribes from the reach of the government. The previous policy of indirect rule through Abdullah gave way to a much more active and interventionist system of colonial control. By that time, Britain had recognized Transjordan as a separate political entity administered as a Mandate under the auspices of the Palestine government. It became more important strategically as a buffer to Saudi expansionism. In addition, Britain was now under the supervision of the Mandate Commission of the League of Nations and had to show that it was developing the country to prepare it for independence. The British, now directly engaged in internal affairs and with full control of the military, took to running the government down to the smallest detail, at times reducing Abdullah and his Arab government to the role of mere executors of British policy. From their newly established position of dominance, the Mandate authorities could try to impose British ideas about the functions of a modern state—namely, the creation of central institutions, rule of law, rational administration, and, up to a point, official accountability. As far as the tribes were concerned, this new British policy meant the abolition of the privileged status given by Abdullah to certain shaykhs and tribes, the suppression of unruly tribes, and the protection of productive communities from harassment. It also meant a fairer distribution of the tax burden among the inhabitants of Transjordan in that strong nomadic tribes were no longer to be exempted from payment.

Britain's involvement initiated a gradual and, at times, hesitant process of state formation and the consolidation of state authority. Two reformed institutions, the central administration and the Arab Legion, allowed the government to assert a greater degree of control. However, this development was still confined to the settled zone, where the reach of the government was relatively secure. By the mid-1920s, the British could report on substantial progress in controlling the nomadic tribes when they roamed this area during the summer. Tax collection proceeded satisfactorily everywhere, and even nomadic tribes such as the Bani Sakhr and (since the incorporation of Ma

an in 1925) the Huwaytat paid their share.

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The central administration was now in a better position to enforce the law and execute court decisions. Even tribal shaykhs from the most prominent families of nomadic tribes were no longer immune from legal action taken against them in the civil courts.²⁴

Despite the introduction of centralizing reforms, British attempts to administer Transjordan along modern bureaucratic lines and submit the tribes to tighter control were hampered by the weakness of the government until at least the end of the 1920s. One of the first steps taken by the British was the abolition of the tribal administration under Shakir (Niyabat al-

Asha

ir). Instead, the government established special tribal courts. However, Shakir continued to play a major role in tribal affairs even without a formal institutional platform, and the courts themselves barely functioned in the 1920s, a failure that indicates just how resilient the legal and political autonomy of the nomads in this period actually was.

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Although the government managed to assert some degree of control around the towns and over the settled tribes, this was achieved only at the cost of allowing the tribes and their leaders to keep many aspects of their autonomy. The weakness of the central government and the small number of British personnel made it necessary to control the population indirectly via local leaders.²⁶

In their capacity as recognized mukhtārs of tribes, villages, and town quarters, shaykhs and notables became part of the state apparatus and fulfilled administrative chores, working closely with government officials.²⁷

A comparison with British tribal policy in Mandatory Iraq is useful in illustrating the different system that was employed in Transjordan. In Iraq, as Hana Batatu has shown, the British used the social divide between tribesmen and townspeople to facilitate their rule. Attempting to counterbalance opposition to their rule both from King Faysal and from the nationalists in the cities, the British identified tribal shaykhs as potential allies to control the countryside. They developed an elaborate and interventionist tribal policy that aimed to strengthen the shaykhs' control over their constituencies and to shore up the large tribal confederacies that had been in the process of disintegrating since the middle of the 19th century. To achieve this end, they sometimes resorted to reviving bygone tribal identities or inventing new ones altogether. Many aspects of British policy in Iraq were subordinated to the concern of preserving shaykhly authority. Land policies and tax collection were devised so as to benefit the landowning shaykhs at peasants' expense. Similarly, by creating two completely separate legal systems, the British sought to reinforce the town–tribe cleavage and consolidate the shaykhs' control in the countryside. Whereas townspeople fell under the jurisdiction of the civil courts, in the countryside it was the paramount shaykhs who were responsible for administering tribal law. The end result of British policy was a shaykh who became an absolute master of his peasants. Despite these privileges, British authorities did not hesitate to punish, weaken, or even depose a shaykh who did not collaborate to their satisfaction. A recent study by Toby Dodge argues that British tribal policy in Iraq, based on an unsustainable dichotomy between rural and urban societies, derived not from a conscious effort to divide society but from a British misconception of Iraqi society as a whole and in particular its tribal segments.²⁸

By contrast, in Transjordan—where nearly everyone, settled and nomadic, could be considered tribal in some sense (apart from the small Circassian minority and the merchant community)—a social divide of this kind did not exist to be used as a tool of divide and rule. Unlike in Iraq, the tribal shaykhs on the whole were already Abdullah's allies. With their privileged status, they were often seen in British eyes as obstacles to the rule of government. Their influence could not be dispensed with, but it somehow needed to be contained. Also in contrast to the situation in Iraq, by the second half of the 1920s British officials had developed a better understanding of Transjordanian society. Still, even if an elaborate tribal policy was not yet fully developed and declared, many existing societal features could be exploited by the authorities. Turning many of these elements to its own favor, the government successfully manipulated tribal structures and norms to consolidate its power.

The government took advantage of three characteristics of tribal society: the tribe as the basic unit of organization and identity; the latent power of tribal solidarity; and the leadership role of the shaykhs. The individual tribe or tribal confederacy (or their subdivisions) were recognized by the government as the basic administrative unit for purposes ranging from tax collection to the distribution of services and elections to the Legislative Council.²⁹

The main pillar of this system of control was the enforcement of collective responsibility. Keenly aware of their limited ability to establish direct rule and to enforce the law on every individual, the government and the British held the entire tribe or village responsible when a crime was committed in the vicinity and the culprit was unknown.

By definition, this method centered on gaining or enforcing the cooperation of the shaykhs and mukhtārs in the tasks of daily governance. These included maintaining law and order in their area of influence, assisting the government in collecting taxes in return for handsome commissions, and preparing voter rolls before the elections. The government was forced to recognize their special status and to delegate some of its authority to them. Peter Gubser has made this point with regard to Karak, but it can be extended just as well to the rest of Transjordan.³⁰

This method of control not only guaranteed the preservation of the chieftaincies but in many ways strengthened them. Because the government was unable to maintain law and order in tribal areas, it demanded that shaykhs themselves guarantee security in their area of influence, prevent crimes of all kinds, and arrest or report on criminals or suspects. In some instances, incentives were required to secure the shaykhs' cooperation. To guarantee the safety of convoys on the land route between Amman and Baghdad, the government subsidized the shaykhs of tribes roaming along this route.³¹

The Legislative Council stipulated by the 1928 Organic Law created another platform for privileging influential shaykhs and notables. Majid al-

Adwan from the Balqa

, Rufayfan al-Majali and Husayn al-Tarawina from Karak, Salih al-

Awran from Tafila, Abdullah Kulayb al-Shurayda from Kura, and Mahmud Krishan from Ma

an were the most successful candidates; each served on several councils during the Mandate. They represented tribal constituencies that more or less corresponded to the traditional tribal divisions.

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A seat in the council provided the shaykhs with a platform for political expression, limited influence on the government, legal immunity during its sessions, and a handsome salary. What is more, for the purpose of electing the council the law articulated and fixed what became an official (and sometimes quite arbitrary) distinction between tribes who were recognized as nomadic and those who were not. The law allocated two seats to the representatives of the nomadic tribes, who were elected by a committee of shaykhs under the supervision of Abdullah. This colonial division became a strong factor in government policy after 1929 and has been interpreted as another instance of excluding the nomads from the body politic.³³

However, the evidence suggests that it was at least as much a practical recognition of the prevailing social and political order in this society. The creation of the two electoral districts reflected the ascendancy of the Bani Sakhr and Huwaytat in their respective confederations and was probably meant to keep them together for the sake of better administration and control. As for the voting mechanism, the explanation seems to be more simple. First, among the nomads the shaykh enjoyed the exclusive privilege of representing the tribe in its dealings with the government. Second, nomads could not be expected to participate in a formal election because at that time they were suspicious of the government's intentions and especially of any practice that necessitated formal registration, which would have been perceived as a first step toward conscription. Indeed, even among settled communities participation in the first election of 1929 was only partial and provoked public fear.³⁴

Although after 1924 Abdullah was more restricted than during his first three years in Transjordan, he continued to exert his influence in favor of the tribal shaykhs of nomadic and other tribes. He rejected Prime Minister Rikabi's proposals for stricter control over nomadic tribes in particular.

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He also made the most of his prerogative to grant pardons.

Arif al-

Arif, the chief secretary of the Transjordanian government during 1926–29, wrote in his diary that in one year Abdullah pardoned forty-seven men, compared with only nine pardons granted by the High Commissioners in Palestine during the past seven years. He commented that the criminals regarded the courts' sanctions with equanimity because of the abundance of pardons.

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Abdullah's role was mostly manifested outside the better controlled areas in the settled zone. There he remained the main authority on tribal affairs because the British realized that there was no one more qualified than him to do so. This was particularly true as far as the nomadic tribes were concerned. A remark (one of many) from May 1928 made by the British Resident typifies the new British approach toward Abdullah's role: “experience have [sic] shown that it is the Amir who can best manage Beduin affairs with the assistance of his cousin the Amir Shaker.”³⁷

Just how much latitude Abdullah was allowed can be gleaned from the High Commissioner's remark that “[h]is Highness attached great value to that responsibility and would oppose any arrangements which derogated from his authority over the tribes … with whom he (and he alone) is in close contact, and over whom neither the British Resident nor the Officer Commanding the Arab Legion exercise control.”³⁸ Thus, notwithstanding some halfhearted attempts by the government as well as the British to achieve better control over the nomadic tribes, for the most part their authority manifested itself in the desert only indirectly through the personal influence of Abdullah and Shakir. Until the end of the decade, nomadic tribes continued to enjoy considerable latitude in the desert, which composed 80 percent of the emirate's territory.

The success of the emirate authorities in consolidating their rule lay in the skilful blending of traditional and modern modes of government. In this respect, a convenient division of labor had developed. Abdullah modeled his relations with the tribes according to the old chieftaincy system, seeking to gain the loyalty of the major tribes while allowing them to retain many aspects of their autonomy. While preserving and utilizing the tribal structure and ethos of society, the emirate also acquired modern traits inspired by the Mandatory authorities: the consolidation of borders, tax collection, the provision of services, and the growing power of central authority, with its tendency to interfere in societal matters. These small beginnings did not come to fruition until the mid-to late 1930s.

Momentum of State Building

From the late 1920s onward, this pattern of relations between the central government and the tribes began to see major changes. By the mid-1930s, the Transjordanian government had asserted an impressive degree of strength over society. Most dramatic was the effect on nomadic tribes hitherto subjected to only the loosest control by the central authorities. In part, the government's tightening grip was the result of its attempts to enhance control over the tribes roaming in the vicinity of the Transjordanian–Saudi frontier. It was also a reflection of the military and economic weakening of the tribes, which in turn made them more amenable to state patronage. In the course of the 1930s and 1940s, the tribal confederacies faced mounting pressure as the government's expanding role as protector and provider robbed them of much of their raison d'être. Yet as they underwent a radical change in their function and nature, tribes continued to operate. To a large extent, this was achieved thanks to state policies that encouraged the preservation of many aspects of the tribal system and the modification of others.

The intensification of Ikhwan raids on the Najdi border during 1928–30 and the inability of Abdullah and Shakir to restrain the tribes from retaliating resulted in the extension of direct British rule to the desert. Unprecedented control over the nomads was secured in 1929 with the establishment of the Tribal Control Board (Lajnat al-Ishraf

ala al-Badu) and the promulgation of the Law of Supervising the Bedouin. The establishment of the board was inspired by a similar scheme proposed by Abdullah the year before.

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Headed by Shakir and assisted by the commander of the Arab Legion and a tribal shaykh nominated by Abdullah, the board interfered in many aspects of nomadic life that the central administration had never before attempted to regulate. It controlled the movement of tribes and, in the spring of 1930, went as far as to forbid access to traditional grazing ground along the border to help the Royal Air Force (RAF) combat incoming raiders.⁴⁰

It investigated raids and other breaches of the peace in which nomads were involved, seized property, and meted out fines or prison sentences.

Despite the initial success of the board in preventing raids by Transjordanian tribes, Saudi tribes continued to raid uninterruptedly, and in the summer of 1930 the government could no longer hold back tribal retaliation. The resumption of counterraids by Transjordanian tribes triggered the sending of Captain John Glubb from Iraq to assume responsibility for the desert. It was Glubb's more subtle methods of control that finally brought about the pacification of the nomadic tribes and their incorporation under central rule. After securing the cooperation of shaykhs and tribesmen, Glubb formed the Desert Patrol, a small but effective police force based on voluntary recruitment among the nomads. It was spread along several desert forts and was highly mobile, equipped with cars, camels, and wireless. Its soldiers used modern weapons. The RAF provided air reinforcement on request. Within a few years Glubb and his men not only had managed to put a halt to raiding but had also subjected the nomadic tribes to the rule of the central government and expanded the reach of the administration to the desert. Through his command of the Desert Patrol, his position as second in command of the Arab Legion, and his skill in dealing with the tribes, Glubb emerged within a few years as the chief mediator between these tribes and the government. Naturally, his influence increased at the expense of Abdullah and Shakir. After a short but decisive power struggle with the former and the death of the latter in 1934, Glubb consolidated his power, and by the mid-1930s he had become the undisputed authority in the desert.⁴¹

Glubb's effectiveness can be attributed in large part to the nomads' increasingly dire economic circumstances. From 1929 to 1936, Transjordan experienced a severe economic crisis as a result of successive years of drought, locust attacks, and the effects of the world depression. These factors affected all of Transjordan, but nomadic tribes were the worst hit. Since the end of World War I, many aspects of their traditional pastoral economy had gone into decline. The establishment of law and order in the mid-1920s prevented nomads from raiding farming communities and collecting the khawa payment. The new international boundaries were drawn with political rather than socioeconomic criteria in mind, cutting across tribal dīras and limiting the ability of the nomads to migrate to areas with more favorable climate or pasturage. The ceding of Wadi Sirhan to Ibn Saud in the 1925 Hadda Agreement was particularly harmful, as Wadi Sirhan had been an important grazing area for the Bani Sakhr, Sirhan, and Huwaytat, especially in years of bad rainfall. Although the agreement stipulated the preservation of their traditional grazing rights and free access, in practice the tribes endured persecution by Saudi officials and were forced to pay taxes for the privilege. On returning to Transjordanian territory in the spring they were taxed again by the Transjordanian government. As modern means of transportation such as the train, car, and airplane became more accessible, they replaced the camel and the horse. Camels, as opposed to horses, were still valuable to the nomads, who could sell them to Egypt, where their meat was consumed. After 1930, however, as a result of the Great Depression, camel prices fell drastically from £16–20 per camel in the late 1920s to a mere £3–5 in 1932–33. The spate of raids and counterraids on the Saudi border cost the nomads heavy losses of men, flocks, and property. The increasingly repressive means employed by the Tribal Control Board to prevent raids from Transjordan further limited the ability of the tribes to retrieve their looted property, and its ban on grazing near the border resulted in the loss of yet more flock. Thus, by 1933 the nomadic tribes of Transjordan were plunged into poverty and famine. Many died from hunger and related diseases.⁴²

In their enfeebled condition, the tribes were hardly in a position to resist Glubb's policies. They were in desperate need of assistance and thus amenable to the overtures of central government. It was self-interest that dictated their collaboration. In a fascinating recent study of the production of national identity in Jordan, Joseph Massad portrays British tribal policies, particularly Glubb's, as especially repressive and as a main cause of the bedouin's plight. Weakening the tribes through economic and military means, he argues that Glubb destroyed old tribal identities only to invent new ones that became the basis for Jordanian nationalism. According to Massad, Glubb was the initiator and executor of a social engineering project that “debedouinized” the bedouin tribes, stripping them of their traditional attributes to clothe them in new ones created according to his own understanding of what a bedouin was.⁴³

This analysis is most persuasive when it is applied to Glubb's later years in Transjordan, from independence until 1956, when the much enlarged Arab Legion under his command became the main tool for national socialization. As an explanation for why events unfolded as they did in the Mandate period, however, it seems premature. “Debedouinization” was less a result of Glubb's designs than the effect of changed economic and political circumstances that weakened the nomads after World War I and particularly during the 1930s. Glubb steered some aspects of this process in his attempt to discipline soldiers and impose his control in the desert. He was, after all, a colonial officer, and there can be little doubt that his first loyalty was to the British government, not to tribesmen as such. But it was also Glubb who stood up to his superiors, criticized British policy, and tried to help tribespeople through their difficult years, even if, in doing so, his ultimate objective was to bring them under his control. By paying subsidies; preventing cross-border raids; providing employment, clothing, and food; promoting agriculture; and offering free medical treatment, Glubb helped tribesmen to survive this difficult period and, not coincidentally, promoted his own influence, as well.

One of the keys to understanding Glubb's record in dealing with the nomads—as well as with what the British defined as tent-dwelling seminomadic tribes such as the Bani Hasan and Bani Hamida who occupied both the settled zone and the fringe of the desert—was his appreciation of the existing social order and customs. Like Abdullah, he cultivated close relations with the shaykhs, cooperating with them and coopting them. He was also careful to uphold their privileged economic status by favoring them with economic assistance and giving their sons priority in recruitment to the army.

⁴⁴

Glubb's promotion of a certain conception of “tribal values” as a means of more effective control can best be seen in his idea to establish tribal courts using customary instead of civil law, not only for nomads in the desert but also for settled tribesmen. Beyond the opportunity to employ the shaykhs and thus further co-opt them, Glubb recognized that the prominence of customary law in tribal society and its common acceptance as a regulating mechanism could help to strengthen control over tribesman. He proposed keeping as much of the indigenous legal practice as possible while modifying it to suit modern conditions. In practice, this meant the gradual introduction of the principle of punishment by state authorities (lightly enforced in practice) and the preservation of compensation, the basic sanction in tribal law. In modifying the law, Glubb sought to use the moral authority of those few shaykhs known to be qāḍī (or ra

y) al-qilta—namely, a judge who enjoyed the prerogative to change the law to adapt it to the changing circumstances.

⁴⁵

The 1936 Bedouin Control Law and the Tribal Courts Law were the ultimate manifestation of Glubb's philosophy. They also had the effect of formalizing Glubb's practical control of the desert, which he had already achieved immediately after Shakir's death in 1934. With the enactment of these laws Glubb became the ultimate authority in the desert. After 1937, tribal courts in which cases were tried exclusively by tribal chiefs operated in every province and in the desert. The new laws recognized the centrality of customary law in Tranjordanian society as a whole and, as far as nonnomadic tribes were concerned, allowed its formal use with regard to some legal claims considered “tribal,” such as honor, blood money, or the determination of the temporary refuge for the culprit and his family.

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These new regulations introduced a legal procedure that resembled the traditional tribal system. Thus, litigants were tried exclusively by tribal judges chosen by the disputing parties themselves. Judges followed the customary law and were also free to employ customary mechanisms of judgment such as bush

a or arbitration.

⁴⁷

But whereas the legal procedures were kept mostly intact, the framework in which they operated was completely transformed as state officials were drawn in to play an important role in the legal process. It was the Arab Legion, rather than the victim's party, that was now responsible for facilitating the judicial hearing and executing the verdict. In criminal cases, after compensation was determined by the judge, the governor could imprison the culprit for up to one year. Finally, the judges had to be chosen from a list approved by the government and the emir.⁴⁸

According to Glubb, the compromise between old ways and modern needs was largely accepted by the public. Justice done according to accepted values proved effective in maintaining law and order. Tribesmen cooperated with the authorities, and criminals were brought to court. Within a year of the operation of the courts Glubb reported “unqualified success” for the new system in the desert. British Resident Cox echoed Glubb and described the acceptance of the system in the settled areas, as well.⁴⁹

Two years later, Glubb could provide statistics that proved the popularity of the courts all over the country and the public confidence in them, which manifested itself in the rarity of appeals.⁵⁰ It seems that the new system gained popularity among tribesmen because it addressed the major deficiency of the old one—namely, the difficulty of executing the court's decisions. The new system allowed tribesmen who felt injured to approach the nearest Arab Legion post to file a charge. If the court found their complaints justified, they were guaranteed that the army would enforce the payment of compensation. Yet it is safe to assume that many cases continued to be heard by tribal judges without the involvement or knowledge of Glubb and other state officials.⁵¹ The Tribal Law was not a colonial method to exclude certain tribes regarded by the state as nomads from the national Jordanian body politic. Rather, it was another way to include them and facilitate their integration into the modern state.

While Glubb was busy administering the deserts, the overall process of state formation had reached a point of critical mass by the middle to late 1930s. The central government had expanded its functions and tightened its control over the population. Its military presence was increasing. The rule of law was taking hold in both the settled zone and the desert. The borders, now demarcated and stabilized, were better controlled. Tax collection had become more systematic and effective, especially as the result of an ambitious land-reform program.⁵²

Consequently, the state apparatus assumed a deeper involvement in society and interfered in many spheres of life that had been the prerogative of the tribe. State agencies—and no longer the tribes—were well on their way to becoming the prime controller, regulator, and provider in society. Security, economic relief, employment, health care, education, the regulation of land ownership, dispute resolution—all the functions that had been provided within the tribal structure only a few years earlier were now increasingly the responsibility of the central government.

In spite of these transformations, tribal organization, identity, and ethos remained a dominant feature of society. The persistence of tribal life and social structures, albeit in a much modified form, resulted in part from policies undertaken by state authorities who found it easier and cheaper to control society indirectly by preserving and strengthening the tribe as the basic administrative unit and ruling it via recognized shaykhs. It was also achieved through appropriating customary methods of conflict resolution to maintain law and order.⁵³

This was especially true in the desert, but it was even the practice in the settled zone, where the government's position was much more secure. The government ruled through the shaykhs, not in place of them, and continued to delegate responsibility for maintaining law and order, tax collection, dispute settlement, and distributing state largesse. Shaykhs remained the main link between the central government and the population, maintaining and even increasing their status as important political actors even as the powers of central government increased.

Abdullah's contribution to the preservation of the tribal order was of crucial importance. He continued to extol tribal culture and values and was careful to observe the tradition and project the image of a tribal leader. Similar to his early days in Transjordan, he spent much of his time camping the length and width of the country, and he exchanged gifts and tribal hospitality with his subjects.⁵⁴

This behavior was not only in keeping with customs of sociability but also a deliberate political strategy designed to secure the personal loyalty of the shaykhs. Abdullah maintained a chieftaincy-like political system based on close personal relations, an open-door policy, mediation (wisāṭa), and, when possible, conciliation. The increased responsibilities assumed by state agencies made his role in smoothing out differences between government officials and the population all the more important. In such a way he was able to facilitate the state's rule in its areas of influence, especially in times of crisis, such as during the 1936–39 Palestinian revolt and World War II. Time and again during crises, Britain availed itself of Abdullah's sway over the tribal leaders, and thus grew to appreciate his indispensable role.⁵⁵ For their part, the shaykhs, faced with growing state power, willingly cooperated with Abdullah in the expectation that he would defend their vital interests. In fact, cooperation with Abdullah was one means by which some freedom of maneuver on the part of the tribal unit was preserved. The shaykhs of the Bani Sakhr, the Huwaytat, and the Majalis of Karak were the main beneficiaries of this kind of politics. Notwithstanding Abdullah's style of leadership, the persistent prominence of shaykhs and tribal groups, and government policies aimed at preserving both, the tribal order that emerged was very different from the one that had existed on the eve of the establishment of the emirate.

The Decline of the Chieftaincy

As state agencies increased their intervention in social affairs and assumed many of the security and welfare functions previously provided within the tribal unit, the institution of the chieftaincy was becoming something of an anachronism. Evidence of a growing internal struggle within the two large nomadic confederacies from the second half of the 1930s indicates the loss of cohesion within the tribal confederacy and a parallel shift toward smaller organizational units. These were the first symptoms of the breakup of the chieftaincy into smaller units.

In the late 1930s, the two nomadic confederacies of Transjordan—the Bani Sakhr and the Huwaytat—witnessed growing power struggles between rival shaykhs. Competition for leadership had always been a prominent feature of tribal society. However, the establishment of a political alliance between Emir Abdullah and the two confederacies, bringing state recognition of their leaders, had the effect of institutionalizing the position of the two paramount shaykhs. With such backing, their leadership was secured against potential rivals in a way their predecessors could never have imagined. There is no evidence of a serious challenge to their leadership before the late 1930s. After that time, however, both Mithqal al-Fayiz of the Bani Sakhr and Hamad ibn Jazi of the Huwaytat faced growing strains within their respective confederacies.

The power struggle among the Bani Sakhr erupted in 1937 when Mithqal's leadership was called into question by shaykhs of the Zaban tribe over a long-running land dispute. His authority was challenged on the basis that he was too closely identified with the government and that he had compromised the interests of his people. The Zaban gathered fully armed with their men in what was described as a demonstration against Mithqal. It took a strong force from the Desert Patrol to mediate between the two parties and prevent a clash.⁵⁶

By this time, it seems, Mithqal's status owed more to his close connections with the government than to his personal prestige within the confederacy. The indifference of the Bani Sakhr to his brief arrest in 1941 after assaulting the prime minister is further evidence of his diminished base of support. On this occasion, only his immediate kin from the Fayiz tribe rallied around him.⁵⁷

Similar conflicts occurred among the Huwaytat, beginning with the 1937 elections for the Legislative Council. Muhammad abu Taya, shaykh of the Tawayha, bid for the seat reserved for the Huwaytat by challenging Hamad ibn Jazi, who had held it for the previous three councils. Hamad kept his seat in a close race, but tension among the shaykhs did not subside. In 1939, Abdullah brokered a peace between the two shaykhs and their respective branches of the confederacy, and a further attempt to mollify Muhammad was made a year later when Abdullah granted him the title of pasha. However, these two acts did not unify the Huwaytat as a confederacy. Rather, they were a recognition both of the importance of Muhammad abu Taya and of the growing independence of the Tawayha from the Huwaytat.⁵⁸

To a large extent, these rivalries reflected the loss of the confederacies' raison d'être, given the creeping expansion of state agencies and the services they offered. With the enlargement of the Arab Legion, the government was no longer dependent on the tribes as an independent military force, as it had been during the 1920s. Furthermore, the loss of their best warriors and leaders to the legion drained the chieftaincies of their power, and they could no longer mount a sustained armed challenge to the government. Another important reason for the weakening of the chieftaincies was the loss of the mobility of their members as increasing numbers of tribesmen engaged in cultivating their land. Beyond its military weakness, the chieftaincy was also less relevant as a framework for collective security. The increasing prevalence of law and order in the desert meant that the chieftaincy was less and less necessary as a guarantor of its members' personal security and rights.

The decline of the institution of the chieftaincy was accelerated by economic factors. The increased security of the countryside was an essential precondition for the revival of the economy in the late 1930s. This, combined with the experience of the drought and the enlargement of the Arab Legion, shifted tribesmen into new occupational pursuits. Having learned their lesson from the lean years of the early 1930s, many nomads did not try to rebuild their herds to the former level. They took advantage of government projects to pump water in the fringe of the desert and, with Glubb's support, took an active part in digging wells and cleaning old Roman cisterns. In addition, Glubb initiated a policy of free migration according to which tribesmen could access grazing grounds outside their own dīra under the protection of the Arab Legion. These developments increased the value of the areas east of the Hijaz railway, which became grazing grounds for sheep and even attracted fellahin from nearby villages. For many, sheep rearing took the place of camel herding. Better security and the availability of new grazing ground favored the creation of larger sheep flocks that could be built up more quickly than herds of camels.

The tendency toward sheep rearing and the development of water sources within the Transjordanian deserts brought about another change in migration patterns. As camel herds shrank and water became available nearer to the settled zone, tribespeople had less need for access to Arabian winter pastures. The Bani Sakhr, for example, resorted less and less to migrating to the Wadi Sirhan, confining themselves to life within the frontiers of Transjordan and becoming more closely involved in the life of the country. These changing patterns of migration had a direct effect on the need for chieftaincies or even individual tribes to provide security for their members. Increased security meant that herders were no longer required to move and camp in large groups as a precaution against raids. Families and small herding units moved freely to such grazing areas as could be found.⁵⁹

The availability of new sources of income further contributed to the decline of the chieftaincy as many tribesmen began to earn their livelihood independent of the tribal unit, working casually for the government in public works or in a more permanent arrangement as soldiers.

Partition of tribal land among the different tribes as had occurred among the Bani Sakhr seems to have been both a symptom and a cause of confederal disintegration. In 1945, the different tribes of the Bani Sakhr agreed under Glubb's auspices to partition among themselves the land east of the settled zone on the fringe of the desert. In a step toward encouraging private ownership, the agreement prescribed the allocation of land within each tribe's area to those who did not already own land. This was to be done “under the supervision of the government and by the shaykhs.” Despite these provisions, the confederacy still played an important role in land control. Some land farther east remained communal land dedicated to grazing. Every member of the Bani Sakhr continued to enjoy free access that entailed grazing and residual rights to any uncultivated land within the areas now owned by each tribe. However, this agreement clearly shifted land control from the confederacy level to that of each individual tribe and even initiated the process of private ownership.⁶⁰

The fragmentation of the tribal system was most evident among the two nomadic-based tribal chieftaincies whose members underwent the greatest social change, but settled tribes were hardly insulated. In addition to the aforementioned disintegration of the Balqa

alliance, a change in organization among settled tribespeople in the town of Salt that occurred in 1940 provides an example of this trend. Until that year, the al-

Anansa tribe had been in an alliance with another tribe, the al-Khalifat. With the increase in law and order, this alliance was deemed redundant in the eyes of its members, who applied to the government to recognize them as two separate tribes, each with its own mukhtār.

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The Changing Role of Shaykhs

In spite of the creeping signs of confederal disintegration and the growing attempts from within to challenge their position, shaykhs managed to retain and even strengthen their ascendance within their tribes. Several factors accounted for their success. One was the continued importance of shaykhs as the embodiment of authority in tribal society. Another was the effectiveness of the shaykhs' own efforts to resist the encroachment of the government and to safeguard their influence and autonomy. The resilience of their position also owed much to a state policy that preferred to continue controlling the population via recognized shaykhs, thereby upholding and even reinforcing their traditional status. Yet beneath the surface of apparent stability, the nature of paramount shaykhs as well as of shaykhs of individual tribes had changed dramatically. Their legitimacy now derived less from the recognition of their moral authority by fellow tribesmen than from their status as the exclusive representatives of their tribes vis-à-vis the central government. Good relations with the government became imperative for a shaykh to maintain his leadership position. Put differently, tribal shaykhs were no longer leaders of largely independent and autonomous communities but go-betweens for these communities and the state authorities. In this capacity, shaykhs were increasingly entwined in the state structure and identified with its interests.

Land became the shaykhs' primary source of income and as such was an important factor binding them both to Abdullah (a landowner himself since the early 1930s) and to the land-owning merchants.⁶²

During the early 1930s, the large landowners emerged as an active political elite. Shared concern for land issues, the economic situation, commitment to the emir, and a desire to fend off government interference cemented relations between the different members of this group and contributed to its coherence. They cooperated in the Legislative Council to press the government to offer aid to cultivators, reduce land taxes, limit the powers of the Arab Legion, and prevent government control over land rights. Many of them also joined forces to promote Jewish immigration into Transjordan. Having relocated their center of activity to the capital since the mid-1930s, many shaykhs operated as mediators between their people and expanding government departments. From the seat of government they could use their influence to better represent the interests of their tribes while operating within and speaking the language of the Transjordanian “political field.”

With the expansion of the state and the shaykhs' growing involvement in it, their position became increasingly ambivalent and problematic. On the one hand, the shaykhs were closely integrated into the state administration, serving as state officials, performing tasks for state agencies, and maintaining contact with Abdullah. Many became dependent on the central government for salaries, appointments as judges in tribal courts, or benefits such as agricultural subsidies or handouts. On the other hand, the shaykhs were anxious to maintain at least the appearance of independence from the central government, both for themselves and for their tribes. Keeping the central government at arm's length proved difficult, given the extent of their collaboration with and dependence on the government. The shaykhs sitting on the Legislative Council epitomized this problem. Their support was necessary for legislation allowing the government to pursue its program, although they resented the loss of their autonomy and the government's tendency to interfere in their lives. While shaykhs in most instances approved the legislation, they nevertheless expressed frustration at their inability to place checks on the government.⁶³

Shaykhs employed several strategies in their attempts to overcome this dilemma and keep central authority at bay. Many cultivated good relations with foreign (and sometimes hostile) regional powers. By defying state authorities and playing off different actors against each other, the shaykhs were in some cases able to secure greater influence. Foreign patrons could be used as a negotiating tool to press Abdullah or the government, thereby increasing the shaykhs' leverage with the state authorities. These contacts were also used as an insurance policy in case a severe conflict arose between them and the Transjordanian government.

Connections between shaykhs and the Jewish Agency partly served this purpose. It was another means they pursued to overcome their impoverishment during the early 1930s as well as to retain some independence of action. Members of this group defied British Resident Henry Cox, the commander of the Arab Legion, F. G. Peake, and Glubb, all of whom fiercely opposed the idea of Jewish colonization and demanded a halt to the negotiations.⁶⁴

The leader of this group, Mithqal al-Fayiz, advocated the admittance of Jews and resisted the government's disapproval. He even formed a political party to lobby for this cause. In 1934, the British tried to buy Mithqal's goodwill by granting him a loan of £1,000 to help him develop his agricultural estate and relieve his financial difficulties. The offer was turned down. As Cox explained, Mithqal preferred to rely on the financial support he received from the Jews rather than submit his property to the control of the government.⁶⁵

Support for Palestinian and Syrian rebels served to enhance the shaykhs' moral authority. Shows of support for nationalism and defiance of the British, the government, and occasionally even Abdullah himself served to demonstrate the independent power of the shaykhs. Open opposition was also a way of reminding state authorities that they could not take the tribes' acquiescence for granted. The resumption of subsidies to shaykhs during the 1936–39 Palestinian revolt shows the effectiveness of this tactic. During the revolt, several tribal leaders offered active support to the Palestinians and risked a direct conflict with the government. Mithqal al-Fayiz, whose connection with the Zionists had meanwhile ground to a standstill, was seen in British eyes as the most active tribal leader in Palestinian affairs. Throughout 1937, Glubb reported on restlessness and insubordination among the different tribes of the confederacy and attributed the Bani Sakhr's behavior to their chief's deep involvement in the politics of Palestine.

⁶⁶

The second most important shaykh of the confederacy, Haditha al-Khuraysha, head of the Ka

abna branch, who had supported the Syrian rebels in the mid-1920s, also contributed to the Palestinian struggle. Rashid Khuza

i, the strongman of Jabal

Ajlun, had to seek temporary refuge in Syria because of his defiance of the government and Abdullah. Majid al-

Adwan, shaykh of the

Adwan and head of the Balqa

alliance, is remembered locally for offering substantial support to the Palestinians through the provision of money, weapons, and hospitality. Notwithstanding this support, Majid was careful not to cross certain red lines and find himself in open conflict with the government. When in 1938 several Palestinian fighters asked to use his territory as a base for anti-British activity, he firmly refused and demanded their immediate departure. Several other shaykhs were suspected of nationalist activism.

⁶⁷

A number of nomadic shaykhs nurtured close relations with the Saudis. Muhammad abu Taya of the Huwaytat was the object of Saudi enticements in 1934. Glubb feared that the shaykh's extreme poverty might lead him to transfer allegiance to the Saudis and consequently offered him financial support.⁶⁸

Mithqal al-Fayiz turned the exploitation of his contacts with Ibn Saud into a fine art. Mithqal, perhaps the shaykh closest to Abdullah, used his connections with Ibn Saud to enhance his position with the emir, who was clearly annoyed by this association between his archrival and his protégé. When in 1937 Mithqal and Abdullah fell out over the former's involvement in Palestine, Mithqal reacted by starting negotiations with the Saudi government to move into its territory.⁶⁹ In March 1940, the Transjordanian authorities discovered a secret correspondence between Mithqal and Ibn Saud. Glubb could not clearly establish the reason for Mithqal's contacting the king but suspected that he had done so to gain leverage in his relations with Abdullah. When in subsequent years Mithqal was at loggerheads with the government or Abdullah, speculation was often raised about his departure to Saudi Arabia. It seems that in 1943 he actually moved to Saudi Arabia for several months until affairs calmed down and he was persuaded to return home.⁷⁰

By striking a balance between collaboration and calculated displays of resistance, many shaykhs succeeded in preserving their special positions of leadership even as confederacies had begun to fade. Commissioned by state authorities to act as go-betweens for the government and their communities, and granted official positions, titles, subsidies, and assistance in cultivating their land, many tribal shaykhs not only managed to hold on to their privileged social and economic status amid the momentous changes happening all around them, but were actually strengthened in the process. Many, indeed, became rich in the late 1930s and in the 1940s, when the economic situation improved. They consolidated their power by occasionally defying the central government or playing off internal and external actors against each other. They continued to command respect and influence among their tribes and played an important political role at the national level. The shaykhly families who dominated the country in 1921 remained prominent throughout the Mandate period. When the end of the Mandate coincided with a changing of the guard among some of the seniormost tribal leaders, these families managed to keep the leadership positions within their immediate families. Thus, with the death of Rufayfan al-Majali in 1945, his son Ma

arik replaced him as a member of the Legislative Council for Karak and inherited his title of pasha. A year later, following Majid al-

Adwan's death, Abdullah conferred the title of the paramount shaykh of the Balqa

on his elder son, Hamud. Also in 1946,

Akif al-Fayiz, who was gradually replacing his aging father Mithqal in his public duties as paramount shaykh of the Bani Sakhr, was appointed by Abdullah to serve as Head of Protocol for Tribes in the palace.

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Tribal shaykhs thus became an important part of the Transjordanian elite and developed a stake in the existence and survival of the emirate.