Few philosophers achieve the combination of scholarly rigor, readability, and inspirational power that Kristin Shrader-Frechette has integrated into her most recent book. She argues that environmental pollution is currently causing more serious health effects—especially among children, the poor, and minorities—than most of us realize. Although much of the blame for this cover-up can be placed on the multinational corporations that benefit from lax regulatory standards, Shrader-Frechette argues that each of us has ethical responsibilities to participate in democratic action to alleviate the problem. Along the way, she provides a seemingly never-ending stream of striking facts and statistics not only about pollution but also about the regulatory capture of federal agencies by industry groups, the mistreatment of workers and the environment throughout the world, the rise of economic inequality in the United States, and the growth of privately funded academic science. She also provides numerous stories of individuals who have engaged in effective democratic participation to alleviate injustice. One particularly striking example is Reason Warehime, a U.S. military recruit who was marched to ground zero moments after the detonation of a nuclear weapons test that was four times the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. He subsequently lost all his teeth; developed radiation-induced cataracts, osteoporosis, and muscle degeneration; became sterile; and was diagnosed with lung cancer. Afterwards, he dedicated himself to tracking down atomic veterans, documenting their health problems (which the military often refused to acknowledge as effects of radiation exposure), and uncovering falsified medical records from their military service.

Shrader-Frechette begins her book with a litany of discouraging scientific findings regarding the current health effects of air and water pollution, even in developed nations such as the United States and those in western Europe. Although she marshals an impressive body of recent data coming from sources like the World Health Organization, the Centers for Disease Control, and the Environmental Protection Agency, these figures continue to be a matter of significant scientific debate and uncertainty. She therefore emphasizes the ethical point that “any pollution-related deaths and injuries are too many, especially in the richest nation in the world, if they are easily preventable, deliberate or criminal, occurring because of violations of human rights to know and to consent, or imposed inequitably on vulnerable groups like children” (31). She argues that a range of corporate strategies keep most of us in the dark about the severity of pollution-induced health effects. Some of these approaches include multimillion dollar PR campaigns and lobbying efforts, the work of front groups and think tanks, “revolving doors” between corporate boardrooms and government regulatory agencies, “private interest” science designed to produce specific results, and corporate control of media outlets.

In response to these problems, Shrader-Frechette argues that we all have ethical responsibilities to engage in democratic action. We all benefit to one degree or another from food and consumer products that are made cheaper as a result of harmful practices associated with the use of pesticides, the acquisition and use of petroleum, the incineration and disposal of waste, and the treatment of workers. She claims not only that many of these practices violate human rights to life, to knowledge, and to consent, but also that these rights violations are distributed in a radically inequitable fashion. Because it is almost impossible for contemporary consumers to avoid being complicit in these unethical practices, she claims that we have duties to take action to mitigate the resulting injustice. One might object that the rights that she identifies are not absolute and that the economic benefits associated with pollution could therefore outweigh those rights under some circumstances. Nevertheless, Shrader-Frechette makes a good case that our current situation is difficult to justify—partly because many of those who are exposed to the most serious pollution-induced health risks do not appear to be experiencing economic benefits as a result, and partly because it is doubtful that the money we fail to spend on pollution prevention is actually serving more economically beneficial purposes.

Although the book is largely ethical in focus, philosophers of science will find much of interest, especially in the third chapter, which is titled “Private Science, Public Injury.” Besides providing a disturbing account of the biased research practices of industry front groups, think tanks, and pharmaceutical companies, it discusses five general strategies that interest groups employ in order to obtain their preferred conclusions: (1) using problematic tests, models, or data; (2) employing small samples and short-term studies that increase the probability of false negative results; (3) depending on theoretical estimates rather than empirical measures of harm; (4) failing to do uncertainty analysis; and (5) developing diversionary arguments, such as insisting on human experiments (which are typically unethical) before regarding pollutants as harmful. Shrader-Frechette also provides insightful criticisms of the attempt to reduce ethical considerations (e.g., whether or not a chemical should be regulated) to scientific ones (e.g., whether health risks from synthetic chemicals resemble risks from “natural” sources).

The book as a whole, and the third chapter in particular, provides an excellent body of material for philosophers of science interested in how value judgments permeate scientific research. It will also be valuable for those who are exploring the social dimensions of epistemology. Shrader-Frechette not only diagnoses significant threats to the objectivity of the scientific community, but she makes important suggestions for constraining those threats (e.g., requiring testing of pollutants or pharmaceuticals by independently funded laboratories). Those interested in the practical aspects of confirmation theory, such as the ways in which statistical analyses can be manipulated and misinterpreted, will benefit from reading this book as well. Furthermore, it serves as a model for how philosophers of science can contribute to public policy and promote the public good. A testimonial from Felicity Sackville Northcott of Johns Hopkins University aptly sums up the inspirational effect that the book is likely to have on its readers: “It made me want to go out and slay a few dragons of my own!”