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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 October 2005
In 1997, lobbyists for the Independent Insurance Agents of America,under pressure from then Senate Banking Committee Chair AlfonseD'Amato (R-NY), threw in the towel and agreed to negotiate withtheir long time enemies, the banking and Wall Street investmentindustries, on new laws structuring the financial industry for the21st century. Their compromise removed a majorlegislative barrier to facilitating the emergence of large, one-stopshopping financial corporations. More surprisingly, the ConsumerFederation of America and other public interest groups also startedbargaining over the shape of the consumer protection laws governingthese new institutions. Getting something through bargaining, theybelieved, was better than letting the financial industry write theselaws themselves. Not all consumer groups participated in thesenegotiations or gave support to the final bill; there were just notenough consumer protection provisions included to please theirideologically motivated members. Nor did every banking and insuranceagent organization support the final deal, largely because theirmembers felt threatened by the prospect of an industry dominated bya few financial behemoths. Yet the final interest group coalitionthat drove the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 across President BillClinton's desk was truly surprising in its ideological breadth.
In 1997, lobbyists for the Independent Insurance Agents of America, under pressure from then Senate Banking Committee Chair Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), threw in the towel and agreed to negotiate with their long time enemies, the banking and Wall Street investment industries, on new laws structuring the financial industry for the 21st century. Their compromise removed a major legislative barrier to facilitating the emergence of large, one-stop shopping financial corporations. More surprisingly, the Consumer Federation of America and other public interest groups also started bargaining over the shape of the consumer protection laws governing these new institutions. Getting something through bargaining, they believed, was better than letting the financial industry write these laws themselves. Not all consumer groups participated in these negotiations or gave support to the final bill; there were just not enough consumer protection provisions included to please their ideologically motivated members. Nor did every banking and insurance agent organization support the final deal, largely because their members felt threatened by the prospect of an industry dominated by a few financial behemoths. Yet the final interest group coalition that drove the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 across President Bill Clinton's desk was truly surprising in its ideological breadth.
We do not know how frequently competition among interest groups resolves into cooperation and coalition building; truly representative data simply do not exist and are not likely to be collected in the near future. What we do know is that the American interest group system has become larger and much more diverse over the last several decades (see Walker 1991). This, in turn, has lead scholars to be reasonably confident that competition among groups is growing. Rather than retreat into increasingly narrow issue niches too small and resource poor to support viable groups (see Gray and Lowery 1997), new groups are establishing themselves by attracting members whose policy desires can only be achieved at the expense of others so that the lobbyists for these groups must engage in what appears to be zero-sum struggles to influence policy outcomes. But why then would these competing lobbyists ever engage in bargaining or form coalitions supporting a single compromise position on contentious issues?
Consider that many of the public interest/ideological groups emerging in the 1960s and 1970s have memberships comprised of politically aware and ideologically driven individuals committed to challenging the alleged dominance of older business/professional organizations (see Berry 1999). Faithfully representing member preferences often seems to mean more to the elites running these organizations than pleasing legislators, even though this sometimes means sacrificing opportunities to participate in legislative bargaining. Defeat can still be a victory in the eyes of highly committed members if ideals have not been compromised. Yet even these organizations do sometimes engage in compromise, thus allowing competition to resolve into cooperation (see McFarland 1993). For example, in 2000 several groups interested in preserving wilderness and wetland habitats successfully negotiated a deal with sporting goods manufacturers and the oil industry to divert government revenue from offshore drilling to public land preservation. Several ideologically extreme environmental groups protested any deal-making with big oil, but many of the larger organizations, such as the National Wildlife Federation and Defenders of Wildlife, supported the deal.
My research explores interest group competition and attempts to explain why bargaining and compromise among groups representing ideologically diverse, even polarized, constituencies occurs, as well as when it fails to occur between ideologically similar groups. The need for group elites to please members and other financial backers is certainly one powerful constraint on their ability to cross ideological space and bargain. On the other hand, a powerful incentive to compromise may come from coalition-minded legislators who may see cooperation among groups as a proxy for consensus in the electorate (Ainsworth 1997). Bargaining, however, also requires cooperation among interested parties, an expectation of give and take and, as coalition research has found, a willingness to offer incentives such as sharing financial and political resources (Hula 1999). The tactical decisions of lobbyists are therefore partially conditioned on expectations of the choices of their competitors, something I observed in my early research (Holyoke 2003). A model of lobbyist decision making, therefore, is a combination of incentives and constraints from three competing audiences: group members, legislators, and other lobbyists.
I recently conducted extensive personal interviews with 82 lobbyists in Washington, D.C., on six issues in the domains of environmental conservation, agriculture, and banking in an effort to understand how lobbyists decide to cooperate or engage in open conflict with each other as they strive to influence policy. This work has given me a deeper appreciation of the advantages and limits of elite interviewing. It has also pushed me to grapple with formal models of choice and bargaining from cooperative game theory and learn new techniques for estimating statistical models where observed decisions are conditioned on the choices of others. I have come to believe that while groups use issue framing as a tactic, thus making issue definition multi-dimensional, bargaining is often about policy outcomes in uni-dimensional space. The need to satisfy competing audiences provides lobbyists with the flexibility they need to bargain and consider issue position other than those desired by a majority of group members. If lobbyists for competing groups choosing to jointly support a bill is as an indicator of cooperation, then on 14 of the 24 bills addressing my six issues more lobbyists chose to resolve competition by cooperating than by engaging in conflict. Some of my other empirical results are not overly surprising: moderate interest groups tend to cooperate with each other more often than ideological extremists, and outcomes tend to favor groups and lawmakers closer to the legislative median. Other findings are more surprising: liberal public interest groups and business/professional groups are not monolithic blocs, but are often divided internally and form issue coalitions (temporary alliances) with each other. Group members may also have a greater capacity to exert restraint over their lobbyists than one might expect. While my results are not generalizable, they are suggestive. Politics is still making strange bedfellows in the interest group universe, and as this system, and American politics more generally, becomes increasingly pluralistic, competition is only going to increase; but so too will the need to bargain and compromise. Perhaps this will stimulate more bridge building in American politics that not only brings lobbyists together, but also the constituencies and interests around the nation they represent.
Thomas T. Holyoke is assistant professor of political science at California State University, Fresno. He can be reached at tholyoke@hastings.edu.