Authors of a popular book about quantum physics tend to construct one of two narratives: either one particular interpretation of quantum physics is presented as the only one in existence, or the reader is shown several interpretations, with the author explaining which one he (it is usually a he) favours. Thus Brian Cox and Jeff Forshaw, in The Quantum Universe (2012), only explain the many-worlds interpretation to their readers, without mentioning that this is one of many existing interpretations. John Gribbin, on the other hand, writes in In Search of Schrödinger's Cat (1984) that the Copenhagen interpretation is the most widely accepted interpretation among physicists, but that his personal preference strongly leans toward many-worlds.
There are currently more than a dozen different interpretations of quantum physics in existence, which all differ in their interpretation of the collapse of the wave function: does it collapse at all? Does it collapse upon observation? Does it only collapse upon observation by a conscious entity? The two most widely known interpretations are the aforementioned Copenhagen interpretation, which is usually taught in universities under Richard Feynman's denominator ‘shut up and calculate!’, and the many-worlds interpretation, which is the one most popular-science and science fiction authors write about.
First proposed by Caves, Fuchs and Schack in 2002, QBism – short for quantum Bayesianism – is one of the newest interpretations of quantum physics. Its uniqueness lies in its radical reinterpretation of probability, dismissing frequentist probability in favour of Bayesian probability. As Bas van Fraassen's 1989 ‘cube factory’ thought experiment showed, frequentist probability is flawed, despite its being the only form of probability theory that is currently taught in schools, used in universities and allowed in experimental research. Bayesian probability, invented in the eighteenth century and used until superseded by frequentist probability, has now been brought back into quantum physics to offer new explanations for questions and paradoxes that have plagued the science since its inception. In his short, succinct popular exposition QBism: The Future of Quantum Physics, retired physicist Hans Christian von Baeyer presents QBism as ‘the most radical interpretation’ of quantum mechanics (p. 235) in a fast-paced narrative that is sure to leave a non-expert reader reeling with a range of new ideas.
Von Baeyer writes for an audience that is new to quantum physics, and therefore spends the first half of his work explaining the field. In this respect, the first eight chapters have much in common with all other popular quantum physics books. However, von Baeyer's clear and concise descriptions and explanations with helpful analogies are better than many explanations that came before. This reviewer has never encountered a more lucid explanation of the datedness of the Bohr model.
The next topic von Baeyer explains is probability, comparing frequentist to Bayesian probability with the intention to explain why the latter is more useful in quantum physics. It indeed seems likely that this section convinces the reader that frequentist probability as most of us have learned it in secondary school is inadequate, which is a commendable achievement. However, the superiority of Bayesian probability is not conveyed as convincingly. The reader is asked to trust their gut feeling in understanding Bayesian probability, which will probably grind the gears of many readers who have been made to understand that gut feeling is not convincing enough for science. Such a stance is particularly confusing for those readers who already had to abandon their gut feelings at several points in the book and simply accept that a different view of reality is correct: explaining the results of an experiment performed in the year 2000 in response to the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox, von Baeyer writes, ‘I cannot explain it any better than that. What matters is that it was, in fact, experimentally confirmed. Get used to it!’ (p. 165).
More than nearly every other popularizer, von Baeyer emphasizes the human endeavour of science and the way it influences science as a whole. Many popular expositions structure their narrative around a history of famous scientists, yet their findings, insofar as we still agree with them today, are presented as facts. Since QBism is based on the inherent subjectivity of quantum physics, von Baeyer needs to explain that science as a whole is a subjective process, which he does clearly and succinctly, even when the five-page chapter in which he does so is likely to leave readers reeling, as much of what they were ever taught about the scientific method is thrown out of the window. Having readers realize that most of the scientific process is in fact subjective would have been a major achievement, but this connection to other branches of science is not made explicit, as every part of the explanation is made to relate to QBism alone. Von Baeyer's explanation touches upon the territories of the disciplines of history and sociology of science as if they did not exist before the advent of QBism. ‘QBism implies that things don't happen the way they do because they obey a law of nature but that the laws of nature have been invented because things happen the way they do’, writes von Baeyer (p. 199), yet this, of course, has nothing to do with QBism in particular, and a reader to whom these ideas are new might be better off with a reassurance that this has in fact always been the commonly accepted interpretation of the laws of nature.
QBism ends with an appendix in which ‘four older interpretations of quantum physics’ are briefly discussed, sorted by popularity among scientists (p. 235). This clever approach ensures that these four interpretations, which include Copenhagen and many-worlds, are covered for completeness's sake without making the reader feel that any of these theories are deserving of their currently dominant status within physics, or worth exploring further in other popular-physics books.
For a non-expert reader, reading QBism may be a profoundly unsettling experience. The explanations and arguments are easy to comprehend, but the consequences are likely to undermine everything a reader already knew about science. For a historian or a sociologist of science, it will be a relief to see a popular work that acknowledges the human element as deeply embedded in the scientific process.
