Robert Cryer's excellent book is “about international criminal law” (p. 1), but it is not an account of international criminal law in the strict sense. Unlike M. Cherif Bassiouni's Introduction to International Criminal Law Footnote 1 —to which Cryer refers at page 1—or Cryer's own co-authored work,Footnote 2 Prosecuting International Crimes is not a law textbook, but an analytical monograph on the history and philosophy of international criminal law (ICL), and is an indispensable source for advanced students and practitioners of the subject.
Cryer does not simply restate the provisions of ICL but seeks to explain their origins and evolution. Part I reconstructs, in an intellectually challenging manner, the development of ICL, analyzes states’ rights and duties in the areas of co-operation in criminal matters and implementing ICL, and sketches the contributions of the UN ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC to the harmonization of ICL. In this fashion, Part I lays the groundwork for the succeeding evaluation of “the operation of the [ICL] regime with respect to critical principles derived from concepts of legitimacy and the rule of law” (p. 5).
Part II deals with the key concept of the book—that of selectivity in ICL. Cryer states generally that “[s]elective enforcement of the law is not inherently wrong”, but limits his hypothesis by posing the question as to “when selective enforcement [would be] unacceptable” (p. 192). A possible answer, he suggests, is that “whenever a crime goes unpunished, there is an unrighted wrong to the victim and to the relevant society” (p. 193). Consequently, it must be an aim of the ICL regime to make selectivity—which is inevitable at the national and international levels alike—compliant with the principles of legitimacy and the rule of law (cf. pp. 194−9). In this framework, the “core crimes” under ICL—aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—and other relevant crimes (e.g. terrorism and drug trafficking), and the general principles of liability and defences are examined, and an overall conclusion is offered (pp. 327−30).
In the Conclusion, Cryer attempts to answer why “the regime [his] book has investigated cannot be seen as a global one, [and why it] is [unlikely] to become global in the near future” (pp. 327−8). He identifies the reasons as consisting of: (1) the opposition towards the ICC regime of some major powers, such as the US, China, and India (p. 327); and (2) faults inherent in the Rome Statute. Cryer concludes that the International Criminal Court still “has sufficient weight to do what [it] was really meant to do: that is, encourage States to prosecute international crimes themselves” (p. 329).
In sum, Cryer's monograph should be necessary reading for all wishing to understand why the modern ICL regime functions the way it does and to reflect upon possible ways for improving its operation. It is hoped that, in a future edition of the book, the author might take stock of the 2010 Kampala Amendments to the ICC Statute and of relevant developments in national laws. An analysis of the ICC case-law would further enhance the monograph's unique value.
