States of Credit by David Stasavage is elegant, distinctive, and dynamic. Stasavage, who is Professor of Politics at New York University, integrates large literatures in political science, history, and economics, and assembles impressive new data sets on public debts and representative assemblies. He exploits these features through a comprehensive, theoretically informed empirical analysis that blends quantitative sophistication with historical richness. The result is a nuanced explanation of political representation and the development of public borrowing in medieval and early modern European history.
Stasavage establishes two striking trends. City-states like Cologne or Genoa developed public debts far earlier than territorial states like Castile or France. Furthermore, city-states financed those debts at much lower costs.
How so? City-states were typically governed by representative assemblies, and representative government enabled credible fiscal monitoring. Stasavage's argument is novel because it posits political representation and public debt as outcomes of two more fundamental factors: distance and wealth composition. The small physical size of city-states facilitated budget monitoring. Furthermore, merchants typically dominated representative assembles in city-states. These elites had liquid assets and wished to diversify their holdings by investing in public bonds. By contrast, territorial states were physically larger, and traditional landed interests presided over political affairs. City-states were thus not only more likely than territorial states to create public debts in the first place, but borrowing costs were more likely to be lower and access to credit more likely to be preserved.
Stasavage constructs his argument over eight chapters. Chapter 2 describes the importance of public credit in European history, and presents panel data for 31 polities between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries. Chapter 3 discusses the role of political representation, and displays sister panel data on representative institutions. To rigorously test the key claims, Chapter 4 performs an econometric analysis that controls for a variety of confounding factors. The next three chapters flesh out the core argument and establish robustness. Chapter 5 examines the origins of city-states, with a fascinating emphasis on the division of the Carolingian Empire in 843. A clever instrumental-variables strategy provides further statistical proof of the city- state public credit advantage. Chapters 6 and 7 pursue case studies of three city-states (Cologne, Genoa, Siena) and three territorial states (France, Castile, Holland), respectively. These accounts are valuable complements to the econometric tests. Chapter 8 finishes with implications. The thesis that the oligarchic structure of city-states was first a blessing but later a hindrance to long-run economic growth is of particular interest.
I very much hope that I have conveyed my admiration and enthusiasm for States of Credit. I now offer a set of comments to spur further thought.
Much of the literature on parliaments, commitment, and creditworthiness traces back to the classic work of Douglass North and Barry Weingast (“Constitutions and Commitment.” The Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (1989): 803–32), who examine parliamentary reforms with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England. In their view, the constitutional right of parliament to monitor government expenditures at regular intervals and in transparent ways was of key importance for public credit. However, representative governments in medieval and early modern city-states did not resemble the North-Weingast ideal. Unlike territorial states, there was no clear division between crown and parliament in city-states, which were run by councils with rotating magistrates selected from within their own ranks. Furthermore, oligarchic political control by merchant elites characterized the most fiscally successful city-states. Public finances were intentionally opaque. When city councils became more open and democratic (e.g., Siena after 1355; also see ahead), credit risk rose. Finally, city-states used forced loans (though it must be said that these loans paid interest, and were traded on secondary markets).
The distinction between city-states and territorial states was also complicated. Over time, territorial states absorbed city-states. There was a zero-sum-game element to state expansion, because territorial states had to tear away control from local authorities like merchant elites. To grow, territorial states often struck particularistic bargains that enabled locals of various stripes to retain traditional fiscal privileges. Institutional fragmentation thus rose as new areas were incorporated.
Both the peculiar nature of representative structures in city-states and the particularistic method of expansion by territorial states suggest that there was an institutional factor beyond distance and wealth composition that also influenced public debt: the royal moral hazard problem of warfare (see P. Hoffman, “Why Was It that Europeans Conquered the World?” Unpublished Paper, California Institute of Technology, 2009 and G. Cox, “War, Moral Hazard, and Ministerial Responsibility.” The Journal of Economic History 71, no. 1 (2011): 133{61). In the most successful city-states, oligarchic merchant councils closely monitored spending as well as tax decisions (Tables 4.1 and 4.2, Chapter 6 case studies). By contrast, fiscal authority was inefficiently divided in territorial states. Political elites of various locales and stripes controlled tax policies, while executives made spending choices (e.g., France, pp. 139–42, Castile, pp. 147–48). Sovereigns could not make credible promises to spend tax funds in productive ways like roads rather than military adventures, because they did not bear major consequences for wasteful decisions. As Hoffman (2009, p. 24) writes, monarchs “overspent on the military and provided more defense than their subjects likely desired. But they had little reason not to. Victory… won them glory, enhanced reputations, and resources…Losses never cost them their throne.”
In this “heads I win, tails you lose” equilibrium, credit risk was likely to be high. Furthermore, since elites were reluctant to lend to sovereigns in the first place, access to public credit was likely to be small. Indeed, public finances in territorial states that were able to resolve the moral hazard problem rivaled those of city-states (e.g., seventeenth-century Holland or England after 1688 versus eighteenth-century France; see Figure 3.2 and Table 4.1, column 10). Likewise, credit risk rose in city-states where merchants lost direct fiscal control (e.g., the revolt of 1355 in Siena that led to greater popular representation contra the merchant oligarchy called “The Nine”; see pp. 125–31).
From the vantage point of the moral hazard problem, state size influenced the extent to which governments valued efficient fiscal institutions. Since the ability to finance wars was the key driver of the demand for public credit, absolute amounts of military, taxes, and debts mattered. Because territorial states were larger than city-states in population and resources, sovereigns could likely underuse their full military capacity (i.e., soldiers, weapons) and still effectively battle city-states. Also due to their large size, territorial states could likely gather greater overall tax revenues, and more easily borrow the minimum debt quantities necessary to successfully compete with city-states. If territorial states faced military, tax, and debt capacity constraints that were less binding, then sovereigns would have had less incentive to surrender budgetary control (which they valued highly) to parliament and solve the moral hazard problem. Since city-states did not have the luxury of largess (e.g., for Cologne to defend itself at Neuss in 1474–75 from the bigger Duke of Burgundy, it had to borrow more in two years than it had over the preceding half-century; see pp. 112–13), however, then they would have had a stronger incentive than territorial states to establish undivided fiscal institutions.
