There is much to be admired in this short study of the German-Soviet War, 1941 to 1945, which is the English translation of the German-language book Unternehmen Barbarossa. Der deutsche Krieg im Osten, 1941–1945, published in 2011. (Puzzling, no translator is cited in this English-language edition.) Although an enormous amount of literature has appeared in recent decades on the German invasion and occupation of the Soviet Union, Christian Hartmann's book nonetheless succeeds in feeling fresh. This may have something to do with it being written not for scholars or students but with the clear purpose of reaching a wider, nonacademic audience. Thus, the decision to dispense with all references to sources and literature used is, while unfortunate, nonetheless understandable. Hartmann, a research fellow at Munich's renowned Institute of Contemporary History, demonstrates considerable skill as a writer but also outstanding knowledge of the subject matter in condensing the many facets of the war into an accessible, well-structured, succinct, and judicious work.

Early on in his discussion of the military operations, Hartmann wisely avoids any repetition of the still widespread belief that the Wehrmacht had victory snatched from its grasp at the gates of Moscow in December 1941, and instead points out that as early as July the German troops had begun “to win their victories on the point of exhaustion” (p. 49). In taking this line of argument, the author supports the compelling results of recent research carried out independently by the historians David Stahel (Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East, 2009) and Christoph Dieckmann (Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Litauen 1941–1944, 2011) to the effect that the Blitzkrieg had in fact failed by mid-July 1941, less than a month into the war. Hartmann's study succeeds in being much more than a purely military study, however, by also incorporating such aspects of the conflict as high politics, ideology, occupation policy, Soviet society, and German atrocities.

Importantly, Hartmann makes it clear from the outset that “Operation Barbarossa was a war of aggression that the Third Reich started out of choice not necessity” and, furthermore, that “the German atrocities during the war weigh significantly more heavily than do the Soviet ones” (p. 3). Fittingly, then, one of the book's nine chapters is devoted to “German War Crimes and Atrocities” (chapter six, pp. 85–108). The chapter is broken down into six subsections on German crimes committed against Jews, prisoners of war, and partisans, during the siege of Leningrad, in terms of economic exploitation, and in the scorched-earth policy pursued during the German retreat. With regard to the Holocaust of Soviet Jews, Hartmann rightly notes that the Wehrmacht's “institutional responsibility was immense” (p. 88). The death of more than three million Soviet prisoners of war, however, “was the largest crime committed by the Wehrmacht,” whose guilt weighs particularly heavy “because taking care of prisoners of war is actually a routine task for a professional army” (p. 89). In the 900-day siege of Leningrad by Army Group North, Hartmann recognizes “the motive of systematic genocide” (p. 98).

In searching for reasons that Germany lost the war against the Soviet Union, Hartmann tellingly concludes that the German leadership was “so foolhardy that [it] waged war from the beginning, not only against the Soviet Union with its superior resources, but also against almost all of its peoples at the same time” (p. 150). This was because “German rule was focused almost exclusively on the aims and interests of the occupiers” (p. 66). Essentially, the German leadership's idea of how the war should be conducted “meant destruction, exploitation, and oppression” (p. 151). It is little wonder then that the Soviet Union lost a total of 26.6 million people during the four years of this war, 15.2 million of them civilians. (The number of noncombatant Soviet dead is in fact more than eighteen million, including as it does the more than three million unarmed Red Army soldiers who perished in German captivity.) In Hartmann's words, this is a “monstrous figure, reminding us once again just what kind of a war this was” (p. 157).

It is to be hoped that this commendable book, written by one of the leading experts on the German-Soviet War, finds a broad and substantial audience in its original German edition, this English translation, and any other languages it might be translated into.