A new logic of political contestation defines democratic politics in Western Europe, argue Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti. They contend that the old logic of Left and Right that framed political competition in the twentieth century is still there but that it has been diminished and overlaid by new lines of conflict (p. 37). Where the old logic of competition engaged in a conflict of broad goals, policies, and values, the new logic gives rise to competition without opposition. Candidates and parties in Western European democracies are less likely to stand for one part—this region, religion, or class—against others, and instead, every side claims to represent the whole. And each insists that it offers an escape from corrupt rule by elites. All promise integrity and technocratic competence. Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti call this combination “technopopulism” and see it as the new development that accompanies what is often described in purely destructive terms as “democratic erosion” or “democratic backsliding.”

Among the book’s distinctive strengths is its blend of conceptual innovation with detailed empirical case studies. The book aims to contribute to “interpretive political science,” which, as the authors explain, focuses on efficient causes by developing concepts that are necessary to identify and diagnose political change (and which complements the familiar explanatory political science centered on causal relationships). The concept at the core of the book is, of course, “technopopulism” itself, which the authors discuss with precision in the first chapter. A closely allied concept is “political logic,” which refers to the fundamental questions that “set the terms of electoral competition” (p. 23). The question that technopopulism highlights is who can most successfully combine “populist claims to represent the people as a whole with the technocratic competence to design and implement effective policy” (p. 36).

On the authors’ account, the logic of technopopulism has displaced the older logic of political competition that dominated European democracies from 1890 to 1965, according to which politics expressed background economic, religious, and regional cleavages. Social cleavages gave rise to an ideological politics in which each side was compelled to recognize the partial legitimacy of its opponents, if only because social cleavages were so visible that no side could delude itself that it represented the whole. However, as social cleavages fragmented, the ideological logic of politics receded, and the connection between traditional parties and social groups was attenuated. The linkage between society and politics that parties ordinarily sustained was relaxed, and partisans themselves came to be seen by ordinary citizens as disconnected elites. This was the context for the rise of what Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti describe in chapter 2 as “pure cases” of technopopulism: New Labor in the United Kingdom, the Five Star Movement in Italy, and Macron’s La République En March! in France. In contrast, Spain’s Podemos party and Salvini’s Lega party in Italy represent “hybrid cases,” where the old ideological logic of competition continues alongside the newer technocratic populism.

Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti chart the rise of party democracy and the familiar left-right terms of competition from 1890 through 1965 and its gradual decay from 1965 through 1990. The historical story is masterfully rendered in these pages. A core contribution of the historical narrative lies in the last episode, from 1990 to the present, where the authors show how technocratic populism captures a variety of phenomena across Western Europe since 1990. The discussion of technopopulism’s historical origins leads to consideration of its consequences: intensifying political conflict ironically combined with a draining of substantive content from politics. The electorate is disaffected while governments pursue more authoritarian and penal strategies to surveil and pacify the public (pp. 154–166).

Technopopulism is not simply the erosion of familiar democratic institutions. It is, as the title of the book announces, a “new logic of democratic politics.” But it is also a logic that eats at the foundations of representative democracy. Its toxicity arises from its basis in populism’s defining quality: the claim to represent the true people exclusively, and with that, a refusal to see other participants to the political contest as legitimate.

Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti’s case studies—themselves a riveting primer in contemporary Western European politics—make a convincing argument for the rise of technopopulism. Yet, they point to questions about the capacity of technopopulism to offer a stable political logic for political competition. Technocracy might equip populist leaders to deliver the goods and therefore stabilize a form of nonpartisan (populist) majoritarian democracy—if populist technocracy worked. But as the horrific spread of COVID-19 infections that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi unleashed at his own rallies in India testify, populists often cannot abide the restraints that technocracy imposes even when they want the results that technocratic expertise promises. Technocracy’s problem, from a democratic perspective, is also its problem for populists: it empowers elites such as economists, lawyers, and scientists. Yet, the authority of the technocrat, grounded in expertise, limits the power of the populist leader, grounded in attunement with the public. This limitation stands as a potential offense that the populist leader, as the true embodiment of the whole people, can find intolerable. In short, the more technocratic the regime, the less populist—which puts into question whether the combination of technocracy and populism can be sustained and extended beyond the cases Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti adduce.

Does the “new logic” of politics that the authors find in Western Europe apply to democracy in other parts of the world? Pure cases may be hard to find. If Bolsonaro’s Brazil, Modi’s India, and Trump’s America exemplify the logic of technopopulism, they might be hybrid cases, where the old cleavages of region, religion, and class remain relevant. Does technocracy amplify the threat that populism poses to the rule of law and constitutional democracy, or does it temper it? Will democracy elsewhere betray the tendencies of democracy in Western Europe? This study puts these questions at the center of comparative politics as well as political theory.

This is interpretive political science at its best: it combines conceptual innovation, a deep familiarity with historical cases and the details of contemporary politics, and normative urgency. Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti’s book is essential for those who wish to understand democracy and populism in Western Europe and the fate of democracy everywhere.