This is a book which promises much but, for the most part, does not deliver. It is based on a questionable interpretation of the existing literature in this field and on a selective reading of the works of the neoconservatives it examines. Its covers much ground that has been discussed elsewhere and its conclusions do not depart from the widely accepted, and now rather banal, contention that neoconservatives, during both the Cold War and the war on terror, exercised some influence over the Presidents they served under (Reagan and Bush Jr. respectively.)
Velasco's historiographical effort to justify his study is muddled. He claims that existing studies of neoconservatism and US foreign policy do not appreciate the neocons’ influence on policy (3). Yet on the same page he acknowledges that John Ehrman's 1994 book focusses on “the ideas and impact” (my italics) of neoconservatism (3) and then admits that studies of the post-Cold War neocons also focus on “the policy impact of neoconservative ideas” (3). He also claims that Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke's 2004 book America Alone “basically ignores” the policy influence of the Cold War neocons (3); in fact they examine this in detail at 121–81 and 204–31. It is also discussed in books by Gary Dorrien (2004), Jacob Heilbrunn (2008) and Justin Vaïsse (2009). Ultimately, his claim that there is no book “that studies and contrasts both generations [of neocons] in foreign affairs” is unconvincing; it overlooks key contributions, already cited, which examine the Cold War and post-Cold War neocons and their impact on policy. In this sense, there is no clear intellectual rationale for the book.
However, Velasco offers a second justification: he seeks to synthesize two political-science theories – realignment theory and historical institutionalism. This would be a worthwhile exercise if, in doing so, the author were able to shed new light on the nature of the neoconservative networks or their influence on policy, but he does neither. Aside from some interesting and useful details on the funding of the American Enterprise Institute during the 1970s, the book's conclusions seem synthetic, in the sense that they do not make a substantive original contribution to the debate that moves beyond the literature already cited. The use of realignment and historical institutionalism seems more about proving that those two theories can coexist than about using them as tools to offer a unique perspective on neoconservatism. Velasco's argument that neocons exercised some influence over Reagan and Bush is commonplace. His ultimate conclusion, that “neither interests nor ideas were the sole protagonists of political change” during the periods of neoconservative influence is facile because no scholar writing in this field has assigned these changes solely “to one variable,” as Velasco claims (224).
Moreover, the book contains some omissions and misinterpretations. These are discussed below.
In chapters 4 and 5 Velasco argues that the neocons were integral to the development of Reagan's human rights policy and military build-up and were amongst Reagan's greatest supporters. But Velasco overlooks the fact that, by 1983, leading neocons had already become very disillusioned with Reagan for not doing more to support the Solidarity movement in Poland, for selling Airborne Warning and Control Systems to Saudi Arabia and for holding direct talks with Moscow about arms reduction. Norman Podhoretz – repeatedly cited by Velasco as a leading neocon theorist – castigated Reagan in Commentary magazine, most notably in a 1983 article entitled “Appeasement by Any Other Name.” This runs contrary to Velasco's portrait of the neocons as key policymakers and supporters of Reagan and his claim that “their access to the wielders of power was even more noticeable during times of crisis” such as the declaration of martial law in Poland (133).
On the basis of the neocons' opposition to the Vietnam War, Velasco also mistakenly claims that they were opposed to the whole principle of containment (193). In fact, they were amongst the staunchest supporters of containment but simply believed that the policy had been misapplied in Vietnam because it was not strategically important and the war could not be won. To quote Robert Tucker in Commentary in 1977, “Why should the quintessential character of containment be found in Vietnam rather than in Western Europe or Japan?”
In his coverage of post-Cold War neconservatism, Velasco errs in attributing their preference for preventive military action to Richard Perle's call for an invasion of Iraq after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait (167 and 171). As the author himself acknowledges, this call was made in response to the invasion, not before it; thus by definition it was not a call for preventive action.
In addition, Velasco states that unilateralism was a “core” principle of the post-1989 neocons (172); but this overlooks their staunch commitment to the expansion of the NATO alliance and to maintaining its purpose and credibility in the post-Soviet world. In chapter 6, the author also makes the highly dubious claim that the post-Cold War neocons were influenced by Samuel Huntington's “clash of civilizations” thesis. However, Huntington's views were simply not part of the neoconservative discourse in the 1990s and he remained aloof from their intellectual network even as it rose in prominence. Tellingly, the chapter does not include a single example of a neoconservative citing or referring to Huntington, only one secondhand assertion of this alleged link from a non-neocon (182).
Finally, Velasco's argument that neoconservatives were able to exercise power under Reagan and Bush Jr. ignores the fact that, in both administrations, they occupied only second- and third-tier positions. The author never explains how and why they were able to form alliances with non-neocons in top-level cabinet positions and what the implications of this are for the notion that neoconservatives held quite distinct ideological positions in comparison to other conservatives.
Ultimately, this book might have some use as an introductory text or for anyone interested in whether realignment theory and historical institutionalism can coexist, but it does not offer profound or novel insights into the influence of neoconservatism on US foreign policy.
