Introduction
The eighth European Parliament (EP) election in May 2014 was widely regarded as the most important election to date for the following reasons. First, it was the first post-euro crisis election at the European Union (EU) level and was described as ‘an important test of faith in the European project’.Reference La Guardia 1 Second, it was the first post-Lisbon Treaty election, and the newly-elected European Parliament was endowed with new powers of legislation, the so-called ‘co-decision’ powers with the EU Commission.Reference Hix 2 Third, the new Parliament would, for the first time, formally ‘elect’ the next Commission President (Ref. Reference Hix2, pp. 1–2). That is to say, the new Parliament co-decides not only the EU’s policies, but also its chief executive officer.
The election outcome revealed that anti-EU, anti-immigration populist right-wing parties (PRPs) fared considerably better than anticipated in a number of EU member states, especially in France and the UK where they have become the largest parties; altogether, they have become the third largest political force in EU politics. The then French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, described this outcome as a ‘political earthquake’, while the then president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, viewed the rise of PRPs in EU politics as a big danger to European integration. 3 , Reference Mudde 4
Some do not agree that the EP election outcome was a PRP earthquake. Mudde argued that, quantitatively speaking, only ten out of 28 EU members elected PRP Members of European Parliament (MEPs) and such parties gained additional seats in six countries while losing seats in seven others.Reference Mudde 5 Goodwin also argued that some PRPs were more established after the 2014 EP election, but others remained marginal.Reference Goodwin 6
It is true that some PRPs, especially those in Italy, the Netherlands, and Finland, performed badly. However, several key points cannot be ignored. First, that such parties have greatly risen in number and may have ‘a greater pool of potential supporters who are also receptive’ to their appeals.Reference Fontanella-Khan, Carnegy and Stacey 7 , Reference Goodwin 8 Second, as some critics have argued, the point is not how many seats they acquire in the EP, but rather how much pressure they put on their national governments. National governments, especially in France and the UK, have encountered an acute dilemma of how to respond to immigration and EU-related issues.Reference Gunduz 9 , Reference Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz 10 Third, some have suggested that minority parties tend to perform better in European elections because voters feel freer to vote with their hearts, in particular, with respect to issues of the EU and European integration. If that is the case, the sharp rise of PRPs in France and the UK in the 2014 EP election should have been more worrying than some comprehended at the time. In the meantime, Brexit has become a reality. France is the EU’s second largest member, and the Franco-German axis is the locomotive force behind European integration. The growth of Eurosceptism in major EU members thus has resulted in political instability to European integration.
This article aims to answer three related questions: first, why did PRPs rise in the 2014 EP election and in a context where tolerance and multiculturalism are the core values of European integration? Second, what messages are delivered to European integration? Third, did policy-makers read the messages correctly?
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. The second section reviews the theoretical accounts of the rise of PRPs. From those competing interpretations, the third section discusses the most plausible causes of the 2014 EP election result. The fourth section clarifies what the election result implies for European integration, and whether or not EU policy-makers read them correctly. The conclusion summarizes the findings of this paper.
Definitions have to be clarified first. To define a populist right-wing party is both academically and practically difficult. Academically, there is no consensus on terminology, as PRPs may appear similar in some respects but different in others (Ref. Reference Goodwin8, p. 12).Reference Arzheimer 11 Practically, they vary significantly on issues according to their local preferences, traditions, and political circumstances (Ref. Reference Mudde5). Acknowledging these differences and different criteria to classify PRPs, this paper adopts Rydgren’s view and defines PRPs as populist in terms of anti-establishment, and right-wing in terms of their emphases on ethno-nationalism, anti-immigration and anti-EU attitudes.Reference Rydgren 12
Theoretical Accounts for Explaining the Rise of PRPs
PRPs have emerged in three distinct waves in the post-war years. The first wave began right after the end of the war and was composed of openly fascist and neo-Nazi parties. The second wave arose in the 1970s and consisted of mainly anti-tax populist movements. Both waves received only marginal support. The third wave developed from the mid-1980s, following a new phase of immigration when 30 million people moved into Europe; this wave has been more sustainable than the previous two waves.Reference Ignazi 13 However, the rise of PRPs was not a universal phenomenon. In such countries as Austria, Belgium and France, PRPs had been growing notably and were even invited to form coalition governments. In other countries, such as Germany and Spain, they had not been electorally successful and have been labelled as ‘flash parties’ (Ref. Reference Goodwin8, pp. 1–3).Reference Rydgren 14 , Reference Van der Brug and Fennema 15
Despite their different fortunes and performances, PRPs of the third wave have been able to command sustainable electoral support in nearly half of Europe’s countries, and this political reality caused what Messina terms: ‘the most disturbing and intractable challenges to democracies’.Reference Messina 16
How does one explain the persistence of PRPs in contemporary Europe? There are two families of explanations, one focused on the demand-side factors while the other focuses on supply-side factors.
Public Demand-side Factors
This group explains the electoral support for PRPs from macro-structural factors that change voters’ interests, emotions, attitudes and preferences. There are three accounts in this group.
First, the ‘relative deprivation/modernist losers’ thesis builds on people’s frustration arising from declining market situations or from fear of economic decline in the near future. It argues that such economic frustration and fear, associated with the loss of social status or fear of loss of status, explain why people support PRPs (Ref. Reference Rydgren12, pp. 247–248).
The ‘modernization losers’ account further argues that the rise of PRPs can be understood as ‘the radical effort to undo social change associated with modernization’.Reference Minkenberg 17 Betz argued that the support for PRPs is largely ‘a consequence of a profound transformation of the socioeconomic and socio-cultural structure of advanced Western European democracies’ from an industrial to post-industrial economy. Those who cannot cope with the ‘acceleration of economic, social and cultural modernization’ and/or who run the risk of falling into a new underclass or unemployment may favour PRPs, as their anxiety, discontent, resentment and insecurity can only be channelled into support for such kind of parties.Reference Betz 18
Empirical studies support the class profile of PRP supporters, but unemployment is not a good predictor for PRP’s electoral performance. Regarding the class factor, several studies have shown that PRPs gained very extensive support from the economically insecure working and old middle class with lower- and mid-school educational qualifications, while they gained very little support from more secure and higher-paid sections of the middle class with university-level educations (Ref. Reference Goodwin8, pp. 6–9; Ref. Reference Gunduz9, p. 40; Ref. Reference Arzheimer11, p. 259). In addition, unemployed people are more likely to vote for PRPs.Reference Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers 19 Regarding unemployment rates, however, the findings are not conclusive. For example, a number of cross-national surveys found either insignificant (Ref. Reference Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers19, pp. 370–371),Reference Kessler and Freeman 20 or negative relationships between unemployment rates and electoral support for PRPs.Reference Coffe, Heyndels and Vermeir 21 , Reference Arzheimer and Carter 22 The work of Swank and Betz found no significant relationship between either unemployment rates, slower economic growth, or inflation rates, and the electoral support for PRPs, but confirmed that a significant negative relationship existed between a universal welfare state system and PRP support.Reference Swank and Betz 23 Arzheimer also found that unemployment benefits can effectively reduce PRP support (Ref. Reference Arzheimer11, p. 274). On the other hand, others confirmed a positive relationship between the two (Ref. Reference Arzheimer11, p. 274).Reference Jackman and Volpert 24 , Reference Rydgren and Ruth 25 Some further found that unemployment correlated with PRPs only when it interacted with immigration issues.Reference Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 26 , Reference Golder 27 Anderson’s case study on Denmark and Norway also suggested that unemployment would correlate with PRP support when it became a serious political problem in elections.Reference Anderson 28
Second, the ‘ethnic competition’ thesis argued that immigration issues were the main, if not the only, reason for voters to support PRPs, because they wanted to reduce competition from immigrants over scarce resources such as job markets, housing, welfare state benefits, or even the marriage market. Following these arguments, it was assumed that PRP support would be manifest in areas where there was a high presence of immigrants, among voters of lower-educated and unskilled backgrounds, and among male voters confronting competition predominantly from immigrants (Ref. Reference Goodwin8, p. 16).Reference Norris 29 , Reference Rydgren and Ruth 30
A number of empirical studies supported this account. They found that a positive relationship existed between the number of immigrants and asylum seekers with PRP support (Ref. Reference Arzheimer11, p. 274; Ref. Reference Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers19, pp. 370–371; Ref. Reference Coffe, Heyndels and Vermeir21, p. 153). However, some pointed out that such co-relationships were conditional. For example, Golder found that it was significant only when unemployment rates exceeded 1.3%.Reference Golder 31 Others indicated that immigration was effective in increasing PRP support only when this issue was linked with other meaningful ones, such as criminality, social unrest, unemployment and economic crisis.Reference Rydgren 32 , Reference William 33 Another study suggested that the effects of immigration depended on how the electorate perceived it, rather than the actual threat it posed (Ref. Reference Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz10, p. 116). On the other hand, others found no significant relationship between the two (Ref. Reference Norris29, pp. 169–172),Reference Kestila and Soderlund 34 and for Rydgren, these surveys suffered from ‘an ecological fallacy’, because ‘most competition is more local in character’ while most surveys were conducted at national levels (Ref. Reference Rydgren12, p. 250).
Third, the ‘political discontent’ account claimed that the growing political alienation and discontent in Western European democracies have created an audience receptive to anti-establishment and anti-system appeals and thus provided opportunities for PRPs to gain support from protest voters. Some empirical studies support this account (Ref. Reference Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers19, p. 371; Ref. Reference Kessler and Freeman20, p. 283; Ref. Reference Norris29, pp. 157–159).Reference Oesch 35 However, one report found no significant relationship between protest voters and PRP electoral support.Reference Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 36 Furthermore, it was argued that protest voters played a more important role in PRP breakthrough elections than in subsequent elections, as Rydgren confirmed this tendency in the case of France’s Front National (Ref. Reference Rydgren12, p. 251). On the other hand, Norris disagreed with this account, because mistrust of politicians and political institutions had been widespread in many Western European democracies, but PRPs were not successful in all of these countries (Ref. Reference Norris29, p. 164). Furthermore, this account cannot clarify why protest voters would turn to PRPs instead of other opposition parties (Ref. Reference Rydgren12, p. 251). Therefore, the protest vote is ‘a concept that in itself contains biased ambiguities’ (Ref. Reference Van der Brug and Fennema15, p. 479).
In short, demand-side explanations shared one feature in common, namely that they were in different ways based on a strain or grievance theory, which focused on objective conditions that caused voters’ grievances and discontent (Ref. Reference Rydgren14, p. 415). These explanations have been criticized for not being able to acknowledge the fact that the ‘relationship between belief and action is complex’,Reference Eatwell 37 and that voters’ attitudes and interests change ‘more frequently and less predictably than issue preferences’.Reference Ivarsflaten 38 This leads in turn to the so-called supply-side approaches.
Supply-side Factors
This group explains the rise of PRPs from either political opportunity structures or party organization. First, the ‘political opportunity structures’ camp argued that opportunities from de-alignment and realignment processes, convergence between established parties in the same political space, an open electoral system with low entrance thresholds, mass media coverage, and the presence or absence of elite allies, provided favourable political structures for PRPs to emerge and develop (Ref. Reference Rydgren12, pp. 252–257). These factors are discussed in turn.
The account of de-alignment and realignment processes suggests that contemporary Western European democracies are characterized by two cleavage dimensions. One is economic and concerns class, interest distribution between workers and capitalists, and subsequent state intervention in the economy, while the other is socio-cultural and concerns issues such as immigration, law and order, abortion, etc.Reference Cole 39 , Reference Rydgren 40 In recent decades, the socio-cultural cleavage dimension has become more salient than the economic one. In this context, socialist parties have found it more difficult to hold onto their traditional voters, as working-class voters who used to support the centre-left parties on socio-economic grounds have now become receptive to PRP appeals on socio-cultural issues. This provides PRPs with an opportunity for realignment. It is therefore argued that PRPs are less successful in countries where centre-left parties or institutions such as trade unions retain a strong hold on working-class voters (Ref. Reference Oesch35, p. 353).Reference Eatwell 41 , Reference Rydgren 42
As for the convergence thesis, it argues that convergence between established parties will bring opportunities for PRPs, because partial convergence may produce a feeling of established parties ‘being all the same’ and has fuelled voters’ distrust of, and discontent with, politicians and parties, and has created a niche market for PRPs to mobilize protest voters (Ref. Reference Rydgren14, p. 423). Most empirical studies tend to support this account (Ref. Reference Arzheimer and Carter22, p. 439),Reference Abedi 43 , Reference Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 44 but Norris finds no support for the convergence thesis (Ref. Reference Norris29, pp. 192–196).
The account of electoral system and entrance thresholds argues that the openness or closure of an electoral system is critical to the development of a PRP. A political system with an entrance threshold of 2 or 4% would make a difference for the emergence of PRPs (Ref. Reference Rydgren12, p. 254). This account, however, receives mixed support from empirical studies. Some find that PRPs were not particularly successful in proportional electoral systems (Ref. Reference Arzheimer and Carter22, p. 439; Ref. Reference Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie44, p. 568), while others suggest PRPs did get more votes (Ref. Reference Swank and Betz23, p. 238; Ref. Reference Jackman and Volpert24, p. 501; Ref. Reference Golder31, p. 461).
On the issue of access to mass media, many argue that the media, including the internet, play a vital role in the development of PRPs, as the ‘actions of gatekeepers produce the first and most basic selection mechanism’.Reference Koopmans 45 Rydgren points out that Sweden’s New Democracy has benefited greatly from a variety of commercial TV channels which developed in the 1990s,Reference Rydgren 46 and Cammaerts has found that the internet has been instrumental in Belgium’s case.Reference Cammaerts 47 Eatwell also argued that the French Front National reached its electoral breakthrough shortly after its leader was given access to state television.Reference Eatwell 48 The different attitudes between Danish and Swedish newspapers on publishing PRP articles are believed to be a reason for the performance of the PRPs in the two countries (Ref. Reference Rydgren42, p. 474). Others also confirmed the positive relationship of media coverage on immigration issues with PRP support (Ref. Reference Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart26, p. 413).Reference Plasser and Ulram 49 However, for Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, mass media only had limited power in setting political agendas.Reference Green-Pederson and Krogstrup 50 To a large extent, the effects depended on how the issues reported fit with party competition and electoral strategy.
The account of the presence or absence of elite allies generates two opposing hypotheses. On the one hand, it maintained that cooperation with established parties lends legitimacy to PRPs and results in electoral success.Reference Dahlstrom and Sundell 51 On the other hand, it also argued that PRP cooperation with established parties would result in losing voters as they would find it more difficult to use anti-establishment strategies and mobilize protest voters, and eventually face shrinking niches in the political market (Ref. Reference Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie44, 2005, p. 548). Empirical studies so far have been inconclusive over this relationship (Ref. Reference Rydgren12, pp. 255–256).
Second, the ‘party organization’ thesis argues that, even if political opportunity structures are favourable, the success of a PRP still depends on how well it exploits these opportunities.Reference Mudde 52 , Reference Betz 53 Ideology/discourse, party organization, and internal resources are all critical to the capability of a PRP to rise and to develop (Ref. Reference Rydgren12, pp. 256–257; Ref. Reference Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers19, p. 361; Ref. Reference Mudde52, pp. 275–276). Some even argued that the personal charisma of PRP leaders is a major factor for electoral success (Ref. Reference Mudde52, pp. 275–276; Ref. Reference Eatwell48, pp. 101–120). However, as successful politicians ‘are easily called charismatic, and an unsuccessful politician will never be called charismatic’ (Ref. Reference Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie44, pp. 542, 567), this reasoning becomes circular.
Although party organization is recognized as a significant factor for the rise of PRPs, there is a lack of systematic research on party dynamics (Ref. Reference Rydgren12, p. 257).
In sum, demand-side approaches are derived from a macro-perspective while supply-side ones are derived from a micro-level analysis. As with terminology, there is a lack of consensus in explaining the rise of PRPs despite the rich literature and empirical studies discussed above.
The 2014 EP Election: Identifying the Causes of the Rise of PRPs
In accordance with the theoretical accounts, there are three different kinds of interpretations for the rise of PRPs in the 2014 EP election.
The Economic Interpretation: The Euro Crisis
Echoing with the relative deprivation/modernization losers thesis, some have tended to interpret the 2014 EP election result from an economic perspective, suggesting economic stagnation may become a danger to the European project. The then president of the EU Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, for one has maintained that ‘this election follows the biggest financial, economic and ultimately social crisis in decades’ (Ref. Reference Fontanella-Khan, Carnegy and Stacey7).
The EU’s economic context seemed to justify the economic interpretation. The EU’s overall unemployment reached 24.4 million or 10% on average in October 2014. To make matters worse, the European Commission pointed out that one in four Europeans was at risk of poverty even when ‘unemployment is gradually reducing’, because increasing numbers of part-time and low-wage jobs meant that finding a job could not lift workers out of poverty and was no longer equated with a decent standard of living.Reference Fox 54 Unemployment in France reached a record high in November 2014.Reference Pop 55 In the UK, both income inequality and absolute poverty were increasing while social transfer was being cut, making it the country with the widest gap of income growth among OECD members.Reference Andre, Garcia, Giupponi and Pareliussen 56 Surveys also indicated that French and British people were among the most anxious and pessimistic in the EU.Reference Mahony 57 It is not surprising then that PRPs in France and the UK rose to become the largest parties in the 2014 EP election.
Such an economic interpretation, however, cannot explain why Italy, whose people were also pessimistic about the economic future (48%), did not witness the rise of PRPs. Neither can it explain that it was not PRPs but radical left parties that did well in the EP election in those EU members hit most by the euro crisis. 58 An economic perspective appeared to be plausible after the euro crisis, but it cannot fit neatly with the whole picture across the EU.
The Socio-cultural Interpretation: The Immigration Issue
Different from the economic interpretation, some academics interpreted the election result from a socio-cultural perspective, which follows the ethnic competition thesis.
Mudde explains the rise of PRPs in the election as a post-materialist phenomenon, which prioritizes socio-cultural issues and identity politics and relegates economic issues to secondary place. He argued that the euro crisis played a socio-cultural role in this election. PRPs framed the EU bailout policies through their nationalistic and populist rhetoric and, most importantly, framed the euro crisis as contributing to immigration and causing economic and cultural problems in the host nations (Ref. Reference Mudde5). Goodwin also claimed that it was the immigration issue, not economic and political protest, that became the ‘most important factor’ for voters to support PRPs (Ref. Reference Goodwin8, pp. 9–11). The voters were not simply protest voters or losers of globalization, but were concerned about immigration and viewed ethnic and cultural diversity as threats to their culture, national identity and way of life.
In terms of policy issue, immigration was indeed the issue of greatest concern singled out by PRP voters. In the election campaign, all PRPs used explicitly hostile language toward immigrants, ethnic diversity and multiculturalism, which were all argued to result from the EU and European integration. The leader of the National Front, Marine le Pen, accused the EU’s ‘posted workers directive’, which allowed workers from poor EU countries to work in France and put thousands of French people out of work, and thus appealed to recovering ‘our identity from the EU’ (Ref. Reference Fontanella-Khan, Carnegy and Stacey7).Reference Marlowe 59
This socio-cultural perspective, however, cannot explain the fact that PRPs were not successful in Italy and Spain, both struggling with the surge of African immigrants. This inconsistency between the surge of immigrants and the electoral success of PRPs is more evident in the case of Germany. Germany has topped the EU list as the choice of immigrants and asylum seekers since 2012,Reference Teffer 60 but PRPs there have constantly failed to progress in elections, at least until the 2014 EU elections. Neither can this interpretation explain why PRPs had gained as many seats as they had lost in elections between 2005 and 2013, 61 but were able to make a breakthrough in 2014. More importantly, if the immigration issue was as vital as PRPs and their voters claimed, and had become the issue of greatest concern to the electorate since the EU’s enlargement in 2003 (Ref. Reference Goodwin8, p.14), then why do the same PRPs suffer from instabilities in electoral support? Why did the National Front perform badly in elections during the last decade? And why were UKIP’s votes halved in the UK general election a year later following the 2014 EP election?
The inapplicability of socio-cultural interpretation across countries and across different periods of time exposes its limits. This leads to the third perspective, the political explanation.
The Political Interpretation: A Trust Crisis
Several commentators believe that the mismanagement of the euro crisis by the EU’s political elites caused a collapse of confidence in the political establishment and deep disillusionment within the EU. They see the election result as reflecting European voters’ disagreement on, rejection of, and distrust in the political establishment due to the mismanagement of the euro crisis.Reference Papadopoulou 62 , Reference Karakasis 63 Karakasis further warns that the image of the EU and the euro have become synonymous with austerity and continuing poverty, and if European leaders do not read the election results correctly, they may face bigger surprises in future elections (Ref. Reference Karakasis63, pp. 5–6). An official report from the OECD also reminded that although public services benefited every income group, they have a larger effect on lower-income groups. Austerity could hit the poor the hardest, as they rely on public services much more than other income groups and thus public services and redistribution policies are crucial for alleviating poverty (Ref. Reference Andre, Garcia, Giupponi and Pareliussen56, pp. 20–21).
The management of the euro crisis, not the euro itself, was indeed criticized fiercely in the 2014 election campaign. Several surveys have shown that the electorate was neither as anti-euro nor as anti-immigration as PRPs claimed them to be. Rather, voters lacked trust in the political establishment due to the latter’s performance in the euro crisis management and the subsequent economic governance. A survey in July 2014 indicated that while increasing numbers of people believed that their voice was only heard after and because of the shocking result of the 2014 EP election, trust at both the EU and national level remained fairly low, at only 31% for the EU. Interestingly, low trust in the political establishment did not reduce the public’s support for the euro in principle. Fifty-five percent of Europeans viewed the euro in a positive light, and support for the euro has risen even in Portugal, Cyprus and Greece, where the euro crisis hit hardest (Ref. Reference Mahony57).
Furthermore, in Portugal, Spain and Italy, where unemployment remained very high, there appeared little risk of the rise of anti-EU, anti-euro and anti-immigration PRPs, and this was in sharp contrast to France, the UK and Denmark. In a survey on the six largest members, people in Spain (63% of respondents) and Italy (64%) were much more positive than those in the UK (only 51%) and France (55%).Reference Mahony 64 The electorate’s trust in the political establishment remained solid in most countries in the euro crisis. By the end of 2014, a Eurobarometer survey showed that faith in Portugal’s mainstream parties remained as strong as it had been in the cases of Spain, Italy and Ireland. This led Antonio Costa Pinto to suggest that ‘political parties are ... strong in their ability to frame the attitudes of society’.Reference Barber 65
Where ruling parties failed the electorate, the political establishment lost people’s trust in politics. As a result, PRPs became the electorate’s protest outlet and support rose sharply. In contrast, where a ruling party had a strong hold on the electorate and policy debate, the political establishment dominated the electoral market and PRPs found no room to prosper. Unfavourable economic conditions, e.g. the euro crisis, and cultural factors, e.g. controversies over immigration, were not sufficient for explaining the rise of PRPs in the 2014 EP election. These only provided a political scene for ruling parties to demonstrate their governance capability and to fulfil their electoral promises. Kulinska argued that nationalistic tendencies and PRPs had been in domestic politics for decades, but they had been marginalized on the European scene.Reference Kulinska 66 Thus, the rise of PRPs in the election was not a constant phenomenon either within the EU or among individual members, not even in countries where PRPs grew to become the largest parties. Moreover, the rise of PRPs was not because of their ideologies or behaviour; they continued to follow the same pattern and adopt anti-immigration, anti-EU, and strong nationalistic strategies (Ref. Reference Kulinska66, p. 60).
This paper hence suggests that the rise of PRPs in the 2014 EP election is best explained by approaches that emphasize the public demand side. The electorate’s disillusionment with the political establishment, as a result of the management of the euro crisis, accumulated and ultimately became a crisis of political trust. This is not to deny the relevance of supply-side explanations, but the thesis of political trust can account for the variation of support for PRPs in the 2014 election and throughout different periods of time in the same country.
Implications for the EU and European Integration
The argument of a political trust crisis indicated that while the euro crisis had hit the poor and the most vulnerable seriously, the (mis)management of the crisis by European political elites further deepened the divide between winners and losers and highlighted the issues of economic justice and evenness of European integration. The deterioration of distributional justice had damaged the legitimacy of both national and EU governance and developed into a trust crisis for the political establishment, thereby giving the PRPs room for development. Following this line of reasoning, the rise of PRPs is not the real threat to European integration and should not be overestimated.
What is in question, indeed, is the foundation of European integration. European integration has created far more economic and political integration than social and cultural projects that unify Europe (Ref. Reference Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz10, pp. 118–119). Now with European integration being linked closely with ethnic and cultural diversity and described as a threat to national identity and economic welfare by PRPs,Reference Cakmak and Postaci 67 , Reference John, Margetts and Weir 68 the very root of European integration, which is ‘unity in diversity’, is seriously threatened (Ref. Reference Cakmak and Postaci67, p. 1). Dominique Moisi also contended that ‘the legitimacy of Europe is weakened, [and] the legitimacy of France in Europe is weakened further’.Reference Taylor and Emmott 69 The most important issue for the policy makers becomes how to effectively respond to this development, because ‘the ultimate fate of the EU is how ordinary citizens view the role of Europe in their lives’ (Ref. Reference Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz10, pp. 118–119).
It is then important to ask whether policy-makers read the message right. After the election results were revealed, the French prime minister Manuel Valls responded that ‘the EU must react’ to the breakthrough of PRPs. French President Francois Hollande perceived the rise of PRPs as seizing on the ‘disenchantment’ with Europe. He accordingly proposed strengthening the leadership of the eurozone governance by the six EU founding members, so as to provide more support for growth and employment.Reference Mahony 70 , Reference Spiegel and Carnegy 71
These calls for policy changes received support from a few academics. Papadopoulou contended that the EU needs to change its policy direction towards boosting growth, because the only way that it could regain its credibility was to serve citizens’ interests first, and not just require them to adjust to the euro crisis (Ref. Reference Papadopoulou62, p. 12). Collingnon agreed that the right medicine to the euro crisis management was not austerity, but to set up an economic government to stimulate growth, stabilize financial markets, and restore social welfare.Reference Collingnon 72 Liakopoulos similarly argued that EU leaders and mainstream parties should regain their lost voters by redefining Europe’s direction, and by introducing a big investment plan of quality jobs as well as a social Europe, which cares for its citizens.Reference Liakopoulos 73
From the outset, European integration was not just an economic project of producing winners and losers, although economic integration remains the major means to achieving these aims. It is, by nature, a political project aimed at perpetual peace and prosperity. The neglect of a social Europe counteracts the gains from an economic Europe and leads to a political Europe that is disintegrated, as has been reflected by the rise of PRPs.
This article hence supports the policy suggestions offered by Barslund et al. and Vandenbroucke.Reference Barslund, Gregory and Macey 74 , Reference Vandenbroucke 75 The former suggested the EU should create a European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) that could direct financial flows to the unemployed, whenever they were in Europe, and that supported those EU members suffering from increasing unemployment. This could stress the social dimension of European integration and function as a solidarity link between the EU and European citizens. The latter suggested the EU prioritize the ‘Social Investment Package’ on education, training and skills, which has been slipping down in EU policy-making recently because of its emphasis on structural reforms and fiscal disciplines.
How are these calls and suggestions perceived by EU policy-makers? German Chancellor Angela Merkel did not respond to the French call for immediate policy change, but indicated that high unemployment did damage political trust in the EU in some countries (Ref. Reference Taylor and Emmott69). A year later, however, the French and German economic ministers co-published the ‘Gabriel-Macron’ proposal, which suggested that the eurozone should have an institution with its own budget and revenues raised through taxation, essentially an economic government to coordinate the divergent economic performance of euro members (Ref. Reference Teffer60).
Policy change can also be traced from the EU’s new initiatives. Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker claimed that his top priority was to create jobs and growth. In January 2015, the Commission proposed to establish the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) to mobilize at least €315 billion in investment in Europe over the following three years. After being approved by the European Council and EP, the EFSI was scheduled into operation from September 2015 on. 76
Another observable policy change of the Juncker Commission is its emphasis on the idea of a social Europe. Juncker explained on his Twitter account that his goal was to close the gap between the EU and ordinary people, with the social dimension of the EU crucial to achieving this aim. European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility, Marianne Thyssen, further illustrated in a speech that ‘a new start for Social Europe’ implied ‘fair and balanced growth that leads to the creation of decent, quality jobs’ so as to promote ‘upward social convergence’. 77 The Commission swiftly revived the social dialogue between EU executives, employers and trade unions, which was seen as being necessary for the foundation of a new economic governance of the ‘social market economy’.Reference Vincenti 78
Strengthening the eurozone leadership through a coordinating economic institution and the establishment of the EFSI are the right policy responses to the rise of PRPs, and can demonstrate how policy-makers are capable of having strongholds on directing an economic Europe. However, concrete elements of a social Europe are missing. The effects of reviving the social dialogue remain to be seen, and initiatives that address economic fairness and distributional justice are absent. Without addressing the social dimension of European integration, a recovering euro economy underpinned by the EFSI would not guarantee the fall of PRPs. Neither would policy-makers find it sufficient to restore the legitimacy of European integration and the political trust of the electorate.
Conclusion
This article has explored the rise of PRPs in the 2014 EP election and explored the causes of the election result from competing theoretical accounts. While it is difficult to provide a universal explanation for various election results across EU countries, this paper argued that electorate disillusionment and a crisis of political trust are more capable of explaining the variation across the EU. The political disillusionment as well as a trust crisis derived from the long-term neglect of distributional justice arising from European economic and monetary integration had become acute after the mismanagement of the euro crisis. The shocking result of the EP election thus could be interpreted as a protest vote against the political establishment.
The trust crisis should not be underestimated, as it could eventually undermine the legitimacy of the whole European project. This article, accordingly, suggests that EU policy should be redirected from the current austerity to economic recovery. The social dimension of European integration should also be addressed at the same time. These moves are necessary to regain from the electorate the credence of good governance both at the national and EU level. Policy responses taken by the EU so far conform to the former suggestion, but not the latter.
Having celebrated its 50th anniversary just a few years ago, European integration has now witnessed the rise of anti-EU political forces. As an advanced model of regional integration, the EU’s emphasis on economic integration, i.e. an economic Europe, without simultaneously addressing the social dimension, i.e. a social Europe, is doomed to result in anti-EU forces.
Certainly, European integration has experienced numerous ups and downs, and this is not the first time it has encountered a ‘crisis’. The breakthrough of PRPs in the 2014 EP election, however, was the first time that European integration encountered a serious crisis of political trust. Whether or not key policy-makers can rightly read the message from the 2014 election result and rectify mismanagement will determine how far European integration can proceed.
Chih-Mei Luo is a Professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy, National Taipei University, Taiwan, Republic of China. She holds a PhD in Politics from the University of East Anglia, UK. She is an Elected Member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), UK. She is the holder of Jean Monnet Academic Modules 2015–2018. Her areas of specialization are: European integration, European single currency/Euro, economic governance, UK politics.
