Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2004
Opponents of destructive embryo research, such as embryo rightists, as well as proponents accept that natural reproduction is permissible. There is an alternative to natural reproduction—to remain childless. John Harris began this series of articles by asking, what does a commitment to the permissibility of natural reproduction entail? Harris has argued that a commitment to the permissibility of natural reproduction entails a commitment to the permissibility of destructive embryo research. Julian Savulescu has denied this. However, there are significant areas in which our views have converged.
Opponents of destructive embryo research, such as embryo rightists, as well as proponents accept that natural reproduction is permissible. There is an alternative to natural reproduction—to remain childless. John Harris began this series of articles by asking, what does a commitment to the permissibility of natural reproduction entail? Harris has argued that a commitment to the permissibility of natural reproduction entails a commitment to the permissibility of destructive embryo research. Julian Savulescu has denied this. However, there are significant areas in which our views have converged.
What are some of the potentially relevant moral features of natural reproduction?
Robert Winston gave the figure of five embryos for every live birth some years ago in a personal communication. Anecdotal evidence to John Harris from a number of sources confirms this high figure, but the literature is rather more conservative, making more probable a figure of three embryos lost for every live birth. See: Boklage CE. Survival probability of human conceptions from fertilization to term. International Journal of Fertility 1990;35:75–94. See also: Leridon H. Human Fertility: The Basic Components. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1977. Again, in a recent personal communication, Henri Leridon confirmed that a figure of three lost embryos for every live birth is a reasonable conservative figure.
The precise fraction of embryos that perish during natural reproduction is not crucial. Even if 99% of embryos perished during natural reproduction, embryo rightists and other defenders of natural reproduction would go on regardless. What is crucial is that the practice necessarily involves some embryos dying and some surviving. Harris has argued that those that die are instrumentalized for the purposes of ensuring the survival of others. Savulescu has denied this.
However, we both agree that natural reproduction is a creation lottery. Natural reproduction is a practice that involves the creation of a population of embryos for the purposes of creating a new human being and that involves the unavoidable death of 80% of those embryos, where the alternative to this practice is not to create any new human beings. To put this more generally, a creation lottery involves the creation of a population of embryos for the purpose of creating a new human being, and this practice involves the unavoidable death of some of these embryos. Those, such as embryo rightists, who believe that natural reproduction is permissible are logically committed to the permissibility of running creation lotteries.
There are other relevantly similar creation lotteries.
Imagine that assisted reproduction (AR) necessarily required, as a part of its very nature, the production of spare embryos. That is, it was a necessary part of AR that spare embryos be created. Then, AR would be permissible or at least the fact that spare embryos that were destined to die were created would not constitute an objection to AR if one accepted the permissibility of natural reproduction. In the early days of AR, this was possibly true. Today, embryo-sparing techniques of AR are possible. That is, it is possible to create embryos for AR without producing spare embryos. Thus, the deaths of spare embryos are avoidable. AR is not a creation lottery.
There are two points to note about this. First, the use of embryo-sparing techniques is parasitic on the progress and development of AR through the past production of spare embryos. For those who see the creation of spare embryos as evil, such as embryo rightists, the practice of engaging in embryo-sparing AR is parasitic on a past evil practice. If embryo rightists do not believe that we can benefit from past evil, as they typically do not, embryo rightists should oppose even embryo-sparing AR.
Second, although it is possible to conduct AR without the production of spare embryos, it exposes women to a higher risk through multiple stimulations and procedures. There is a strong moral reason to create spare embryos and their creation is morally unavoidable, if one is to conduct AR. Under such circumstances, production of spare embryos during AR is like natural reproduction.
The current practice of AR involving spare embryos is not strictly a creation lottery identical in kind to natural reproduction. The deaths of spare embryos are avoidable, given the current state of knowledge. However, we could refine the idea of what constitutes a creation lottery. We could change “unavoidable” to “unavoidable*,” where “unavoidable*” is defined as “given the current state of the world including knowledge, values, and intentions of human agents.” On this revised definition of a creation lottery, AR would be a creation lottery. The reason is that the destruction of embryos during conventional ART would be unavoidable* because the values (in particular, the weight given to the welfare of women) makes it unavoidable. We cannot argue in this short piece that “unavoidable*” is as plausible as “unavoidable,” but we believe it is.
At the very least, where the production of spare embryos—embryos in excess of those that will be implanted—is a necessary part of some particular procedure in AR, then that procedure is a creation lottery of the kind similar to natural reproduction. It would be permissible.
Suppose a couple contemplating AR were of a mind to avail themselves of this technology only on the condition that some of the embryos created for their use were from the start assigned to research or therapeutic uses. They agreed that they would not reproduce at all (or would not again reproduce) unless, say, two of the ten embryos created for their use were assigned to research. In such a case, all the embryos benefit from the couple's decision because none of them would otherwise have been created. And it is a lottery, just as in natural reproduction, which embryos will have a chance of surviving and which will not. The entire population of embryos has a good chance of existence, and this is their only chance of existence. This would be like natural reproduction in that the practice itself constitutes the only circumstances in which any of these embryos would come into existence and would constitute a chance for all. No one accepting natural sexual reproduction would have a reason to object to this practice, and so it would, presumably, constitute an ethical source of research and therapeutic embryos for embryo rightists.
Reproductive cloning aims to produce a human being by cell nucleus replacement. If cloned human beings have the same moral status as other human beings, and we can see no reason why they should not, then striking implications follow.
One of the major objections to any current attempt to clone a human being is that, in the case of Dolly (the first cloned mammal), only one clone was successfully produced after 277 attempts. Cloning is inefficient and involves very high embryo wastage.
But embryo wastage per se cannot be an objection to reproductive cloning for those who accept natural reproduction. After all, somewhere around 80% of embryos perish in natural reproduction! Reproductive cloning is a creation lottery of the same kind as natural reproduction. The fact that many embryos might perish as a result of our attempting to clone a human being is no objection to reproductive cloning.
Not only is natural reproduction inefficient, it is also unsafe. Approximately 3–5% of babies born have some abnormality. Natural reproduction not only involves the foreseeable and unavoidable creation of some embryos that will die but also some embryos that will go on to become very disabled human beings. Many embryos created are so genetically abnormal that they die, but some survive only to die as grossly deformed babies. The branch of medicine known as “teratology” bears witness to the imperfection of natural reproduction—babies born with missing limbs, with a missing brain, or with two heads. Thus, the definition of a permissible creation lottery should be extended to include the creation of disabled human beings. (Natural reproduction is, of course, also dangerous for the mother. It is well established that carrying a child to term is more dangerous for the mother than early abortion and much more dangerous than not having a child at all.)
A creation lottery involves the creation of a population of embryos for the purpose of creating a new human being, and this practice involves the unavoidable death of some of these embryos and the unavoidable production of grossly deformed and disabled human beings.
Cloning is associated with high rates of embryonic loss and birth abnormalities.2
Reprogramming cell fate: transgenesis and cloning. [Special issues.] Reproduction, Fertility, and Development 1999;10(7,8).
National Bioethics Advisory Commission. Cloning Human Beings. Washington, D.C.: National Bioethics Advisory Commission; 1997.
For those who accept natural reproduction, however, there is no objection to reproductive cloning on grounds of inefficiency or lack of safety. Even if attempts at reproductive cloning involve many embryos that will perish in early embryonic development and others that go on to be grossly deformed human beings, this is no different than natural reproduction. They are both relevantly similar creation lotteries.
This is a striking conclusion. Acceptance of natural reproduction entails acceptance of reproductive cloning, at least from the perspective of the safety and efficiency of the practice.
In theory, there are many ways to reproduce other than by the current techniques of in vitro fertilization and nuclear transfer. Let us call these, together with reproductive cloning, Frankenstein reproductive technologies. For example, parthenogenesis might result in the creation of a human being from a single egg. It is theoretically possible to combine the genetic material of two females in a human egg and cause this genetic material induced to segregate into sex chromosomes that would recombine to form a female embryo.4
Trounson AO. What if there is a “sunset clause” on the Y chromosome? a view on reproductive technologies in the future. Medical Journal of Australia 1999;171:660–2.
Many of these new forms of reproduction would have a high embryo loss rate and a risk of producing genetically abnormal human offspring. However, where the embryonic death and the production of genetically or otherwise abnormal human beings is a necessary and unavoidable part of the process, then these are creation lotteries. That is, for those who accept natural reproduction, the embryo wastage and risk of deformity cannot be an objection to these lotteries.
This does not necessarily imply that these forms of reproduction or cloning are all things considered permissible. There might be social reasons to object to them or objections based on the just allocation of scarce resources. What it does imply, however, is that those who accept natural reproduction cannot appeal to the lack of safety or efficiency of such procedures, given that they are creation lotteries of a kind similar to natural reproduction.
We have argued that creation lotteries similar to natural reproduction are permissible even if they involve high embryo loss rates and monstrous abnormalities. Some embryo rightists and other conservatives are liable to resort to the following obvious objection.
The main alternative to natural reproduction is childlessness. But there is an alternative to monstrous Frankenstein reproductive technologies such as cloning—natural reproduction. Insofar as the loss rate of natural reproduction and/or the deformity rate are lower in natural reproduction, natural reproduction is a preferable creation lottery.
This objection may be valid. We say “may” because each creation lottery involves the creation of a different population that would not otherwise exist—it is not at all obvious that it is preferable to create superior but different populations of people. We have argued elsewhere that we do have a moral obligation to produce the best people.5
Harris J. The Value of Life. London: Routledge; 1980; Harris J. Wonderwoman and Superman. New York: Oxford University Press; 1992. Savulescu J. Procreative beneficence: why we should select the best children. Bioethics 2001;15:413–26.
But if it is valid, it has a very striking consequence. If the Frankenstein technologies become more efficient or safer than natural reproduction (i.e., would have a lower embryo wastage or fewer deformities), then they would be preferable to natural reproduction. If cloning were ever to become more efficient than natural reproduction, then we would have a moral obligation to clone.
This is not so farfetched. It is possible that evaluation of sperm quality and sperm sorting together with intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) might yield higher embryo survival rates than the natural rate of about 20%. If that were ever the case, we would, if this objection is correct, have an obligation to use sperm sorting and ICSI rather than natural reproduction.
So, either there is no objection to Frankenstein reproductive technologies (on grounds of inefficiency or dangerousness) or else, under certain circumstances, we will have a moral obligation to employ them.
There is one last way in which those who favor natural reproduction as a method of procreation might respond. They might claim that the fact that natural reproduction is natural is morally relevant and makes it superior to artificial methods of reproduction. We should give priority to the natural over the artificial.
This is a commonly held value. Witness the obsession with natural foods over genetically modified and other artificial, Frankenstein foods. The belief that the natural should have priority over the artificial, though common, is mistaken. A child born by assisted reproduction is of the same kind with the same moral status as a child born by natural reproduction. Insofar as naturally occurring foods are safer or healthier, there is a reason to prefer them. In many cases, though, artificial preparations are healthier and safer. Indeed, they are preferred. The drug digoxin is used for heart conditions. It is always given in a highly purified pharmaceutical form as digoxin even though it occurs naturally as digitalis in the foxglove plant. Natural reproduction may be more fun than artificial reproduction. That is a reason to prefer it. Natural processes may be less costly or do less damage to the environment. These are reasons to prefer them. But there is no reason to prefer a natural process per se to an artificial process. The mere fact that something is natural is not a reason to prefer it.
The natural per se is morally neutral. Sometimes natural events are good, like a brilliant sunset or an abundant harvest. But often the natural does great harm—disease, pestilence, floods, hurricanes, fire, landslides, and the like can cause massive loss of human life. One might characterize the practice of medicine as the comprehensive attempt to frustrate the course of nature, because people naturally fall ill, are invaded by natural organisms like viruses and bacteria, and naturally die at a young age, often as babies. If we always prioritized the natural, we would have to abjure the practice of medicine and the discoveries of medical science, including vaccines and antibiotics.
Our current fascination and worship of the natural should be tempered. We should remember how Thomas Hobbes so famously described life in a state of nature:
And which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.6
Hobbes T. Leviathan. Oakeshot M, ed. Oxford: Blackwell; 1960:82.
We believe that bioethics is about reason and argument. This series of papers began by trying to understand what a commitment to natural reproduction logically entails.
The process of bioethics involves constructive rational discourse. We have begun with very different points of views on this question. Through a somewhat tortuous process of reason and argument we have found where we differ but, more importantly, also where we converge.
Both of us have tried to see openly what the strengths and weaknesses of the other's arguments are. Through a process of dialogue, we have sought to gain insight into the logical entailments of an acceptance of natural reproduction. This has led us to striking conclusions that we both accept.
Bioethics is disappointing for its lack of constructive dialogue. Bioethics is not about conversion (that is the province of religion) or convincing others that one is right. It is about discovery of the truth and gaining knowledge. Sometimes it requires the revision of one's own beliefs. We acknowledge there are many mistakes remaining in our discourse. We present it rough and largely uncut, much as it has occurred, as an example (albeit far from perfect) of method in bioethics.7
After a difficult and fractious courtship, we have both learned to love or at least admire the perfection of one goddess—the creation lottery. Those who believe that natural reproduction is permissible are committed to the worship of this goddess. They are committed to the permissibility of cloning and other Frankenstein reproductive technologies.