Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, an economist and a historian, have collaborated on incisive and often sharp examinations of Thai economics, society, and politics for over three decades. Their work, always informative and often inflammatory, has inspired more than one generation of scholars to scrutinize more carefully both their subject matter and their own assumptions concerning it.
Unequal Thailand, their latest edited volume, is described as growing out of a project to examine “the interplay between economics and political factors in Thailand's inequality” (p. xiv). This is a timely and important topic in Thailand, which has historically displayed high inequality, and which in the past decade has become politically polarized, in part over the distribution of wealth, income, and opportunity.
The editors’ introductory chapter frames the central theme of the volume with its title, “Inequality and Oligarchy.” In this short essay, they attribute rising inequality in developing Asia to three causes: a secular tendency for returns to capital to exceed the growth rate of the economy as claimed by Piketty;Footnote 2 rising real asset values (especially urban property) when ownership is unequally distributed; and oligarchic political systems that “embrace patrimonial relationships when it suits them and have an aversion to democratic principles of equality, rule of law and social justice for all” (p. 7). The chapter adds a very helpful exploration of Thai and comparative data on income and wealth and a discussion of the political and institutional forces at work.
The remaining eight chapters in Unequal Thailand include some that take a fairly conventional empirical approach, and others that dig in on topics that are less tangible but no less fascinating. Among the former, Duangmanee Laovakul presents work on the distribution of wealth, using previously inaccessible national data on the ownership of land. The data show, perhaps unsurprisingly, that three-fifths of the land in private hands in Thailand is owned by just 10 percent of landholders. Less obviously, at 11.5 hectares, the average landholdings of members of the Thai parliament, regardless of party affiliation, are on an order of magnitude greater than average individual landholdings in the kingdom as a whole (0.9 hectares). The author makes this point and leaves us with an implied question about political barriers to a land tax, or other taxes on assets, that might help alleviate Thailand's chronic underfunding of public and merit goods, such as infrastructure and schools, the provision of which generates widespread benefits.
Given the space limitations of a brief review, it is hard to choose which of the several chapters that look at less tangible dimensions of inequality to discuss. Those by Nualnoi Treerat and Parkpume Vanichaka get the nod for sheer surprise. They document the inauguration and spread of a variety of executive training courses that “nominally offer training for senior executives … but in reality exist primarily to create networks across the elites of the society” (p. 73). It is generally well known that in Thailand, many of the institutions that elsewhere serve to formalize and regulate public life—including parliament, political parties, and even business associations—are quite weak. Instead, “decision-making often evolves from informal processes, while the formal institutions often merely act as a rubber stamp” (p. 74). The authors document in detail the formation, content, methods, and even (by office, if not by name) the participants in a series of courses that combine some academic content and a great deal of relationship-building. Recruitment, importantly, requires no prior training, but only that applicants be “senior executives or prominent public figures … [having] accepted influence in society, economy or politics” (p. 80). For example, sixty-two individuals from families in the Forbes list of “Thailand's 40 richest” had attended one or more of the six courses documented in this study. Inevitably, the authors argue, individuals who have met in these courses then find themselves interacting in the legal, regulatory, or legislative space. There is no smoking gun in this chapter, but there is a very intriguing and plausible account of elite consolidation and collaboration. Readers are left to draw their own conclusions as to the implications for inequality—notably of opportunity.
One shortcoming of Unequal Thailand is that, throughout the book, the discussion of inequality is framed far more in terms of the specifics of Thai society and politics than by broader forces arising from secular changes in the global economy and increasing integration of countries through global markets; these forces are distinct from “free market capitalism,” a term that Pasuk and Baker incongruously use to characterize contemporary China and India. The editors devote a small part of their introductory chapter to this question, but there is no assessment of just how much inequality is the product of Thailand's flawed system, and how much comes from trends shared widely across the developing world.
As with nearly all previous volumes from Pasuk and Baker, Unequal Thailand presents novel and thought-provoking insights and, as such, should be read by all—scholars and generalists alike—who have an interest in contemporary Thai politics and political economy.
