In recent years, elected conservative women representatives speaking as, for, and to women (or at least claiming to) have been increasingly documented (Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012; Reingold Reference Reingold2000, Reference Reingold2008; Schreiber Reference Schreiber2008; Walsh Reference Walsh and Rosenthal2002; Wiliarty Reference Wiliarty2010). Yet with the relationship between feminism and conservatism frequently regarded as uneasy at best (Bashevkin Reference Bashevkin1994; Bryson and Heppell Reference Bryson and Heppell2010; Dolan Reference Dolan1997; Fraser Reference Fraser2009; O'Regan Reference O'Regan2000), gender and politics scholars have often seemed rather unsure about what to do with these representative claims (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2012). In Anglo-American and established European democracies, feminists—academic and activist—contend that conservative politics is detrimental to women. State retrenchment, the shrinking of the welfare state, and fewer or weak equality policies are frequently and negatively linked to the material situation of, and equal opportunities for, women (Outshoorn and Kantola Reference Outshoorn and Kantola2007).Footnote 1 Thus, even as studies establish that conservative governments’ antifeminism has in the recent past been mediated and constrained (Bashevkin Reference Bashevkin1994; McBride and Mazur Reference McBride and Mazur2010),Footnote 2 the charge is nonetheless that they have done harm to women and, by implication, to the cause of gender equality. Against such a theoretical and empirical backdrop, the veracity of contemporary conservative representative claims “for women” come under suspicion for being “wolves in sheep's clothing”: representatives claiming to act for women but adjudged, ultimately, to harm women's interests.
Documenting and evaluating the claims of elected conservative representatives to substantively represent women undoubtedly presents gender and politics scholars with a new empirical research agenda: what do conservative representatives claim, and do, for women? We contend that it also constitutes a more profound conceptual and normative puzzle. One implication of taking seriously conservative claims to represent women (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2012) is, in our view, to raise the possibility that the dominant framework for analyzing substantive representation has proven to be limited. Extant theories of women's substantive representation frequently elide this with feminist substantive representation (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2012). So, what should we make of conservative representatives who make representative claims for women but only sometimes act like, and with, their feminist sisters?
By working through these contemporary representational problematics, this article develops a new, empirically grounded account of women's substantive representation. It is based on a critical rereading of the empirical literature on conservatism and gendered representation, and it directly engages with recent creative theories of representation (Saward Reference Saward2006; Squires Reference Squires2008). We survey a wide range of generic studies on women and politics, as well as specific case studies of gender and conservative parties, and further develop our own research on conservatism and women's substantive representation (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2012; Erzeel, Celis, and Caluwaerts Reference Erzeel, Celis, Caluwaerts, Celis and Childs2014). In our subsequent reworking, we reconsider the “what” and especially the “how” of women's substantive representation. We contend that traditional accounts of feminist substantive representation frequently point to a universal set of women's issues and women's interests, either existing or imaginable, and require a representative process marked by commonality and solidarity. In everyday terms, to “count” as good substantive representation, women representatives act together in a feminist fashion. To do otherwise, representatives are “outwith” the substantive representation of women.
Saward's (Reference Saward2006) “economy of claims” approach has been much employed by gender and politics scholars in recent years because it offers an account of substantive representation in which a multiplicity of claims makers is recognized. Moreover, it suggests that instead of any simple aggregation of interests, what is in the interest of women “emerges” out of contestation among claims makers and among claims makers and those they claim to represent. We are concerned, however, that an uncritical or crude adoption of the economy of claims approach implies that all representatives’ claims are equally valid—that “anything goes” (Dodson Reference Dodson2006). Hence, we lay out three initial conditions—of congruency, representational praxis, and “fit”—that establish whether particular claims and representatives should be legitimately considered “for women.” But we also do more than this. We propose a shift away from a content model of women's substantive representation and advocate a process model, albeit one embedded in wider democratic polities.Footnote 3
In the final part of the article, we outline a process of representation that is characterized by three core principles: responsiveness, inclusiveness, and egalitarianism. These are introduced to ensure that deliberations among claims makers within our representative institutions reflect claims that are substantively “for” women, ensure the collective constitution of women's interests through the presence of diverse representatives (Weldon Reference Weldon2002), and practice ethical deliberation (Young Reference Young2002). Together, we contend this adds a feminist quality control to our process model of representation and, in turn, to outcomes (not least by ruling out antidemocratic and antiwomen representative claims), even as we admit it cannot privilege particular feminist outcomes (Dovi, cited in Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2018).
THE CONSERVATIVE PUZZLE
In established European and North American democracies, most of the women representatives who have been elected to legislatures over the last few decades have come predominantly from left, or centrist, political parties (Norris Reference Norris, Lovenduski and Norris1996; O'Brien Reference O'Brien2018). Sympathetic for the most part to (some kind of) feminist politics, these representatives have been the main focus of gender and politics scholarship on women's substantive representation (Childs Reference Childs2008; Kittilson Reference Kittlison2006; Reingold Reference Reingold2000; Swers Reference Swers2002a, Reference Swers2002b, Reference Swers and Rosenthal2002c). However, conservative women's participation in electoral politics is increasing, whether as party members, candidates for elected office, elected representatives, or members of parliamentary committees on gender equality (Agustín Reference Agustín2012; Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers Reference Karen and Cowell-Meyers2007; Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012; Kantola and Saari 2011; Kürschner Reference Kürschner2011; O'Brien Reference O'Brien2018; Reingold and Swers Reference Reingold and Swers2011; Rowe and Bird Reference Rowe and Bird2011; Wiliarty Reference Wiliarty2010; Young Reference Young2000).Footnote 4
Improvements in conservative women's descriptive representation owe much to contagion from left parties, as well as to the use of sex quotas, which have provided new openings for women to enter parties and legislatures (Kittilson Reference Kittlison2006; Krook Reference Krook2010). The emergence of greater numbers of conservative women on the formal political stage might at first blush seem paradoxical, if not contradictory. Conservative women's very presence in politics departs from conventional conservative expectations about women's roles in society and, more specifically, about who acts in politics (Schreiber Reference Schreiber, Celis and Childs2014). Conservatism historically limited women to the private and not the political sphere, even as it may have permitted a gendered role for them in the public sphere. Nevertheless, conservative women representatives are increasingly demanding and achieving a place at the elected political table (Agustín Reference Agustín2012; Wiliarty and Gaunder Reference Wiliarty, Gaunder, Celis and Childs2014; for countries beyond Western Europe and North America, see Curtin Reference Curtin, Celis and Childs2014; Rashkova and Zankina Reference Rashkova, Zankina, Celis and Childs2014). Once present in legislatures, interparty competition, wider electoral incentives, and women's movement lobbying might very well engender a dynamic for conservative women representatives to address women's concerns (Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012).
With conservative representatives increasingly on the political stage and, arguably, making gendered representative claims, questions about conceptions of women's substantive representation are left begging: can conservative women representatives act for women? According to the classic theory of women's substantive representation of women, the answer would be yes, but only when they act in a particular way, as we will show. The classic theory of women's substantive representation goes like this: the greater presence of women representatives in our political institutions will engender, even as it cannot guarantee, greater substantive representation of women (Mansbridge Reference Mansbridge1999; Phillips Reference Phillips1995; Young Reference Young2000); women representatives, on the basis of their gender identity and gendered experiences, are considered more likely than male representatives to “act for” women.Footnote 5 The once-dominant “critical mass theory” further adds that politics will be regendered once a “tipping point” has been reached, normally taken to be somewhere between 15% and 30% female representation (Childs and Krook Reference Childs and Krook2006; Dahlerup Reference Dahlerup1988). Notwithstanding the recognition that simply counting the number of women present in an elected institution is too simplistic—that gendered institutions mediate representatives’ behavior, that critical actors are more important than numbers, and that representation can take place beyond political institutions (Childs and Krook Reference Childs and Krook2006; Franceschet and Piscopo Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008; Krook and Mackay Reference Krook and Mackay2011; Lovenduski Reference Lovenduski2005)—there is still an expectation, and much empirical data, to suggest that the presence of elected women representatives makes some kind of gendered difference to our political institutions (Celis et al. Reference Celis, Childs, Kantola and Krook2008; Dovi Reference Dovi2002, Reference Dovi2007, Reference Dovi2010; Lovenduski and Guadagnini Reference Lovenduski, Guadagnini, McBride and Mazur2010; Weldon Reference Weldon2002). The “difference” that women representatives are widely expected to make in much of the literature is most often assumed to be feminist.Footnote 6
The “what” of representation, then, is frequently understood in these classic renditions of substantive representation in terms of the demands of second-wave women's movements, most notably, issues of violence against women, child care, reproductive rights, equal pay, and equal rights. There is some empirical evidence to show that conservative women representatives have acted in line with this conception of substantive representation.Footnote 7 Thus, while empirical studies of legislatures frequently show the importance of party differences in representatives’ attitudes and legislative behavior (for the U.K. case, see, e.g., Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012; Norris and Lovenduski Reference Norris and Lovenduski1995; for the U.S. case, see Reingold Reference Reingold2000; Swers Reference Swers2002a, Reference Swers2002b, Reference Swers and Rosenthal2002c), conservative women legislators have also been found to be more supportive of women's issues and gender equality than conservative men (e.g., Campbell, Childs, and Lovenduski Reference Campbell, Childs and Lovenduski2010; Norris and Lovenduski Reference Norris and Lovenduski1995; Swers Reference Swers2002a). There are also cases in which conservative women legislators have come together and acted with women representatives from other parties in support of women's and feminist bills (see Childs and Evans Reference Childs and Evans2012 for the U.K. case). That said, it is also the case that conservative women representatives sometimes privilege different women's issues and adopt a different conceptualization of what constitutes women's interests when they address the same issue as other (left/feminist) women representatives (as identified later, see also Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012). In acting on different issues, and or articulating different conceptions of what is in the interests of women, conservative women representatives challenge and change public discourse about women's interests (Schreiber Reference Schreiber2008).
The label “conservative,” of course, refers to a broad range of actors and parties on the (center-) right position on the ideological scale (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2012). Within a single country, conservative representatives and parties may hold different views. One might, for example, contrast Christian Democrat rightist parties with those in which religion plays a much lesser role (see, e.g., Guerrina Reference Guerrina, Celis and Childs2014; Piccio Reference Piccio, Celis and Childs2014; Schreiber Reference Schreiber, Celis and Childs2014); there may well be parties and organizations that emphasize social conservatism rather than neoliberal views (Bashevkin Reference Bashevkin1994; Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012; Schreiber Reference Schreiber2008). In the context of contemporary Western European and U.S. politics, one would also be faced with populist radical right parties and organizations (Akkerman Reference Akkerman2015; Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2016; de Lange and Mügge Reference de Lange and Mügge2015; Spierings et al. Reference Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge and de Lange2015; Towns, Karlsson, and Eyre Reference Towns, Karlsson and Eyre2014).
A careful rereading of existing empirical studies of women's representational activities—pulling out the differences as well as emphasizing the similarities between the claims and actions undertaken by representatives from different parties and ideological positions—establishes that when they do address women's issues, conservative women's substantive representation is frequently rooted in particular conservative accounts of gender relations (Celis Reference Celis2006; Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012; Kantola Reference Kantola2006; Kantola and Saari Reference Kantola, Saari, Celis and Childs2014; Murray and Sénac Reference Murray, Sénac, Celis and Childs2014; Piccio Reference Piccio, Celis and Childs2014; Piscopo Reference Piscopo, Celis and Childs2014; Schreiber Reference Schreiber2008, 211–12). Particular conservative representative claims and acts for women might stem from personal perceptions and experiences, with women representatives valuing their own mothering and caring roles or reflecting their own experiences of school, workplace, and societal (in)equality (Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012).
Perceptions of women's collective experiences might also inform representatives’ claims. Conservative elected representatives might, for example, be members of, active in, or associated with conservative women's organizations (Schreiber Reference Schreiber2008) that valorize women's difference or see women's public role as a manifestation of their private one (Carroll Reference Carroll and Bystydzienski1992). Conservative ideological and gendered assumptions might also play out in beliefs about the gender blindness of the market; resistance to the necessity of, and/or fairness of, positive discrimination; and/or the rejection of inequality as a structural feature of society, as opposed to the consequence of localized and unfortunate individual acts (Bryson and Heppell Reference Bryson and Heppell2010; Campbell Reference Campbell1987; Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012; Erzeel, Celis, and Caluwaerts Reference Erzeel, Celis, Caluwaerts, Celis and Childs2014; Wiliarty Reference Wiliarty2010). For religious conservatives, adhering to theological views of gender or views inspired by religious values about gender relations will inform their representative claims.Footnote 8 Conservative substantive representation of women might furthermore stem from alternative feminist accounts of women's position in society and gender relations. Relational (Offen Reference Offen2000) or maternalist feminism emphasizes women's distinctiveness, complementarity, equal worth, and partnership with men.Footnote 9 Here, notions of natural sex differences, separate spheres, and care might underpin a preference for policies that support mothers’ choice to stay home and look after children through state financial subsidy over policies that would support women's participation in the paid workforce.
In reviewing the existing empirical literature, we further identify a series of conditions under which conservative women have substantively represented women, with particular political issues and party and institutional contexts mediating these acts. To illustrate: looking at the United States, feminist attitudes and behavior on behalf of Republican elected representatives are likely reduced when the political costs are higher, notably, when party cohesion and partisan politics are more salient (Dodson Reference Dodson2006; Swers Reference Swers2002a). Swers found, for example, that during the 104th Congress, Republican congresswomen shifted their attention to women's welfare rather than reproductive issues. The former was felt not to upset their male colleagues in the same way (Swers 2000a, Reference Swers2002b, Reference Swers and Rosenthal2002c). The “type” of conservatism is also significant. Bashevkin's (Reference Bashevkin1994) comparative study of the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada shows that social conservatism is more likely to favor less feminist and antifeminist positions compared with neoliberalism, which may be more comfortable with some (liberal) feminist perspectives. Third, the nature of the conservative party's organization and structure matters. Studies of the German Christian Democratic Union suggest that “corporatist catch-all parties,” oriented toward internal compromise and guaranteed internal representation of women, generate greater possibilities for the party's women's sections to shape policy (Wiliarty Reference Wiliarty2010; Wiliarty and Gaunder Reference Wiliarty, Gaunder, Celis and Childs2014). Finally, is the role played by critical actors.Footnote 10 In the U.K. case (Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012), then home secretary and now prime minister Theresa May was key to the Coalition government's greater attention—relative to previous Conservative governments—to violence against women and girls in the period 2010–15 (Campbell and Childs Reference Campbell and Childs2015a, Reference Campbell, Childs, Selden and Finn2015b).
If studies of women's substantive representation only look to identify (1) when conservative representatives act on the same issues as feminist representatives, (2) when they act in the same feminist way on these issues, and (3) when they act in concert with other women to achieve these particular feminist ends, gender and politics scholars risk missing some of the gendered representative claims and acts undertaken by conservative representatives on the ground in contemporary democratic politics (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2012; Curtin Reference Curtin, Celis and Childs2014; Murray and Sénac Reference Murray, Sénac, Celis and Childs2014; Piscopo Reference Piscopo, Celis and Childs2014). While there is empirical evidence that some conservative representatives make feminist representative claims for women (as noted earlier), other conservative women representatives—or even the same ones on other occasions—make claims and act in ways that might readily be considered to be less feminist or even antifeminist. Conservative women representatives are frequently found to be attitudinally and behaviorally less feminist (for an early study, see Carroll Reference Carroll1984). Republican women, for instance, were found to be less likely than Democrats to join organizations that espouse feminist beliefs, publicly advocate measures consistent with these beliefs, or develop legislation or projects as an extension of these beliefs (Carroll Reference Carroll1984, 312–13). Conservatives are often the most fervent antifeminists (Grey Reference Grey2002; Swers Reference Swers2002a, Reference Swers2002b, Reference Swers and Rosenthal2002c; Trimble Reference Trimble, Arscott and Trimble1997).
EVALUATING CONSERVATIVE CLAIMS
Why does all this matter? It matters precisely because conservative representatives making claims to, and acting for, women in ways that are distinct from left/feminist representatives in many Western democracies challenges the presumption of a universal and feminist set of women's interests that lies at the heart of the existing conceptual framework for understanding the substantive representation of women.Footnote 11 Insofar as it might have once been thought that there was a singular group of women's interests to be represented, this is no longer, and arguably never was, the case. As is widely appreciated, women (including in many instances, feminists) disagree over key women's issues, including abortion/reproductive rights, prostitution/sex work, pornography/censorship, face veils, positive discrimination, the status and financial benefits of marriage, and sexuality and transgender rights (see, e.g., Politics & Gender Special Issue 2012; Celis, Kantola, and Krook Reference Celis, Childs, Kantola and Krook2014).
In such contexts, we contend that gender and politics scholars require something more than a claim that women's substantive representation occurs when women representatives act in a “feminist” fashion. Once we admit that women are a heterogeneous category, any assumed universality of women's issues and interests must consequently be considered only a potentiality (Celis, Kantola, and Krook Reference Celis, Childs, Kantola and Krook2008), as the possibility of contestation among women, and even among feminists, is ever present.Footnote 12 Yet even if the substantive representation of women can no longer be measured by whether representatives act in an assumed feminist fashion on women's issues, it remains important to be able to determine what counts as the substantive representation of women.Footnote 13 To do otherwise is to imply a relativist “anything goes” (Dodson Reference Dodson2006) perspective in which all claims and actions for women are accorded the same value. This is something we find distinctly unattractive; as gender and politics scholars, we wish to hold conservative representatives to account for their claims to represent and substantive actions for women.
We could assume a priori that conservative representatives are but “wolves in sheep's clothing” (and we should look for evidence of this). And/or, we could assume that conservative women (the represented) are “falsely conscious” of what is in their interests (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2012) (again, we should examine this possibility in empirical research, mindful of Pitkin's concerns relating to symbolic representation and creative theories of representation). Instead, we advance three conditions by which to evaluate the quality of conservative representative claims for women (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2012). The first is “congruency”—congruency with conservative women's attitudes and a responsive relationship to conservative women in society (Bird Reference Bird2011; Saward Reference Saward2010; Severs Reference Severs2012), alongside evidence of good representational relationships between conservative women and conservative representatives (Dovi Reference Dovi2002).Footnote 14 This criterion measures the quality of relationships: both between mass/elite attitudes and policy preferences and reciprocal relationships between representatives and those they claim to represent (Dovi Reference Dovi2002). Classic responsiveness is met when conservative representatives echo the concerns of conservative women in society, but representatives can also be considered responsive when the represented accept the claims made for them (Campbell and Childs Reference Campbell, Childs, Celis and Childs2014; Mateo Diaz Reference Mateo Diaz2005; Saward Reference Saward2006; Severs Reference Severs2012). We should also be mindful of how representatives can “propagate” particular views of the represented (Saward Reference Saward2006).Footnote 15 Most existing studies appear not to have empirically investigated relations between conservative representatives and nonparty conservative women's organizations. However, mass/elite comparisons based on survey data suggest that conservative parties in both the United Kingdom and Belgium may not yet be sufficiently responsive to women. British conservative women voters and elites are more in favor of gender equality than men, and hence the party overall (Campbell and Childs Reference Campbell, Childs, Celis and Childs2014; Campbell, Childs, and Lovenduski Reference Campbell, Childs and Lovenduski2010).Footnote 16
The second condition for evaluating a representative's claim for women draws a distinction between what Dodson (Reference Dodson2006) terms “walking the walk” and “talking the talk” on women's issues. It is not sufficient for conservative representatives to make claims for women, they also need (or at least to seek) to deliver on them (Rashkova and Zankina Reference Rashkova, Zankina, Celis and Childs2014; Şahin-Mencütek Reference şahin-Mencütek, Celis and Childs2014).Footnote 17 Importantly, studies have already found that it has often been much harder to effect change than activists and some gender and politics scholars once thought (Lovenduski Reference Lovenduski2005). It is for this reason, especially for conservative representatives operating within political parties that are seemingly less amenable to gender equality on ideological grounds,Footnote 18 that researchers need to investigate failed, or less successful attempts, to enact claims, as well as to document successful acts for women. To do otherwise is to risk deducing representational acts from representational talk. It is for future empirical research to determine whether conservative representatives do more of the former than the latter, and if so, why.
The third condition considers how a particular claim “fits” with other claims made at the same time by the same actor (or closely related actors), most likely the representative themselves and their party and/or government (see Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012). This broadens the scope of the inquiry into women's substantive representation beyond a sole focus on “women's issues” in order to capture relationships between claims for women and wider political claims that might compete with or “trump” claims for women. For example, it is easy to imagine women's claims that appear parallel or compatible with other conservative claims at the level of rhetoric but that, in practice, see the former negated or marginalized (Childs and Webb Reference Childs and Webb2012; Piccio Reference Piccio, Celis and Childs2014). In the United Kingdom, for example, the language of “choice” has been deployed by the Conservative Party and adjudged to suggest that the party is agnostic between mothers participating in the paid labor market or staying at home. Critics will suggest, however, that this choice is mediated at best, circumscribed more often, by the availability of affordable child care. Critics will also add that this “choice” is less freely available to women who are dependent upon the state and who will be expected to engage in paid work when their children reach a certain age. The married/partnered woman with children faces no such requirement or expectation. If we turn to recent gender and politics analysis of popular radical right parties in Europe, we might also evaluate representative claims that remain at the rhetorical level (see Akkerman Reference Akkerman2015; Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2012) or where rhetoric about gender equality in the context of discussions about multiculturalism and immigration coexists with little practical concern for gender equality in other contexts, namely paid work, child care, abortion, and marriage (Akkerman Reference Akkerman2015; Towns, Karlsson, and Eyre Reference Towns, Karlsson and Eyre2014).
WOMEN'S SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION: A PROCESS APPROACH
In contexts of women's heterogeneity, a cacophony of gendered representative claims is to be expected (Dodson Reference Dodson2006), and arguably welcomed, with an array of elected and nonelected representatives articulating different views about what is in the interests of women. This raises the aforementioned question of what to do with these competing claims. Recent developments in political representation theory are useful here: in Saward's (Reference Saward2006, Reference Saward2010) economy of claims approach, multiple actors make different kinds of claims to act for the represented, just as Dodson suggests.Footnote 19 The general form of the representative claim is as follows (Saward Reference Saward2006, 36): “A maker of representations (‘M’) puts forward a subject (‘S’) which stands for an object (‘O’) that is related to a referent (‘R’) and is offered to an audience (‘A’).” This newer understanding of representation has been well received by a number of gender and politics scholars. Applied to the representation of women by women representatives, this would imply—in its simplest form—that women representatives put forward a subject (themselves), to stand for an object (the interests of women), that is related to a referent (some women in society), and is offered to an audience (again, women in society, and perhaps others, too).
In the first instance, the economy of claims approach draws attention to the limitations of a unidirectional understanding of representation. The latter posits women's interests as known to the represented and knowable to the representative who can “pick” them up, take them into political institutions, and act upon them. The former not only offers the attraction of (rightly) moving beyond a singular focus on elected representatives, it also, as previously noted, no longer considers the represented “prior to” the representational process, as in most Pitkin-inspired accounts. Rather, the represented are constituted as part of the processes of representation (Saward Reference Saward2006; Squires Reference Squires2008). In our view, working with creative theories of representation, informed by insights from the more empirical gender and politics literature, offers fertile ground for better theorizing the “what” and especially the “how” of representation.
In respect to the “what” of representation, the conceptual possibility of including claims makers and representative claims for women other than those usually regarded as representing women is now opened up. This would include representatives, including conservatives, who were previously not recognized to be representatives of women as they did not fulfill the criteria of feminist substantive representation. In this way, Saward's approach is useful for our purposes precisely because it depicts representation as a process open to a variety of representative claims and claims makers. Second, it regards competition over what constitutes women's issues and women's interests as positive (Weldon Reference Weldon2002). This is again highly beneficial at a time when, as repeatedly emphasized, women are widely acknowledged to be diverse and when women's issues and interests show no likelihood of becoming any less so (Collins and Chepp Reference Collins, Chepp, Waylen, Celis, Kantola and Weldon2013).
Such argumentation, moreover, points to a different conceptualization of what counts as “good” substantive representation—the criteria by which the quality of women's substantive representation can be assessed (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2015; Severs Reference Severs2012). It does this both by the inclusion of multiple representative actors and perspectives and by reconsidering the form of representation. Rather than a model of representation that assumes representatives of women “know” women's interests, which are then articulated within electoral institutions, where decisions are made on the basis of the aggregation of interests, representation is regarded as a process within (and indeed outside of) formal political institutions, where interests are advocated for and deliberated over (Mansbridge et al. Reference Mansbridge, Bohman, Chambers, Estlund, Føllesdal, Fung, Lafont, Manin and Martí2010; Saward Reference Saward2010; Urbinati Reference Urbinati2000; Williams Reference Williams1998).
That said, gender and politics scholars should be attuned to the danger of presuming that the economy of claims analogy implies a consideration of representative claims that is fair, and that will automatically produce the “best” outcome. In particular, we are concerned that this approach usually fails to sufficiently acknowledge the ongoing importance of elected political institutions as key sites for women's substantive representation (Williams Reference Williams1998), which is our focus here. Nor is this approach as yet generating institutional design ideas. Lastly, it insufficiently addresses questions of power. In respect to the latter, it is important to note that Saward emphasizes that as representatives construct particular representations of the represented, these may be “read back,” that is, contested by the represented. But recall concerns about how representatives may also “propagate” particular views of the represented. In our case, conservative representatives may very well propagate antifeminist representations of women, which may be against women's interests. Furthermore, we want to foreground the likelihood that some representatives will be privileged and others marginalized within our elected institutions and that this would likely have negative effects during deliberations and in respect of outcomes.Footnote 20 Inter alia, we would expect representatives with fewer resources, or unfamiliar with the norms and practices of particular institutions, and with less established relationships with the media or civil society, or with a smaller support base, to fare less well (see Young Reference Young2002).
Mindful of criticisms of process approaches to women's substantive representation, we identify three principles to structure “good” substantive representation: responsiveness, inclusiveness, and egalitarianism. In the traditional feminist account of substantive representation, responsiveness is presumed to be from feminist political elites to women in society; the representatives are judged by the extent to which they act in respect of the stated aims of actors from the feminist movement. In our framework, in contrast, responsiveness looks to representative relationships between representatives and women, in their diversity, thereby broadening the potential “what” of women's substantive representation beyond the aims of a particular feminist movement. Inclusion asks whether all women have a voice in deliberations about what is in the interests of women—such a principle protects women and women's interests currently marginalized from politics, even as it does not presume in any simple way that these are necessarily more important or meritorious than others. Egalitarianism asks whether all claims are equally considered in the deliberations. In other words, is it recognized that some women's views—some representative claims for women—are likely to be marginalized or silenced. We contend that without the airing of these views, and without their claims being taken seriously as part of deliberations, this will likely limit what is ultimately constituted as women's interests (Weldon Reference Weldon2002). It also risks reducing the legitimacy of democratic institutions, as some (no doubt more marginal) women's voices are excluded from, or accorded little weight in, discussions. This also risks having deleterious effects on women's affective representation.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A focus on conservatism and women's substantive representation can be simply an additive study: analysis of the representational claims and actions of relatively new actors present on the contemporary political scene. This has significant empirical value in and of itself. We can note, for example, the increased presence of conservative women representatives in our elected institutions and acknowledge that this has given rise to an appreciation of greater ideological heterogeneity among women representatives. Empirical research has indeed established that while under specific conditions some conservative women representatives are found to act with, and like, their left/feminist colleagues, they sometimes articulate antifeminist perspectives. In these interventions, conservative representatives may nevertheless make explicitly gendered claims and claim to be speaking in the interests of women.
One response to conservative representatives claiming to act for women is to recognize that there is a more varied and contested understanding of what constitutes women's issues and women's interests than that suggested by a rigid definition that reduces women's substantive representation to a particular feminist definition. We could choose simply to ignore or reject conservative claims to representation. Yet we suggest that, rather than dismissing these claims and claims makers, it is more insightful to explore how conservative representatives, when making claims for women, might be participating in the substantive representation of women. In our view, they may be doing so when they act in ways that marry conservative women's concerns in society; when they act and do not simply engage in rhetoric; and when their actions are not undercut by other acts, policies or outcomes unfavorable to women—the three conditions that we outlined earlier in this article as a first means of determining whether a representative claim or sets of claims are “for women” and not merely masking some other interest or group. Note, however, that this is only the beginning of the evaluation of representatives claims for women.
Alternatively, we could reject gendered representative claims made by conservative representatives as without women's substantive representation. This is, in our view, unwise. And it is in this respect that our article addresses the conceptual puzzle thrown up by acknowledgment of conservative representatives: how to make theories of women's substantive representation inclusive of the gendered representative claims of representatives who are not feminist (as usually understood). Judging all gendered representative claims against feminist ideological criteria—even a robust and context-specific definition of feminism—of course makes clear when claims and acts are feminist (according to that definition) but risks limiting appreciation of what is going on as representatives act for women in practice. In contrast, we hold that it is more fruitful for scholars to acknowledge these additional claims, at least initially. In so doing, we move away from standard theoretical accounts of both the “what” and the “how” of substantive representation. The former—a content approach—can no longer be about an agreed set of universal women's issues and a shared understanding of what is in the interests of women defined in a particular feminist fashion. We envisage, instead, a contestation between claims makers for women in which what counts as women's interests is not assumed in advance but constituted through deliberation (deliberated over) rather than determined by any simple aggregation. To mitigate concerns about feminist outcomes in such an approach, we deploy the three principles of responsiveness, inclusiveness, and egalitarianism, which we suggest should structure deliberations so as to mitigate concerns about who is present, what interests are advocated for, and the nature of the interactions among representatives.
In shifting from a focus on the actors (women/feminists) and content (legislative and policy outcomes) of women's substantive representation to a focus on the processes of representation, we risk, as Suzanne Dovi has pointed out, the inability to privilege feminist outcomes (Celis and Childs Reference Celis and Childs2018).Footnote 21 We are far from agnostic about outcomes. And we acknowledge that a feminist content approach to women's substantive representation is highly seductive. But in our view, a content approach takes us back to the place that we feel gender and politics scholars need to get away from: a subjective, a priori definition of women's interests. Nevertheless, there is something in Dovi's accusation: a process approach is risky. But we have sought to moderate that risk. Our approach is situated within an account of representational politics that is characterized by foundational democratic principles which should limit, even if it cannot negate, anti-feminist outcomes. Those who are “not really” acting for women will likely be found out early on, and those who do not subscribe to our norms of deliberation will become apparent. Indeed, it might be said that our safeguards give rise to the potential for better substantive representation because of its commitment to being inclusive and constituting women's interests through deliberation (see, e.g., Barnes Reference Barnes2016; Young Reference Young2002). Of course, our conceptualization will be contested by those who prefer to exclude and it invites new empirical study. Subsequent research should determine whether conservatives are acting as “good representatives” on the ground (Dovi Reference Dovi2002) and explore how representative processes and electoral institutions can be better designed to engender the “good” substantive representation of women.
