In a June 2004 article for the Buenos Aires daily La Nación, Argentine economist Roberto Cachanovsky underlined that, due to the political and macro-economic instability of the last decades, Argentina's per capita gross domestic product stood at the same level as in late 1974. How and why did a key South American nation come to have such a dismal economic performance over the last few decades? In order to address this enigma, Klaus Veigel's book examines the hectic years of Argentine recent history that run from the 1976–83 dictatorship to the transition to democracy and the first democratically elected governments, and finally the onset of the last wave of globalisation.
With Argentina's political and economic collapse of December 2001 as a starting point, the author argues that this crisis cannot be ascribed to the impact of developments during the 1990s or to the incompetence of the De La Rúa government only. In his view, its origins can be dated as far back as the early 1930s; the problems were subsequently aggravated during the 1960s and 1970s, and finally burst out again after the temporarily successful economic reforms of the 1990s (pp. 2–4). Because of their emphasis on the lack of a sustainable post-1930 political and economic consensus, Veigel's arguments closely resemble those raised by Guillermo O'Donnell and Mallon and Sourrouille in the mid-1970s.
The book has a chronological structure. Chapter 1 examines the world crisis of the 1970s and the Peronist government of 1973–6. The second chapter deals with the collapse of this government, the onset of the military dictatorship, and the dictatorship's relations with the international financial community in light of ‘a larger trend toward right-winged authoritarian governments across Latin America in the 1970s’ and the conservative onslaught of the IMF and the US government (p. 37). Chapter 3 is largely focused on the nature and origins of Argentina's foreign debt in the 1970s. With strong emphasis on the debt and banking crises of the early 1980s, the next two chapters broach the collapse of the military regime and the transition to democracy. Chapters 6 and 7 dwell on the political and economic frustrations of Argentine democracy until the structural reforms of the early 1990s. The last chapter takes the reader through the momentous decade that ended with the tragic crisis of 2001–2. In the conclusions Veigel summarises his findings, takes up again his arguments about the nature of Argentina's long-standing problems, and expresses doubt as to whether the country will ever establish ‘a semblance of stability’ with credible economic policies and due respect for basic property rights and political institutions (pp. 207–10).
Based on a wide range of primary and secondary sources mostly from US libraries and archives, the book rightly underlines ‘the international dimension of the Argentine crisis’ (p. xi). Hence, many paragraphs summarily and usefully discuss with a balanced outlook the changeable international political and economic scenarios, the dilemmas of successive Argentine governments and the hitherto little-known role of key foreign protagonists such as the US government, the World Bank and the IMF in the unfolding of local events. Comparisons with contemporary economic and institutional developments in Chile and Brazil are also sprinkled throughout the study.
The book lacks a more sophisticated discussion of the institutional foundations and internal dynamics of economic policy-making and political power in Argentina, however. On the one hand, this seems due to the fact that relevant local sources from major public archives such as the Central Bank and Banco de la Nación Argentina were not consulted. These repositories are not as well organised as those in Europe and North America, but the worthwhile annual reports of both institutions are accessible in many libraries, and the recent work of Argentine and foreign scholars shows that, following expeditious standard procedures, the insightful minutes of their executive board meetings and even some related files are open to bona fide scholars. Presumably Veigel's failure also stems from a lack of due attention to works in Spanish by Argentine scholars such as O'Donnell's masterly Estado y alianzas, Nofal's review on the last crisis, and Rougier and Fiszbein's monograph on the Peronist government of the 1970s.
With regard to periodisation, the Isabel Perón administration's scramble for foreign financing and better relations with the international financial community since late 1974 should have been included in the chapter about the Peronist government of the 1970s. Chapter 2 could then have focused on the Proceso, especially underlining the fact that ministers of economy Martínez de Hoz and Alemann relied on strong links forged with David Rockefeller and other leaders of international banking circles since the 1950s.
Factionalism and partisan politics, and the resulting stop-go cycles, have long been known to have overshadowed economic policy-making in Argentina since the late 1940s. Yet Veigel maintains without substantial supporting evidence that it was since the 1970s that these strains have undercut the search for a broad consensus to build up a new economic order and meet changing international challenges (pp. 203, 205).
This book will call the attention of those interested in the study of Argentina's troubles in recent decades and comparing them with Chile's and Brazil's outlook at the dawning of the new century. At the same time, the substantial macro-economic knowledge accumulated on Argentina suggests that the time has come to address in greater detail, and drawing upon novel sources such as those mentioned above, its more recent internal mechanics of power and policies.
