Does international interaction mirror the corporate world? How much can scholars of international relations learn from the insights of those who study the business world? Among the latter, for instance, it has become conventional wisdom that reputation matters a great deal. Firms that are perceived to be reliable have an easier time attracting new customers, raising capital, and entering into beneficial arrangements. Scholars of international politics are generally skeptical about the importance of reputation for states.
While clearly there are important differences between business and interstate relationships, it is curious that scholars in different fields have arrived at such disparate conclusions regarding a crucial shared concept. In his book, Gregory Miller aims to explain that disconnect, and challenge IR's conventional wisdom about the relative unimportance of state credibility and reputation.
The IR scholarship on reputation and credibility in international politics has evolved through a couple of clear stages. In the first, early-deterrence theorists like Thomas Schelling argued that actions are interdependent, that potential adversaries and allies routinely learn fundamental lessons about the basic disposition of states based upon their behavior in other arenas. In practice, this meant that remaining engaged in otherwise peripheral, pointless ventures (Vietnam, Korea, etc.) made sense as attempts to send messages about US resolve. Four decades of empirical and theoretical work have brought that wisdom into doubt; today, the dominant view in the academy (if not yet among practitioners) is that actions tend to be independent, that other states rarely learn the lessons we hope to teach. The current consensus—one that has been supported in recent years by the work of Jonathan Mercer, Ted Hopf, Daryl Press, and many others—is that, despite what practitioners may believe, reputations do not decisively affect the actions of others. Furthermore, states can do little to control their reputations for resolve; target states form their own views, ones that are largely unaffected by efforts to control them.
Miller astutely notes that almost all of the existing work on reputation and credibility has focused on resolve, or specifically on the relationship of these concepts to the outbreak of war. The literature to this point has been focused at least in part on the answer to this question: Are reputations worth fighting for? No major work has sought to examine the effects of reputation on other central aspects of international behavior. The Shadow of the Past is the first extension of the study of reputation beyond war, in this case into alliance behavior.
Once the focus is broadened, Miller argues, the importance of reputation in explaining state behavior becomes much stronger than what is currently accepted. Not only does reputation matter for attracting allies, he hypothesizes, but it also affects the kinds of alliances that are formed. Less reliable partners will tend to have less autonomy within the arrangement; those with better reputations will be allowed more flexibility, both in the way that alliances are constructed (what Miller calls precision) and the costs they must pay to maintain their position in the alliance (or obligation).
The book follows what has become the standard IR template: The first chapter reviews the literatures under consideration, the second lays out the author's argument, the next four examine cases, and the conclusion restates the results and extends the argument. Miller chose the same cases that were examined in a major work in this area that bears the brunt of his critique, Jonathon Mercer's Reputation in International Politics (1996), all of which were from pre–World War I Europe. By doing so, Miller proposes to give his hypotheses a tough test. The reader is left to wonder, however, how cases can pose challenging tests for both sides of an argument simultaneously; after all, Mercer argued that these were tough cases for his argument as well. Either pre–World War I Europe contains conditions that would lead one to believe that reputation is important or it does not. Nonetheless, overall Miller finds support for his hypotheses, though more in some cases than others. Reputations did affect the decisions of the great European powers of that era when it came time to create alliances, and shaped the nature of those that formed.
Overall, Miller's book successfully advances scholarship on both reputation and alliance formation. The dominant current scholarly understanding of the latter tends to focus on geopolitical or power-centric, rather than cognitive, variables. Miller seeks to refine rather than replace that current understanding, and is more convincing in his attempt to do so than in his critique of Mercer. Although it would have been helpful to be a bit more specific about how much reputation matters in the formation of alliances compared to other potential variables, this is still an interesting and overdue observation.
Nevertheless, the attempt to apply wisdom from business scholarship to IR has limits. For one thing, ceteris paribus assumptions are much more persuasive in the corporate world than they are for states. While customers and firms in a competitive market have many options when deciding to whom to give their business, states rarely—if ever—have multiple, virtually equivalent, choices of allies. Miller seeks to argue that if all things were equal, states would prefer to have reliable alliance partners; this is no doubt true, but in international politics, all things are never equal. Sometimes the choice is either side with the Kaiser or no one.
In his conclusion, Miller points out that perceptions of allied reliability can be destabilizing, if and when they embolden states to act more aggressively than they otherwise would. The most stable situations, at least in theory, would be those in which outside actors view alliance commitments to be reliable, but those inside the alliance are unconvinced. Challenges to and by the alliance would therefore be unlikely. Governments seeking to avoid war, he writes, should “make allies believe that they are relatively unreliable, while convincing adversaries that they are highly reliable” (p. 193). How this could be done in practice—much less whether any state has actually sought unreliable allies, which would seem unlikely based on his own argument—is not quite clear.
Indeed, the conclusion is the weakest part of the book. Miller contends that his arguments are not merely restricted to European alliance politics of a century ago by applying them to NATO and the “war on terror.” Both attempts are unconvincing, however. He does not make a good case for the importance of reputation in the creation or ultimate character of NATO; indeed, it is doubtful that any such attempt could be successful. Has the reputation for reliability really had any influence over the allies the United States has pursued (or vice versa) since World War II? Has the reliability of the new members—Albania, Latvia, Croatia, and so on—affected the nature of the alliance? Miller then goes on to suggest that post–Cold War NATO alliance behavior is even more supportive of his hypotheses, and argues that the commitment its members made in Afghanistan may have emboldened the United States to invade Iraq. This suggestion is, to put it kindly, original. At the very least, the number of pages devoted to these ideas—four—does not allow the author to explain or defend them to the depth that would be necessary to convince any reader with a basic knowledge of recent history.
Overall, The Shadow of the Past is a welcome addition to the scholarship on both reputation and alliances. It is useful for those working on reputation to be periodically reminded that there is more to international interaction than merely crises and war. This book engages the current conventional wisdom and sharpens it, while perhaps failing to deliver a fatal blow.
