Historians today broadly agree that the Imperial Austrian state underwent radical changes during World War I. If previous generations saw the monarchy’s 1918 disintegration as the product of long-term decline, recent historiography has found more persuasive explanations for collapse in the short-term exigencies of war and, above all, the government’s myopic response to them. Ke-Chin Hsia’s admirable monograph on “war victims” enriches this general interpretation with welcome nuance and fresh insights. His account of the state’s evolving provision for war invalids, their families, and widows and orphans complicates the now dominant narrative of Austria-Hungary’s wartime self-immolation in dictatorial military rule, persecution of non-German and non-Magyar peoples, and food shortages and the bungling attempts to mitigate them. Instead, readers of this carefully argued, painstakingly researched book will find that although the sweeping reforms undertaken in wartime in the field of war victim welfare had fundamental flaws, they presaged more comprehensive and successful implementation in the early years of the Austrian First Republic. This, in turn, implies that the history of the Habsburg monarchy least desired successor state (at least from the perspective of its citizens) ought to be freed from the “gloom-and-doom straightjacket” (236) of its scholarship.
The road to universal benefits for all categories of disabled veterans and their dependents was a long one. Hsia ties slowly expanding welfare provision over the century before 1914 to changing notions of the soldier in society. Whereas disabled ex-servicemen in the sequestered “invalid houses” initiated under Maria Theresa were beholden only to patriarchal dynastic authority, those and their dependents who benefited from laws in 1875 and 1887 were supposed to represent the ideal of a citizen soldiery that the 1868 introduction of universal male conscription had hoped to foster. But until the eve of the Great War, all welfare provision amounted to “institutionalized charity” (21) that privileged invalids of higher rank or more years of service. The hecatombs of 1914/15 shocked the system into rapid reforms, which were initially haphazard and confusing for benefit claimants. Nonetheless, by the middle of the war, an unspoken pact had crystallized between the Austrian state and its citizens: “the latter would fight on the state’s behalf, and the state would take care of them and their families’ needs” (71). The centerpiece of this new arrangement was the Social Welfare Ministry established in 1917. Resurgent political parties, above all Social Democrats and Christian Socials, lobbied the ministry with their respective visions of comprehensive welfare, while the hidebound military’s antiquated formulas linking benefits to rank and length of service condemned them to oblivion. Despite the monarchy’s collapse in autumn 1918, the stage was set for welfare to be a decisive factor in subsequent political calculations.
Hsia’s most striking discovery is the extent to which war victims themselves influenced developments during the critical early months of the Austrian Republic. The “war victim movement” (132), institutionalized above all in the Central Association of German-Austrian War-Damaged Persons, appear in his account as revolutionary actors on par with radicalized workers, peasants, and nationalist activists. Amounting to no fewer than 5 percent of the republic’s population in 1919, war victims basked in enormous public sympathy. Ability to alleviate their suffering was widely seen as a litmus test for the state’s right to exist. Fortunately for the mostly Social Democratic government, the invalids were willing to cooperate, shunning communist calls from the street for more radical revolution, and agreeing to major reforms that benefited them and conferred legitimacy on the embattled new regime: The April 1919 Invalid Compensation Law, which granted benefits to any and all citizens adversely affected by war on the basis of lost earning power, and the October 1920 Invalid Employment Law, which obliged firms and the civil service to make a proportion of positions available to disabled veterans. Although their prominence in public affairs declined rapidly after 1919 due to infighting and the post-1922 austerity measures of the Seipel government, war victims were, for a brief but crucial moment, key actors in a “revolution in state-citizen relations in Austria: A legal commitment by the central state to directly ensure a minimum level of welfare for individual citizens” (190).
Much of this book is narrated from within legal-bureaucratic agendas, debates, and rivalries. Hsia expertly translates the documents’ rarefied language into layman’s terms, but his efforts to spin discussions of reform among civil servants and politicians into high drama does not everywhere succeed. In the place of such blow-by-blow intra-office set pieces, the present reviewer would have welcomed more information on the identities of the war victim activists—social, political, ethnic, etc.—and whether their diverse profiles shaped their demands. Hsia’s Austro-German-centered research also raises important questions about the experiences of war victims in other parts of the monarchy and, especially, in other successor states. Victims’ State sets a high bar for all future investigations on the subject.