Mark Alfano’s Character as Moral Fiction is a book which can certainly be catalogued under at least three distinctive areas of philosophical engagement— moral psychology, virtue ethics, and virtue epistemology. Traversing the connecting paths of these areas, Alfano develops an interesting line of thought with a view to respond to the situationist critique of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. He claims that though most people do not have robust virtues and character traits—as many psychological research findings have convincingly pointed out in recent times—it may still be quite rewarding to assign certain moral and intellectual virtues to them because such an act would function as self-fulfilling prophecies. For example, he says, people become courteous on being called courteous, they generally become courageous on being called courageous, and they become creative on being called creative in public, and so on.
However, this claim is likely to raise the eyebrows of many, especially the Kantians, since the author goes on to argue for the requirement of such attribution, even under factitious conditions, i.e., even if we are unaware of the real status of the agent concerned or even if we consider the agent to be not-so-virtuous. One may wonder, How we can randomly attribute virtues such as honesty, benevolence, courage, compassion and the like to a person when we do not have any evidence of their existence. Wouldn’t such attributions raise questions about epistemic norms? Wouldn’t it stir certain doubts about our own intellectual honesty?
Drawing insights from certain well-recognized empirical research of social psychology and behavioural economics, the author argues for the permissibility of such attribution without resorting to any standard, evidence-laden belief. He considers this permissibility as a necessity because attributions or announcements of our belief about people’s character traits in the public space act like placebo effects in stimulating them to behave in the ascribed manner. This signifies that the “contents of these beliefs or attributions are true because they are believed, and not believed because they are true” (83). Thus, though the artificial announcements or attributions initially tend to betray the evidence-norm, yet by causing the conditions of their own truth, they subsequently confirm it. In other words, when self-concept-based factitious virtues are attributed openly, there emerges an expectation about the agent concerned and this expectation tacitly encourages her to act in a particular way. This is so mainly because we, human beings, usually do not like to go against the expectations of our fellow members. We tend to take care of what our moral community expects of us.
This simple but attractive thought has been innovatively used by Alfano as the central recipe for his book. Chapter I presents a set of salient features of what the author calls the “hard core” of virtue ethics. Chapter II reformulates the situationist challenge with the help of some major situational factors, which influence our moral conducts. Chapter III analyses certain existing attempts, which are apparently unsuccessful, in defending virtue ethics from the situational problems. Chapter IV develops the author’s own alternative to these attempts through the idea of factitious virtues. In part two, which consists of Chapters V and VI, the same situational critique is extended to the area of virtue epistemology, especially its two varieties: reliabilism and responsibilism. To respond to the situationist challenges, in Chapter VII, the author tactfully applies the idea of factitious intellectual virtues to both varieties, and suggests that “instead of resisting the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology, we should aim to co-opt it” (159). In the penultimate chapter, a new idea called “social distance” is introduced to respond to the moral psychological issues of the normative theory of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.
One of the most interesting things about this book is that it acts like a double-edged sword for the virtue theoretical framework—on one side, it exhibits a temperament for strengthening the otherwise hostile situationist critique of virtue theories, while on the other side, it plays the very interesting role of rescuing these theories from the jaws of their impending vulnerabilities. Between these two interesting roles, the author advocates a naturalistic account of ethics, which advances contemporary researches not only in normative ethics but also in the field of moral psychology.
Philosophers have long been hesitant about the use of any empirical results in their argumentations. The reason behind this hesitation is the fact that the use of empirical data has traditionally been contrasted with the common philosophical methodology, which relies on the strength of a priori justification. But, Alfano has overcome this reluctance quite proactively, as he successfully uses the results of several psychological experiments to establish naturalistic claims. In fact, he has surveyed a record number of such experiments from the social science literature.
While Alfano’s use of experimental results in making naturalistic claims undoubtedly deserves our welcoming nod, we must not forget to pay critical attention to the ways in which these results are being used. For instance, the over-simplified presentations of several case studies, the repetitive use of such studies in making similar points, and most importantly, the uncritical implementation of these studies in moral contexts may raise serious concerns. Besides, given that Alfano wholeheartedly endorses the social scientific approach in his arguments, one may wonder whether such a quasi-scientific approach can really help us unearth the ethical properties, which are believed to be a matter of pure intuition. Furthermore, one may be curious about the exact ethical status of the factitious virtues which, according to the author, come from our artificial performance of certain virtuous actions. In other words, the issue that concerns us here is the apparent distinction between genuine virtues and artificial virtues on the one hand, and on the other, the relative ethical import of the former compared to the latter.
Despite these seemingly loose points, the author has been able to do justice with the basic arguments of the book. The most commendable thing is that this book has successfully brought to our notice the significance of construing virtue and character as social constructs. The book would undoubtedly be of great interest to anyone who loves to read ethical issues in general and virtue-theoretical issues in particular.
