In 1993, the year the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force, European business groups, journalists and policymakers hotly debated the question of how to increase the ‘competitiveness’ of the European Union (EU). European growth rates were low and unemployment was skyrocketing, reaching almost 11 per cent that year.Footnote 1 Reports were prepared and working groups set up with the aim of boosting the member countries’ performance, especially compared with the United States and Japan. This concern was part of a powerful international trend: the discourse that nations (or regions) were like big corporations, rivalling each other in a global race that took place in a giant worldwide marketplace. In this view, all economic problems, such as slowing GDP growth and a cooling job market, were essentially due to a lack of international competitiveness. And there existed a scoreboard to measure how different nations compared with one another: the World Competitiveness Index, which was published in the World Competitiveness Report.
The origin of this index can be traced back to Switzerland in 1979. It was there, within the predecessor organisation of the World Economic Forum (WEF), that a tool was created, which for the first time quantified the competitiveness of countries.Footnote 2 A decade later, the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) – a business school also based in Switzerland – participated in the production of this index and, after 1996, set up its own competitiveness benchmarking tool, rivalling with that of the WEF.Footnote 3 The World Competitiveness Index is part of a spectacular worldwide increase, in the 1980s and 1990s, in rankings that measure and rate the performance of state activities and policies, a trend well documented by research.Footnote 4
These rating tools represent a quantification of social phenomena. As such, it is necessary – as Desrosières and others have pointed out – to pay attention to the social, political and economic factors that contribute to establishing ‘conventions of equivalence’, used to produce and communicate numbers, making them comparable and measurable.Footnote 5 The type of ranking that synthesises quantitative data in order to inform political decision-making has been qualified by Davis, Kingsbury and Merry, as an indicator, which they define as ‘a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of different units’.Footnote 6 Building on this research, Kelley and Simmons use the concept of global performance indicators (GPIs), which ‘rate, rank and categorise state policies, qualities and/or performance’, and are used to ‘invoke reputational concerns and influence policy through the pressure of comparison’.Footnote 7 The WEF’s World Competitiveness Index clearly falls into this category of GPIs, as, since its creation, it has regularly been invoked by different policymakers, business leaders or think tanks to justify political choices.
As with all GPIs, the World Competitiveness Index was closely connected to an ‘underlying theory of social change’, an ‘initial set of theoretical views’.Footnote 8 In this case, it built on a neoliberal frame of reference connected to a multifaceted political project that dramatically increased its influence in global policy-making during the 1980s and 1990s. This neoliberal project can be defined as merging ‘both organisational and institutional practices with systems of thought’, whereas these systems of thought are based on the superiority of the market as the ideal form of social organisation and are focused on policy measures such as deregulation and privatisation.Footnote 9 Contrary to classical liberalism, neoliberalism is grounded in the belief that the success of the market needs to be actively constructed, which implies reliance on political organisations and institutions, such as the World Competitiveness Index.Footnote 10
The concept of competitiveness itself was closely linked to neoliberal thinking. As a matter of fact, in the 1970s a new understanding of competitiveness began to gain traction, and the term was suddenly on everybody’s lips.Footnote 11 This was the result of a revised approach taken by neoliberal advocates, as convincingly argued by Davies: They ‘shifted from defending markets as competitive arenas amongst many, to viewing society-as-a-whole as one big competitive arena’.Footnote 12 From this perspective, the search for competitive global advantage, with its inevitable consequence of increasing inequality, was presented as a fair and ultimately inevitable process, to be actively encouraged by political authorities. This new reading of competitiveness was based on theoretical underpinnings provided by management scholars at that time.Footnote 13 For instance, these theorists argued that the economic performance of nations rested on external constraints placed on managers and that these performances should be compared and quantified, for example by using surveys of business and political elites. The Swiss creators of the World Competitiveness Index seem to have taken this theoretical impetus to heart as they participated in propagating a new reading of quantifiable competition in world economic performance.
The WEF’s competitiveness index was hardly the only GPI grounded in neoliberal principles. Plehwe documents how two economic freedom indexes were launched in 1995 and 1996 by neoliberal circles relying on the Mont Pèlerin Society networks: the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, established together with The Wall Street Journal, and the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World index.Footnote 14 In the late 1990s, the World Bank Group created the Worldwide Government Indicators, followed, in 2003, by the Ease of Doing Business Index, specifically aimed at rating the business friendliness of poorer countries, for example, distributing points for deregulation and the privatisation of public sectors.Footnote 15 There were also ‘country risk and political risk’ rankings developed in the 1970s, followed by the introduction of sovereign credit ratings by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch and Moody’s.Footnote 16 The WEF’s competitiveness index was therefore part of a larger trend of neoliberal GPIs taking off at the time and these indicators furthermore tended to reinforce one another. Thus, the big three rating agencies regularly relied on the rankings of the WEF’s competitiveness index and the Ease of Doing Business Index for their own assessments, which increased their influence.Footnote 17 Just as the Swiss political advocacy forum was therefore not the sole inventor of neoliberal performance indicators, it was not the first to develop the concept of the competitiveness of countries, which pre-existed Schwab’s 1979 report. Rather, the WEF contributed decisively to the popularity of this idea by producing and propagating a benchmarking tool that could serve as powerful political leverage.
Jany-Catrice writes that the sociopolitical conditions in which performance indicators are elaborated are rarely made visible and generally remain unquestioned.Footnote 18 This article seeks to study these conditions and identify the actors and institutions involved in conceiving the indicator used to compare the competitiveness of countries. The history of the WEF’s and IMD’s World Competitiveness Index has not yet been examined in depth, and, in existing research on GPIs, although it is regularly mentioned, its origins are mostly either not discussed or misunderstood.Footnote 19 In general, historians have not paid sufficient attention to performance indicators.Footnote 20 The aim here is therefore to analyse the history of one of the most prominent neoliberal GPIs, focusing on its origins, dissemination and use.Footnote 21 This last aspect will be investigated through a case study on the influence of the competitiveness paradigm in the political process of European integration, at the beginning of the 1990s. It will be argued that two European business associations played a particular role in this regard, the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), today called the European Round Table for Industry. The question of how and to what extent the competitiveness ranking of countries participated in the shaping of nascent EU institutions is especially relevant, as it contributes to the lively scholarly debate about the assumed neoliberal nature of European integration as such.Footnote 22 In particular, it allows for a better understanding of input from business actors to the neoliberal policy choices made in Brussels. There are, however, obvious limitations to determining the influence of the Swiss competitiveness index in this European context, as the indicator was at the same time a contributing factor and itself a product of the general neoliberal political and social setting at that time.
An additional obstacle in the endeavour to examine the history of the World Competitiveness Index is the inaccessibility of the archival records of the two institutions at its heart, the WEF and the IMD, thereby making it impossible to study the actual decision-making process and actions of the main historical actors involved.Footnote 23 This may also be one reason why there is comparatively little research on the WEF, despite its global influence and importance.Footnote 24 In order to circumvent this difficulty, this contribution is based on the WEF’s and IMD’s internal documents and annual reports kept in public archives, as well as on newspaper articles. Furthermore, a copy of the questionnaire sent out by the WEF to establish the competitiveness index preserved at the Hoover Institution in California has proved to be relevant. For the case study on the influence of the competitiveness-of-nations paradigm in the EU debates at the beginning of the 1990s, the archives of the leading British business association, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), have been consulted. Since the CBI was a member of UNICE, these records give insight into the part played by of one of the two European business associations that directly participated in these debates about competitiveness, while the role of the other one, the ERT, has previously been examined by several authors.Footnote 25
This article is divided into four parts. It first investigates the history of the World Competitiveness Index since its creation in 1979 until 1995. The ensuing sections focus on the different phases – identified by David, Kingsbury and Merry – in an indicator’s trajectory of development and use over time.Footnote 26 Accordingly, the second section analyses the index’s conceptualisation and production, followed by a third section examining the GCI’s uses, and centring on the case study of the EU from 1993 to 1995. Finally, the last section deals with the contestation of the indicator. As will be discussed, the World Competitiveness Index was publicly criticised by leading economists at the beginning of the 1990s. This put an end to the WEF’s and IMD’s collaboration and led to the production of two slightly adapted competitiveness indicators after 1996. The conclusion reflects more generally on the insights of this historical examination of the world's first indicator to measure the competitiveness of nations.
A Brief History of the World Competitiveness Index (1979–95)
The quantification of the concept of competitiveness of nations originated at the WEF. The origin of this organisation, based in Cologny, near Geneva, dates back to 1971, when it was created by a Swiss business school, the Centre d'études industrielles (CEI), partially financed by a Canadian multinational corporation, Alcan Aluminum.Footnote 27 The idea of the WEF was to bring together top-level business leaders with policymakers and management theorists to discuss different problems facing European industry. The German engineer and economist Klaus Schwab – at the time a CEI faculty member – would quickly become the main executive to run the WEF, taking on the role of chairman. In 1979, it was at Schwab’s initiative that the WEF compiled an index intended to measure the competitiveness of European national economies for the first time.Footnote 28 The context of the development of the indicator was the WEF’s annual symposium in Davos in February 1980. Around 500 executives took part in the meeting that year, along with influential politicians, to discuss how European company leaders could achieve greater international cooperation, productivity and social engagement.Footnote 29 The first edition of the Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry was conceived as a supporting document for the business leaders attending the Davos meeting.Footnote 30 It was relatively limited, ranking sixteen countries – all European – to assess their competitiveness. The following year, there was another report, this time also including three non-European countries: Japan, the United States and Canada.Footnote 31 While the index was initially conceived as a perk for Davos participants, it was subsequently made available to the general public, albeit for a very high price, which varied annually. It cost over $1,000 during the first years; in 1995, the price was still $677.Footnote 32 From 1982 until 1986, the newly named Report on International Industrial Competitiveness, around 100 pages long, appeared every year in English and French. It eventually included all the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (except for Iceland) as well as—starting in 1981—a separate category of ‘newly industrialised countries’, first Mexico and Brazil, then later Argentina, South Korea and India.
In 1987, the WEF paused the annual publication of the competitiveness report, after its managing director, Stéphane Garelli, left the organisation.Footnote 33 Garelli had become (and would remain) a central figure in the development of the global competitiveness paradigm. Three years after obtaining a master’s degree in economics from the University of Lausanne in 1971, he started working at the WEF. In parallel, he completed his PhD in economics at the same university, graduating in 1977.Footnote 34 An entry in the Swiss commerce registry of 1979 shows that Garelli, referred to as a French citizen and resident of the municipality of Villette, had newly acquired the position of co-director of the WEF Foundation.Footnote 35 Therefore, at the time the first competitiveness indicator was produced, he held this position and was also the managing director of the WEF, which effectively made him the most powerful executive of the organisation after Schwab.Footnote 36
After his departure from the WEF, Garelli returned to Lausanne, where he was hired at the IMEDE. This management school had been founded by the multinational corporation Nestlé in the 1950s, with the objective of emulating the Harvard Business School’s approach to management education.Footnote 37 A few years after Garelli arrived at IMEDE, the school merged with CEI and took on the new name IMD. As seen above, CEI was the business school at the origin of the WEF, where Klaus Schwab had been a faculty member. In his new role at the Lausanne business school, Garelli established the World Competitiveness Center and convinced his former superior Schwab that the competitiveness ranking should be co-produced by the WEF and IMD. Indeed, the two organisations joined forces in 1989 and for seven years published a new benchmarking tool named the World Competitiveness Index, largely based on the same methodology as the earlier GPI.Footnote 38 As we will see, this collaboration between the IMD and the WEF stopped in 1995, and each started publishing their own competitiveness indicator.
Conceptualisation and Production of an Indicator to Measure the Competitiveness of Nations
In the first few years during which the WEF competitiveness indicator was established and its methodology specified, it was Klaus Schwab who personally oversaw the process, assisted by Stéphane Garelli and the organisation’s staff. There was little transparency in the reports about the criteria used to rank countries and no clear definition of competitiveness was given.Footnote 39 It was simply indicated that competitiveness was influenced not only by ‘terms of the cost of production and productivity’ but also by ‘the internal dynamism of a country, its socio-political consensus, the quality of its human resources, its commercial spirit, the manner in which it prepares for the future’, as well as ‘by factors as diverse as wage costs and the cost of social programmes, or the efficiency of telephone systems, or even the ability to speak foreign languages!’Footnote 40 It was only in the 1990s that the combined WEF/IMD report started to define competitiveness more explicitly, as ‘the ability of a country or company to, proportionately, generate more wealth than its competitors in world markets’.Footnote 41
The index was based on two categories of data. On the one hand, the WEF collected existing statistics, produced by public international organisations, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the OECD or the International Monetary Fund.Footnote 42 These figures included unemployment rates, foreign direct investment flows, average wages, growth rates and other macroeconomic statistical material. However, Schwab and his colleagues also invested resources in data collection. Every year, surveys were conducted: hundreds of CEOs and managers of leading companies, as well as a small number of policy advisers or academics, answered long lists of questions. The authors of the report contacted the main executives of those companies that they considered ‘representative’ of all economic sectors in each country that was to be ranked. These businesspeople were asked to give points ranging from one to six, which were then added up to total competitiveness scores. This second category of subjective criteria constituted about one-fifth of the whole assessment at the beginning, and after the IMD started co-producing the report, increased to one-third.Footnote 43 In 1995, over 3,000 surveys were included in the ranking.Footnote 44
The WEF established a small number of main factors of competitiveness as averages of different social and economic indicators, based on both macroeconomic data and executive surveys, each factor comprising a subset of more detailed criteria.Footnote 45 These factors were not all weighted evenly, and their coefficient in the overall ranking changed every year, following the recommendations of a panel of international experts, which were, however, not revealed publicly.Footnote 46 All in all, these main competitiveness factors were rooted in neoliberal economic axioms. This was especially the case for the category ‘role of the state’ (later renamed ‘state interference’ and then ‘government’). It measured the degree of state regulation, the level of public subsidies, the share of the public sector in GDP and employment, and the tax burden on individuals and businesses. The 1994 report, for instance, clearly outlined the ideal role of government:
1. The state intervention on business activities should be minimized apart from creating competitive conditions for enterprises. 2. Government should however provide macroeconomic and social conditions that are predictable and thus minimize the external risks for economic enterprise. 3. Government should be flexible in adapting its economic policies to a changing international environment.Footnote 47
The other main competitiveness factors changed slightly over time and included such categories as ‘dynamics of the market’, ‘forward orientation’, ‘socio-political consensus and stability’, ‘dynamism of the economy’ or ‘people’. For this last category, the 1994 report mentioned that: ‘Attitude of the workforce affects competitiveness of a country.’Footnote 48 To sum it up: a country was considered to be more competitive the more its government limited any kind of regulation (be it in the area of the environment or workers’ health), the lower it taxed companies and individuals, the more autonomy it gave to the private sector, and the more actively it supported the opening of the market to global trade. Competitiveness points were also given for weakly organised unions and low levels of workforce contestation. These criteria – deregulation, free markets, privatisation, a flexible labour market, limiting the role of government to supporting the private economy – directly aligned with the neoliberal political project (advocated by various think tanks and intellectuals), which became increasingly influential in the 1980s. They were also largely in sync with the ideal business environment in the eyes of the corporate leaders surveyed by the WEF. As the US economist David Wyss explained in 1982, ‘the forum calls it a competitiveness index, but in reality, it is a measure of each country’s attractiveness to industry.… The questions are more how much do you like this country as a place to do business than anything else.’Footnote 49 General business-friendliness and neoliberal principles are therefore not easily distinguishable and seem to have blended together in the WEF indicator.
The changes in the rankings reflected this. During the first seven years, the top ranks did not vary greatly. West Germany ranked first in the 1979 report, ahead of Switzerland and France. The following six years, after Japan and the United States had been included, these two countries shared the top three places on the pedestal with Switzerland.Footnote 50 One significant change was the fall of France from being ranked third in the first report to the fifteenth rank in 1982, where it remained the following two years. This was a direct consequence of socialist François Mitterrand’s election as president in May 1981, and the victory of the Socialist Party in the legislative elections in June that year. The new government’s nationalisation plans and social policies were not to the taste of the business executives questioned by the WEF.Footnote 51 Accordingly, in ‘businessmen's confidence’, France was ranked twentieth in the 1983 report (based on the individual surveys).Footnote 52 The WEF quoted Yvan Gattaz, the president of the country’s main business association, who blamed ‘tax and social burdens that suffocate companies’.Footnote 53 On the contrary, the consideration of Japan as the most competitive nation-state over five years is explained by the authors of the 1984 WEF report with the country’s first place in categories that generally weighed more in the assessment of competitiveness, such as its ‘forward orientation’ and low cost of production.Footnote 54 They were optimistic about the relaxation of the country’s capital controls, noting: ‘Japan seems to be showing a slightly more flexible attitude toward foreign investment. Under pressure from the United States and the EEC [European Economic Community], controls have been relaxed somewhat.’Footnote 55 In 1983, the country was also rated first in the category of confidence by the business executives, ahead of Switzerland, which followed in second place.Footnote 56
Overall, the methodological choices for ranking certain countries as more competitive than others made by the WEF and IMD – under the guidance of Schwab and Garelli – largely remained unclear, because the reports included very little information on this process and the criteria that were applied.
How the Competitiveness Paradigm Was Used: The Case of the EU (1993–5)
After conceptualising and production, the following phase in the trajectory of performance indicators is that of their use as ‘sources of knowledge’, forming beliefs and understandings.Footnote 57 The WEF index was employed by different groups and institutions all over the world. Along with other factors, this contributed to the notion of ‘country competitiveness’ becoming widely integrated into organisational routines and policy formation. There are many examples of this. The Japanese employers’ federation, Keidanren, translated the Swiss report already at the beginning of the 1980s and distributed it to its members.Footnote 58 As mentioned above, the three main credit rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s – integrated the competitiveness rankings into their evaluations. In South Africa at the beginning of the 2000s, the WEF index and the World Bank’s Doing Business indicator were referenced by different actors to advance arguments against union rights and job protection.Footnote 59 The same two indicators were also central in Georgia in attracting foreign investments.Footnote 60
This article adds to the research on these last two cases by examining the use of the WEF/IMD indicator, based on a case study of the EU at a critical juncture of its history, the years immediately following its establishment in 1992. It is important to note that it is difficult to identify the direct impact of the Swiss benchmarking tool, as the concept of global competitiveness, energetically backed by management theorists and numerous think tanks, was very much en vogue in the 1980s and 1990s; the WEF and IMD were but one element in a powerful worldwide trend. For instance, both the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush set up committees on competitiveness.Footnote 61 The precise influence that the World Competitiveness Index had on these political actions in the United States is impossible to determine, and the same goes for the European context.
As different authors have analysed, the European Communities increasingly opted for a neoliberal competition policy during the 1980s, especially in relation to the creation of a single market.Footnote 62 International competition from US and Japanese companies actually fuelled the relaunching of European integration – embodied in the Single European Act of 1986 and driven forward by Jacques Delors, the French president of the European Commission – as a process of internal liberalisation understood as enhancing external competitiveness.Footnote 63 After the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, EU authorities were dealing with a multitude of political and economic difficulties, such as German reunification, a severe monetary crisis, the creation of a European single currency, the establishment of a common foreign trade policy, and the decision on what influence socially oriented regulation should have in relation to competition as a principle in economic, financial and industrial policies.Footnote 64 Business actors weighed in on these different processes, and, although strategies sometimes differed, they generally agreed on the aim of increasing the competitiveness of European industry by deregulating the economy and freeing trade.Footnote 65
In the context of slowing growth rates and inflation, the discourse on declining European competitiveness in comparison to the Japanese and US economies was omnipresent, as was the affirmation that regulations and high taxes imposed by EU welfare states were keeping unemployment high. From 1989 to 1995, GDP growth was 1.2 per cent in Western Europe, 1.9 per cent in the United States and 3 per cent in Japan; meanwhile, unemployment reached 10.2 per cent of the labour force in EEC countries during the first half of the 1990s, compared to 6.5 per cent in the United States and 2.2 per cent in Japan.Footnote 66 However, it was not only macroeconomic indicators that were held up as signs of Europe’s competitiveness problem. It was also the WEF and IMD’s World Competitiveness Index that was extensively commented on as proving the European countries’ supposedly fragile position in the competitiveness race.
Every publication of the WEF/IMD ranking from 1993 to 1995 received wide attention in the main newspapers of the EU.Footnote 67 The articles especially mentioned on the unfavourable ratings of European countries. In 1994, the fact that the United States took the lead ahead of Japan, which had been at the top of the ranking for the past six reports, was thoroughly discussed, as well as the entry of Singapore and Hong Kong into the first four positions. The French financial daily Les Échos explained that the Swiss report compared low US labour costs with those in Europe, and reflected on the possibility that Europe would have to reduce its own labour costs to regain its competitiveness.Footnote 68 The Economist was most concerned about the WEF/IMD ranking of government policies in EU states (such as tax rates, business leaders’ opinions on hiring and firing laws, price controls and other forms of state interference):
Of the top ten countries compared on this basis, only five are in the OECD; none is a member of the European Union. Four of the bottom ten are members of both the EU and the OECD. If they want their economies to get fitter, such governments will first have to become leaner.Footnote 69
A year later, when the World Competitiveness Index again placed the United States at the top, with an even greater lead compared to the EU member states, The Times of London wrote: ‘However slippery the definition may be, and however inadequate the statistical means by which it is described […], all those engaged in the competitiveness business acknowledge that the WEF’s regular scoreboard is a key benchmark.’Footnote 70 The article went on to point out: ‘Contrary to the objectives of the Maastricht treaty, European countries are managing their competitiveness very differently, with a ‘growing ideological split’ between the UK-based model of stronger market mechanisms, and ‘those who want to preserve a minimum of social consensus’.Footnote 71
Major European business associations weighed in on whether EU authorities should follow neoliberal recipes: deregulate and render markets more flexible so as to achieve greater competitiveness. This was, first of all, the case with the ERT. Sixteen businessmen from European countries – not only from the EU – had created this organisation in 1983 to increase the European industry’s international competitiveness and engage in a high level of political activism through different projects promoting the Single Market programme.Footnote 72 Most of the ERT’s corporate members were from industrial and manufacturing firms and therefore deeply interested in labour costs and economies of scale. These business leaders directly inspired and influenced EU competitiveness policy.
This was apparent when, in December 1993, the European Council approved the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment prepared by the European Commission, a highly important position paper that would determine the direction that EU policy would take in its early years.Footnote 73 It was specifically aimed at solving different aspects of the economic crisis such as labour market inflexibility, low inflation and low growth. As argued by Cowles, the leaders of multinational corporations in the ERT had decisively shaped the report, as highlighted by the inclusion of the term ‘competitiveness’ in its title.Footnote 74 As a matter of fact, there were close parallels to a report the ERT had published just a week earlier, called Beating the Crisis.Footnote 75 When analysing this thirty-page pamphlet, it is striking how closely the ERT's arguments were aligned with the same neoliberal reading of competitiveness that the WEF and IMD were promoting. Rather than asking the proverbial ‘chicken or egg’ question, it can be argued that the European business organisation, the Lausanne management school and the Swiss advocacy forum were all participating in the same effort to promote neoliberal solutions to economic problems, using the language of global competitiveness. The ERT report began with a diagnosis: ‘Europe has become a high-cost, low-growth economy that is not adapting fast enough and is therefore losing its competitive advantage to more dynamic parts of the world.’Footnote 76 It then listed the necessary ingredients for a return to competitiveness, identifying ‘labour costs [as] the single major cause of falling competitiveness’.Footnote 77 The pamphlet proposed to ‘simplify government and reduce the excessive overhead of bureaucracy’ and recommended getting rid of ‘cumbersome rules’ and regulations, as well as redefining the role of government ‘to enable industry to do its job’.Footnote 78 Furthermore, government should demonstrate its ‘commitment to consistent economic policies that will generate confidence in Europe as a good place in which to invest’, and ‘cut the level of waste that eats away at the economy’, such as the oversized public sector.Footnote 79 While it is not clear if the ERT directly used the World Competitiveness Index to write its report, another European business group, which participated in these interactions with EU authorities, did: the UNICE, a federation of national business associations of member states of the European communities.Footnote 80
As the archives reveal, the UNICE also considerably influenced the European Commission’s White Paper. Already in July 1993, the Commission’s vice president and commissioner for industry, Martin Bangemann, invited the UNICE ‘to send in views on the Commission’s Growth, Competitiveness and Employment initiative (Delors’ White Paper)’.Footnote 81 In parallel, the UNICE also set up competitiveness steering and working groups in the early summer of 1993 to prepare its own report on the declining competitiveness of the newly established EU.Footnote 82 The idea was to ‘show how precarious the [EU] position is’ in terms of competitiveness in order ‘to provide a platform for resisting Community initiatives which would add to business costs’.Footnote 83 The diagnosis of weakening competitiveness was therefore clearly intended to offer a narrative, which could be called upon to counter future EU policies that clashed with corporate interests. What is especially revealing is that the UNICE leaders deliberately tried to use the competitiveness discourse to achieve labour market flexibility. This is confirmed by the words of an economist working for the CBI, in September 1963. Andrew Sentance commented on an intermediate version of the UNICE report, noting that a paragraph
of the paper suggests that improved competitiveness will not be able to solve the problem of unemployment. This is something of an own-goal and should be obliterated from the text. Unemployment is the main issue of concern in Europe at present and we should seek to identify lack of competitiveness as closely as possible to it.Footnote 84
This statement illustrates well that competitiveness had become a performative notion, used in support of policies that came out of the toolbox of neoliberalism, above all the deregulation of the labour market.
When UNICE leaders heard, in the summer of 1993, that the ERT was also preparing a paper on competitiveness, they hoped it would be possible ‘to try to bring the two pieces of work together’.Footnote 85 Evidently this did not happen: the result was simply two extremely closely aligned statements. The UNICE report was ready in time to be presented at a UNICE meeting with Jacques Delors on 7 Dec. 1993 and at a European Council meeting three days later.Footnote 86 Its title was European Competitiveness: How to Make Europe More Adaptable.Footnote 87 The WEF/IMD index was an important source used for the report. Specifically, the UNICE relied on the Swiss indicator for its framework for competitiveness analysis, writing that two of ‘the most relevant’ models for explaining competitiveness were those of Michael Porter (a competitiveness theorist who would later collaborate with the WEF) and of the ‘IMD World Competitiveness Report’ (it is not clear why the WEF was not mentioned). It went on to affirm: ‘Neither model has been ‘proven’ over time. But, taken together, they provide a useful basis for an analysis of the competitiveness of Europe…’Footnote 88 The WEF/IMD index was then quoted over several pages of the UNICE report in order to unfavourably compare EU performance to that of Japan and the United States, notably in the area of ‘co-operation between firms and universities’, in the longer ‘time taken to commercialise’, the poorer quality of air and rail travel, and the poorer quality of telecommunications service.Footnote 89
After deploring the declining competitiveness of the EU, UNICE’s recommendations for action included increasing labour market flexibility by relaxing minimal wage levels and reducing social security, improving business training and making sure public expenditure on R&D was business-oriented, and completing the GATT Uruguay Round to drive forward globalisation. Furthermore, governments should reduce government influence by transferring responsibility for welfare payments from the ‘public sector to the private sector’, by ‘reducing and eventually eliminating paternalistic state aids’ and by ‘privatising state companies wherever possible’.Footnote 90 The parallels with the ERT recommendations and the Swiss GPI are evident: Europe was presented as being in competition with other parts of the world, and it was claimed that it would fare better the more EU institutions and its twelve member governments deregulated and cut back on social spending.
This neoliberal reading of competitiveness profoundly influenced EU policies. In 1995, the EU set up a Competitiveness Advisory Group. The ERT had already demanded the creation of such a group in its 1993 brochure. It had stated the necessity of establishing ‘a European Competitiveness Council representing industry, government and science to advise on and monitor the detailed implementation of the Charter [for Industry]’.Footnote 91 The EU’s Competitiveness Advisory Group was composed of nine leading business executives, along with two trade union leaders and two politicians. It was thus the nine business leaders who were in the majority, three of whom were ERT members: Percy Nils Barnevik, president and CEO of Swedish-Swiss ABB; David Simon, chairman-elect of British Petroleum Company; and Floris Maljers, who had just stepped down as the CEO of British Unilever.Footnote 92 Guided by the European Commission’s White Paper, the group had the mandate to ‘produce a six-monthly report on the state of the Union’s competitiveness and to advise on economic policy priorities and guidelines with the aim of stimulating competitiveness and reaping its benefits in terms of growth and employment’.Footnote 93 Significantly, among the first priorities the group recommended to EU leaders was ‘speeding up of deregulation and liberalization’.Footnote 94 The EU Competitiveness Advisory Group had not only integrated the competitiveness paradigm into its name but also advocated the same policy choices that were recommended by the WEF and IMD to increase a country’s performance in international comparison.
All of these different actors – the Swiss advocacy forum and business school, the organised European business leaders, the EU’s advisory group – were pulling on the same rope and promoting the idea that nations and regions were in competition, and that this race could be measured and compared in terms of ‘competitive advantage’.
Contestation of the World Competitiveness Index
As pointed out by Sarfaty, ‘because indicators carry scientific authority, they mask potential conflicts of interest among technical experts and leave little room for contestation’.Footnote 95 In the case of the WEF/IMD indicator, its scientific authority was not evident. The two men – Klaus Schwab and Stéphane Garelli – who had overseen its production since 1979, held PhDs from not particularly prestigious universities; furthermore, the main institution with which the competitiveness ranking was identified at the time, the WEF, was considered a forum for business actors, with little academic credibility. This arguably opened the door to criticism of the indicator’s scientific reliability. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1990s, different economists started to point out methodological flaws in the Swiss competitiveness ranking, for instance the fact that the quantitative data used in the index were often several years old, that there were problems comparing figures from different data sets, and that the purely subjective estimates of business leaders were given too much weight.Footnote 96 But it was also the concept of competitiveness itself that was called into question. It was especially a few articles by MIT and Stanford professor of economics Paul Krugman that caused a stir.Footnote 97 Krugman generally opposed the whole idea of ranking countries according to their competitiveness, insisting that trade – contrary to the widely accepted doctrine – was actually not a zero-sum game with winners and losers, and that economic problems were not due to the poor performance of a country in a general global race. He directly criticised the Swiss report, as well as a couple of recent books upholding the concept of the competitiveness of nations.Footnote 98
There were many reactions to Krugman's critique of the notion of competitiveness. The British daily Financial Times called attention to the unreliability and incomparability of the data used by the World Competitiveness Report, and the renowned weekly The Economist ironically titled an article on the subject ‘The “C” Word’.Footnote 99 Other journalists defended the WEF/IMD ranking.Footnote 100 Nevertheless, the international controversy stirred up by Krugman had a significant consequence: At the end of 1995, WEF leaders decided to produce their competitiveness ranking independently and stop collaborating with IMD professor Garelli, who for the last seven years had primary authorship of the report.Footnote 101 Furthermore, the WEF indicator was revised. To increase its scientific legitimacy, the Harvard professor of economics, Jeffrey D. Sachs, was appointed as an official adviser. Sachs had recently been declared ‘probably the most important economist in the world’, by The New York Times.Footnote 102 As an economic adviser to the Russian post-Cold War government, he had been a proponent of the neoliberal-inspired ‘shock therapy’ policies and in 1995 was setting up the prestigious Harvard Institute for International Development.Footnote 103 The fact that Klaus Schwab hired him as a co-director of the WEF competitiveness report therefore significantly increased the indicator’s academic reputability. This was even more the case when, in 1999, Schwab and Sachs invited Harvard Business School professor Michael E. Porter, the author of the highly influential 1990 book The Competitive Advantage of Nations, to join them.
A new name was chosen for the WEF ranking published after 1996: the Global Competitiveness Index. Footnote 104 Competitiveness was now defined ‘as the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the sustainable level or prosperity that can be earned by an economy’.Footnote 105 Sachs himself summed it up as ‘the ability of a nation’s economy to make rapid and sustained gains in living standards’.Footnote 106 This was a more nuanced take on competitiveness, ‘bend[ing] the idea of competitiveness to fit modern growth theory’, as The New York Times commented in June 1996.Footnote 107 The WEF went out of its way to insist that competitiveness was not to be understood as a zero-sum game. It was not necessarily because one nation won the competitive race that this came at the expense of other countries, but rather it was an ‘institutional and policy framework for promoting rapid and sustained economic growth’ for a period of five to ten years, in which countries could pursue different growth strategies.Footnote 108 As these justifications show, the entire overhaul of the WEF index can therefore be considered a direct reaction to the critique expressed by Krugman and others, who had made the point of reconsidering global economic relations as going beyond a win–lose scenario.
Besides this more careful definition of the notion at its core and the new Harvard credentials, there were some other changes to the report, sold for $685 and widely advertised in the press as incorporating ‘a revised and improved methodology’.Footnote 109 The WEF report now included opinion pieces.Footnote 110 Furthermore, the 378 indicators of the 1995 report had been cut down by more than half, to 155, and regrouped into eight competitiveness categories. Roughly one-third of the data were still based on around 2,000 questionnaires answered by business executives. Despite these formal modifications, however, the eight competitiveness categories remained closely linked to neoliberal criteria.Footnote 111 The report considered economies competitive if they had ‘open markets, lean government spending, low taxes, flexible labour markets, an effective judiciary and stable political systems’.Footnote 112 Tellingly, Sachs declared that ‘rigid labour markets and costly social welfare programmes’ explained about half of the competitiveness difference between EU members and well-performing Asian countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore.Footnote 113
This neoliberal theoretical frame is confirmed when considering the questionnaire that was sent out by the WEF in 1998, a copy of which has been preserved in the archival fund of the Atlas Network at the Hoover Institution. For example, the business executives were asked whether ‘hiring and firing practices’ were ‘severely restricted by government’ or ‘flexibly determined by employers’.Footnote 114 The closer the answer was to the latter, the more competitive points were given. Another question addressed the composition of government spending, giving minimal points if it was qualified as ‘wasteful’ and more points the closer the answer was to ‘provides necessary goods and services that the private market does not provide’.Footnote 115
The superficially revised methodology of the WEF report did not put an end to the criticism expressed by leading economists. In autumn 1996, Krugman reconfirmed his argument, this time in the highly respected Oxford Review of Economic Policy. It is important to note that the professor acknowledged the WEF’s central role in promoting the concept of competitiveness:
The idea that the economic success of a country depends on its international competitiveness took hold among business, political and intellectual leaders in the late 1970s. The World Economic Forum, which hosts the famous Davos conferences, began issuing its annual World Competitiveness Report in 1980, and the rankings in that report soon became a major criterion by which national performance was judged. By the 1990s the concept of competitiveness was no longer even controversial among influential people. Of course, competitiveness was the key; the only question was how to achieve it.Footnote 116
Krugman concluded this article with a poignant appraisal: ‘It seems far too cynical to suggest that the debate over competitiveness is simply a matter of time-honoured fallacies about international trade being dressed up in new and pretentious rhetoric. But it is.’Footnote 117 The British economist John Kay, professor at the London Business School, agreed. Addressing the WEF’s new claim not to measure ‘the level of national output but its rate of change’, in other words ‘a country’s ability to increase high rates of growth’, Kay wrote that this was already possible based on existing international statistics on actual high rates of economic growth.Footnote 118 The WEF, however, established its indices of competitiveness based on different social and economic indicators, many of which measured government policy according to subjective opinions, such as assuming that a big share of government in the economy was bad. Kay concluded: ‘When it comes down to it, these indices of competitiveness are largely measures of whether the governments of the countries involved have adopted policies of which the authors of the survey approve.’Footnote 119
Despite this continuing negative appraisal, the new WEF report was published annually for another quarter of a century, including an increasing number of countries (seventy-five in 2002), and slightly adapting its methodology. The people in charge of overseeing the reports changed over time, but after the 2008–9 issue, Klaus Schwab alone directed them. In 2020, a final special edition of the Global Competitiveness Report appeared, but it did not include the Global Competitiveness Index, and after that, no further report was published.Footnote 120 The WEF did not explain why it stopped producing the ranking, simply naming difficulties in the context of the COVID pandemic.
A factor that certainly played a role in the demise of the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Index was that it had been in competition with the IMD since 1996. As a matter of fact, the management school had issued its own report, entitled World Competitiveness Yearbook, which included the World Competitiveness Scoreboard. It was authored by Garelli and the same researchers who had previously worked on the report published with the WEF. IMD therefore claimed continuity in having produced the indicator since 1989, and did not significantly change its methods.Footnote 121 The rankings of forty-six countries in 1996 was still based on what it called ‘hard data’ from different international and national institutions, which made up about two-thirds of the evaluation, as well as on a survey of around 2,500 business executives, whereas it seems to have been more difficult for the IMD to collect the ‘soft data’ in the first year, only 15 per cent had answered the questionnaires sent out.Footnote 122 The eight competitiveness factors in the IMD Yearbook were comparable to those of the WEF.Footnote 123 There was one difference, however: the WEF reports favoured a per capita analysis, while the IMD report gave more weight to the size of the market being evaluated.Footnote 124 This resulted in the IMD placing the United States at the top of the pedestal in 1996, followed by Singapore and Hong Kong, whereas the WEF considered Singapore, Hong Kong and New Zealand more competitive than the United States that year. Another difference, according to the IMD itself, was that the WEF ‘puts more emphasis on survey data’, while ‘we prefer a more objective approach based on hard facts’.Footnote 125
Until 2020, the two Swiss competitiveness rankings were published in parallel, rivalling each other for international attention. Since then, the IMD has continued to publish its World Competitiveness Yearbook, effectively having won the competitiveness contest against the WEF.
Conclusion
The historical analysis of the world’s first international performance indicator that sought to measure the competitiveness of nations confirms several key arguments made in the literature on the socio-history of quantification. As was the case with other GPIs, the Swiss index produced and synthesised social, economic and cultural data that could then be used to influence policy choices, relying on the pressure of comparison. Our analysis offers three main additional contributions to this literature.
First, it sheds light on the history of GPIs that were tied to neoliberalism. Since neoliberal advocates relied on active communication of concepts and frameworks, such performance indicators represented helpful tools. In the case of the competitiveness indicator, two institutions that were at the intersection of global neoliberal networks and business linkages, the WEF and IMD, conceptualised and produced a GPI over a period of four decades that became a worldwide reference. Opinion-makers, corporate actors and politicians relied on it to spread the idea that countries participated in a sort of global competitiveness Olympics, with winners and losers, and that deregulation and lower social spending would help a country advance in this struggle.Footnote 126 Competitiveness councils, white papers and working groups were set up in the United States and Europe to advise governments on how to improve their stakes in this race. As this study has further confirmed, neoliberalism was all but a clean-cut, monolithic project in the 1980s and 1990s; there were multiple proponents with sometimes diverging agendas who mobilised the concept of the global competitiveness race, at times acting through the same organisations, as shown for the ERT by Apeldoorn and Komornicka.Footnote 127 Furthermore, the boundaries between theoretical dogmas and plain business interests were often blurred. More research is needed on the connections between the producers of the competitiveness index and neoliberal networks in order to investigate whether close ties existed, as was the case for similar GPIs.Footnote 128 Furthermore, it would be particularly important to study the use neoliberal think tanks made of the WEF indicator, as the Free Market Foundation (a member of the Atlas Network) did in South Africa, at the beginning of the 2000s.Footnote 129
The history of the World Competitiveness Index also allows for a better understanding of the role played by business actors in the creation and circulation of GPIs and on the different motivations they had for promoting them. The competitiveness indicator was conceptualised by the leaders of the WEF as a means to gain institutional legitimacy. It became a well-known and publicised benchmarking tool that was associated with the Swiss business advocacy forum, which at the beginning of the 1980s was striving for international recognition. The index added to the global attention the organisation, then still called the European Management Forum, had already received for its annual meetings organised in Davos. In this sense, it contributed to the increasing involvement of policymakers and executives from other world regions in the WEF by 1987. As the organisation’s annual report published that year stated:
On 30 June 1987 we had 598 member companies and institutions from 47 countries, 55 per cent of which were outside Europe. So it was natural that, while adjusting our objectives to world developments, we should similarly adapt our name which, on 1 January 1987, became the World Economic Forum …Footnote 130
The WEF had succeeded in becoming a forum for business leaders from non-European countries and the World Competitiveness Indicator had undoubtedly helped it in this quest. It also brought financial benefits, as it was sold at a very high price, while the cost of data collection was low, depending on existing statistics produced by other – often public – institutions, and only necessitating conducting an opinion survey.
In addition to these institutional motivations, the competitiveness indicator was closely aligned with the interests of the executives of large multinational corporations: they played a dominant role at the WEF and were generally favourable to free trade and flexible markets. It thus offered a tool that could be employed by business actors to influence policy formation. This was the case with UNICE, which relied on the Swiss indicator in its attempt to determine the economic and social policies of the EU at the beginning of the 1990s. The World Competitiveness Index developed by the WEF and IMD certainly influenced policy decisions in Brussels, although, as with other indicators, it is not possible to isolate its effects from those of a multitude of other factors. It can be seen as one cog in the wheel of the general rise of neoliberalism at that time.
Finally, the analysis of the Swiss competitiveness ranking further clarifies the interrelation of GPIs with democracy. As with other neoliberal indicators, the strength of democratic institutions was not taken into consideration in the competitiveness ranking, as the high scores given to countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1990s demonstrate.Footnote 131 What mattered more to the WEF was political stability.Footnote 132 Furthermore, the history of a GPI generated by private institutions also draws attention to the lack of democratic oversight of its process of production. In 2021, the World Bank stopped issuing the Doing Business index, after a scandal emerged. An independent investigation by an international law firm found that the ranking of China had been advanced after pressure on World Bank officials from Chinese policymakers.Footnote 133 In the spring of 2025, Schwab stepped down from his role as chairman of the WEF, reportedly in reaction to a whistleblower letter accusing him of ethical and financial misconduct and also of having manipulated results of the Global Competitiveness Report.Footnote 134 Later that year, the SonntagsZeitung, a Swiss weekly newspaper, stated that preliminary findings from a probe into Schwab conducted by a Zurich law firm allegedly confirmed that he had influenced results in the report.Footnote 135 Two cases were mentioned in which the WEF chairman was said to have personally interfered with the Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018, for political reasons, in order to influence the rankings of two countries, the United Kingdom and India. The article also implied that the WEF index for 2021 was not published because Schwab had supposedly shared its results beforehand with a member of the government of a (not identified) foreign country that had fallen in the ranking, and then recommended to the WEF management not to publish the report that year.Footnote 136
As these two cases reveal, the lack of transparency and accountability in the conditions of production for GPIs makes them vulnerable to attempts of corruption by different interest groups. In the case of indicators that quantify the competitiveness of countries, the consequences of this opacity are especially important, given their tremendous influence on global economic governance.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Grace Ballor, Hadrien Buclin, Margaux Lang, Gabriella Lima and Mattia Ravano for their help and comments.
