Christian Ostermann's book aims to add a hitherto missing piece to the historiography of German-American relations and the Cold War: East Germany. It does so “through the prism of American attitudes and policy” during the immediate postwar years (x). The book uses an extensive research literature as well as American, German, and Soviet historical sources. Each chapter outlines American perceptions of and reactions to key events, such as the merger of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD); the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR); the Deutschlandtreffen der Jugend and the World Youth Festival; the Stalin Note; and the June 17 uprising. The index provides a useful guide for navigating the book. A bibliography would have been a welcome addition.

The book is based on two premises: first, that US policy toward East Germany was not merely one of “containment” but of “rollback” and “liberation”; second, that the Cold War was a global conflict that needs to be understood from an international perspective.

In the first chapter, Ostermann argues that personal impressions were crucial for the change in US policy toward Germany. By the time the American delegation arrived for the Potsdam Conference, the Soviets had already carried out an extensive industrial disarmament. American officials were shocked and wanted to prevent similar requisitions in the other occupation zones. Thus, although a “unified treatment of Germany” was decided at Potsdam, “the reparations formula” determined that “eastern and western Germany would be placed on very different economic trajectories” (21). The second chapter emphasizes that American officials nonetheless remained divided over whether cooperation with the Soviets would be possible. In particular, Lucius D. Clay hoped that close cooperation would help to prevent the occupation zones from drifting apart. The political transformation of the Soviet zone initially did little to change Clay's assessment, as chapter 3 shows. While officials in Washington favored active intervention, he remained convinced that “far more was to be gained by extending Western influence to the east through quadripartite solutions” (70).

Chapter 4 analyzes American reactions to attempts by Soviet and German communists to present themselves as advocates of German unity. Since their propaganda campaigns met with some success, even Clay eventually abandoned his policy of neutrality. As chapter 5 elaborates, the founding of the GDR (and the perceived overly defensive reaction of the West German government) prompted High Commissioner John J. McCloy to establish the Political and Economic Projects Committee (PEPCO) in 1950. It was expected to “anticipate, counter, and frustrate moves by the East” (113), with the key goal of regaining the “ability to shape the public discourse on the issue of German unity” (116). McCloy succeeded in this aim by defining free elections as a prerequisite for unity. However, US observers were soon convinced that a more active approach was necessary since “the passing of time seemed to favor the SED authorities” (133). Accordingly, chapter 6 is devoted to the American “planning for rollback,” which was motivated by the outbreak of the Korean War and the East German regime's increasingly aggressive rhetoric. The American report titled “Psychological Warfare in Germany” recommended strengthening the resistance in the GDR and not shying away from “infiltration,” “sabotage, abduction,” and “direct action against selected, highly placed functionaries, etc.” (152). Although these plans were met with great enthusiasm among some Cold Warriors, many US officials feared that the report was “somewhat over-optimistic” about the East German population's potential for resistance (154). An interim plan adopted in 1951 was largely limited to anti-communist propaganda work, but it also proposed semi-covert operations and set the goal of liberating East Germany within five years.

Since West German officials tended to reject offensive measures, as chapter 7 elaborates, American services primarily cooperated with private anti-communist groups. Beginning in the spring of 1953, they “engaged in a host of activities ranging from overt information programs to largely covert intelligence, disinformation, sabotage, and defection efforts” (195). In addition, export controls were intended to weaken the adversary, as chapter 8 argues: “Eager to counter Soviet and East German pressure on Berlin, U.S. officials viewed inter-German trade as the ‘pivot on which to swing our entire plan of action’” (208). East and West Germans, however, opposed and undermined the restrictions on interzone trade. To American observers, West Germany and West Berlin “seemed increasingly vulnerable” while “the GDR's economy became increasingly immune to West German influence” (233).

Subsequently, the June 1953 uprising took US officials by surprise, as they had “overestimated the stability of the GDR” (239). Nevertheless, Ostermann emphasizes in chapter 9 that the United States had not been an “innocent bystander” (274). In the period leading up to the uprising, they “had launched a broad counteroffensive to keep the spirit of resistance alive behind the Iron Curtain, raising expectations among East Germans” that the West would support them. However, the author underlines that the westward integration of the Federal Republic was the top priority at all times, and other measures had to work without jeopardizing this goal.

Although library shelves on the Cold War are already well stocked, Ostermann succeeds in advancing our knowledge of the conflict's beginnings from an international perspective and considers communist and US activities as interrelated in his analysis. His book surprises its readers, especially when he draws on historical documents declassified in response to his Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Overall, Between Containment and Rollback is a multifaceted, well-structured, and in-depth study that offers a new and stimulating perspective on key events of the postwar period.