In The China Model, Daniel Bell champions Chinese meritocracy and lambasts “Western democracy” defined as “one person, one vote.” He recognizes that meritocracy has its flaws, but believes that it is perfectible while democracy “cannot be improved” (Chapter 3; Concluding Thoughts). However, Bell’s detailed discussions contradict his overall argument, suggesting that the “vertical” combination of “meritocracy at the top, experimentation in the middle, and democracy at the bottom” makes China fall victim to the worst of both worlds. Bell draws his inspiration from Singapore and Hong Kong, but meritocracy is already decaying there. Bell’s analysis inadvertently demonstrates the necessity of buttressing meritocracy with democracy.
Bell contrasts the “crisis of governance in Western democracies” with the “stunning economic success” in China (Chapter 1). Although Bell contends that China has avoided what he calls the “tyrannies” of American democracy, the details suggest otherwise (Chapter 2). (Bell at times retreats from the strong claim that political meritocracy “consistently leads to better consequences than electoral democracy” to the weak one that “China’s one-party political system is not about to collapse” and so he merely “argue[s] for improvements on that basis” (pp. 8–9). However, arguments about authoritarian resilience have been around for two decades).
The first “tyranny”—that of the majority—is familiar. Interestingly, although Bell applauds village elections as “democracy at the bottom” (p. 169), he laments that Chinese farmers and village officials alike are of low quality like American voters (pp. 15, 189). Second, the “tyranny of the minority” involves money politics and income inequality. Unfortunately, China does not fare any better (p. 43). In village elections, candidates need the party’s blessing and may resort to bribes or threats to win votes (p. 189). Third, the “tyranny of the voting community” points to the lack of representation for foreigners and the unborn. Remarkably, Bell observes that China not only exhibits anti-foreign “bellicose nationalism” (p. 141), but also “wreck[s] the environment for future generations” (p. 19). Fourth, the “tyranny of competing individuals” suggests that elections “exacerbate rather than alleviate social conflict” (p. 55). Although Bell claims that China is “a harmonious society,” he notes that, “China relies on force to prevent the open articulation of diverse interests” (p. 60). In short, undemocratic China is not immune to democracy’s “tyrannies.”
China is double hit by meritocracy’s troubles as well. The first problem of corruption, which is the very antithesis of meritocracy, has become so structurally entrenched that it presents “a mortal threat to the political system” (p. 108). The second problem of ossification is “just as threatening to the system” (p. 135). Although civil service examinations are “theoretically open to all,” they disadvantage poor families that cannot afford extra tutors and classes (pp. 85, 131). Meritocracy depends on a high degree of economic equality (p. 132), but the growing “tyranny of the minority” has effectively rendered meritocracy a code word for “elite arrogance” (p.126).
The third problem of legitimacy—based on meritocracy, nationalism, and performance—is likewise mixed. Meritocracy has its own problems of corruption and ossification. Nationalism incurs the “tyranny of the voting community.” Bell puts his bet on performance legitimacy but wonders if that is sustainable (p. 145). Although Chinese leaders are not subject to electoral cycles and should be able to make long-term planning, they have used “short-term economic growth” to measure “‘successful’ performance, regardless of the social costs” (p. 95). While economic growth is “an essential condition for the reduction of poverty” (p. 93), its “unqualified pursuit” has deepened inequality (p. 94). Bell also reckons that Chinese leaders have the “ability to anticipate and respond to natural and social disasters” (p. 53), but they have covered up disasters like the Wenzhou train crash(pp. 145–6). Bell nevertheless praises the party’s leadership for avoiding the financial crisis of 2007–08 (p. 172). However, economists argue that the investment-driven stimulus package only provided a short-term boost to GDP growth but created unsustainable levels of debt that have since haunted the long-term health of the economy. Beijing’s mishandling of the stock market crash in the summer of 2015 has also left global investors doubting the competence of the Chinese leadership.
Despite such staggering problems, Bell still has confidence in the “China model” because meritocracy is perfectible while democracy is not. Nevertheless, Bell’s detailed analysis shows that the critical link of “experimentation in the middle” is blocked. Self-correction requires that successful local experiments are “replicated and scaled up to other parts of the country” (pp. 190–3) while failed experiments are dropped. Unfortunately, top-level decisions are more guided by “an intensely politicized process driven by competing interests, ideological frictions, personal rivalries, tactical opportunism or ad hoc compromises” (p. 190). Even successful experiments “can be relabeled as failures and discontinued with a change of central government leadership” (p. 192). Experiments that meritocratize the selection and promotion of officials face particularly “acute” obstacles from current leaders with “vested interest” in the status quo (p. 193). The “most glaring gap” between the ideal and the reality of meritocracy is “the political dominance of princelings” (p. 193). Regardless, Bell remains faithful, reasoning that meritocratic arrangements were introduced only in the 1990s and so it is only a matter of time before it reaches perfection.
What has the passage of time accomplished for meritocracy in Singapore, the prototype of the China model?Singapore instituted meritocracy since its founding. In discussing the problems of meritocracy, Bell extensively draws examples from Singapore. If even Singapore could not prevent meritocracy’s flaws and self-correct them, what makes China more perfectible?
Bell should also pay more attention to Hong Kong, which provides the closest window to how “democracy at the bottom and meritocracy at the top” function on Chinese soil. Bell believes that China can develop Hong Kong-style independent social organizations and free speech to correct for meritocracy’s troubles (pp. 118, 191). Bell narrowly defines democracy as only “one person one vote,” presuming that it is separable from civil freedom. When political scientists discuss “democracy,” they mean “liberal democracy” with the entire package of freedoms including the rule of law, the independent judiciary, and the free press. Hong Kong’s model of “freedom without democracy” worked before 1997 only because Britain, the then sovereign power, was itself a democracy. Since the handover, the model has been broken (Victoria Tin-bor Hui, 2015. “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement: The Protest and Beyond.” Journal of Democracy 26(2): 111–21). “Meritocracy at the top” means that the chief executive is screened and chosen by a 1,200-member Election Committee dominated by pro-Beijing business and professional elites. The chief executive, in turn, appoints loyalists to ministerial positions and advisory boards. The result is the “tyranny of the minority” that has chipped away administrative meritocracy, police neutrality, judicial independence, academic freedom, press freedom, and even the Independent Commission Against Corruption that Bell holds dearly (p. 118). Without democracy at the top, “democracy at the bottom” is likewise subject to top-down control. Elections to District Councils are largely free but not necessarily fair. Pro-regime councilors command the majority partly because they have resources to offer heavily discounted tours and free festive goodies. If Hong Kong’s long-standing meritocratic and independent institutions have wilted under Beijing’s watch, what makes the rest of China more perfectible?
If meritocracy decays in semi-democratic Singapore and Hong Kong, meritocracy functions reasonably well in Western democracies. Indeed, Bell praises Britain’s civil service and House of Lords, France’s Ecole Nationale d’Administration, and America’s Supreme Court and Federal Reserves (pp. 27, 127, 161). Bell’s sharp dichotomy between Chinese meritocracy and Western democracies rests with a definitional sleight of hand. He lumps together “professional civil servants and political officials” and treats “the Secretary General of the Organization Department of the Communist Party” as part of the political leadership in analyzing Chinese meritocracy (pp. 170, 186), but excludes meritocratic “judicial and administrative agencies” in examining Western democracies (p. 27). Bell is correct to search for “democratic meritocracy” and conclude that Chinese meritocracy must ultimately be legitimized by the people’s consent—though he remains mistaken to think that a one-off referendum is sufficient (Chapter 4).
In sum, Bell’s “China model” is self-contradictory in theory and has failed in practice. Without full democracy, meritocracy at the top is corrupted, democracy at the bottom is stifled, and experimentation in the middle is blocked.
