Jacques Derrida first delivered his two-part seminar on the death penalty, which was originally given under the title “Perjury and Pardon,” from 1999-2001 at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris, France. The Death Penalty, Volume 1 represents the first half of this seminar series, and in their “Editorial Note,” Geoffrey Bennington, Marc Crépon, and Thomas Dutoit “invite the reader of this first volume not to finalize his ‘idea’ of the death penalty (or death penalties) according to Jacques Derrida so long as the second volume, which is different in many ways from the first, has not been published” (xiv). Although we should not expect that Derrida will “finalize” anything about his thoughts on the death penalty, these words of caution are useful insofar as they temper any expectation readers might have of finding in Derrida’s writing anything that resembles a definitive statement on a question so philosophically complex and historically and ideologically over-burdened as the death penalty. It is hardly a secret that Derrida’s rhetorical and epistemological style is not for everyone. In other words, readers expecting a polished philosophical analysis of the question of the death penalty, one that develops linearly and logically through a set of propositions and proofs will be disappointed insofar as Derrida readily exploits the intellectual freedom and playfulness that a seminar-style investigation permits and even (out of pedagogical necessity) demands. This is a virtue of Derrida’s methodology and style and should not be dismissed as a philosophical vice. In attending to the question of the death penalty and in full recognition of its multi-faceted exigencies, Derrida accompanies his students (and now his English-speaking readership) on a wide-ranging intellectual journey through the life and/or writings of Jesus Christ, Socrates, Locke, Rousseau, Hugo, Robespierre, Kant, Marx, Nietzsche, Genet, Blanchot, Lacan, and Camus, all the while contextualizing the discussion historically and politically alongside such events and movements as the invention of the guillotine, the French Revolution, the 1977 de jure abolition of the death penalty in France, and the 1972-1976 de facto suspension of the death penalty in the U.S. Derrida’s philosophical erudition and archival curiousity is on full display in these seminars, ensuring that his reflections on and critiques of the question of the death penalty and the continuing struggle for its abolition is a stimulating intellectual experience.
Derrida’s working hypothesis is that the theologico-political discourse of democratic modernity is irrevocably predicated (however implicitly) on the state’s exceptional right to the death penalty. The death penalty, in other words, operates in the service of the political community of democratic modernity precisely as an exception, as the sovereign state of exception, which retroactively confirms the state’s sovereign legitimacy. Sovereignty is predicated on the state’s right to condemn its citizenry to death for crimes that it deems to violate the safety and security that compromise the integrity and cohesiveness of the political community. Derrida’s contribution to a theologico-political critique of the death penalty derives from this conception of sovereignty, and in the opening sessions of this seminar Derrida traces the genealogy of this integral relation between the death penalty and the theologico-political discourse of sovereignty back to the Enlightenment-era conviction (Derrida cites Kant and Charles Baudelaire as its most notable proponents) that the persons condemned to death by the state not only retain their rights as citizens but, in the spectacle of their execution, vouchsafe for the polity’s commitment to humanist principles of rationality and order: “access to the death penalty is an access to the dignity of human reason, and to the dignity of a man who, unlike beasts, is a subject of the law who raises himself above natural life. That is why, in this logic, in the logos of this syllogos, the death penalty marks the access to what is proper to man and to the dignity of reason or of human logos and nomos” (8). The biopolitical consequences of the Age of Enlightenment, punctuated so spectacularly by the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution, is that to believe in the transcendent qualities of human reason, that is to say, in Kantian parlance, in the noumenal dimension of the categorical imperative, is to freely forfeit one’s ownmost right to death to the juridical and political prerogative of the state.
Derrida reminds us that it was Charles Baudelaire who in 1865 took Victor Hugo’s impassioned advocacy for the abolition of the death penalty to task on precisely these grounds, namely that for Hugo to argue in opposition to the death penalty solely because it violates the absolute principle of our right to life is tantamount to grounding our humanity, our capacity for reason, and our desire for freedom exclusively in the biological and animalistic common denominator of our shared human existence. What it means to be enlightened in the Age of Enlightenment, in other words, is to freely and rationally accept the convergence of the right to life with the juridico-political right to death. Submitting to law and order is the apotheosis of enlightened civility, so Baudelaire’s line of argumentation goes, and thus logically entails endorsement of the death penalty. Derrida’s purpose in tracing the discourse of the death penalty to the political and philosophical history of sovereignty is to demonstrate that any project seeking to abolish the death penalty cannot afford to ignore just how ingrained the death penalty is in the cultural and spiritual fabric of modernity.
The Death Penalty, Volume 1 is divided into 11 “sessions”. Sessions 1-4 excavate how and to what degree the death penalty is constitutively intertwined with the philosophical, literary, political, and theological institutions and discourses of modernity. In sessions 5-11, Derrida turns his attention to various strands of the abolitionist movement and its over-reliance on challenging the cruelty of the death penalty. Given how integral the death penalty is to the ongoing historical project of modernity, it is not surprising, Derrida points out, that so much of the abolitionist movement has been devoted to eradicating the cruelty of the death penalty rather than the death penalty as such. Although sentimentalist and moralizing appeals to the cruelty of the death penalty have indeed resulted in its abolition in many Western states (notwithstanding the U.S.), such appeals do almost nothing in the context of the constitutive right of sovereignty to the death penalty, sovereignty’s right of condemning an enemy and a citizen to death within the limits of law and reason.
For instance, one of the failures of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to place a moratorium on the death penalty was that this decision was based on the grounds that the practice of the death penalty in 1972 amounted to “unusual and cruel punishments” (79). This decision paved the way for the implementation of lethal injection as a ‘humane’ technique of capital punishment, thereby resurrecting the death penalty in the context of what Derrida strategically describes as the Christian democratic U.S. Without targeting the death penalty as such, and by expending so much of its energy on mitigating the cruelty of capital punishment, the abolitionist movement inadvertently ensures the long-term survival of the practice that it otherwise seeks to eradicate. Undertaking a successful philosophical critique of the death penalty in the service of its universal abolition, which is Derrida’s avowed purpose in these seminars, must therefore be predicated on demonstrating that the death penalty is intrinsically and absolutely contrary to the right to life. These seminars represent Derrida’s struggle (and it is a struggle) to overcome the political, cultural, historical, and indeed ideological obstacles standing in the way of the successful philosophical performance of this demonstration.
Finally, while readers will justifiably take issue with some of Derrida’s local arguments (e.g., accusing Blanchot of complicity in support of the death penalty in his essay “Literature and the Right to Death”), there is no doubt that our conception of the death penalty and the controversial role that it continues to play in determining our collective political, cultural, and historical futures is enriched and expanded by reading these seminars.
