In God, the Good, and the Spiritual Turn in Epistemology, Roberto Di Ceglie argues that faith ought to play a role in belief formation and retention.
In Part I of the book, Di Ceglie argues what he calls mere epistemology (ME), a position which was common in the modern era, with John Locke being the exemplar, and which is characteristic of the epistemology of many Christian philosophers today. Mere epistemology claims that ‘one should always prefer beliefs supported by more evidence to beliefs supported by less evidence’ (italics in original) (2). For ME, faith is mere propositional assent, where assent comes in degrees and ought to be proportioned to the evidence. Thus, arational factors such as commitments ought not influence beliefs, and as such, beliefs are rational if and only if, and to the degree that, the evidence supports those belief (58). He contrasts ME with the views of John Henry Newman, Thomas Reid, and Alvin Plantinga.
In Part II, Di Ceglie considers Thomas Aquinas’ position on the relationship between faith and reason, a position that is incompatible with ME, and which he uses to advocate for what he calls the spiritual turn in epistemology. He also considers the nature and purpose of debates, reframing debates from a way to pursue truth to a way to pursue the good (which includes truth).
According to Di Ceglie, ‘ME is arguably aimed at achieving agreement among debaters’ (2). If the participants to a debate follow the precepts of ME, then they should eventually arrive at an agreement. Yet, debates generally, and religious debates in particular, are often inconclusive. This implies that the participants do not operate solely on the basis of an impartial analysis of the evidence. Rather, according to Di Ceglie, their continued disagreement is due to their respective arational commitments.
In contrast to ME, Di Ceglie argues in Part III for the spiritual turn in epistemology; that one ought to be committed to the good as they sort through the evidence (118). His position takes inspiration from thinkers like Alvin Plantinga, John Henry Newman, Thomas Reid, and especially Thomas Aquinas. The commitment to the good should not be made after a rational investigation, as the ME proponent requires. Rather, it ought to come first. As such, Di Ceglie’s account not only explains why believers in a debate do not yield their position given contrary evidence, it justifies it.
For the Christian, the commitment is to God (who is the good) and to Christian doctrines. This commitment comes through faith, which is granted by God through his grace. Thus, faith is more than propositional assent. Given these arational commitments, one’s confidence in Christianity can appropriately exceed what is justified by the evidence. In fact, according to Di Ceglie, no amount of counterevidence to Christianity should cause a believer to reject or even doubt the faith.
Di Ceglie’s book is well argued and historically informed. The chapter on Aquinas’ view of faith and reason engages in an impressive survey of various interpretations, including their problems, and offers an in-depth defence of his own interpretation.
He also provides a necessary corrective to ME. He advocates for a view that allows a person to sustain steadfastness in his religious beliefs despite an ever-changing body of evidence. For example, in his view, a believer can maintain his confidence in the reliability of the Gospels or of God’s existence even as scholarly views on the matter shift over the years.
And yet, it seems to me his position goes too far in advocating for a faith that is not responsive to the evidence. If the evidence against Christianity seemed insurmountable and tenacious even over centuries, it seems unreasonable to continue to believe in Christianity. This seems to be in line with what St. Paul suggests in I Corinthians 15 when he marshals evidence for the resurrection and claims that our faith is in vain if Christ is not raised.
Further, perhaps Di Ceglie’s position does not take seriously our fallibility as knowers. What if we believe a proposition that we think is claimed or entailed by Christian doctrine, but it actually is not? Following Di Ceglie, it seems we should retain that belief even in the face of overwhelming counterevidence. But instead, we should recognize that even if Christianity is true, we may be mistaken in how we understand it. When confronted with overwhelming evidence against a proposition, perhaps we should question whether the proposition is actually part of Christianity as properly understood.
Di Ceglie’s book provides a novel position on the relationship between faith and reason that ought to be considered seriously by anyone in philosophy of religion and epistemology.
