Franz Szabo's book on the Seven Years' War is good, old-fashioned military/diplomatic history. It focuses on the decision makers—King Frederick II, Wenzel Anton Kaunitz, the Duke de Choiseul, Field Marshal Leopold Daun, and others. Szabo discusses their plans for campaigns, the diplomatic exchanges, the initiatives, the disagreements, the frustrations, the battles, the strategies, and the hesitations. He does not discuss the impact of the war on soldiers, civilians, the landscape, public opinion, or any of those issues that concern military historians more and more. Nor does Szabo conclude with the cost of the war not only in treasure but in lives lost and property destroyed. There still is a need for this kind of history, and Szabo has filled that need for those interested in the Seven Years' War.

Szabo stresses at the beginning that his book is about the war in Europe. It does not include the colonial wars such as the French and Indian War or the war in India fought between Britain and France concurrently with this one. The main focus is on Prussia and Austria, which Szabo regards as the key players in the continental war, with France, Russia, and the British-supported army of the Duke of Brunswick brought in when necessary.

Szabo's bête noire is Frederick. Szabo blames Frederick entirely for the Seven Years' War. The long-range cause for the war was Frederick's invasion and securing of Silesia in 1740, which Szabo refers to as larceny. The short-range cause for the war was Frederick's invasion of Saxony in 1756, which Frederick “earmarked for annexation and despoilment” (38). In Szabo's view, Frederick was an all-around brute. He was contemptuous of international custom, bullied his officers, exploited civilians, chastised his soldiers whenever they did not live up to his expectations, and ridiculed any who disagreed with him. Even his pretenses to Enlightenment seemed a sham.

Worst of all in Szabo's mind, Frederick was unwilling to accept the blame for his own failings. When Frederick prepared a strategy or campaign, he was full of arrogance and overconfidence. When Frederick suffered a setback, he would first of all find someone else to condemn for the misfortune. Then he wallowed in self-pity, talked of ending his life, and wrote poetry lamenting the evils that seemed out to get him. At the same time, he would cast scorn on his enemies, particularly Daun, his primary antagonist. After his victory at Hochkirch, Daun received a papal blessing, and Frederick referred to him as “my consecrated fat beast” (227). Despite Szabo's criticisms of Frederick, what does come through the pages of his book is that, of all the commanders in the Seven Years' War, Frederick was clearly the best. He was bold, aggressive, confident most of the time despite his fits of despair, and focused on what he had to do to achieve that victory that would end the war to his advantage. The book also hints that, despite the king's outbursts, his officers and men respected his skill and believed in his talent. The commanders who opposed him, including Daun, were far more cautious. On more than one occasion, the Allies seemed poised to conduct that decisive campaign that would bring Prussia to its knees only to back off for various reasons. Szabo notes that these commanders were answerable to higher authorities and hence could not take the risks that Frederick could, but throughout the book the people back in the capitals such as Maria Theresia, Tsarina Elizabeth, and Kaunitz pressed their generals to take risks now and then, which these officers were reluctant to do. One reason they did not pursue these opportunities was their fear of Frederick. They seemed deeply concerned the king would spring something on them when they did not expect it.

For archival sources, Szabo relies primarily on the Austrian collections in Vienna, particularly those in the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv. There are no references to Vienna's Kriegsarchiv, which may have provided significant information. The only other archive in the bibliography is one in Brno in the Czech Republic. For Szabo's scholarly approach, archival research is probably not as important because so many primary sources have been published in regard to the Seven Years' War. Still, one wonders if papers in other archives might have yielded material for other interpretations or approaches.