Theologian Jean Porter is not new to major contemporary discussions central to natural law theory. Her earlier book, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics (Eerdmans, 1999) set the propaedeutic stage for this book, where Porter brings about a sterling analysis of ethical naturalism in both a philosophical and a theological sense. While adept at probing the philosophical foundations of traditional natural law theory, as developed by Thomas Aquinas, especially in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, nonetheless Porter is at great pains to demonstrate that a theological reading is necessary in order to complement – rather develop – the Aquinian insights on moral theory based on nature. Porter argues that the scholastic concept of natural law was one of the great achievements of medieval theology. Given this perspective, she argues that a conceptually coherent and fully articulated natural law theory is more precisely a ‘distinctively theological’ account than a philosophical analysis. While this is a debatable point to philosophers dedicated to ethical naturalism, nonetheless Porter defends her position deftly. This impressive account indicates Porter's cognizance of much major recent work in natural law theory, which is by any account burgeoning. In addition, Porter is well aware of contemporary analytic accounts of moral theory, and she renders a thoughtful analysis of John McDowell's writings. In the arena of what is called today ‘Analytical Thomism’, John Haldane also has been paying close attention to McDowell's significant recent work. Using all of these resources, Porter sets upon her goal, which is to offer a significant reformulation of natural law theory that is responsive to the challenges faced by contemporary moral theology.
In a shorter review such as this, one might best approach this book by a more or less staccato yet illustrative account of the impressive and substantive analyses and arguments discussed with much aplomb in Porter's book. Throughout, Porter places emphasis on the fact that reason is always a necessary condition for the articulation of a natural law theory; hence her title for this monograph. While this reviewer is more convinced about ethical naturalism rooted in natural kind ontology than Porter would accept, nonetheless Porter argues in some detail about what she takes to be the conceptual weakness of natural kind moral theory. Moreover, she argues persuasively about what she considers to be the limits of the so-called ‘new natural law’ theory espoused and developed by John Finnis, Germain Grisez and Robert George, among others. In addition, in her discussion of the role of reason as a necessary condition to lay bare the foundation of ethical naturalism, Porter argues that the built-in limitations endemic in Aristotelian ethical naturalism can be overcome by the exercise of the virtues. The same holds, Porter argues, for any account of Aquinas' natural law moral theory that is independent conceptually of a theological dimension. Hence, for Porter, the exercise of the virtues is necessary for a human person to attain eudaimonia, which is the overarching goal for human activity in any form of Aristotelian naturalism. Porter at times appears to lean more towards a Ciceronian position on natural law than towards a stricter adherence to an Aristotelian based theory such as one finds in Aquinas. Central to this analysis is Porter's discussion of the role of happiness in Aquinas' theory; Porter argues that happiness is not identical with ‘well-being’, which is often discussed as the end of Aquinas' treatment of moral theory.
Other areas of Porter's astute analysis that deserve mention are her consideration of twentieth-century accounts of rights theory found in the writings of Hart, Rawls and Dworkin, among others, which are met with engaging argument. The discussion of natural human rights theory is quite good, and Porter is conversant not only with the more classical aspects of this theory but especially with the recent work of Brian Tierney. Tierney's text sets the stage for an earlier account of natural rights theory than had previously been assumed by philosophers writing on these topics in the middle part of the twentieth century. Porter is equally conversant with recent work in Christian moral theology, especially the writings of theological natural law writers like Rhonheimer; in particular, Porter offers an excellent analysis of Rhonheimer's account of natural law theory as well as other twentieth-century moral theologians in the Roman Catholic tradition.
Porter argues correctly that natural law theory is in fundamental ways premodern; in this arena, she offers a very good critique and analysis of modern natural law theories, which is a topic often skirted by contemporary philosophers engaging natural law theory in a serious dialectic. In addition, Porter adeptly discusses the recent natural kind work in biology, which is propaedeutic to work in natural law moral theory. Porter's analysis of recent work in biology with Aristotle's formal cause is noteworthy. This is a necessary condition in order to make sense of a concept of human nature that is fundamental to natural law theory and conversant with the best biological work of the day. That Aquinas would agree with this methodology is, in the mind of this reviewer, not a debatable issue. Of course, this is linked conceptually with an Aristotelian analysis of formal cause, a part of Aristotle's long neglected philosophy that has recently been resurrected by philosophers like Haldane and James Ross.
The arena for future debate concerning Porter's arguments will focus on the degree to which classical Aristotelian ethical naturalism – which this reviewer argues is developed in Aquinas' theory of natural law – has the built-in limits that Porter proposes. One would suspect the role that the late Henry Veatch – picking up from the analysis of the French Dominican scholar, René Antoine Gauthier – once referred to as the ‘metaphysics of finality’ is a necessary condition for this discussion. Such a foundational basis provides for the role of human nature as well as considering the ends or purposes necessary for any developmental account of moral theory on which natural law theory rests. The issue now is not whether older criticisms like Moore's much overused ‘naturalistic fallacy’ hold ethical naturalism to the fire, but whether or not arguments like the ones proposed by Porter are sufficient to render a totally philosophical account of Aquinas on natural law theory untenable. Porter is to be congratulated for getting Aquinas' theory back into the forefront of discussions in Christian moral theology. But where the philosophers will log into here is another issue. Nonetheless, this is a book highly recommended to both philosophers and theologians interested in what one of the more sophisticated of a talented group of contemporary natural law thinkers argues in her recent interpretation of Aquinas' influential theory of ethical naturalism.
