Everything that Spinoza says in the Ethics rests ultimately upon his idea of substance, but it is not always clear what he means by the word or concept “substance.” There is a debate in the literature about whether substance is or is not the totality of nature or everything that exists.Footnote 1 Some statements he makes indicate that substance is the totality of nature; other statements he makes point to the view that substance is not. I would like to take a fresh look at his view of substance. In doing so, I will first demonstrate that although there is only one substance, it functions in two different ways. Second, I will show that each function need not conflict with the other. Each does a different job in Spinoza’s philosophy. Third, I will see what consequences each view of substance has for some other ideas in his philosophy. Finally, I will explain what the relation is between these two views.
I
I will first examine his view in the Ethics and other related writings that substance includes everything that exists. Nothing is excluded. Substance is all pervasive. In order to demonstrate this, I will explore his definitions of substance and mode and examine his different views of infinity.
Spinoza defines substance as that which is in itself and is conceived through itself and whose concept is not formed through a concept of another thing (E1Def3).Footnote 2 He defines a mode as an affection of substance which is in another and is conceived through another (E1Def5). One understanding of these definitions is that substance does not exist in anything else nor is it conceived through anything else; whereas a mode exists in substance and must be conceived through substance. In E1P15 he says that whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God. According to E1Def5 and E1P15D, modes exist only in substance and can be conceived only through substance. One way of reading these statements, but not the only way, is to say that the word “in” can be taken in a physical and spatial sense, such as “the chair is in the room.” If we use it in this way then not only is the chair in the room, the room is in the building, the building is in the city, the city is in the country, the country is in the continent, etc. We could go on until we hold that everything except the universe is in the universe, and there is nothing that is not in the universe. This would make sense if we view substance under the attribute of extension, and it would be one way of accounting for physical objects in the world. One way of reading the word “through” is to say that whatever we conceive must be conceived through something else. This means that whenever we have an idea of a particular thing, such as an idea of a chair, we can conceive it only through another idea, such as the idea of a room, which requires another idea, such as the idea of a house, which requires another idea, etc. We cannot really understand an idea of something unless we have another idea of something in which it is included. This would make sense if we view substance under the attribute of thought. Since one substance is expressed under two different attributes, and the modes under each attribute are one and the same expressed in two different ways (E2P7S), the “in” and “through” can be construed as the “in” and “through” of being included in something else. One approach to the Ethics is to start with that which is the most inclusive and work toward things that are less inclusive, such as particular things.Footnote 3 It is not that we cannot focus on a particular thing, but we cannot truly understand a particular thing unless we view it through what it is included in. A particular thing can never be separated from what it is included in. From the point of view of extension this seems obvious when we look at things in our world. They always take place in some environment.
An examination of Spinoza’s view of infinity will also be helpful in establishing the view that substance includes everything. There are two different kinds of infinity. First there is the infinity of substance, which Spinoza calls absolute infinity. Second there is the infinity of the attributes, which he calls infinity after its kind. In Part 1, Definition 6 of the Ethics he says that God or substance is absolutely infinite, and in the explication of that definition he distinguishes between absolute infinity and infinity after its kind. An attribute is not absolutely infinite but only infinite after its kind.Footnote 4 He does not discuss the infinity of the modes in the Ethics until later in Part 1, in Propositions 16, 21, 22, 23, and then in Letter 64.
In Definition 6, Spinoza says that by God he means an absolutely infinite being consisting of infinite attributes. This infinity does not involve any limitation, and this definition tells us that substance is all inclusive. Everything is contained in this infinity (KV1/2,1st Dialogue [3]). There is nothing that substance does not include.Footnote 5 It includes the attributes and all the modes. It is, as he says in E1P8S1, the absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature. By “some nature” I take Spinoza to mean its nature or the nature of substance. Preceding that scholium he demonstrates that substance is infinite, and in the scholium he uses the words “absolute affirmation” which he opposes to being finite, which he then says is in part a negation. By using the words “absolute affirmation” he is affirming the existence of everything. There is nothing left out.
The absolute infinity of substance is different from the infinity of the attributes, each of which is infinite after its kind. An attribute is infinite only insofar as it is that attribute and does not include other attributes. Infinity after its kind involves a limitation when we consider only one or more attributes but not all the attributes of substance. An attribute expresses only an essence of substance; it does not express all the essences of substance. In E1P10 Spinoza tells us that each attribute of substance must be conceived through itself, and in the scholium to that proposition he says that each attribute can be conceived without the aid of the other. Furthermore, we find out in that same scholium that one attribute cannot be produced by another, and all the attributes have always been together in substance. So if we take all the attributes together, even though each one is different and limited by the others, then we have all the attributes that are infinite after their kinds. All the attributes that are infinite after their kinds are the same as absolute infinity that is substance, since substance is the only thing that is absolutely infinite, and all the attributes taken together involve no limitation. There is nothing more to substance than all the attributes since the attributes constitute the essence of substance (E1Def4), and substance and the attributes are the same (E1P4D). Spinoza says that they are distinguished only by reason (CM1/3, 2/5).Footnote 6 In the KV Part 1, Chap. 9, he tells us that there are modes that are infinite in their kind. Their kind, though, must be different from the kind of the attributes because these modes when taken together are not the same as substance. Their kind is limited by the attribute to which they belong.Footnote 7
There are passages in his other works that agree with what he says about infinity in the Ethics. In the TdIE [76] he says that the origin of nature is a unique and infinite being, beyond which there is no being. By this statement, I take him to mean that there is no other being but substance. He also tells us that outside of God there is no object of His knowledge (CM2/7). God knows everything, and the objects of Him knowledge are not external to him. God’s knowledge is infinite and all is contained in God. In KV1/2,1st Dialogue [3], he says if we want to limit infinite nature in which everything is contained, we would have to limit it with nothing, but to limit it with nothing is not really a limitation. By saying that nothing is a limitation, Spinoza means that there is nothing negative in substance since substance contains everything, but that any other infinity or finite thing involves either some limitation or negation.
Spinoza says that what follows from the attributes of God must be infinite (E1P21), but what follows from the attributes of God cannot be absolutely infinite, which only substance is, or cannot be infinite after their kinds, which only the attributes, such as thought and extension, are. The attributes do not follow from God since all the attributes are identical with God, but the infinite modes apparently do follow from God. Spinoza talks about the infinite modes in E1P21. The infinite modes can be immediate or mediate. Motion and rest and intellect and will are the immediate infinite modes (E1P32C2).Footnote 8 All bodies and minds are included under these modes. All bodies are in motion or at rest, and all minds involve the intellect and will.Footnote 9 In E1P22 and E1P23 he talks about the attributes being further modified by a modification. These modifications are the mediate infinite modes. The mediate infinite mode under extension is the infinite totality of finite modes, or what Spinoza calls in Letter 64 “the face of the whole universe.”Footnote 10 This mode encompasses all the finite modes under that attribute. It always remains the same, but the finite modes that it includes vary in infinite ways. He says the same thing in E2P13L7S, where he talks about the whole of nature. In this scholium he tells us that the whole of nature is one infinite individual whose parts vary in infinite ways without any change in the whole individual.Footnote 11 The whole of nature remains the same while its constituent bodies vary in infinite ways. There is something similar to this mediate infinite mode under the attribute of thought, but Spinoza does not give it a name. When Spinoza says that the infinite modes follow from the attributes of God, he means that they are still included in God, though they are not as inclusive as substance or the attributes. They are less perfect or contain less reality than the attributes or substance.
What can be inferred from Spinoza’s definitions of infinity? Given the different kinds of infinity it must be the case that substance that is absolutely infinite includes the other infinities, for he says in Letter 12 that some infinites are greater than others.Footnote 12 Substance is infinite by its nature, and the infinite modes are infinite by their cause. In Letter 81 he speaks of infinity but not of an infinite number. Spinoza reserves the term “number” for finite magnitudes. When he talks about infinity, he is not talking about an infinite number. According to Letter 12, numbers, like time and measure, are modes of imagining and do not tell us anything about the nature of things. There is nothing more absolutely infinite than substance, and every other infinity is less inclusive than substance. There is no infinity outside of substance, and every kind of infinity is either substance or included in substance. The infinity of each attribute is included in substance unless we have all the attributes together, which would be the same as substance. The infinity of the immediate modes is included under each attribute, and the infinity of the mediate modes is included under each of the immediate modes. Under each of the mediate modes there is an infinity of finite modes that vary in infinite ways. There is no other infinity. The rest of the modes are finite, and a finite mode is limited by another finite mode under the same attribute.Footnote 13
So far we have established one view of substance. There is another view which states that substance does not include everything. There are two questions that motivate this view. One is, if substance is everything and substance is self-caused, then wouldn’t everything be self-caused?Footnote 14 Another is, how can substance be the cause of everything if everything besides substance is already in it? I will try to answer these questions by focusing on Spinoza’s ideas of natura naturans, natura naturata, and external causation.
One argument that Spinoza uses to show that the modes are different from substance is based on the distinction he makes between natura naturans and natura naturata. In the KV1/8 he divides the whole of nature into natura naturans and natura naturata, but in the Ethics he does not mention the whole of nature when he talks about the difference between natura naturans and natura naturata (E1P29S). He just mentions the difference between them without depicting them as being two parts of a larger whole. By natura naturans he means what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or substance and its attributes that express an infinite and eternal essence. This is the same as God who is determined by himself alone. By natura naturata Spinoza means all the modes, both infinite and finite, that follow from God’s nature.Footnote 15 These modes are determined by something other than themselves, namely, God. Natura naturans and natura naturata then are not the same thing. Natura naturans is nature acting, and natura naturata is nature acted upon. Substance has an active nature, and the modes are passive in relation to substance. To say that the modes follow from God’s nature suggests that they are not in God, natura naturans, but separate from God, though they are dependent on God. There is an independent/dependent relationship between substance and the modes. The modes depend on substance, but substance does not depend on anything except itself.
A second argument that modes are separate from substance is based on the idea of external causes. There are two kinds of causes for Spinoza. The cause of a thing must be either contained in the nature and definition of an existing thing or the cause must be outside of it (E1P8S2). In the first case we are talking about substance that is self-caused; in the second case we are talking about modes that are caused by something else. Here we are concerned with the second kind of cause. There must be a cause for each finite mode, and the cause for the finite mode must be independent of and external to that mode (E1P8S2). Everything except for substance or what is included in substance comes into being through an external cause. God is the external cause of the finite modes, and one finite mode is the external cause of another finite mode. Although each mode is in reality separate from each other and separate from substance, the modes under consideration have to belong to the same attribute, and the knowledge of the effect, such as the knowledge of a mode, must depend on the knowledge of the cause, which is another mode or substance. A finite mode cannot come into existence by itself. It cannot be self-caused. Only substance is self-caused. The existence of a mode has its origin in the power of an external cause, and what is brought about by that power owes its existence to the power of the external cause (E1P11S). The greater the cause is, the greater the power is (E1P11S).
The effects of external causes come into existence by efficient causation.Footnote 16 When Spinoza says that God is the efficient cause of all things (E1P16C1) and the first cause (E1P16C3), we can take him to mean prior in causality where there is a sequence of events. How else could we explain the coming and going of finite modes? In fact, he does say in E1P17S that God is prior in causality to all things. God is self-caused, but these modes are caused by God. If substance is the first cause and there are other causes besides substance, then the finite modes are effects of substance and other finite modes. A finite mode is caused by substance, and one finite mode causes another (E1P28). If the effect is external to the cause, then the finite modes are separate from substance.
The way in which effects follow from causes can be indicated by a sequence of events that take place in time. If we view the finite modes as coming into existence at a certain time – which we ordinarily take to be the case with finite modes, such as animate beings – then how can they be included in substance since Spinoza tells us that substance is eternal (E1P19)? What is temporal is excluded from what is eternal. One mode causes another mode in time, but substance is the first cause and does not exist in time. This means that while substance does not exist in time, what substance produces takes place in time. There is a difference between what takes place in time and what does not take place in time. If finite modes exist in time then they cannot be part of substance if substance is eternal. They must be separate from substance.Footnote 17
I can now answer the two questions that motivate the second view. Substance is not everything. Substance is self-caused and it is the cause of everything other than itself. Natura naturata, the infinite and finite modes, is not substance or the attributes but follows from the nature of substance. Substance cannot be the cause of everything it contains because it does not contain everything. It does not contain the finite modes. It is external to these modes, and one mode is external to another. Substance is the cause and the finite modes are the effect.
II
I have presented arguments for two different views of substance. I will now show that each view performs a different job in Spinoza’s philosophy, and the jobs need not be incompatible with one another. They are just different jobs. The first view of substance, whereby all the modes are included in substance, can account for the idea of eternity. It also can account for the essence and existence of substance, the attributes, the infinite modes, and for the essence of finite modes. It cannot account for the duration and existence of finite modes. The second view of substance, whereby the modes are different from or separate from substance, can account for the duration and existence of finite modes but not for their eternity and essence.
Spinoza says that God or all the attributes of God are eternal (E1P19). If substance is eternal, then according to the first view of substance all the things that are included in substance must also be eternal. By eternal he means no duration, whether duration has a beginning and end or no beginning and end (E1D8Exp). To say that something is eternal does not mean that it exists at all moments of time. Eternity does not involve successive moments of time. It does not admit of “when,” “before,” or “after” (E1P33S2, KV1/4[3], CM1/3). Eternity cannot be defined by time nor related to time (E5P23S). No temporal predicates can be applied to it. In E1P33S2 Spinoza says that all God’s decrees have been in existence from eternity, and God is not prior to his decrees or without them.Footnote 18 Some critics argue that Spinoza’s use of the term “always” implies temporality or omnitemporality.Footnote 19 But Spinoza uses “always” in the Ethics only when talking about the infinite modes (E1P21) or what follows from substance (E1P17S1), not substance or the attributes.Footnote 20 One might argue that just as Spinoza goes from the most inclusive infinity to a less inclusive infinity, he goes from eternity to sempiternity (existence at all times) to duration (having a beginning and end). But it is not clear where sempiternity, if there is such a thing in Spinoza’s works, begins or ends because in E1P21 he also says that all the things that follow from God are eternal, and in E1P21D we find that that which follows from the necessity of an attribute cannot have a determinate existence or duration.Footnote 21 Also, when talking about the infinite modes in E1P23D he links eternity with necessity and infinity. So it seems that his use of the word “eternal” when applied to substance, the attributes, and the infinite modes trumps his use of the word “always.” In TdIE [102] he says that eternal things occur simultaneously. I take this to mean that they occur together without any duration, beginning, or end. What are eternal are the essences of things since their essences involve neither existence nor duration (E1P24C). But the existence of the attributes and infinite modes must also be eternal since they are God’s decrees, which the finite modes in their durational existence follow. The mind, a finite mode, can become eternal when it conceives an eternal necessity through God’s essence (E5P23D). Since the mind is the idea of the body, this idea involves the essence of the body under a form of eternity (E5P29), and God has the idea that expresses the essence of a body under a form of eternity (E5P22). Here we are talking about the essences of the mind and body, not their existences. The first view of substance cannot explain the mind when it does not have an idea of the body under a form of eternity. In this case the mind is not eternal and must be external to substance. So the first view of substance cannot include the existence of finite modes.
Spinoza tells us that God’s essence involves existence (E1Def1). If God’s essence involves existence, then, according to the first view of substance, the essence of all the things included in God must also involve existence. Nothing can exist outside of God. The word “essence” occurs five times in the definitions of Part 1 of the Ethics, so it must be important to Spinoza. He does not attempt to define “essence,” though, until E2Def2, and there he talks about only what belongs to or pertains to the essence of a thing. He says the essence is that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived and which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing. In E2P10CS he says that the essence of human beings is constituted by certain modifications of God. God’s essence involves existence (E1Def1), but the essence of other things, such as a human being, does not involve existence (E1P24, E2A1). God cannot be nor be conceived without existence, but a human being can be conceived without existence. Since all the attributes are identical with God, their essence must involve existence.Footnote 22 I think that this also applies to the infinite modes since they are infinite, eternal, and exist necessarily (E1P21-23).Footnote 23 The essence of the finite modes, though, does not involve existence (E1P24). Experience, he says, tells us about the existence of modes, but it does not teach us the essences of things (Letter 10). In this Letter Spinoza says that we understand the essence of a thing from a definition and what can be deduced from a definition, and we understand the existence of a thing from experience, but we do not experience a thing’s essence. Essences including the essence of God, the attributes, and the infinite and finite modes must be derived independently of experience. We have, for example, definitions of body, mind, and individual things in Ethics 2, and in Ethics 3 he offers us definitions of an emotion and various emotions. The existence of finite modes, though, depends entirely on experience, and their existence cannot be included in God’s essence. So again we find that substance does not include everything.
Essences for Spinoza are eternal.Footnote 24 An essence is an eternal truth (E1P17S2). In this scholium he is talking about the essence of a human being, a finite mode. In E3P7 he says that the striving to persevere in existing is the actual essence of a thing. Is there a difference between an essence that involves a finite existence (an actual essence) and an essence that does not involve a finite existence? Some argue that a thing has two essences, an actual essence which is durational and a formal essence which is eternal, but I think that this is not the case.Footnote 25 Rather, these are two aspects of one essence. Spinoza uses formal essence in TdIE [35, 38, 41], in CM1/2, and in E1P17S2, E2P8, E2P40S2. A formal essence is the essence of a thing in the mind of God. This is eternal, since all God’s ideas are eternal. An actual essence (E3P7, E4P4D) is the essence of a thing or God’s idea expressed in a finite mode. This involves the conatus and duration. God has an idea of the essence of each thing, and when we have this idea our idea is identical with God’s idea of the essence of a thing. This is what I think Spinoza means in E5P36, where he says that the mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explained by the human mind’s essence considered under a species of eternity. When our idea is not identical with God’s idea, our idea involves existence and duration. Spinoza, in E2P11, E2P13, E5P23D&S, and E5P29, uses the words “actual existence.” By “actual existence” he is talking about the mind, a finite thing, having an idea of the body or its body. This occurs in time and can be explained by duration this is different from conceiving the body under a form of eternity that involves another idea of existence.Footnote 26 We can see then that Spinoza includes the essence and existence of everything in substance except for the actual essence or existence of finite modes.Footnote 27
The second view of substance does a different job. It accounts for the ideas of duration and existence of finite modes. According to the second view of substance, the existence of finite modes is not included in substance because substance is eternal and the finite modes are temporal. In E2D5, Spinoza defines duration as the indefinite continuation of existing. Duration applies only to the existence of finite modes, not to their essence (CM2/1). When a finite mode, such as the human mind, exists, it has duration, a beginning and end, only while the body exists (E5P21). It can be longer or shorter and composed of parts (Letter 12). Whether or not it exists depends on the laws of nature. It is according to the laws of nature that finite modes come into existence and go out of existence at a certain time. When we compare the duration of one thing with that of another, we get time. Time is simply a mode of thinking (Letter 12, CM1/4). It does not exist external to the human mind. This second view of substance can account for the existence and duration of finite modes, but it cannot account for the eternity and essence of substance, the attributes, and the infinite modes. It also cannot account for the essence of finite modes.
Spinoza uses the first view of substance to explain the words “in,” “through,” and the ideas of infinity. Once he has done this he can account for the ideas of eternity and essence. He uses the second view of substance to explain natura naturans, natura naturata and external causation. Once he has done this he can account for duration and existence.
III
What consequences do the two views of substance have for some other ideas in Spinoza’s philosophy? The consequences concern three ideas: (1) the relation between God and the human mind from God’s point of view; (2) the relation between the human mind and God from the point of view of the human mind; and (3) the ideas of good and evil from both points of view. I will deal with each of these separately.
(1) The first view of substance offers one view of the relation between God and the human mind. This view is expressed in various propositions in E2, where Spinoza talks about God being modified.Footnote 28 God is the totality that can be modified or expressed in a finite mode, such as a human mind or an idea in a human mind that is an expression of that totality. If God were just substance and the attributes (natura naturans), then it seems that we would not be able to talk about God being modified. But an idea in the human mind is identical with God’s idea of that thing when God is modified through the human mind (E2P11C). There is a difference between God constituting the essence of God’s mind and God constituting the essence of the human mind. When God constitutes the essence of God’s mind, God is considered as natura naturans. God only constitutes the essence of the human mind when God is considered as natura naturata. In that case we are still talking about God, and natura naturata is included in God.
The second view of substance offers a different view of the relation between God and the human mind. According to this view, natura naturata is distinct from natura naturans and neither is part of a larger whole as it was in KV1/8. There is no way that God can constitute the essence of the human mind as he does in the first view. When God is modified as an idea in the human mind, God is no longer God. Once God is modified, God is no longer natura naturans. We must stress the difference, as Spinoza does in E1P29S, between natura naturans and natura naturata. An idea in the human mind that belongs to natura naturata can never be identical with an idea in God’s mind. Spinoza says that the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of human beings (E2P10). The essence of a human being is separate from the essence of God. God is the efficient cause of the existence and essence of things (E1P25), and the cause is separate from the effect. We can still say that the essence of finite things is eternal, but their existence is not.
(2) A second consequence concerns the relation between the human mind and God. With the first view of substance we are concerned with the human mind being an expression of the mind of God. When the human mind has an idea, God, not insofar as he is infinite but insofar as he is finite or expressed in a particular mode, has the idea that the human mind has. Of course, God has other ideas too. In E5P36, Spinoza says that the mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself, but again not insofar as God is infinite. Here he is talking about the human mind under a species of eternity. The mind’s intellectual love of God is part of the love by which God loves himself. There is no difference in this case between human beings’ love of God and God’s love of human beings, though this is different from God’s love of himself. The love that the human mind has of God he calls intuitive knowledge and this knowledge is included in God. Because the human mind is included in God, it can have, as Spinoza says, an adequate knowledge of God (E2P47).
According to the second view of substance, the human mind is only part of the infinite intellect of God (E2P11C) but not part of God’s essence. God does not have an intellect and will, or if he did, it would be totally different from the intellect and will that belong to the human mind (E1P17S2). The infinite intellect of God is not God but an infinite modification of God. The second view of substance also makes a distinction between the mind’s intellectual love of God and the love that God has of himself. God’s love of himself is the same as substance, whereas the mind’s love of God is a mode of substance. In that case there is a difference between God’s love of himself (substance) and the mind’s love of God (a mode). Also according to the second view, the human mind cannot have an adequate idea of God because the human mind is not part of God. Adequate ideas can only occur if the human mind is a part of God, but according to this view the human mind is not. There is too great a separation between God and the human mind.
(3) The first view of substance can explain how our ideas of good and evil are modifications of God. If God is the totality of everything, then evil, if it exists, must exist in God. Adam’s decision to eat of the forbidden fruit must be contained in God. Even though Spinoza says that evil has no essence, it still has existence in the minds of human beings, and human beings are modifications of God. Spinoza says that God knows evil and sin insofar as they exist inside the human mind (CM2/7). But Spinoza also says, in Letter 19, that God is not the cause of Adam’s decision to eat of the forbidden fruit insofar as Adam’s decision is an evil one. God is the cause only of things that have essence, and evil does not express essence. Yet in Letter 23, he says that God is the cause of Nero’s intentions and actions but not of evil, since evil is a mode of our thinking. But if God is the cause of Nero’s intentions and actions, he must be the cause of Nero’s thinking it is evil, even though this thought is inadequate. It is inadequate because it does not involve essence. If God is the cause of everything, then he must be the cause of our inadequate ideas. Ideas of good and evil, which are inadequate ideas, are in God just as hurricanes and tornadoes occur in God. Bayle was right when he said that according to Spinoza God is the cause of evil,Footnote 29 but only insofar as he is modified by a modification. Since good and evil only involve existence, God is the cause of their existence, but God is not the cause of their essence, since they have no essence.
According to the second view of substance God would not be the cause of good and evil in the world because good and evil, as we said, have no essence. God also would not be the cause of the existence of good and evil in the human mind because the human mind is not part of God. From God’s point of view good and evil do not exist, but from the point of view of the human mind good and evil do exist. The occurrence of good and evil in the human mind would have to be explained by various causes other than God, such as other modes or what might be called the fortuitous run of circumstances (E2P29S).
As we have seen, there are some major differences in consequences between the first and the second views of substance. The differences depend on whether we view substance as all inclusive or substance as not all inclusive. They also depend on whether we view substance as explaining the eternity and essence of the modes or as explaining the existence and duration of the finite modes. The first view cannot explain the durational existence of the finite modes, and the second view cannot explain the eternal essence of the finite modes. In order to avoid the incompatibility of the two views, I think that we have to go back to the distinction we previously made between the formal and actual essence of a thing. The formal essence is the essence of a thing in the mind of God. This essence is eternal. The actual essence is the essence of a finite mode or God’s idea expressed in a finite mode. This involves duration. All formal essences are God’s ideas, which are included in God since God is eternal and absolutely infinite. All actual essences are not included in God since God produces things that involve duration and finitude. We need both views of substance in order to accommodate everything in Spinoza’s philosophy. Each view gives us a different explanation of how substance functions. Each view taken separately is true but is incomplete without the other.
IV
Now that we have seen the consequences of each view, we can ask what the relationship is between the two views of substance. In TdIE[100] Spinoza talks about two series of causes, one of fixed and eternal things, another of mutable particular things. These mutable things exist in time, so their existence is not an eternal truth. Their essence, though, can be explained by fixed and eternal things. Mutable particular things depend on fixed and eternal things (TdIE[101]). Essence has to do with the eternal laws of nature; existence depends on the series and order of causes (CM1/3). He tells us that it is impossible to grasp the series of mutable things because of the infinite number of external factors affecting particular things. The chain of causes of many things is hidden from us (E1P33S1).Footnote 30 But what we can grasp about particular things cannot be understood apart from their essence because their existence gives us only external characteristics, such as the various properties of a thing or how one thing affects another. The essence of particular things can come only from intrinsic characteristics, i.e., from the fixed and eternal laws that govern what things there are and how things come into existence. If the essence and existence of things are present in God eternally, and if God is all inclusive, then there are no external causes to the finite modes. This is the first meaning of substance. But if the existence of some things is not present in God eternally, and God is not all inclusive, then there are external causes. This is the second meaning of substance. According to this view God is external to a mode, and one mode is external to another.
Besides external causes, Spinoza speaks about internal causes. If God is the efficient and first cause of all things (E1P16C1&C3, E1P25), this cause he says in Letter 60 can be internal or external. By internal cause is meant the power or force of its own essence, whether it is God’s essence or the essence of a particular mode. If God is the internal cause, and God has no external cause, then everything that God causes is in God. If God is the external cause, then all the things that God causes are external to God.Footnote 31 If all the modes are included in God, then it is easy to see that God has knowledge of everything that happens because God has an idea of everything that is in him.Footnote 32 All the energy of the universe is contained in God. But if the modes are not included in God, it is harder to see how God could have knowledge or control of things occurring outside of him. This might account for how some things happen haphazardly in nature. If God, as Spinoza says, is the efficient cause of the essence and existence of things and the effects are outside of him, how can God have knowledge of what will happen in the future? And if God is the source or origin of the whole of nature, as Spinoza says in TdIE[42], does this mean that God is not the whole of nature but brings about the whole of nature?Footnote 33
How can God be the internal cause of all things which are in him? One way to answer this question is to use the idea of essences. Essences for Spinoza, as we said, are eternal. An essence is an eternal truth (E1P17S). God has an idea of his essence and everything that follows from his essence (E2P3). If God is eternal and infinite, then what follows from God must also be eternal and infinite. What follows from God? It cannot be the attributes because they are identical with God. It is the modes, but which modes? Motion and rest and intellect and will are the infinite immediate modes (E1P32C2, Letter 64). They are eternal and infinite in their kind (E1P21, KV1/9[2]). They are eternal in the sense that they do not involve duration, whether duration is definite or indefinite. They are infinite in the sense that their laws cover all bodies and minds. Then there are the infinite mediate modes. They are infinite because they include the infinity of finite modes, and they are eternal because they do not involve duration (E1P23D). The infinity of the modes is not the same as either absolute infinity or the infinity of the attributes. It is the infinity of the modes which is understood through thought or extension and which supplies the laws regarding the operations of individual minds and bodies. God’s laws are the laws of nature expressed through the attributes and the infinite modes. In fact, Spinoza says that the whole of nature is the connection of causes that operate through thought and extension (E2P7S, KV2Pref). Spinoza is here talking about essences or what are considered the laws of nature to which individual existing finite things must conform.
How can God be the external cause of all things that are outside of him? We can answer this question not by using the idea of essences but by using the idea of existence insofar as it pertains to the finite modes. These modes have duration and exist separate from God, but they depend on God. Although God is eternal and infinite, he is the cause of their coming into existence and their going out of existence.
In the TdIE[101] Spinoza says that essences are to be sought from the fixed and eternal laws of nature, and the series of existing things depends on these fixed and eternal laws. In the first case, we would include the essence of substance, the attributes, the infinite modes, and the finite modes. There are really no causes here. Causation in a temporal sense applies only to the existence of finite modes. The laws of nature are eternal, infinite, necessary, and immutable.Footnote 34 They explain how finite things happen the ways that they do. Spinoza says that in the same sense that God is self-caused, God is the cause of all things (E1P25S). If we take him seriously, as I think we must, then all things except the existence of finite modes are eternal since they are caused in the same way that God causes himself, and God is eternal. In the second case we have duration, where finite modes come in and out of existence following the laws of nature. God has the power to produce the existence of these modes. What is in substance according to the first meaning of substance are the essence and existence of the attributes, the infinite modes, and the essence of the finite modes. These are all eternal. Those things that God produces are only the existence of the finite modes. These, according to the second view of substance, are separate from God and involve duration, which has a beginning and end. God produces not essences nor the existence of the attributes and the infinite modes, but just the existence of finite modes.Footnote 35 But the cause and effect of these finite modes cannot be understood without God. The knowledge of an effect involves the knowledge of the cause (E1A4), and the effect follows necessarily from the cause (E1A3).Footnote 36 Even though in this case the cause is separate from its effect, one cannot occur without the other. God is not the remote cause of the modes because a remote cause is one which is not conjoined in any way with its effect (E1P28S, KV1/2, 2nd Dialogue [2]), but the effect is most perfect which follows directly from God, such as the infinite immediate modes, and is less perfect which follows indirectly from God, such as the infinite mediate modes. When it comes to the existence of finite modes, the effect is separate from the cause but is still conjoined with its cause.
The solution to the problem of whether modes are included or not included in substance depends on admitting both views of substance – the first view of substance whereby everything except for the existence of finite modes is infinite and eternal and included in substance; and the second view of substance whereby the existence finite modes, including the human mind and the human body, involve duration and are not included in substance. No one view can do the complete job.Footnote 37
