INTROUCTION

Islamists are often portrayed as religious zealots whose emergence, action, and motivation result from Islamist ideology.Footnote ¹ The quest to better understand Islamist groups has thus led many scholars to study Quranic verses and religious texts, along with Islamist ideologues that emerged at critical times constructing influential ideas. The presupposition was that the best understanding of Islamists would come from studying their ideology, as it directly emanated from religious texts and/or interpretations by Islamist ideologues. An emerging literature finds this interest in ideology unfounded holding that Islamist activism is a rationally calculated pursuit of individual interests, not an outcome of religious indoctrination. Scrutiny of Islamist ideology, therefore, cannot shed much light on the phenomenon as Islamists use ideology selectively, strategically, and instrumentally. This body of analysis contends that even Islamic militancy is actually based on strategic calculation, and a better understanding would come from a rational choice (RC) approach characterizing Islamists as rational actors who engage in cost-benefit analysis and strategic calculation. This article uses three case studies — the Turkish Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi — JDP), the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami — IAF), and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun — MB) — to examine the explanatory power of the RC approach on Islamism. Understanding the parameters of rationality has important theoretical and empirical significance for bringing religion into mainstream political science inquiry and for bringing scholarly work on the Islamist phenomenon into the general political science literature.

This article has two objectives. The first is to delineate, discuss, and evaluate the main arguments of the application of the RC theory by examining the major works of its pioneers.Footnote ² The article concentrates on three assumptions embedded in the RC approach: (1) ends/preferences are consistent and stable and are considered exogenous; (2) selection of the means is a rational process; and (3) individual-based analysis is the key. Second, after discussing the conceptual implications of these assumptions, the article empirically evaluates each assumption. Examination of the Turkish JDP illustrates that, contrary to the theory's expectation, ends/preferences are dynamic and endogenous. Discussion of the Jordanian IAF aims to point out that the party's non-violent stance was inherited from the Jordanian MB rather than emerging from a decision-making process during which both violence and non-violence were considered. Examination of the Egyptian MB illustrates that an individual-based analysis cannot shed light on the discrepancy of power along gender lines.

While each case could be considered an example par excellence in its own category, they share similarities with other regional cases to which the conclusions could apply. The examination of these case studies relies on sources in Arabic, Turkish, and English and uses the process-tracing method (George and Bennett Reference George and Bennett2005, 205–232). The essay argues that although the RC approach to Islamism has offered explanations for pragmatism, this application has three major drawbacks: lack of room for ideological change, extreme voluntarism between the choice of violence and non-violence, and lack of insight for intra-group gender relations. The point is not to argue that Islamists are irrational political actors, nor is it to call for a return to Islamic exceptionalism. Rather, the intent is to illustrate the point that, although Islamist political actors use strategic calculation, the RC's unique assumptions of rationality may lead to incomplete and even misleading analyses.

RELIGIOUS IDEAS VERSUS INTERESTS

The literature on Islamism contains studies that focus exclusively on Islamist ideology as the main explanatory approach (Kepel Reference Kepel and Braley1999; Ben-Dor and Pedahzur Reference Ben-Dor and Pedahzur2003; Lewis Reference Lewis1995; Esposito and Voll Reference Esposito and Voll2001; Esposito Reference Esposito1983; Delong-Bas Reference Delong-Bas2004; Jansen Reference Jansen1997). Some contend, for example, that Islam is more than a religion — that it is a “total civilization” dealing with every aspect of individual life (Ben-Dor Reference Ben-Dor1996, 244). Accordingly, Islam is inherently political, and “Islamic fundamentalism has a much more political flavor and many more political implications than other kinds of fundamentalism” (Ben-Dor Reference Ben-Dor1996, 245). Others postulate that certain features associated with democracy are “profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition” (Kedourie Reference Kedourie1994, 6) that, Islam promotes theocracy as government (Lewis Reference Lewis1993, 6) that, Islam lacks the notion of modern citizenship and therefore can attract Islamists all over the Muslim world for the same cause (Lewis Reference Lewis1996, 54) that, suicide bombings are justified in Islamic teachings (Cook Reference Cook2007), and that jihad is a basic commandment of Islam (Lewis Reference Lewis1988; Venkatraman Reference Venkatraman2007).

Those who disagree have undertaken extensive textual analysis to illustrate that Islam is intrinsically democratic. They contend that such Islamic notions as consultation (shura), consensus (ijma), and independent interpretive judgment (ijtihad) are consistent with Islamic democracy and undermine radicalism (Voll and Esposito Reference Voll and Esposito1996, 27). Still others rely largely on textual analysis of major works by political thinkers, such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Turabi, and Ibn Tawmiyya, to demonstrate the philosophical roots of Islamism (Nettler Reference Nettler1996; Bonney Reference Bonney2004; Calvert Reference Calvert2008). Regardless of their claims that Islam drives Islamism or undermines it, this literature concentrates solely on theological roots of Islamist ideology, mostly portrayed as detached from the socio-economic context.

Exclusive focus on Islamist ideology as an explanatory framework has fundamental flaws, especially the inability to illuminate cross-national differences among Islamist groups. Moreover, this approach fails to account for the ideological change that one group manifests over time, such as the process of de-radicalization. These failures occur because the ideology-based explanations largely neglect the broader socio-economic context shaping the Islamist ideology. Further, they overestimate “the historical continuity of Islamic ideas and practices and tend to explain contemporary Islamist activism as an expression of a religious essence abstracted from time, place, and social context” (Beinin Reference Beinin2005, 112). If religion directly drives Islamist ideology, why does it significantly vary across cases and over time?

In contrast to this notion of Islamic exceptionalism, a growing body of literature shifts attention from religious ideas to individual interests. Scholars seeking to discover universal, law-like generalizations about human behavior challenge the claims about the sui generis characteristics of Islam, arguing that fundamental principles of political behavior are the same across different political, economic, and social systems and that religious activity constitutes no exception. Grounded in microeconomic theory, the RC approach considers religious behavior to be a RC and argues that Islamist ideology is instrumental to this choice. Put differently, the theology is a consequence rather than the cause of Islamism (Iannaccone and Berman Reference Iannaccone and Berman2006, 110).

Microeconomic analysis and RC approach have been applied to other religions, particularly Catholicism,Footnote ³ but have only recently found their way into the study of Islamism, mainly through application to militants and suicide bombers as well as non-violent groups (Kalyvas Reference Kalyvas2000; Doran Reference Doran2002; Evans Reference Evans2005; Bond Reference Bond2004; Moghadam Reference Moghadam2003; Pape Reference Pape2003; Reference Pape2005; Mishal and Sela Reference Mishal and Sela2000; Sprinzak Reference Sprinzak2000; Wiktorowicz Reference Wiktorowicz2004a; Randall Reference Randall2005; Kydd and Walter Reference Kydd and Walter2006; Ferrero Reference Ferrero2005; Blaydes and Linzer Reference Blaydes and Linzer2008). Using terms borrowed from microeconomics, such as consumer, commodity, equilibrium, free-rider dilemma, consumption, competition, market and etc., the literature posits basically no difference between religious activity and consumption behavior. Footnote ⁴ Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman argued:

This conceptualization rejects the idea of fundamentalism as “pathology,” “anomaly,” or “dysfunction.” As Robert Pape, a pioneer of this approach, argues, even suicide bombings could be demonstrated to be rational, and the “main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works” (Pape Reference Pape2005, 61). For instance, the reason Hamas and Islamic Jihad against Israel intensified in 1994 and 1995 was because they believed that Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank accelerated due to suicide attacks (Pape Reference Pape2005, 67). The long emphasis on ideology as the driving force behind suicide bombings is therefore misplaced. As Pape puts it:

Therefore, even large-scale violence against civilians can be explained as strategic calculation (Doran Reference Doran2002; Evans Reference Evans2005; Bond Reference Bond2004; Moghadam Reference Moghadam2003; Pape Reference Pape2003; Kalyvas Reference Kalyvas2000). For Stathis Kalyvas, “The massacres are not irrational instances of random violence motivated by extremist Islamist ideology …; they can be understood instead as part of a rational strategy initiated by the Islamist rebels aiming to maximize civilian support under a particular set of constraints” (Kalyvas Reference Kalyvas2000, 243). A closer examination reveals that neither the targets nor their victims are randomly selected; rather the killing is meant to give a message to others, such as punishment or deterrence (Kalyvas Reference Kalyvas2000, 245).

The scholars are also interested in answering the motivations of individuals who participate in high-cost, risky self-sacrificing activities. According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, these groups claim that their ideology is the exclusive path to salvation: “For those who accepted the movement ideology and sought salvation, a refusal to engage in high-cost/risk activism was tantamount to violating self-interest, because it meant that they would go to Hell” (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler Reference Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler2006, 296–297).

A similar rational calculation underlies the way Islamists frame their messages. The concept of strategic framing disregards ideology as a superimposed intellectual category or a natural outcome of Islamism, and characterizes it as strategically calculated, rationally constructed, and meticulously selected instances of Islamist messages. As Wiktorowicz notes, “Jihadists and reformists operate in a competitive religious marketplace of ideas and therefore must offer religious interpretations or products that can effectively tap into audience predispositions and personal understandings about religion and its application in the modern world” (Wiktorowicz Reference Wiktorowicz2004a, 162). Wiktorowicz explains that militants use four strategies to assert the right to sacred authority: demonizing competitors, praising the intellectuals within their group, emphasizing intellectuals’ expertise, and questioning the credentials of opponents. Adding ideas to the RC approach, then, does not undermine the notion of rationality in the pursuit of individual interests, as ideas are understood as the instruments of pursued goals rather than goals being the instruments of ideas.

THE RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH TO ISLAMISM: AN ANALYTICAL EVALUATION

Application of general political science concepts and theories to Islamism provides an opportunity to bring Middle East studies within the general body of political science literature. By questioning essentialist assumptions, the application of these theories opens the door to identifying characteristics that Islamist movements share with other social movements and draws scholarly attention away from exhaustive textual analysis, which failed to illuminate the variation across cases and over time. The RC approach is an attempt to explain Islamist pragmatism and shifts in Islamist policies. Indeed, examples of Islamist pragmatism diverging from doctrinaire positions might include the Taliban's generation of money by trading opium, a drug unequivocally illicit according to Muslim teachings (“A Regime that Deals in Drugs, Terror and Now Vandalism” 2001). Similarly, the MB of Egypt has gradually adopted neoliberal economic policies and now prefers “a greater role for private capital and a greater degree of deregulation of the internal market than what was allowed by the Nasser regime” (Utvik Reference Utvik2006, 233). Such a shift might be at odds with Islamic values such as community, justice, egalitarianism, and profit without capital interest. It is evident that Islamist agendas, arguments, and rationale change in sudden and unexpected ways and do not always align with traditional interpretations of religious texts. Moreover, Islamists can be calculative political actors who engage in strategic thinking. However, as developed below, the rationality assumption of the RC approach goes beyond this narrow definition of strategic thinking. Three assumptions below are particularly relevant to the discussion here.Footnote ⁵

First, the RC assumption that ends/preferences (which correspond to Islamist goals) are consistent and stable and takes them as given (exogenity), not leaving much room for ideological change.Footnote ⁶ The theory, instead, focuses on the decision-making process, arguably rational, with no explanation or even discussion of the Islamist goals, assumed to be stable and ordered. What if Islamists go through a process of de-Islamization and can no longer be characterized as Islamists? Although the theory recognizes this possibility by acknowledging possible shifts in preferences, this assumption about consistent and stable preferences discourages researchers to actively consider this possibility. Moreover, the complete separation between ends and means does not allow the researcher to consider any possibility of interaction between them, through which means transform the ends. As the examination of the Turkish JDP in the next section exemplifies, what Islamist ends are in a given setting is a crucial question to answer and ideological transformation through the-ends-means-interaction is a real possibility. The omission of Islamist goals in a given setting could be also misleading, since the theory might easily dismiss Islamist claims about ideological change as “just a tactic.”

Second, the selection of the means is a rational process assumes that Islamist actors choose the means that best serve their interests. The implication is that “rationality is evaluated in terms of whether the strategy is intended to obtain an individual's primary preference,” and “as long as the actor … believes that she is seeking to optimize her top preference, the individual is acting in a rational manner” (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler Reference Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler2006, 300). Thus, through cognitive assessment, political actors choose the means that they believe will achieve their ends/preferences. The assumption that individuals engage in such a decision-making process and make such assessments lies at the center of the rationality assumption. This assumption implies that Islamists confront more or less equal options and can switch between them back and forth as conditions change. This extreme voluntarism is problematic, especially with respect to a decision to resort to violence or adopt non-violence. As the Jordanian IAF's experience suggests below, the point is not only that some Islamist groups have never resorted to violence. The more significant point is that resorting to violence has never been on the group's agenda.

Third, in line with methodological individualism, the main theoretical, empirical, and epistemological concern of the RC approach is the abstract individual. The assumption neglects the asymmetries of power along gender lines and male members’ ability to exert more influence over decision-making. An examination of the Egyptian MB below evinces that, despite Islamist organizations’ activism, women lack power within the decision-making mechanisms and these groups show particular resistance to transforming their unique understanding of gender relations.

IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE: THE CASE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY OF TURKEY

The issue of ideological transformation questions the application of the RC approach to Islamism in a number of ways. First, recent literature casts doubts on the assumption that ends/preferences are consistent and stable by introducing new evidence that Islamist goals change as a result of ideological moderation. Although a strong example of this phenomenon is the Turkish JDP, other examples of Islamist moderation abound. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham (Reference Wickham2004) demonstrated that Egypt's Wasat Party (Hizb al-Wasat) adopted democratic principles by reinterpreting Islam and became moderate even in the absence of democratization. Mona Al-Ghobashy (Reference Al-Ghobashy2005, 374) discussed the impacts of the institutional rules of authoritarian electoral politics on organization and ideological change for the MB of Egypt. On the ideological level, Al-Ghobashy argues, that the group has moved away from the interpretations of Sayyid Qutb to more moderate ones solicited by Hasan al-Banna, the founder. In a comparative study of Jordan's IAF and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Tajamma al-Yamani al-Islah), Jillian Schwedler (Reference Schwedler2006) demonstrates that both parties have changed, although in dissimilar ways: Jordan's IAF has become more moderate over time, while Yemen's Reform Party has not. Schwedler explains the variation in terms of (1) how each regime creates public political space structures, (2) different internal structure and decision-making practices of each party, and (3) the justification of new practices in terms of each party's central ideological commitments. The evidence for ideological change is by no means limited to non-violent groups, as several militant groups have undergone de-radicalization and renounced violence. Examples include the Egyptian Jihad (Al-Jihad), the Islamic Group (Jama'at al-Islamiyya), and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group-GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé) (Ashour Reference Ashour2009).

A second implication of the RC approach's neglect of ideological change is the possibility of mischaracterizing these groups by calling their claims about moderation “tactical.” Because of the theory's focus on the means, tactics, calculation, etc., Islamist goals are excluded from analyses since they are assumed to be stable. However, what an Islamist group attempts to achieve in a given setting is not only a complicated question begging to be answered, but also it has significant policy implications. For example, fear that the MB seeks to install an Islamist regime was the Hosni Mubarak's regime's justification for brutal repression of the group and refusal to issue the Brothers a legal status. The same fear applies to Israel in its non-recognition of the Hamas government. Many Western countries’ resistance to end patronage with authoritarian rulers of the Middle East are driven from the fear that Islamists, if in power, would overthrow the existing regimes and entirely reshape the political character of the region. This point also suggests that the specific features of Islamist ideology remain relevant contrary to the theory's expectations.

Third, an application of the RC approach would also obscure ideological transformation possibly caused by the interaction between ends and means thus suggesting that goals could be endogenous, instead of exogenous as suggested by the RC approach. The case of the Turkish JDP is illustrative in demonstrating the difficulty to complete separate ends and means and the possibility of such interaction. The case of the Turkish JDP is crucial because the party represents more than an ideological change from a more radical position to a moderate one. In other words, it is a case of de-Islamization, during which a party claims to have become non-Islamist (Hale and Özbudun Reference Hale and Özbudun2009; İnsel Reference Insel2003; Çavdar Reference Çavdar2006; Tugal Reference Tugal2009; Uzgel and Duru Reference Uzgel and Duru2009). This case is also significant because the party has won two consecutive elections (2002 and 2007), which presents a unique opportunity to consider both its record and its rhetoric. How has the moderation of the Turkish case taken place?

To discern the extent to which the JDP broke with the past, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the traditional Islamist movement. The Turkish Islamist movement, often referred to as the Millî Görüş (The National View), has traditionally had several characteristics.Footnote ⁷ First, the movement is now represented by a number of political parties whose popularity initially was limited. Before the JDP was formed in 2001, four previously established parties had been closed down as posing threats to the established secular order. These parties were the National Order Party (NOP — Millî Nizâm Partisi (1970–1971), National Salvation Party (NSP — Millî Selâmet Partisi (1973–1981)), the Welfare Party (WP-Refah Partisi (1983–1998)), and the Virtue Party (VP — Fazilet Partisi (1997–2001)).Footnote ⁸ Second, the Millî Görüş has displayed a strong anti-Western stance. An early manifestation of this position was articulated by Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the first three parties, regarding the prospect of establishing a customs union between Turkey and the European Community in the early 1970s. Erbakan strongly opposed the negotiations, calling the community a “Catholic Union” (Erbakan Reference Erbakan1971, 58), and a “Zionist plan to divide Muslims take over the world” (Erbakan Reference Erbakan1971, 64), and suggested that Turkey should form a union with the Muslim countries instead (Erbakan Reference Erbakan1971, 80–83; “Millî Selâmet Partisi” 1973). Anti-Western rhetoric further appeared in the WP's program, the Adil Düzen (Just Order), which was openly anti-capitalist, anti-European Union, and anti-NATO (Erbakan Reference Erbakan1991a). The Just Order became known for its strong anti-capitalist stance, claiming capitalism was the source of hunger, poverty, unemployment, exploitation, and underdevelopment. This WB program insisted that Turkey should adopt an economic program with a strong role for the state and cooperate with other Muslim-dominated nations to form a common defense and a customs union operating with no interest rate (Erbakan Reference Erbakan1991b).

The JDP was established in 2001 against this historical background, with its founding leaders being active participants of the Turkish Islamist movement. Despite this legacy, however, the new party fundamentally differs from its predecessors. The JDP openly and unequivocally distanced itself from Islamist goals of implementing Islamic law and repeated its adherence to democracy and the principle of secularism.Footnote ⁹ Moving away from the earlier anti-capitalist and anti-Western stance, the party has become the cheerleader for neoliberal economic policies and Turkey's prospective European Union membership. “We have changed!” declared Abdullah Gül, a leader of the new party and the current President, adding that “this transformation is based on realist evaluations of current political conditions and self-criticism” (Hürriyet 2001c). The new party criticized attempts to “exploit Islam for political purposes” and identified its ideology as “conservative democracy,” which is not interested in “mixing religion and politics” as religion should be restricted to private life (Hürriyet 2001b). Avoiding the fate of the previous parties was a priority for the JDP's strategic thinking. The party adopted a non-confrontational tone; it did not field a headscarf-wearing woman for the parliament; it paid respect often and repeatedly to the legacy of Ataturk and the military; and it repeatedly praised the secular system. When asked about the nature of this change, Tayyip Erdoğan, the chairman and current prime minister, said previous parties had taken confrontational positions under the conditions of extreme polarization created by the Cold War. The current circumstances, Erdoğan argued, required a different line of politics, a change he considers a virtue. Erdoğan had previously argued that Islam and secularism are incompatible (Hürriyet 2001a).

The JDP is thus an example of political learning triggered by a specific political and economic system set up by the Turkish state from the beginning of the republic. The JDP had to operate under the rules of a strictly defined state system backed by the military and the judiciary and function in a largely secular society. The anti-Islamist measures taken in 1997 came to be known as the February 28 era, during which the military intervened in politics through the National Security Council. These measures further strengthened the power of the state institutions and left little to no room for challengers of the status quo. That the JDP's ideology, conservative democracy, radically departed from ideologies of its predecessors and combined capitalism, secularism and Westernization was an acknowledgement of this reality. This is an example of changing goals, which are no longer exogenous.

The JDP's actual transformation has not been as clear-cut as claimed by the party rhetoric, nor has its claims about change prevented confrontations with the secular establishment, which was convinced that the JDP has a hidden agenda. Furthermore, the JDP's initial momentum for democratization has waned and the party now suffers from the common weaknesses of the political system as a whole, including clientelism, lack of tolerance for difference, and gender bias. Despite these reservations, dismissing the JDP's assertion as tactical, however, would fail to acknowledge the complexity of the new Islamist politics and distinguish its distinct characteristics from its Islamist predecessors. This failure is by no means minor because, although the specific characteristics of the Turkish system remain unique and the JDP experience is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, evidence suggests a genuine possibility of ideological moderation in other cases in the region.

THE “RATIONAL” SELECTION OF THE MEANS?: THE CASE OF THE ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT OF JORDAN

Most Middle Eastern governments treat Islamist groups as illegitimate political actors and accuse them of hiding violent and revolutionary tendencies beneath peaceful rhetoric. These groups often repeat their commitment to gradual Islamization through non-violent means, a claim existing regimes argue is only tactical. The RC approach's assumption that the selection of the means is a rational process seems to be in support of this skepticism by suggesting that the adoption of non-violence by an Islamist group is only tactical and could be easily replaced by violence if the conditions change. This clearly goes against many Islamist groups’ claims that they are fully committed to non-violence.

The below analysis of the Jordanian case of the IAF suggests that non-violent Islamist groups do not consider violent and non-violent options to be equal, as for many non-violent groups resorting to violence is not even an option. When the IAF, the political arm of the Jordanian MB and Jordan's largest and best organized political party, was licensed in 1992, it inherited the Jordanian MB's historically non-confrontational relationships with the Hashemite Kingdom.Footnote ¹⁰ Non-confrontation has been the norm despite a number of crises, such as the 1997 electoral boycott and the 2007 crisis with the regime. The IAF boycotted the parliamentary elections in 1997 to protest the electoral law, which the party argued provided preferential treatment to tribal forces while marginalizing the opposition. The 2007 crisis emerged when the IAF suffered a major defeat in parliamentary elections. Despite the increased tension with the regime, the IAF, like the Jordanian MB, is committed to remaining within the political boundaries drawn by the Kingdom.

The political liberalization of Jordan, initiated by King Hussein in 1989, was strictly controlled by the Hashemite regime. The Kingdom tried to ensure that the electoral results did not produce “unwanted” outcomes, such as a possible victory by Islamists. The Kingdom passed laws such as the one person, one vote law of 1992 and other restrictions on the opposition in general and the Jordanian MB in particular.Footnote ¹¹ “Various pieces of legislation were passed that many analysts and observers considered as restrictions on civil and public freedoms and a retreat from the trend towards democratization in the country” (Rumman Reference Rumman and Abu2007, 23). Consequently, the liberalization proved to be quite short. When tensions increased between the Kingdom and the opposition parties, King Hussein dissolved the parliament and called for new elections at a later date (Rumman Reference Rumman2006). In 1997, the IAF joined other opposition parties in demanding a change in the electoral law. It threatened a boycott if the law was not amended, and the elections were held without the IAF.

Early crises between the IAF and the regime had significant implications for the party. First, the party realized that staying out of the parliamentary system meant it had no chance of affecting legislation. Second, the IAF realized that its relations with the regime would not be as smooth as the past relationship between the Jordanian MB and the Hashemite rule under King Hussein.

The tension with the regime increased after King Abdullah came to power in 1999, and the regime began to routinely detain the members of the MB and the IAF. The 2007 elections took place within this context and resulted in a major defeat for the party, which won only 6 out of 110 seats.Footnote ¹² The regime's efforts to limit the IAF's power and its electoral violations undoubtedly contributed to the electoral defeat of the IAF, which was meticulously documented and condemned by the party.Footnote ¹³ In its report, the IAF identified three phases of violations — those prior to the elections, such as the preparation of the ballots; those occurring on the election day; and those occurring during the screening and announcement of the election results. More importantly, however, the electoral defeat exposed internal tensions between radicals, or hawks (suqoor), who tend to be of Palestinian origin, and pragmatics, or doves (hamaim). Despite the internal divisions within the Brotherhood in general, and the IAF in particular, disagreements arise over taking a tougher stance on specific issues rather than on the question of resorting to violence against the Hashemite Kingdom. Like the Jordanian MB, the IAF has never considered the use of violence as legitimate and has been proud of embracing peaceful means. The party has repeatedly, openly, and unequivocally condemned terrorism.Footnote ¹⁴ In the party document, “Vision,” posted on the party's website, the IAF lays out a detailed discussion on non-violence and its commitment to it, calling terrorism “an illegitimate use of force” (Islamic Action Front Homepage n.d.). This was also made clear when, in the midst of the party's 2006 confrontation with the regime, the IAF and the Jordanian MB issued a joint statement that unequivocally rejected extremism and terrorism, and embraced moderation while denouncing foreign intervention (Brown Reference Brown2006, 19). Thus, despite the internal tensions within the party, the question has not been whether to resort to violence against the regime. This remained the case even after pro-Hamas Hammam Said was elected as the leader of the Jordanian MB. “Once elected, Said toned down the abrasive rhetoric, emphasized domestic issues, and reached out to the Jordanian government” (Hamid Reference Hamid2010). In essence, the ideological fault lines within the party fall along three issues: (1) gradualism vs. imposed change, or whether political participation is a means to overthrow the system or the IAF should try to be part of the political system; (2) the role of Islam, that is, whether Islamic law should be immediately or gradually adopted; and (3) the Palestinian question, or whether to normalize relations with Israel or give full support to the Palestinian cause (Brown Reference Brown2006, 8).

The commitment to non-violence by mainstream Islamist movements is not unconditional. When it comes to the issue of occupation, Islamists tend to make exceptions. Islamist organizations believe that violence against the occupying power in places like Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon constitutes legitimate resistance rather than terrorism. The IAF also distinguishes between legitimate use of violence and terrorism. The party argues that violence is “legitimate when used against occupation, colonialism, and … unjust use of force,” while terrorism is illegitimate as it “spreads horror among people, it puts innocent people at risk, and it is an unlawful means to an end … and … completely differs from an armed struggle within the framework of legitimate resistance” (Islamic Action Front Homepage n.d.). The latter, the IAF adds, is in line with both international and Islamic law (Al-Shari'a Al-Islamiyya). Thus, while the movement itself has never resorted to violence and has been proud of embracing peaceful means, it has lent support to Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Iraqi insurgency (Hamzawi and Bishara Reference Hamzawi and Bishara2006). In response to Hezbollah cells discovered in Egypt in 2009, for instance, Zaki Bani-Irshayd, then Secretary General of the party, stated that what Hezbollah did was in fact a “legitimate duty for the Arab nation necessary for the Islamic resistance in Gaza Strip” (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 2009). Regardless whether this position is justified or not, the distinction is widely shared in the region and by no means unique to Islamists.

What the above discussion on the Jordanian case should highlight, then, is the Jordanian MB's long-enjoyed patronage with the Hashemite Kingdom, which strategically supported the movement vis-à-vis the leftist and nationalist groups for decades. In response, the Brotherhood has remained loyal to the regime and adopted a non-confrontationist policy — in contrast to its counterpart in Egypt, which drove confrontation with the Nasser's regime. Non-violence has become the Brotherhood's identity, a legacy later inherited by the IAF.

LIMITATION OF INDIVIDUAL-BASED ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD OF EGYPT

The question of gender receives no attention in the RC literature, which considers social norms, such as discrepancy of power, exogenous to the model and assumes a rational individual to be egoistical and purposive, never acting “on principle but only on the basis of an assessment of the consequences of a line of action for the problem of maximizing the chances of achieving the effect he seeks” (Denzin Reference Denzin1990, 174).Footnote ¹⁵ As a result, actors know “how an end affects other plans, or set of ends, know the different chains of means that are available at any given moment, and know how these means affect other means and other goals” (Denzin Reference Denzin1990, 174). Detached from the social context and any type of power relations, this individual-level analysis faces challenges in explaining common phenomena among organizations, which include (1) the disparity of power along gender lines within the organization; (2) the internal struggle and tension between men and women, and (3) resistance to change and compromise regarding gender roles. Each of these points is discussed below for the Egyptian MB, the oldest and the most influential Islamist organization, and its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Although The MB was established back in 1928, it operated as an illegal, albeit tolerated, group from 1954 until 2011. In the aftermath of the January 25 uprising, the group was finally allowed to form a political party in March 2011. The first parliamentary in the post-Mubarak era is dominated by the FJP parliamentarians.

Disparity of Power

The 2005 program of the Egyptian MB asserts equality between men and women and proclaims the group's respect for women and its commitment to women's rights:

The program guarantees rights to women's electoral participation and to membership in the legislative councils while emphasizing that motherhood and familial duties should be women's primary responsibilities. Thus, equality of women and men does not mean “sameness.” Women and men are considered “complementary” to each other, but it is “the husband who is qualified for that leadership. This role is not one of repression, hegemony, or tyranny but one of kindness, love, and gentleness” (The Muslim Brotherhood Homepage 2006). The same idea was also adopted by the FJP. The party program ensures “women's access to all their rights, consistent with the values of Islamic law, maintaining the balance between their duties and rights” (Freedom and Justice Party Election Program 2011).

Women activists in the Brotherhood have always engaged in grassroots activism targeting other women. A separate organization for women, Muslim Sisters, was established in 1932 and has played a crucial role in recruiting women. The Sisters were especially active during the short-lived political liberalization period prior to the 2005 Presidential and parliamentary elections (Çavdar Reference Çavdar2007). Since then, many women-only demonstrations, protests, and gatherings have taken place (The Muslim Brotherhood Homepage 2005; “Freedom and Justice Party Women Committee Asserts Role of Women in the Nahda Project” 2012). The Brotherhood fielded its first female candidates in the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections (Gihan El-Halafawi and Makarem El-Deiri, respectively), but neither won a seat at the time. The new electoral law made under the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, the ruling junta that seized power in the post-Mubarak era, required political parties to put one woman nominee on every party list. The FJP nominated more female candidates than any other party. Four out of nine female parliamentarians in the new parliament are from the FJP (out of 498 total seats).Footnote ¹⁶

Despite women's grassroots activism, their role within the organization remains marginal. The Sisters, directly tied to the Supreme Guide, are not represented in either of the decision-making bodies, the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) and the Guidance Bureau (Maktab Al-Irshad). A further retreat came in 2007, when the MB published the first draft of its party program (The Muslim Brotherhood Homepage 2007). The document contained a broad description of the Brotherhood's political, economic, and social vision, which was criticized on many grounds but particularly for its section on women's rights. The program adopted the view that women (and non-Muslims) are not eligible to hold the highest political office, the Presidency, arguing that this would go against the principles of Islamic law. The 2011 election program remains equally vague on this issue as it acknowledged women's rights in accordance with the Islamic law, which is subject to interpretation. Thus, the Sisters’ grassroots activism has not translated into greater roles in the decision-making processes; rather their power is contained through separate and auxiliary organizations called women's branches.

The justification for women's marginal role is often based on references to Islamic law, culture, and tradition, which opens up a Pandora's Box of competing interpretations of the Islamic ideology. Essam Al-Erian, the MB's spokesperson, argues that nothing in Islamic law prevents women from being leaders, and agrees with Mohamed Habib, the MB Deputy Chairman, who urged the group to alter its position toward women and non-Muslims (Africa News 2006). In response, Mahmout Ezzat, Secretary General, argued that the MB does not change Islamic rulings. “Although there are disagreements,” Ezzat said, “this rule is based on consensus among scholars” (“Muslim Brotherhood did not Exclude” 2008). Asghar Ali Engineer, a reformist Indian Islamic scholar not affiliated with the MB, also disputed that women's exclusion from the leadership position is based on a hadith attributed to Prophet Mohammed. Engineer argues that Quranic verses state equality between men and women, but societies want to retain their existing values based on men's superiority: “Most of the Qur'anic verses on women are not explained in the light of other Qur'anic verses (only reliable methodology to understand real intent of the Qur'an) but in the light of ahadith which degrade women … It is unfortunate that still our Ulama are not prepared to critically evaluate these anti-women ahadith” (Engineer Reference Engineer2008).

Pressure from the Sisters

The female members of the MB have also challenged conservative interpretations of the sources of Islamic law (Qur'an, sunna and hadith) and the Sisters’ marginal status within the organization. Women activists make no secret of the pressures they exert over their respective movements' leaderships in order to expand their role and participation. Jihan Al-Halafawy, the first female candidate on the MB's electoral list in 2000, disclosed that she had spoken with the Supreme Guide of the MB on several occasions about the need to have women members in the movement's politburo (Abdel-Latif Reference Abdel-Latif2007).

The pressure and criticism coming from the Sisters are rarely public, although an open letter from a Muslim Sister to the Supreme Guide in 2007 stirred discussions and revealed the tension within the organization (Abdel-Latif Reference Abdel-Latif2008). Those women who argue for a greater role within the organization insist that defending their rights equates with defending Islam, as, they argue, Islamic principles have never subjugated women. As Mervat Hatem observes, this trend among Islamist women challenges their passive image: “While patriarchal Islamist groups have sought to impose conservative gender rules on women, Islamist and other Muslim women have not passively accepted them” (Hatem Reference Hatem2002, 44). Rather, “their reinterpretation of religious texts has created a new space for women in demanding equity” (Hatem Reference Hatem2002, 44). Similarly, Omaya Abdel-Latif argues that an important factor for the increasing criticism coming from women is “the emergence of a young generation of Islamist women activists who are critical of their marginal status and believe that the Muslim Sisters’ role has outgrown their subordinate positions in the movement (Abdel-Latif Reference Abdel-Latif2008, 1).” Abdel-Latif explains that, despite a lack of organizational mechanisms, these women get their voices heard by the Brothers because many of them are sisters, daughters, and wives of senior Brotherhood leaders.

Resistance to Change

Recently, many Islamist groups have undergone a process of moderation and de-radicalization. Indeed, some Islamist groups have adopted liberal economic policies that they once criticized; others who previously criticized elections now participate in them. However, change and moderation has not occurred across all issue areas, and “gray zones,” such as gender, remain quite ambiguous (Brown, Hamzawy, and Ottoway Reference Brown, Hamzawy and Ottoway2006).Footnote ¹⁷ Likewise, the MB has passed through a number of phases, including a spiritual one at its beginning, radicalization during the 1950s and the 1960s, and de-radicalization and inclusion into the system since the 1970s — even though the MB has officially been banned since 1964. The group is on its way to becoming a political party, a topic still subject to intra-group discussions. Despite its evolution and change over time, the leadership of the MB remains resistant to addressing women's positions even with pressure from the Sisters and other male members. Although the MB moved to field female candidates after 2000, the changes taking place still lag in other issue-areas and gender continues to be a taboo — especially for the leadership. As Valentine Moghadam once commented, this resistance is closely related to a religious justification as “it claims a religious derivation and thus establishes its legitimacy” (Moghadam Reference Moghadam2003, 5), indicating that gender inequality tends to be resistant to change.

The fault lines along gender are not unique to the MB or even Islamist organizations. What seems to be peculiar to faith-based organizations, however, is the justification for gender disparity on the grounds of religion, making it particularly resistant to compromise and change. Despite this resistance, Islamists’ understanding of gender is neither unchanging nor uncontested as many female and male members of the MB challenge conservative gender attitudes by either disputing the authenticity of oral traditions or reinterpreting religious texts.Footnote ¹⁸

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article did not intend to provide an alternative to the RC approach but aimed to illustrate the limited explanatory power of the RC-based explanations. While the above-examination of the three cases acknowledges actors’ strategic calculation in pursuing political goals (e.g., The JDP leaders’ repeated praise of Atatürk to avoid closure, female MB candidates for a more progressive party outlook) and their ability to evolve over time and adapt to varying environments, it reveals the complexity of the cases and the difficulty of reducing them to the instrumentally RCs of self-interested individuals. Rather, in each case, a distinct structural factor seems to be playing a crucial role, namely the state, historical trajectories of the Islamist groups, and patriarchy. The identification of these factors does not denote an invariant model that claims to illuminate all cases under similar conditions. The point is that, in the absence of these contextual reference points, the ahistorical notion of rationality offered in the RC approach does not account for actual Islamist phenomena, nor can it provide predictions about their future state of activism.

While the literature on Islamism has long lacked theoretical analyses, partly due to the conviction that Islamism is a unique phenomenon and therefore cannot be explained by existing theoretical frameworks, this recent splurge in literature seems to be going in the opposite direction. The methodological underpinnings of the RC approach are based on parsimonious variables, formal modeling, and theory-testing with the conviction that political science must emulate the natural sciences and produce de-contextualized, objective, scientific truth about causal laws of politics. Starting a research design with a set of assumptions about an orderly world may be tempting and unquestionably easier for researchers, let alone be a vogue within the political science discipline. This comes, however, at the expense that researchers stick to the initial assumptions and see the world through their preconceived notions with scant contribution to the understanding of the actual political phenomenon. As Ian Shapiro puts it, “If the problems posited are idiosyncratic artifacts of the researcher's theoretical priors, then they will seem tendentious, if not downright misleading, to everyone except those who are wedded to her priors” (Shapiro Reference Shapiro2002, 61). Undoubtedly, greater interaction, borrowing and learning from each other is necessary between the general political science literature and that of Islamism. In doing so, we are in dire need to contextualize, conduct empirical research that is receptive to who the other is, and remain open to a variety of methodological approaches that utilize different epistemological and ontological traditions. Clearly, this task would look “messier” than working with the RC approach's few variables. But, parsimony should not come at the expense of aptness.